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
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ARTICLE I.

THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT OF THE OLD
TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES AGAINST SLAVERY.

By George B. Cheever, D. D., New York.
[Concluded from Vol. XII. p. 770.]

Patriarchal establishments of Isaac and Jacob.

LEPSIUS has noticed the great personality of Abraham, and what he calls the *non-prominent activity of Isaac*. The contrast is indeed striking; and the only interval in which we behold, in his circumstances, the patriarchal greatness and prosperity of his father, is the period of his sojourn in the land of the Philistines, recorded in the 25th chapter of Genesis. But Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac (25: 5); and the account given of him some twenty years after Abraham's death, is as follows: "The Lord blessed him, and the man waxed great, and went forward and grew until he became very great; for he had possession of flocks, and possession of herds, and great store of servants" (26: 12-14). Here the appellative for the greatness of his household is the Hebrew עֲבָדָיו, the verbal from עָבַד, signifying the whole body of his domestics, or of those in his employment, including, of course, the herdsmen and well-diggers. Comp

(Job 1: 3) the description of Job's very great household, עֲבָדָיו רָבָה מֵאָה. There is no intimation of slavery, nor any approximation thereto, in Isaac's family or jurisdiction.

From him the same gifts of inheritance descended with the right of the first-born to Jacob, in whose family the patriarchal dominion and opulence passed from one person to twelve, in the Constitution of the Jewish State. During the sojourn of Jacob with Laban, there is no change of manners, no introduction or appearance of any form of slavery. Jacob himself is said to have served Laban for wages; he was Laban's servant as well as his son-in-law; and it is said that "the man increased exceedingly, and had much cattle, *and maid-servants and men-servants*," וַיִּשְׁפְּרוּהוּ וַיַּעֲבְדֵימָהּ (Gen. 30: 43). These went with him, when he fled from Laban; they were his עֲבָדָיו, his patriarchal establishment, when he met Esau, and sent messengers to his brother, saying: "I have oxen and asses, flocks, and men-servants, and women-servants (Gen. 32: 5). But his two wives, and his two women-servants, and his eleven sons, are described as his immediate family, and are set apart by themselves,—the handmaidens with their children, and Leah with hers, and Joseph and Rachel (Gen. 33: 6, 7). After a favorable interview with Esau, he travels on slowly, with his flocks and herds, to Succoth and Shalem, and erects an altar.

But here at Shechem was perpetrated that murderous outrage, by the sons of Jacob, in the sacking and spoiling of that city; remembered by the Patriarch, with a solemn curse, upon his dying bed. After destroying the males of the city, "all their wealth, and all their little ones, and their wives, took they captive." There is no account of the final disposition made of these unfortunate captives; but in this infamous transaction we have the first intimation of any possibility of the possession of servants, by violence and fraud, among the descendants of Abraham.

Among the heathen nations, captivity in war was one of the most common modes by which men became slaves; but in the history of Abraham we see the patriarch refusing to sanction such a transaction by his example. When he had

conquered those heathen marauders who took Lot captive, the king of Sodom proposed that Abraham should give him *the persons*, and take the goods to himself, dividing thus the spoil between them, on grounds easy to be guessed at from our knowledge of the morals of the Sodomites. But Abraham declared that he would enter into no bargain with him, neither for goods nor persons: from a thread to a shoe-latchet he would take nothing. Aner, Eshcol, and Mamre the Amorite, might make what terms they pleased, but he himself would take nothing.

Jacob's abhorrence of the conduct of his sons is marked: he denounced the whole wickedness of the murder and captivity of the Shechemites, and was beyond measure distressed by it. He seems to have made it the occasion of a religious reformation, commanding his household, *and all that were with him*, to put away the strange gods that were among them, and be clean (Gen. 35: 2). Thus Jacob returned to the habitation of Isaac his father, who died in Hebron at the age of one hundred and eighty years, and his sons Esau and Jacob buried him. "And Esau took his wives and his sons and his daughters, *and all the persons of his house*, וְאֵת כָּל-נַפְשֹׁתַי בֵּיתוֹ, and all his substance which he had gotten in the land of Canaan, and went into the country from the face of his brother Jacob; for their riches were more than that they might dwell together, and the land wherein they were strangers could not bear them because of their cattle" (Gen. 36: 6, 7). Here the expression וְאֵת כָּל-נַפְשֹׁתַי בֵּיתוֹ is clearly synonymous with בְּבֵיתוֹ in the description of the households of Isaac and Job; it comprehends domestics and dependents, the *born in the house*, וְיֹלְדֵי בֵּיתוֹ, and the hired servants, and all whose time and services, in a limited or definite apprenticeship, were bought with money of the stranger.

The blessing of a birth-right conferred in itself no superior authority upon one brother over the other; but Isaac's peculiar blessing upon Jacob, on the occasion recorded in Gen. xxvii., made Esau tributary to his brother, as unexpectedly to Isaac as to himself; for the arrangement had been quite the reverse, but for Rebecca's deceit and Isaac's

blindness. "Let people serve thee, and nations bow down to thee: be lord over thy brethren, and let thy mother's sons bow down to thee" (Gen. 27: 29). There was the solemnity of a divine inspiration or compulsion in this, for Isaac felt that he could not revoke or change it; yea, and he shall be blessed, in spite of his stratagem and our disappointment. Behold, I have made him thy lord, and all his brethren have I given to him for servants (Gen. 27: 33, 37). The expression *for servants* is לַעֲבָדִים, so that an unscrupulous advocate for the divine right of slavery might much more plausibly find it here, in the blessing upon Jacob, than in the curse upon Canaan. But the nature of this domination is instantly defined, and the definition applies to both transactions. "By thy sword shalt thou live, and shalt serve thy brother; and it shall come to pass, when thou shalt have dominion, that thou shalt break his yoke from off thy neck." Here a national subjection was meant, and not a personal servitude.

Captives in War.

That the divine reprobation rested upon the custom of making slaves out of captives taken in war, is manifest from many passages. God never permitted it among the Jews themselves, when there were two kingdoms in conflict, and among other nations it is not unfrequently presented as a sin and misery, the result of a marked retributive providence.

Among heathen nations it was a custom to dispose of the captives taken in war by *casting lots* for them. This was the fate endured by some of the Jews themselves, who were thus disposed of, in some cases, for the most infamous purposes conceivable (Joel 3: 3). They have *cast lots* for my people, and have given a boy for an harlot, and sold a girl for wine, that they might drink." It was thus that the cities of Egypt were laid waste, and the inhabitants carried captive. No Amon is mentioned in Nahum, and it is stated that "they *cast lots* for her honorable men, and all her great men were bound in chains" (Nahum 3: 10). In the pro-

phesy of Obadiah, the Edomites are threatened of God for their violence against the Israelites, and for standing aloof when the heathen carried them away captive, and foreigners entered their gates, and *cast lots* upon Jerusalem (Obadiah xi). They are also accused of "standing in the crossway to cut off those that escaped," and of "delivering up those that remained," and it is declared that, as they had done to others, so should it be done unto them (Ob. 14: 15).

In the same manner, the tribes and inhabitants of Tyre and Zidon, and of the coasts of Palestine, are arraigned, and assured of God's vengeance, because they *had sold the children of Judah and the children of Jerusalem to the Grecians*, that they might be removed far from their border (Joel 3: 6). For this iniquity, God declares: "I will sell your sons and your daughters into the hand of the children of Judah, and they shall sell them to the Sabeans, to a people far off, for the Lord hath spoken it" (Joel 3: 8). As a direct testimony of God in regard to the sinfulness of such a traffic, these passages are very important. The being sold in bondage is presented as one of the most terrible judgments of God upon a guilty nation. The same judgment is threatened against the sinful Hebrews themselves (Deut. 28: 68), as the climax of all the curses pronounced against them for their sins: "Ye shall be sold unto your enemies for bondmen and bondwomen, and no man shall buy you;" ye shall be tossed to and fro for sale, as so many cattle, with the shame and the misery of being so despised and abhorred that no master will be willing to buy you.

The despotism of such a dominion, even when it was in some measure lightened, and God began to redeem them from it, is graphically set forth in the confession, prayer, and covenant of Nehemiah and the people, returning from their captivity. "Behold we are servants this day in the land thou gavest to our fathers, and it yieldeth much increase to the kings whom thou hast set over us because of our sins; also, *they have dominion over our bodies*, and over our cattle at their pleasure, and we are in great distress" (Nehemiah 9: 36, 37).

The First Instance of Man-Stealing.

There needed no law against man-stealing to assure the conscience of its being a crime; and it has been a subject of wonder that the sons of Jacob could so deliberately and remorselessly plunge themselves into such guilt. But the steps in the history are logical forerunners and sequences. Events follow upon character, and one act produces another, with a perfect moral fitness and fatality. Anything might have been expected, any development could not have been surprising, after the dreadful tragedy at Shechem. The murderous sacking of that city, and the disposal of the captives, had prepared the sons of Jacob, "moved with envy," (the former passion having been revenge), for the crime of kidnapping. They took their choice between murdering their brother and selling him, it being only the providence of God in the passing of the Ishmaelites just then, from Gilead towards Egypt, with their caravan of camels, laden with spices, and balm, and myrrh, that suggested to them the merchandise as more profitable. So they sold Joseph to the Ishmaelites, for twenty pieces of silver. And the Midianites sold him into Egypt (Gen. 37: 28, 36). The word used for this transaction is in both cases the same, *קָנָה*. And Potiphar bought him, *וַיִּקְנֵהוּ*. (39: 1). The word *bought* is from *קָנָה*, and the same is applied (Neh. 5: 8) to the purchase, for redemption, of the Jews that had been sold unto the heathen. Joseph is called by Potiphar's wife (39: 17), the Hebrew servant, *הָעֶבְרִי*. Joseph describes the transaction by which he was brought into bondage in Egypt as *man-stealing*; for indeed I was stolen away out of the land of the Hebrews, *גָּנַב גִּבְרִי*. The chief butler's description or designation of Joseph, is that of a young man, a Hebrew, servant to the captain, *יָשָׁר עֶבְרִי עָבֵד* (Gen. 41: 12).

In the course of Joseph's interview with his brethren, the word *עָבֵד* is very frequently employed, and they and Joseph use it to signify a bondman for crime. "Should we steal silver or gold? With whomsoever of thy servants it be

found, both let him die, and we also will be my lord's bondmen," לַאֲדֹנִי לַעֲבָדִים (Gen. 44: 9, 17). "And he said, He shall be my servant" עֶבֶד. "Let thy servant abide instead of the lad, a bondman to my lord," עֶבֶד לַאֲדֹנִי (Gen. 44: 33). It signifies here the most degraded slavery, but it was a slavery into which the brethren of Joseph well knew they had themselves, many years previous, most diabolically sold their own brother, for twenty pieces of silver. They were now threatened with the same bondage.

Condition of the Israelites in Egypt.

The question next arises, in the order of the history, whether any of the *great store of servants* spoken of as formerly belonging to Jacob's household, went down with him into Egypt to settle there. No mention is made of them, and only his own posterity are particularized in the census. "And Jacob rose up from Beersheba, and the sons of Israel carried Jacob their father, and their little ones, and their wives, in the wagons which Pharaoh had sent to carry him. And they took their cattle, and their goods, which they had gotten in the land of Canaan, and came into Egypt, Jacob, and all his seed with him. His sons and his sons' sons with him, his daughters and his sons' daughters, and all his seed brought he with him into Egypt" (Gen. 46: 5, 7). "All the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, which came out of his loins, besides Jacob's sons' wives, all the souls threescore and six (46: 26). The enumeration here is simply all that came out of Jacob's loins; it does not prove that none others were with them; and Joseph is said to have "nourished his father, and his brethren, and all his father's household, with bread, according to their families" (47: 12). וַיֵּאָחַז בְּלִיָּהוּ. Joseph's own enumeration to Pharaoh was: "My father, and my brethren, and their flocks, and their herds, and all that they have, are in the land of Goshen." The two years of sore famine must have greatly reduced the עֲבָדָיו, the household establishment of the patriarch, once so rich and numerous. Servants and dependants

would be dismissed, their herds and their flocks would be diminished; nevertheless, we cannot certainly conclude that no servants whatever went with them into Egypt. But there we shortly find the testimony (Ex. 1: 7) that "the children of Israel were fruitful, and increased abundantly, and multiplied, and waxed exceeding mighty, and the land was filled with them."

Though they occupied a separate province, yet manifestly at the time of Moses and the Exodus there was much commingling with the Egyptians in social life and in neighborhoods. There was visiting and sojourning between Egyptian and Hebrew families. This is clear from Ex. 12: 21—23 and Ex. 3: 21, 22: "Every woman shall borrow of her neighbor, and of her that sojourneth in her house." A degree of intimacy and familiarity is here intimated, which the oppressive edicts and cruel measures of the Pharaohs had not broken up. Up to the time of the death of Jacob and Joseph and all that generation, their condition in Egypt had been one of honor and prosperity, and their intercourse with the Egyptians was disastrously productive of increasing looseness, luxury, and idolatry in social life, and was full of evil morally, as it was of advantage financially. The system of cruelty at length adopted by the government of Egypt, did not find nor create a corresponding cruelty on the part of the Egyptian people, and their friendly communion with the Hebrews was kept up even to the last.

From Ex. 1: 11, it would seem that the avenue or pretence on which their oppressors began to afflict them, was the collection of the tribute for the king. Operating by means of officers, tax-gatherers, for the collection of the impost, they seem to have required its payment in labor, and to have increased the severity of that labor at their pleasure: "Let us deal wisely with them. Therefore they did set over them מְסִירֵי מַסִּים *captains for the tribute*, to afflict them with their burdens." Under these exactors, other officers were appointed, called afterwards מְסִירֵי *taskmasters* (Ex. 5: 10); and under them, from among the Hebrews themselves, were appointed מְסִירֵי *overseers* (Ex. 5: 14—19); in fact, slave-drivers. How

large a proportion of the people were drafted for these burdens, or how many were exempt, we have no means of knowing. It was a servile conscription; but it did not make the whole people, personally, slaves.

Nature of tributary servitude. Case of the Canaanites generally, and of the Gibeonites particularly.

In the prophetic blessing of Jacob upon his children, it is said of Issachar that "he bowed his shoulder to bear, and became a *servant unto tribute*," לָמַס עֲבָד (Gen. 49: 16). As our line of induction and of argument is historical, taking up the points of statutory law in their regular succession, we propose here to examine the nature of the tributary and personal servitude imposed by the Mosaic laws, and set in practice by Joshua, upon the Canaanitish nations. This phrase, לָמַס עֲבָד, a *servant unto tribute*, applied by Jacob to Issachar, is the generic expression descriptive of that servitude. Let us carefully trace the principle, the law, and its operation.

In Deut. 20: 11, it was enacted that, when any city of the heathen was conquered by the Hebrews, "all the people found therein *shall be tributaries unto thee and they shall serve thee*," וַיְהִי יָהּ לָמַס וַעֲבָדוּהָ. The same expression is found in Josh. 16: 10, of the conquered Canaanites serving the Ephraimites under tribute. The form is exactly that used by Jacob in reference to Issachar, וַיְהִי יָהּ לָמַס עֲבָד. In Judges 1: 28, 30, 33, 35, we have four instances of the same expression applied to the treatment of the Canaanites — by Manasseh, by Zebulon, by Naphtali, and the house of Joseph. They did not drive out nor exterminate the inhabitants, but they *became tributaries unto them*, וַיְהִי יָהּ לָמַס; in verse 28, they put the Canaanites to tribute, וַיִּשְׁמָם אֶת-הַחִיטִּינִי לָמַס. In Josh. 17: 13 the same expression, varied only in the use of the verb נָתַן, they set, or appointed, the Canaanites (לָמַס) to tribute. So in Isa. 31: 8, the young men of the conquered Assyrians *shall be for tribute*, shall serve as tributaries, לָמַס יִהְיוּ. We shall see, from comparison of 1 Kings 9: 21, 22 and 2 Chron.

8: 8, 9, precisely what this kind of tributaryship was, in personal service.

The law in regard to the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites, was this: that they should be exterminated; nothing should be saved alive "that breatheth," in any of the cities of the people whose land God had given to the Hebrews for their inheritance (Deut. 20: 15, 16, 17; also, Deut. 7: 1—4). And the reason was plain, namely, "that they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods" (20: 18. Ex. 23: 23, 33). Only to the cities of other and distant heathen nations was peace to be proclaimed; and, if accepted, then the people were to be tributaries, as above. But if not accepted, and war was preferred, then all the males were to be destroyed, and the women and the little ones preserved (Deut. 20: 12—14). See, for an example of the manner in which this law was fulfilled, Num. 31: 7—18, in the war against the Midianites. The children of Israel took the women of Midian captives, and their little ones. See also, in regard to the cities of the Canaanites, Josh. 6: 21 and 8: 26; also, 10: 32, 35, 37, 39; and 11: 11—19. And, for example of the different treatment of cities not of the Canaanites, see Josh. 9: 15, 27, the league that was made with the Gibeonites under the supposition that they were a distant people; and which was fulfilled, according to the law, as above, by which the distant nations were to be treated. The Gibeonites were made tributaries: "There shall none of you be freed from being bondmen, and hewers of wood and drawers of water for the house of my God" (Josh. 9: 23).

More than four hundred years afterwards, under the reign of David, this treaty was remembered, and a most tremendous judgment came upon the kingdom in consequence of its violation by Saul. The three-years' famine mentioned in 1 Sam. 21: 1 was declared, of God, to be for Saul and for his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites. According to the treaty made with them by Joshua, they were to be always employed in the menial service of God's house. The treaty was kept. The city of Gibeon, with most of its de-

pendencies, fell to the lot of the tribe of Benjamin for an inheritance (Josh. 18: 25). It was also, with its suburbs, appointed of God, by lot, to be one of the cities of the Levites, given to them for an inheritance out of Benjamin (Josh. 21: 17). But more than this, it became the place of the Tabernacle¹ of the Congregation of God (1 Chron. 16: 39 and 21: 29, and also 2 Chron. 1: 3), and the great high-place of sacrifice (1 Kings 3: 4), and of the brazen altar before the Tabernacle (2 Chron. 1: 5), where Solomon offered a thousand burnt-offerings at once, and where God appeared to Solomon, and entered into covenant with him (1 Kings 3: 5).

There is a remarkable coincidence between this historic fact and the tenor of the treaty with the Gibeonites (Josh. 9: 27): "For Joshua made them hewers of wood and drawers of water for the congregation, and for the altar of the Lord, even unto this day, in the place which he should choose." No one could have foreseen that he would choose Gibeon; but so it was. Yet not in that city only did the Gibeonites serve the altar; but when the city was passed to the inheritance of the Levites, the Gibeonites and their race must have become the servants of the Priests, "for the congregation and for the altar of the Lord," wherever the tabernacle was set up, as at Nob, the city of the Priests, where David received the hallowed bread from Ahimelech (1 Sam. 21: 1 and 22: 19). In his wrath against Ahimelech, and against all that harbored David at that time, Saul not only slew the priests, fourscore and five, but destroyed the whole city of the priests, with all its inhabitants (1 Sam. 22: 18, 19). This was the most atrocious and the hugest crime of all his reign. Nothing is to be found that can be compared with it.

Several points are now determined: 1st, The separation of a particular race to be bondmen of the altar, servants of the Priests, for the service of God's house, in a class of labors indicated by the proverbial expression "hewers of wood and drawers of water." There is no intimation of the Gibeonites or their posterity ever being bondmen in any other

¹ "Being brought thither as to the chief residence of the sons of Ithamar, who waited on the sanctuary when Shiloh fell." — *Lightfoot*, Vol. II. p. 198.

way, or in private families. 2d, This service, and their separation and consecration for it as a race, was a boon granted them instead of death, which otherwise, by the Divine law, they must have suffered. They were spared, in consequence of the treaty with them ; and the covenant with them was of life and labor as the servants of the sanctuary. The life was pleasant, the service was not over-toilsome ; they accepted it with gratitude. 3d, The treaty was kept for hundreds of years ; and from generation to generation the Gibeonites and their posterity fulfilled their part of it, continuing, as at first appointed, the servants of the Sanctuary. Saul was the first who broke this treaty ; and God's own view of its sacredness may be known by the terrible manner in which he avenged its breach, and continued to protect the Gibeonites. Saul had not only destroyed the city of Nob, but had "devised means by which the Gibeonites should be destroyed from remaining in any of the coasts of Israel (2 Sam. 21: 4).

Case of the Nethinim.

It has been supposed that the Gibeonites constituted a part of the Nethinim, so often mentioned as the servants of the Tabernacle and of the Temple. The first trace of this name we meet in Num. 3: 9 and 8: 19, where the Levites are said to be given as a gift (נְתֻנִים) from God to Aaron and his sons for the service of the tabernacle. Also, Num. 18: 6. The verb from which this word is derived (נָתַן), is used by Joshua in describing the result of the treaty made with the Gibeonites: he gave or granted them to become, he set or established them, hewers of wood, etc., for the altar of the Lord (Josh. 9: 27) ; he *nethinized* them for the service of the Priests. So, in 1 Chron. 6: 48, the Levites are said to have been *appointed*, נְתֻנִים *nethinized*, unto all manner of service in the tabernacle. In the same manner, for the service of the Levites, others were given, appointed, *nethinized*; and this class, under the Levites, included the Gibeonites, and came to be designated, at length, apart from them, and from other servants, as the Nethinim (נְתֻנִים), 1 Chron. 9: 8, where the

name first occurs as of a separate class; the people returned from the captivity in Babylon being designated as Israelites, priests, Levites, and *the Nethinim*. Then the term occurs in Ezra 2: 43, 58, coupled with the children of Solomon's servants (בְּנֵי עֲבָדֵי), in one and the same classification; all the Nethinim and the children of Solomon's servants, in number—392. The priests, and the Levites, and some of the people, and the singers, and the porters, *and the Nethinim*, dwelt in their cities; and all Israel in their cities" (Ezra 2: 70). Priests, Levites, singers, porters, and Nethinim are again specified in Ezra 7: 7; and, in verse 24, the edict of Artaxerxes is specified, forbidding any toll, tribute, or custom from being laid upon priests, Levites, singers, porters, *Nethinim*, or ministers of the house of God.

In Ezra 8: 17—20 a message is sent to Iddo and his brethren *the Nethinim*, at the place Casiphia, for ministers for the house of God; and in answer to this message, there were sent, along with a number of Levites, two hundred and twenty Nethinim, of the Nethinim whom David and the Princes had appointed for the service of the Levites. In Neh. 3: 26, the Nethinim are recorded as having repaired their portion of the wall of Jerusalem, near their quarter in Ophel. They are also enumerated, as in Ezra, along with *the children of Solomon's servants*, as having come up from the captivity (Neh. 7: 60, 73). They are also recorded with the Levites, priests, and others, as parties in the great covenant which the people renewed with God, to observe his statutes (10: 28). The particular quarter of Jerusalem where they dwelt is pointed out, and the names of the overseers that were over them (Neh. 11: 21). Others of them, as well as of the priests, Levites, and children of Solomon's servants, dwelt in other cities, according to their respective possessions and engagements (Neh. 11: 3).

Their return to Jerusalem from the captivity was voluntary; they might have remained abroad. It was not a return to slavery, but a resumption, of their own accord, of the service of the Sanctuary, to which they had been devoted. So it was, likewise, with "the children of Solomon's ser-

vants;" they resumed their position in their native land, of their own choice, and by no compulsion. And both the Nethe-nim and the descendants of Solomon's servants, had their families and lineal ancestry preserved in the genealogical register of the nation; they had "entered into the congregation of the Lord."

Case of the Servants of the Captive Jews.

The enumeration, given by Ezra, of the returned people, is, for the whole congregation, 42,360, besides their servants and their maids (עֲבָדֵיהֶם וְאִמָּהוּתֵיהֶם), of whom there were seven thousand three hundred thirty and seven; and there were among them two hundred singing men and singing women. At first sight it might have been supposed that these singing men and singing women formed a part of the train of servants; but it does not appear so from the corresponding record of Nehemiah; they were an additional class. They, with the servants, and the maids, may all have been "bought" by the Jews during their captivity; but the purchase of a servant was no indication of slavery, where this language was customary to describe even the acquisition of a wife, or the buying of a Hebrew servant, who could not be a slave. The case of the free-born Hebrew *selling himself* for money (Lev. 25: 47) is in point; and the same person who has thus voluntarily sold his own time for money, is afterwards said to have been *bought* (25: 51). Such was the common usage of the term, not at all implying slavery.

It seems remarkable that they should return from their captivity in such array: men-servants and maid-servants (עֲבָדֵיהֶם וְאִמָּהוּתֵיהֶם), seven thousand three hundred and thirty-seven; singing men and singing women two hundred and forty-five (Neh. 7: 67). To account for this, we have to turn to the prophet Isaiah, to the prediction of God, that, when he should have mercy upon his captive people, and set them again in their own land, "*the strangers should be joined with them*, and should bring them to their place, and the house of Israel should possess them in the land of the Lord *for servants*

and handmaids (לְעַבְדִּים וְלַעֲמָהוֹת), and they shall take them captives whose captives they were" (Isa. 14: 2). Here is a most remarkable fulfilment of prophecy. At the same time it is obvious that the whole arrangement of their servitude must have been to a great degree voluntary, a service for which remuneration was required and given. It must have been, in every respect, a service contracted and assumed according to the principles and laws laid down in the Mosaic statutes, and in no respect a slavery such as those statutes were appointed to abolish.

It is to be noted that, in the language of Nehemiah, the term עֶבֶד is not used in designating servants, but the word נָעַר *young man*; as, for example, Neh. 5: 16, spoken of the governor's servants (נָעָרִים) having borne rule over the people; also 5: 16, all Nehemiah's servants (כָּל־נָעָרִי); also 4: 22, of the people with their servants, *every one with his servant* (אִישׁ וְנָעָרוֹ); also 4: 23, *I, nor my servants* (אֲנִי וְנָעָרִי). The same in 5: 10 and other places. The usage is plain, and not to be mistaken. The same usage prevails in the book of Ruth.

On the other hand, when Nehemiah intends to express the idea of bond-service, and to describe what the Jews themselves had been in their captivity, he uses the word עֶבֶד. For example, chap. 5: 5, We bring into bondage our sons and our daughters to be servants, כְּבָשִׁים לְעַבְדִּים. Also 2: 10, To-biah *the servant*, וְטוֹבִיָּה הָעֶבֶד. Also 9: 36, We are servants, עֲבָדִים; and 11: 3, The children of Solomon's servants, עֲבָדִים. There was "a mixed multitude" that came up with the Israelites from the captivity (13: 3); and of this multitude, the 245 singing men and singing women must have formed a part. The servants belonged to the same class; and there were a large number of strange women, of the Moabites, Ammonites, Egyptians, and others, with whom the people had intermarried, and formed families. These would bring their household servants with them; but the class designated by Nehemiah as נָעָרִים, must have been of a different character. They may have been free, and free-born in every respect, making their own contracts of service, and choosing their own masters. And whether עֶבֶד or נָעַר, whether strangers or

natives of Palestine, they belonged, when circumcised, to the Jewish nation, and might "enter into the congregation of the Lord." They might have been slaves in Egypt, or Ethiopia, or Assyria, but they could not be such in Judea; on the contrary, however degraded, in whatever country from which they came, the Mosaic Institutes immediately began to elevate and emancipate them.

We find an interesting and important instance in the episode related in 1 Chron. 2: 34, 35—the case of the Egyptian Jarha, the servant of Sheshan, and adopted by him as his son, to whom he gave his daughter to wife, and the Jewish genealogy of the family continued uninterrupted in the line of their children. This is an instructive commentary on the laws; and, being a case nearly parallel, in point of time, with the transactions in the book of Ruth (for Sheshan must have been nearly contemporary with Boaz), it indicates, as well as that history, the admirable contrast between the freedom prevalent in Judea and the despotism in every other country. "I am the Lord your God, which brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, that ye should not be their bondmen, and I have broken the bands of your yoke, and made you go upright" (Lev. 26: 13). The same emancipating power, exerted by God's interposing and protecting providence and discipline upon the Jews themselves, was also exercised by the system of statutes, privileges, and instructions, under which the poorest and humblest creature in the land was brought, upon the bond-servants taken from the heathen: the bands of *their* yoke were broken, and they were made to go upright. "Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy brother; thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land. The children that are begotten of them shall enter into the congregation of the Lord in their third generation" (Deut. 23: 7, 8).

Case of the Children of Solomon's Servants, and of the Strangers appointed to labor.

The children of Solomon's servants, as well as the Nethi-

nim, have the honor of being registered according to their genealogy by families, as in Neh. 7: 57—60. Ten individuals or heads of families are named; and their children are the children of Solomon's servants, numbering, together with the Nethinim, only three hundred and ninety-two. From the context it would appear that their fathers' house was considered of Israel; and they, being able to show their genealogy, were honorably distinguished from others, who could not show their fathers' house, nor their pedigree, whether they were of Israel (Neh. 7: 62). On the whole, it would seem that they were a favored class, and honorably distinguished by their service, which was to them an hereditary privilege worthy of being retained, and not an ignoble or a toilsome separation, nor a mark of bondage.

We must, however, consider their state and probable employment, in connection with the following passages and proofs in regard to the tributary service levied by Solomon upon them and similar classes. In 2 Chron. 2: 17, 18, we find it recorded that Solomon numbered all the strangers that were in the land of Israel, after the numbering wherewith David his father had numbered them; and they were found a hundred and fifty-three thousand and six hundred. And he set threescore and ten thousand of them to be bearers of burdens, and fourscore thousand to be hewers in the mountain, and three thousand and six hundred overseers, to set the people to work. See also 1 Kings 5: 15, 16. To this is added, on occasion of the mention of Solomon's vast enterprises in the building of cities, the following historical record (2 Chron 8: 7, 8, 9): "All the people left of the Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, that were not of Israel, but were of their children who were left after them in the land, whom the children of Israel consumed not, them did Solomon make to pay tribute unto this day. But of the children of Israel did Solomon make no servants for his work." Comparing this with the similar record in 1 Kings 9: 20, 21, 22, we find some additional light as to the kind of tribute exacted: "Their children that were left after them in the land, whom the children

of Israel were not able utterly to destroy, upon these did Solomon levy a tribute of bond-service (וְלִמְסֵעַבָּר), a tribute of labor; but of the children of Israel did Solomon make no bondmen. The tribute, then, was an appointed value, paid in manual labor, furnished by these tributary races, in the person of laborers, who labored not as hired servants, but as working out the taxes of such service imposed by the monarch.

All the strangers were numbered, זָרִים, the same word used in Lev. 19: 34, 35 and other passages, as Ex. 22: 21: "Thou shalt not oppress the stranger; the stranger shall be as one born amongst you, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." But these nations of Canaan, that were to have been utterly destroyed (see Deut. 20: 17), had never been exterminated, and the different tribes, in their inheritance, could not drive them out; but as far and as fast as possible put them to tribute, made them serve under tribute, לִמְסֵעַבָּר (Josh. 16: 10), being precisely the same expression used in 2 Chron. 8: 9 and 1 Kings 9: 21 of the tribute of bond-service levied by Solomon. See Josh. 15: 63 and 17: 12, 13; also Judges 1: 21, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35; also 3: 3, 5. This tributary service did not make them all hereditary bondmen; but was a tax of service to a certain amount, levied according to fixed rules, so that these foreign races must supply a sufficient number of laborers to work out that tax. The tax was a perpetual tribute; consequently, the bond-service by which it must be paid, was perpetual, unless there had been a system of commutation, of which however we find no direct evidence. It was only the races of the land of Canaan, such as are mentioned in 1 Kings 9: 20, 21 and 2 Chron. 8: 7, that could by law be thus treated; and such treatment was itself, in reality, a merciful commutation, instead of that destruction to which they had originally been devoted.

The numbering of these strangers for the work of building the Temple, was begun by David; that work was a public national and religious service, such as that to which the Gibeonites, more especially from the outset, had been consecrated, at a time when it was supposed that they only, of all the inhabitants of Canaan, would have been spared. But

a great many others were spared also; so that, in the general numbering of the people by Joab, at David's command (2 Sam. 24: 2 and 1 Chron. 21: 2), the cities of the Hivites and of the Canaanites are particularly designated (2 Sam. 24: 7); and comparing this with Josh. 17: 12 and Judg. 1: 27—33, there is reason to suppose that the particular designation is with reference to the class of inhabitants. In this general census of the people, Joab seems to have noted these "strangers" by themselves; and after this census "David commanded to gather together *the strangers* that were in the land of Israel, and he set masons to hew wrought stones to build the house of God" (1 Chron. 22: 2). It is doubtless to this that the reference is made in 2 Chron. 2: 17, "Solomon numbered *all the strangers* that were in the land of Israel, after the numbering wherewith David his father had numbered them."

That the strangers numbered and appointed for their work by David, and those numbered and appointed by Solomon, were of the same class, and that this class comprised the races named in Solomon's catalogue of tribes from whom he levied his tribute of bond-service, is rendered more certain by an examination of the number of foreigners or strangers of all classes that must have been, at this time, under the royal government of Israel. In 1 Chron. 5: 10, 19, 20, 21, there is an account of a battle between the Reubenites and a very numerous tribe of Hagarites, in which the children of Israel gained a great victory, insomuch that they captured a hundred thousand souls. This was in the days of Saul. Besides these Hagarites, it is evident that the number of tributaries must have greatly increased from David's own wars, as is proved in 2 Sam. 8: 4, 14. We should have a census of more than a hundred and fifty thousand "strangers," from these transactions alone; so that the number recorded in 2 Chron. 2: 17 (a hundred and fifty-three thousand and six hundred) as being all the strangers in the land of Israel, must be taken as rated for legal bond-service, from the nations or remaining races of the Canaanites only.

In this connection we must remember the law in regard to all

heathen nations conquered in war (except the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Hivites, Perizzites, and Jebusites, devoted to extermination), which was as follows (Deut. 20: 10, 11): "When thou comest nigh to a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it; and it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein *shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee.*" Between these and the races of the Canaanites there seems to have been a distinction as to treatment always maintained. It would seem that Lev. 25: 45, "Of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy," must refer particularly to the Canaanitish races, as we shall see more particularly in the examination of that passage. These nations and their descendants were to be made to pay a tribute of bond-service, such as the Hebrews could not exact from all the heathen, and were forbidden to impose on one another. Accordingly, in the account of such bond-service, as laid by Solomon on the descendants of these races, it is expressly stated in contrast, that "of the children of Israel did Solomon make no bondmen." A levy was raised at the same time, from all Israel, of thirty thousand men who labored in Lebanon, ten thousand a month, by courses (1 Kings 5: 13, 14); but this was very different from the tribute of bond-service levied, which comprised the threescore and ten thousand that bare burdens, and fourscore thousand hewers in the mountains. Along with these tributary and hereditary laborers, there were united the laborers obtained from Hiram, king of Tyre, for whose service Solomon paid Hiram, but not them: "unto thee will I give hire for thy servants, according to all that thou shalt appoint" (1 Kings 5: 6).

That the condition of the races under this law of tributary service was not one of general or oppressive bondage, is clear from the position in which Araunah the Jebusite appears before us in the interview between him and David, 2 Sam. xxiv. Araunah, although of the tributary race, is a substantial householder and farmer, dwelling amidst his own possessions, and making a bargain with king David, as in every respect a free-

man. Uriah, also, though high in the service of David, and having his house at Jerusalem, was a Hittite. The tributary service was evidently a very different thing from universal personal servitude. In the same way, from the transaction recorded in Ex. 2: 9, we learn that the servitude of the Hebrews in Egypt was not so universal as that all were slaves, or treated as such. Pharaoh's daughter makes a bargain with the mother of Moses, for a nurse's service, and gives her her wages. The woman is free to make such a bargain, and to receive such wages on her own account. There is no master over her, notwithstanding that the tyranny of Pharaoh is so terrible that she dare not acknowledge her own child, lest he be put to death.

The Exodus from Egypt, and the Mixed Multitude.—Law of the Passover.

The first moral judgment of God concerning the slavery of Egypt, was impressed upon the mind of Abraham in the covenant which God made with him: "Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and they shall serve them, נִעֲבָדִים; and they shall afflict them, וַיַּצֵּי; and also that nation whom they shall serve will I judge." The moral sense of Abraham was sufficiently enlightened to know that not simply because the subjects of oppression were of his seed, was such oppression sinful, but that the bondage, unless inflicted of God as a punishment for sin, was itself sinful. The slavery prevalent in Egypt is here condemned as a crime worthy to be punished.

The first historical description of it, after this prophetic judgment, is in Ex. 1: 11, "They did set over them task-masters, to afflict them with their burdens, שָׂרֵי מִסִּים לְבָעֲלָם, overseers of tribute, on purpose for their oppression in their burdens. "And the Egyptians made the children of Israel to serve with rigor, and they made their lives bitter with hard bondage, בְּעִבְרִית קָשָׁה, hard labor, in mortar, and in brick, and in all manner of service in the field; all their service wherein they made them serve was with rigor" (Ex. 1:13,14).

— Now therefore behold the cry of the children of Israel is come unto me: and I have also seen the oppression (לִצְרָר) wherewith the Egyptians oppress them (Ex. 3: 9). The same word is used in Ex. 23: 9, "Thou shalt not oppress a stranger." This dreadful bondage was a type of the slavery of sin; as also the passover, in memory of their deliverance, was a most affecting and powerfully significant type of redemption by the blood of Christ.

Out of this bondage, when God delivered them, they went up "about six hundred thousand men, on foot, besides children; and a mixed multitude went up also with them, and flocks and herds, very much cattle" (Ex. 12: 37, 38). The mixed multitude, (מִצְרַיִם,) are nowhere definitely described. The question whether they had bond-servants of their own, whom they carried away with them from Egypt, might possibly be settled, could we have a classification of that *mixed multitude*. On the whole it seems not probable that any Egyptians were under bond-service to them, and their own race were certainly not slaves to one another, though they might be servants. If they had foreign servants, not of their own race, we judge (from the manner of the enumeration in a similar case, namely, the return of the Jews from the captivity in Babylon) it would have been distinctly stated. In Ezra 2: 64, 65 and Neh. 7: 66, 67, as already noted, the number of the whole congregation of Israel is first given, as in Exodus, and then it is added: "besides their man-servants and their maid-servants, of whom there were seven thousand three hundred and thirty-seven." The whole number of the people to be cared for and to be fed, are again mentioned by Moses, in Num. 11: 21, as six hundred thousand footmen, no reference being made to any others than those named in the first census. The mixed multitude, also, are again referred to, in the same chapter, by themselves: "the mixed multitude that was among them fell a lusting" (Num. 11: 4), but no reference is found to the servants among them.

In regard to this point, it is impossible to determine absolutely from the law of the passover; because that law looked to the future condition of the congregation, providing for

future emergencies. No uncircumcised stranger might eat of the passover; but every man's servant, bought for money and circumcised, might eat of it. The uncircumcised foreigner and hired servant might not eat of it; and both the home-born and the stranger were under one and the same law in regard to it (Ex. 12: 43—49. Num. 9: 14). The servant bought for money was bought into the Lord's family; he was, in point of fact, redeemed from bondage into comparative freedom, taken under God's especial care, and from a system of lawless slavery, passed into a system of responsibility to God, both on the part of his master, and on his own part. It was a change of amazing mercy, from hopeless heathenish bondage to the dignity of citizenship in the commonwealth of Israel.

Religious Privileges of Servants.—Law of the Sabbath.

After the law of the Passover, the first indication looking to the condition of servants is in the law of the Sabbath, Ex. 20: 10: "Thou shalt not do any work; thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, *thy man-servant nor thy maid-servant*, עֲבָדֶיךָ וַעֲמָלֶיךָ." This was a provision unheard of in the world, a provision necessary for the religious privileges and freedom of those under servitude, a provision which alone, if there had been no other, would have separated the condition of servants and the system of menial service, among the Hebrews from that among any other people on earth, raising it to a participation in the care and sanction of God, and transfiguring it with social dignity and liberty. Such would be the effect of the Sabbath, fully observed according to its intent and precept, upon the system of labor and the condition of the laboring man, all the world over; for the Sabbath is the master-key to all forms and means of social regeneration, freedom, and happiness. But it was a new thing in the world for the leading, governing gift, privilege, and institution of instruction, refinement, and piety to be conferred upon the poor as well as the rich; upon the serving and laboring classes equally with the ruling; and appointed as directly and on pur-

pose for the enjoyment and benefit of the one class as of the other. The work of the transfiguration of the toil and bondage into a system of free and voluntary service, carefully defined, protected, and rewarded, adopted and adorned of God with all the equalizing religious rights flowing from a theocracy to the whole people; this work, thus begun in the appointment of the Sabbath, was carried on, as we shall see, in the same spirit, and with the same purpose, in all additional regulations; till society, in this its normal form, became (as it would have continued, in reality, if the appointed form had been carried out) a fit type of the Christian dispensation to come," where there is neither Jew nor Greek, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond, nor free; but Christ all and in all" (Col. 3: 11 and Gal. 3: 28). Such an institution of free and willing service, guarded by the law as an integral portion of a free and happy State, was preparing and moulding, by divine command, and in form was perfected, as should not need to be put away or unclothed, at Christ's coming, but was fitted to be clothed upon with his Spirit, and sanctioned by his benediction. This was to take the place of slavery, was to put slavery out of existence; and, wherever and whenever the oppressed of other communities should be gathered beneath its operation, was to make freemen of slaves.

There is a striking particularity in one of the repetitions of the law of the Sabbath (Ex. 23: 12), where the servile classes specified in the first normal form are omitted, and the purpose of the Sabbath's rest is stated to be "*that the son of thine handmaid, and the stranger, may be refreshed.*" Here the expression "son of thine handmaid," is בֶּן-אֲמָתֶיךָ, the same as used, in Psalm 116: 16, of David: "I am thy servant, and *the son of thine handmaid.*" I am not a servant, but *thy* servant, and the son of thine handmaid. The son of the handmaid, in Ex. 23: 12, is catalogued in the same class and standing with the free stranger; and the passage is certainly, in some measure, a key to the interpretation of the expressions בֶּן-אֲמָתֶיךָ and אֲלֵי-בֵיתֶךָ, Gen. 15: 3; 17: 12, 13; Lev. 23: 11; Eccl. 2: 7 and Jer. 2: 14. These expressions, so far from

indicating *slaves*, as the assumptions and perverse interpretations of some lexicographers and translators might lead the English reader to suppose, do not necessarily even mean *servants*, but are a form of expression purposely separate and different from the generic appellation for servants, because they intimated a relation to the master and the family which was *not* that of servants. The condition of the child did *not* follow that of the parent; but, after the period of natural dependence and minority, the בְּנֵי-בֵיתָא and the יְלִידֵי בֵיתָא, the *sons of the house*, and the *born of the house*, or *home-born*, were their own masters, free to choose for themselves the master whom they would serve, and the terms on which they would serve him. This is susceptible of demonstration beyond possibility of denial in regard to children of Hebrew descent; because, not even the parents could, by law, be kept as servants longer than six years; and of course the children, being Hebrews equally with the parents, and coming under the same law, could no more be so held than the parents themselves. This shows how monstrous is the assumption and perversion of the Lexicons, beginning with the *fons et origo* of modern interpretation, that of Gesenius, when they deliberately, and without one particle of proof, render these expressions by the Latin word *verna*, followed by English translators with the word *slave*. Neither by periphrasis, nor literal signification, can these expressions be so interpreted; never, in any case, in which they are used. And if the literal interpretation had, in every case, been adhered to, *sons of the house*, and *born of the house*, instead of the word *slave*, employed in the Lexicons, or *servant*, which is mostly used in our translation, no one could have connected the idea of servitude with these expressions, much less the idea of slavery. For example, the literal translation of Eccl. 2:7 is thus: "I obtained servants and maidens, and there were to me sons of the house," וַבְּנֵי-בֵיתָא הָיוּ לִי, a relationship of dependence, certainly, and showing wealth and perpetuity in the family, whose servants were not hirelings merely, but voluntary domestic fixtures, of choice as well as dependence; but not a relationship of compulsory servitude, or slavery, or of servants considered as property.

Now the transfer of the degrading and infamous chattelism signified in the Latin word *verna* and the English word *slave* to such a relationship, and to the phrase *son of the house*, or *born of the house*, as its true meaning among the Hebrews, is one of the most unauthorized and outrageous perversions ever inflicted upon human language. It is almost blasphemous, as designed to fix the blot and infamy of slavery upon what was and is the noblest, most benevolent, most carefully-guarded, freest, and most affectionate system of domestic service in the world.

It is a system of such freedom and benevolence, and so ingeniously designed and adapted to conquer every surrounding and prevailing form of slavery, and subdue it to itself, that its infinite superiority to the selfish law and oppressed condition of the world, and its enthronement of benevolence instead of power as the ruling impulse and object (in that part of social legislation especially, where the law and custom of mankind have made selfishness not only supreme, but just, expedient, and even necessary), are something supernatural. The contrast and opposition of this system over against the creed and habit of power, luxury, oppressive selfishness, and slavery, so long prevalent without question of its right, is, by itself, an impregnable proof of the Divine inspiration of the Pentateuch. It is a proof, the shining and the glory of which have been clouded and darkened by the anachronisms, prejudices, and misinterpretations of Biblical archæologists and translators, but which is destined to be yet cleared and acknowledged by the Christian world with gratitude to God. We shall at length cease to look to Arab or Egyptian Sheikhs and Pashas for illustrations of the life of Abraham, and to Roman or American slaves for pictures of the Hebrew households.

The Year-Sabbath and the Annual Feasts.

But besides the weekly Sabbath of devotion, every seven years the land should keep a Sabbath of a whole year unto the Lord, the seventh year, a Sabbath of rest for the land,

and, in consequence, for all classes of servants: "And the Sabbath of the land shall be meat for you; for thee, and for thy servant, and for thy maid, and for thy hired servant, and for thy stranger that sojourneth with thee" (Lev. 25: 27). Here the עֲבָד, the servant of all work, the אִמָּה, the maid-servant, and the שָׂכִיר, the hired servant, are all specified; the seventh year belongs to them as well as to their masters. In Ex. 23: 11, 12, these two institutions of the year-sabbath and the seventh-day Sabbath are coupled, and the purpose specified is that of rest and refreshment "for the son of thine handmaid and the stranger," בֶּן-אִמָּהּ וְיָתוֹם. Here are already two-sevenths of the time of life guarantied to the servants for rest and sacred discipline. The injunction of a circumspect piety is added to the enactment of both these ordinances.

Then, in the same chapter, the three great annual feasts follow, enacted in order, Ex. 23: 14—17, these enactments being drawn out with minute detail and precision in Deut. 16: 2—16, and they are designated as the Feast of Unleavened Bread, the Feast of Weeks, and the Feast of Tabernacles. In Ex. 34: 21—23, the weekly Sabbath and these three annual festivals are coupled in the same manner as the Sabbath and the Seventh year of rest in Ex. xxiii. The spirit of these festivals and their duration are described in Deut. xvi. and Lev. 23: 34—43. And the equalizing benevolence of these institutions is the more marked by the repetition of the rule: "Thou shalt rejoice in thy feast, before the Lord thy God; thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy man-servant, and thy maid-servant, and the Levite that is within thy gates, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow that are among you" (Deut. 16: 11). Taking into consideration the time necessary for going and returning to and from each of these great Festivals, together with their duration, we have in their observance some six weeks, or nearly another seventh of the whole time devoted, for the servants as well as the masters, to religious joy, and rest, and refreshment.

Then, in addition, are to be reckoned the Feast of Trumpets (Lev. 23: 24), the Day of Atonement (23: 27—34 and

16: 29), the Feast of the New Moon (Num. 28: 11. Hos. 2: 11; Ezek. 46: 1, 3). If to these we add the Feasts of Purim and the Dedication, and the oft-recurring joyous family festivals (1 Sam. 20: 6. Gen. 21: 8), we have more than three-sevenths, or nearly one half the time of the servants given to them for their own disposal and enjoyment, instruction and piety, unvexed by servile labors, on a footing of almost absolute equality and affectionate familiarity and kindness with the whole household: father, mother, son, daughter, man-servant and maid-servant, all having the same religious rights and privileges — “They go from strength to strength, every one of them in Zion appearing before God.” How beautiful, how elevating, how joyous was such a national religion, and how adapted to produce and renew continually that spirit of humility and love, in the exercise of which the whole law was concentrated and fulfilled.

Time and Treatment of the Hebrew Servant.—The Six Years' Contract.

The section in Ex. 21: 2—11, prescribing time and treatment for the Hebrew servant, is full of instruction: “If thou buy a Hebrew servant (הֶעֱבָדְךָ עֶבֶד עִבְרִי), six years he shall serve; וְיֵצֵא; and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing” (וְיָצָא לְחֵפְזִי חֵפֶז); his term of service expires, and he is free without cost. He had himself sold his own time and labor to his master, by contract, for six years — no longer; and this was called buying a Hebrew servant. Such a servant was not the master's property, nor is ever called such, although he might have been described as “his money;” that is, he had paid in money for his services, for so long a time, and, in that sense, he was his money, but in no other. We have already noted the usage of the word קָנִי, to buy; and its application in describing the purchase of persons in such relations as forbid the idea of property or slavery. This is one of those instances. The Hebrew servant was bought with money, yet he was in no sense a slave, or the property of his master. In entering into a six years' contract of service, h

was said to have sold himself; yet he was not a slave. He might extend this contract to the longest period ever allowed by law, that is, to the Jubilee; yet still he was not property, he was not a slave; his service was the fulfilment of a voluntary contract, for which a stipulated equivalent was required, and given to himself. The reason for the adoption or appointment of six years for the ordinary legal contract of Hebrew servitude, may very likely be found in the example of Jacob's service of six years with Laban for his cattle.

This section is to be compared with Deut. 15: 12—18. Here, it is : *If thy brother be sold, that is, if he have hired himself to thee*, and serve thee six years; or if a Hebrew woman do the same; then, when this period of service is ended, not only is he free, as above, but “thou shalt not let him go away empty. Thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy flock and out of thy floor, and out of thy wine-press.” This extraordinary provision of an outfit was some offset, and was intended to be such, for the comparatively low wages of a six years' עֶבֶד, or servant, as compared with the wages of a hired servant, by the year or by the day. It was a great inducement to continue the engagement to the end of the contract, and not be seeking another master. And at the same time it is enjoined as a reason why the master should be liberal in this outfit, that he has gained so much more from the labor of the servant for six years, than he could have done if he had contracted with him as a טֹבֵר or hired servant. The computation is made as follows : *He hath been worth a double hired servant, in serving thee six years* ; בְּשֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים טֹבֵר עֶבֶדְךָ, *double the wages of a hireling serving thee*; that is, if thou hadst hired a servant by the year, and kept him six years, he would have cost thee twice as much as a servant whom thou buyest, or contractest with, for six years at a time.

Supposing that for a six years' term a man could be engaged for eighteen shekels; then a yearly hired servant could not be got for less than six shekels the year; it would therefore, in most cases, be more desirable to engage a six years' עֶבֶד, than to hire by the year; and, notwithstanding the difference in price, it might, in many cases, be more desirable

for the servant also. Micah, in the case recorded in Judges xvii., hired a young Levite from Bethlehem Judah, to dwell with him as his priest, for wages; and he gave him ten shekels of silver, and a suit of apparel, and his victuals, *by the year*. There are no such examples of specific contracts with ordinary servants recorded; but the price of Joseph's sale to the merchant-men of the Midianites, was twenty shekels of silver. The sum to be paid when a man-servant or maid-servant was gored to death by an ox, was thirty shekels of silver to the master (Ex. 21: 32), the price, perhaps, of a six years' contract. The price of the prophet, in Zech. 11: 12, or the hire, or wages (שָׂכָר is the word used), at which he and his services were valued, and paid, was thirty shekels of silver. The redemption-price for a man who had vowed himself to the Lord, was fifty shekels of silver from twenty years of age till sixty; and for a woman, thirty shekels; from five years to twenty, twenty shekels for a man, ten for a woman; from a month to five years old, five shekels for the man-child, three for the girl. And it is added: from sixty years old and above, fifteen for the man, ten for the woman. This was the priest's estimation of the persons for the Lord (Lev. 27: 2—7). Now this seems an estimate adopted from the value of labor or service at these different periods, the value of a man's time and labor.

Now the *wages* of a man as a servant, are often the subject of consideration in the scriptures, but the *price* of a man never. There is no such idea recognized as the price of a servant considered as property, or as if he were a thing of barter and sale; his owner is never spoken of; there is no such thing as the owner of a man, and no such quality is ever recognized as that of such ownership. When the recompense is appointed for the master whose servant has been killed by another's ox, it is the master, not the owner, to whom the recompense is to be made, *as* master, not as owner. There was no servant without wages, either paid beforehand, for a term of years, or paid daily, if hired by the day, or annually, as the case might be. The three kinds of contract or service, and of corresponding wages, are spe-

cified Lev. 19: 13, the wages of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until morning, תַּגְּלִית וְשִׂכָּרָא, the *reward* of the hired servant. Job 7: 1, his *days* like the *days of an hireling*. Lev. 25: 53, as a *yearly hired servant*. Ex. 21: 2, where the rule seems referred to as most common, of a six years' service and contract. There was no indefiniteness in any of the legal provisions, no difficulty in ascertaining each servant's rights, and they were not only secured by law, but such tremendous denunciations were added in the prophets, as that in Jer. 22: 13: Wo unto him that useth his neighbor's service without wages, and giveth him not for his work; and Mal. 3: 5, I will be a swift witness against those who defraud the hireling in his wages, and keep the stranger from his right. The *stranger* comprehended *servants*, as well as *sojourners*, of heathen extraction.

Now when the recompense of thirty shekels was ordained for the master, whose servant had been gored by another man's ox, they were to be paid, not because the servant was his, as property, or as being worth that price; as if he were a slave, a chattel, belonging to an owner, but because the master *had paid to him* the price of a certain number of years of labor, which years the servant owed; and therefore the recompense was for the loss of that part of the service which had been paid for, but, by reason of death, could not be fulfilled. The master did not and could not own *him*, in any case, but only had a claim to his time and labor, so far as it had been contracted and paid for. It must have been paid for beforehand, because otherwise, if the servant's pay had not been promised till after the time of the contract, the master would have been owing the servant at his death, and could have no claim, but the nearest of the family of the servant would have had the claim. But the case being that of the קָבֵר, the six years' hired servant, or perhaps the servant obtained from among the heathen, the master has the claim for services which was paid for, but not fulfilled.

The legal term of service for six years could not be lengthened, *except at the pleasure of the servant*. The man-servant and the maid-servant were equally free in making

their contracts; neither of them could be held at the pleasure of the master, nor could be disposed of, but at their own pleasure. They were perfectly free, except so far as by their own act and free will they had bound themselves for an equivalent to a term of service. Under certain contingencies they could, by law, compel their master to keep them, but he could never use them as property, never make merchandise of them, never transfer them over to another. If a maid-servant chose to contract herself to her master's family, in such manner that he on his part could keep her till the Jubilee, and she on her part could forbid his sending her away, then both herself and her children were to remain till that time. The covenant was legal and explicit. They were bound to him, in his service, and could not quit, but with his consent, till that time. On the other hand, he was bound to them, and could not transfer them to another family, country, or household, nor any one of them, nor convey their service to any other person.

This is to be regarded in examining the next clause, which states the *one only condition* on which the servant could be retained by the master until the Jubilee. If, during his period of six years' service, his master had given him a wife, and she had borne him children, then, at the end of the six years, he could not, in quitting his master's service, compel the master to relinquish the contract, whatever it was, which had given him a right to the service of the maid-servant, his wife, for a still longer period, or to the Jubilee. It was optional with him to leave his wife and children with his master, and go out from his service by himself alone, or he could stay, and with his wife and children engage with his master anew, until the Jubilee; and his master could never separate the family, nor send any one of them away, nor violate any of the terms of the contract; and both for time and for wages the covenant was at the pleasure of the servant, as well as the master, and by law the master was compelled to treat him as a *בְּטָכִיר שָׂנִית בְּשָׂכָר*, as a yearly hired servant, and not as an *עֶבֶד*, or servant of all times and all work; as a servant on stipulated monthly or

yearly wages, and not as one whose whole time of service until the Jubilee had been bargained for and paid for in the lump. The whole covenant was determined and ratified in court, before the Judges, with the greatest care and solemnity, on the affirmation of the servant that he loved not only his wife and children, but his master also, and his house, and was well with him, (comp. Deut. 15: 16,) and would not go away from him. The sign of the covenant, and its proof positive and incontrovertible, so that neither master nor servant could by fraud have broken it, was the boring of the ear, both of man-servant and maid-servant.

This transaction was entered into by the servant, notwithstanding the claim of a liberal outfit from his master, from the flock, and the floor, and the wine-press, to which he was entitled by law, if he chose to leave his service. The receiving a wife from his master, during any time of his six years' service, was also at the servant's own pleasure; all the conditions of such marriage being perfectly well known to him, the dowry which he would have to pay for his wife, if he remained with her, being in part the assuming of a new contract of service with the master, as long as hers had been assumed, or to the Jubilee. And then, they and their children would go from his service, with all the property they had been able to acquire by their wages and privileges in his household. This, if they had been provident and sagacious in the use of lawful means and opportunities, might at length amount to an important sum. The servant might become possessor of a competency, during a twenty-five or thirty years' sojourn in his master's family. And the servant born in the house, his son (וְיָלִיד בֵּיתוֹ), the home-born (וְיֶקֶן בֵּיתוֹ), or of the *sons of the house*, might become his master's heir, as in the household of Abraham; or he himself might be his master's steward, with all the wealth of the establishment under his hand.

The position of such an עֶבֶד, or Hebrew servant, or even heathen servant (as in the case of Eliezer of Damascus), might be more desirable than that of the hired servant not belonging to the family. It was only households of com-

paratively considerable wealth, that could afford to enter into such contracts with their servants, or to keep a retinue of retainers born in the house. Hence the fact of having such a class of servants is referred to in such a manner as proves it to have been esteemed a mark of greatness and prosperity (Eccl. 2: 7). And these domestic servants, born in the family and holding by law such a claim upon it, were attached to it, and its members to them, with an affection and kindness like that of its sons and daughters, one toward another. Perhaps the passage in Jer. 2: 14 may be rendered with reference to this fact: "Is Israel a servant (עֶבֶד)? If a home-born (אֶם-יִלִּיד), why is he a spoil? How should he be carried away and made a prey, if he belongs to the household, if he is the home-born of his God? These home-born servants, and those whose contract of service lasted beyond the six years' term of ordinary legal indenture, were at the same time to be treated on the same footing with the hired servants and sojourners, with the same careful regard to all their rights and privileges.

In connection with the case of the master giving his servant a wife, the instance of Sheshan is illustrative (1 Chron. 3: 34, 35). Sheshan had no sons, and he gave one of his daughters as a wife to one of his household servants named Jarha, an Egyptian. This Egyptian servant, beyond all doubt, was received into Sheshan's service on the legal conditions laid down in Lev. xxv., on a contract voluntary and for a stipulated equivalent. There is not the slightest indication of his ever having been a slave. Egyptian strangers and sojourners among the Hebrews, as well as those from other nations, often sold themselves to service in this manner in the Holy Land. Yet with such reckless confidence and mistake, characterizing the assertions of too many commentators on this whole subject, it is asserted in Kitto's Cyclopædia (article Sheshan), that Jarha was not only a slave, but that his marriage took place while the children of Israel were themselves in bondage in Egypt! This is said, notwithstanding the fact that the recorded genealogy of Sheshan demonstrates that he was contemporary with Boaz, Obed,

and Jesse, being in the seventh generation in direct descent from Hezron the grandson of Judah.

There is no other instance, save this in Ex. 21: 4, (which is plainly mentioned as an exception to a general rule,) in which any claim of the master to the children of his servants is ever intimated. The home-born *וְלִידֵי בֵּית* — and the sons of the house *בְּנֵי בֵּית* — though in subjection to him, as the father of the family, and lord of the household, were not his property, in any sense; and because he had a servant-maid, her children were not on that account his servants, except by a separate specific contract. No child, whether Hebrew or heathen, in the land of Judea, was born to involuntary servitude, because the father, or mother, or both, were servants; but every child of the house was born a member of the family, dependent on the master for education and subsistence. If married persons engaged themselves as servants, or *sold themselves*, according to Hebrew phraseology, then, when the six years' time of their service expired, they went forth free, and their children with them; there was never any claim upon the children to retain them merely because they were *בְּנֵי בֵּית*, sons of the house; but their parents had authority over them, and possession of them. The phraseology in the case before us, *the wife and her children shall be her master's*, *וְהָאִשָּׁה וְיֶלְדֶיהָ תְּהֵי לַאֲדֹנֶיהָ*, conveys no meaning of possession, but simply of *remaining with* the master, as long as the contract specified, as long as he had a right by law to her services. Inasmuch as she herself was not, and could not be, *her master's*, except only by voluntary contract, for a price paid to herself, and for a time specified, neither could the children be her master's. The only way in which he could give her to her husband to be his wife was, (1) either by paying to her father the dowry required, and so purchasing her for a wife for his servant, in which case he would have a claim upon his or her services or both, additional to the amount of that dowry; or (2) she was his maid-servant already according to the ordinary or extraordinary legal contract, for the six years (Deut. 16: 12), or for the time from the making of a new contract, till the

Jubilee (Deut. 16: 17), and as such he gives her in marriage. In either case, she being bound to him for a longer time than her husband, her children would, of right, and by law, remain with her, under subjection in her master's household, and could not be taken away by the father, if he chose to quit. The children could not be taken from their parents, but after a certain age they were at liberty to chose their own masters, and to make their own terms of service. This resulted inevitably from the law limiting and defining the period of service in every case; even when until the Jubilee, still, most absolutely and certainly defined and limited by that. There was nothing left indefinite, and no room for the assumption of arbitrary power, so long as the provisions of the law were complied with. And it was the breaking of those provisions, and the attempt on the part of the masters to force their servants into involuntary servitude, and so change the whole domestic system of the state from freedom to slavery, that, by the immediate wrath of God in consequence, swept the whole country into a foreign captivity, and consigned the people to the sword, the pestilence, and the famine, Jer. 34: 17. The horror with which any approximation again towards any infraction of the great law of liberty, was regarded, after the return of the Jews from that retributive captivity, is manifested in Neh. 5: 5, and is instructive and illustrative.

Let us now see what would be the actual operation of the exceptional contract in Ex. 21: 4—6, running on to the Jubilee. That this is the meaning of the word *forever*, in the terms of this contract, is not disputed, and is incontrovertible from Lev. 25: 39, 40, the law of the Jubilee overriding all others and repressing all personal contracts within itself. At the recurrence of the Jubilee, all were free. Then, after the year of Jubilee, when every family has returned to its original possessions, new engagements were necessarily entered into with servants, new contracts were made. It does not seem likely that, at the outset, any indentures of service for the next forty-nine years would be deemed desirable, either by masters or servants. Almost all contracts would be the

ordinary legal ones of six years. But after the expiration of one or two *septenniums*, there might be cases of contracts looking to the Jubilee. On a probable computation, the instances would be rare of such engagements beginning before the middle, or near the middle, of the period. In that case, if a master gave a wife to his servant, and the covenant was assumed by boring the ear, the children, as *בְּנֵי-בֵית*, home-born, the sons of the house, would be under subjection to the master, at the very farthest, not longer than our ordinary period of the minority of children. For example, take the contract of a maid-servant as occurring in the fourth *septennium*, or say in the twenty-fifth year, an agreement to serve in the family for twenty-three years, or until the Jubilee, and according to the Hebrew idiom for contracts till that time, *forever*. During the first *septennium* of this maiden's service, a Hebrew servant is engaged for six years, and soon forming an attachment, asks of his master the maid-servant for a wife. She is given to him by his master, and they have children; and, at the expiration of his six years, he avails himself of his legal privilege, and enters into a new contract with his master till the Jubilee. At that time the oldest of his children would be about twenty-one years of age, and the youngest might be five or ten; they are all free by the operation of the law of Jubilee. From twenty to twenty-five years would ordinarily be the utmost limit of any contract of service, whether for parents or children.

The penalties against the master for cruel or oppressive treatment of his servants, were the same, whether the servants were Hebrew or of heathen extraction. Whatever injury was committed against any servant, was to be avenged; for the loss of an eye or a tooth the servant should have his freedom, whatever might have been his contract with his master, whatever sum his master might have paid him beforehand, no matter how many years of unfulfilled service might remain (Ex. 21: 26, 27). In connection with a similar section it is added: "Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger as for one of your own country, for I am the Lord your God (Lev. 24: 22). The application of this

principle is beautifully and pointedly illustrated in Job 31: 13—15, and the reason given is the same, namely, that the same God and Creator is the God both of master and servant: "If I did despise the cause of my man-servant or of my maid-servant, when they contended with me, what shall I do when God riseth up? and when he visiteth, what shall I answer him? Did not he that made me in the womb, make him? and did not one fashion us in the womb?" If a servant were killed by his master, the punishment was death; if the servant died after some days (Ex. 21, 20, 21), in consequence of blows inflicted by the master, then, in mitigation of the punishment, the presumption was admitted in law that the killing was not intentional; because, the master having paid the servant beforehand for his services up to a certain time, "he was his money," and he could not be supposed to have intended to kill him, unless he did kill him outright; and then the penalty was death.

*Phraseology for contracts with servants. — Selling, or
Hiring out.*

We have illustrated the position of the *buyer*, and the meaning of the word used for the *purchase* of servants. Let us now examine the usage of the word which is applied to designate this transaction on the part of the *seller*. We take the first example from the law of contracts with servants, Ex. 21: 7, 8, *if a man sell his daughter to be a maid-servant*. Here the subject of the sale, so called, is a Hebrew daughter. Her sale as a servant could not possibly be anything more than an engagement for six years' service, at the end of which she was again free. The person who purchased her, had no property in her, for she was as free as he was, except in the engagement of service for a limited time. But in the case before us she is sold for a wife, and is purchased as such, and the law defines and secures her rights with her master, who has betrothed her to himself. He buys her for his wife, and must treat her as such, and cannot transfer her to another. If he put her away, she is free with-

out money. She is described as being sold at one and the same time, to be a maid-servant and a wife. She is at once the אִשָּׁה and the אֲמָתָה of the husband. Her master may be the husband himself, or he may marry her to his son; but the section shows that her father has engaged her in the service of the master on condition of her marriage either to one or the other; and if this engagement is not fulfilled, she returns to her father free without money.

(1) The word here used for this transaction is the verb מָכַר, to sell. It is used of contracts with free persons, both as servants and wives. The first instance is in Gen. 31: 15, where Rachel and Leah declare that their father *had sold them*, מָכַרְנִי, merely the concise description of his giving them in marriage to Jacob, who had paid for them to Laban, seven years' personal service for each. The instances in Ex. 21: 7, 8, Gen. 31: 15, and Deut. 21: 14, are the only cases in which the word is employed in reference to a wife. These cases form a class by themselves.

(2) Then there is the class of passages in which the same word is applied to the ordinary legal contract of a Hebrew servant with his master or employer. Deut. 15: 12, if a Hebrew man or woman be sold unto thee, בִּי-יִמָּכַר לָךְ. Jer. 34: 14, hath been sold unto thee, יִמָּכַר. Lev. 25: 39, 42, 47, 48, 50, different forms of the same word, מָכַר. To these cases we add the instance of a similar purchase, but forced beyond what the law admits, that is, an arbitrary contract, forbidden in regard to the Hebrew servant. *Will ye sell your brethren? or shall they be sold unto us?* וְיִמָּכְרוּ, הֲמִיכְרוּ. Both the sale and the purchase are forbidden, except on the conditions in Ex. 21: 2—11.

(3) The same word is used to designate the crime of *man-selling*, the idea of contract for service being excluded. It is the sale of persons as of chattels, by way of merchandise. The first instance is in Gen. 37: 27, the selling of Joseph by his brethren, נָמְכְרוּ, *let us sell him*. Also, 37: 28, יִמָּכְרוּ, *they sold him*. The same Gen. 45: 4, 5, and Ps. 105: 17. This crime of selling a man is described by the same word, and forbidden under penalty of death, Ex. 21: 16, and Deut. 24: 7.

(4) A fourth class describes selling as the penalty for theft, Ex. 22: 3. But here the sale is not indefinite; it is in case of the thief not being able to make restitution, in which case he must be sold, that is, put to compulsory service, for such a period as would make up the sum by the customary wages for labor. In this class of passages we include the cases of selling for debt: Is. 50: 1, To which of your creditors have I sold you? Compare Matt. 18: 25. The selling for debt is simply an engagement of service for so long time as would be sufficient, by the ordinary legal wages, to pay the legal claim. It was not slavery, nor any selling as of slaves.

(5) A fifth class of passages, in which God is described as selling his people for their sins, or causing them to be sold to the heathen. Deut. 28: 68, sold unto their enemies for bondsmen, *ye shall be sold*, הִתְמַכְּרֶתֶם. Deut. 32: 30, *except their rock had sold them*, אֶל־לֹא בִי צִוִּים מְכָרָם. Judges 2: 14; 3: 8; 4: 2; 10: 7. 1 Sam. 12: 9. Ps. 44: 13. Joel 3: 8. The sense in these cases is that of delivering up into the power of another. Of this meaning is Judges 4: 9, *the Lord shall sell Sisera*. To this class, must be added Is. 50: 1, and 52: 3, where the Jews are described as selling themselves for their transgressions; that is, they did, *by* their sins, what God did, *for* their sins, delivered themselves over into the power of their enemies.

(6) A sixth class comprehends 1 Kings, 21: 20, 25, Ahab selling himself to work wickedness, and 2 Kings, 17: 17, the people selling themselves to do evil; that is, giving themselves up unrestrainedly, in consideration of the wages of sin for a season.

(7) In a seventh class of passages, the word is employed to describe the bondage of the Jews in their captivity, Neh. 5: 8, הִתְמַכְּרִים לַגּוֹיִם. Add instances in Esther 7: 4, where the word is used to signify delivering or betraying into the power of another, first, for destruction, second, for bondage.

(8) In another class still, the heathen are arraigned for the curse of selling Hebrew captives. Joel 4: 3, 6, 7, *sold a girl for wine*, מְכָרָהּ; *sold the children to the Grecians*, מְכָרָהֶם. Here

the meaning obviously is that of traffic as in merchandise, and the denunciation of God's wrath follows accordingly.

The crime of selling one another is also described by the same word in Amos 2: 6, "*they sell the righteous for silver* (those that have committed no crime, they sell), *and the needy for a pair of shoes*. Compare Amos 8: 6, where the oppression of buying the poor with silver is denounced along with the crime of perjury and false balances in traffic. The *giving*, or, in Hebrew phraseology, the *buying*, of servants, *as provided by law*, was a just transaction, *voluntary* on both sides; but in the cases before us, the thing forbidden is the buying and selling of persons against their own consent, who are compelled by their poverty to be thus passed as merchandise; and this is denounced as crime. So in Zech. 11: 5, *They that sell them say, Blessed be the Lord, for I am rich*; adding to this monstrous crime the iniquity and hypocrisy of invoking and asserting God's blessing upon it.

From all these cases it is clear, that in law the word מָכַר, to sell, when applied to persons, signified a voluntary contract, such as ours of hiring workmen, or the contract between a master and his apprentices; and that in any other cases, except as making restitution for theft, or to work out a just debt, the buying and selling of persons was a criminal transaction. The buying as well as the selling, in such a transaction, is denounced as criminal. It was making merchandise of men, a thing expressly forbidden in the divine law, on penalty of death. Accordingly, even in anticipation of the law, its principles were already acted on. There is not one particle of indication that Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob ever sold one of their servants, nor any supposition of the power or right to do so. Nor ever, from the Patriarchs down, is there any instance of any man or master selling a servant. The history of the word fails to disclose one single case of such merchandise. On the contrary, it proves that it was forbidden, and was regarded as sinful; and that either the holding, or selling, or both, of a servant for gain, and against his will, or without his voluntary contract, was an oppression threatened with the wrath of God.

And here belongs the consideration of Deut. 21: 14, the case of the captive woman taken from the heathen for a wife, but afterwards rejected. Two things are forbidden in the treatment of her: 1. *Thou shalt not sell her at all for money*; וְכָרָה לֹא-תִמְכְּרָהּ בַּכֶּסֶף. Comp. Ex. 21: 8.

2. *Thou shalt not make merchandise of her.* Thou shalt not bind her over to another, thou shalt not transfer her to the power of another. She shall not so be subject unto thee, that thou canst deal with her as merchandise or property. The word in this second prohibition is *תִּמְכְּרָהּ*, from *מָכַר*, *to bind*. Our English translation seems to make it exegetical of the preceding prohibition; but it is not a synonyme with *מָכַר*, neither was intended as paraphrastic of that. It is the same word employed in Psalm 129: 7, of the mower binding sheaves to be carried away for use or traffic. לֹא-תִמְכְּרָהּ בָּהּ, thou shalt not play the master or oppressor over her.

A comparison of this with Ex. 21: 8, where the English translation speaks of *selling a Hebrew woman to a strange nation*, which is forbidden, will show that in that passage the translation does not convey the proper meaning; for it was *never* permitted on *any* ground, or for any reason whatever, to bind a Hebrew woman to a heathen, or to deliver over to a foreign nation any Hebrew man or woman, as servant or wife. In the case before us (Deut. 21: 14), this is forbidden in regard to the captive taken from the heathen in war; how much more in regard to any Hebrew! The expression in Ex. 21: 8, לֹא-יִמְכְּרָהּ לְגֵזֶרַת אֲרָצָה, *to a strange nation he shall have no power to sell her*, should be rendered, *to sell her to a strange tribe, or to a strange family*; and the meaning evidently is, that she shall not be transferred from her master to *any other* family, but is wholly free. For the usage of *מָכַר*, compare Lev. 21: 1, 4. Eccl. 6: 2. It might mean, *to a family of strangers*, sojourning in the land, and joined to the congregation by circumcision. The hiring, selling, apprenticing, or disposing of her *in any way at all for money*, is strictly forbidden. She is perfectly free.

The Law against Man-stealing—What it proves.

Immediately after the laws determining the nature and time of contracts with servants, the legislator passes to the crime of murder and the death-penalty against it. Then follows the great fundamental statute, which demonstrates the criminality of slavery in the sight of God : HE THAT STEALETH A MAN AND SELLETH HIM, OR IF HE BE FOUND IN HIS HAND, HE SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH (Ex. 21 : 16). As the stealing of men is the foundation of slavery in most cases, and especially of modern slavery, this statute condemns it as sinful, intrinsically, absolutely. The stealing, the selling, the holding, of a man in slavery, is death ; either form of the crime shall be so punished. Whether the kidnapper keep or sell his victim, the crime is death. But the purchaser, with knowledge of the theft, is equally guilty, and would be treated as conspirator and principal in the same crime. This law, in connection with the other provisions in the Hebrew system, would render slavery impossible. The limitation of legal servitude to six years, and the law of universal freedom on the recurrence of the Jubilee, would alone prevent it ; but the law against man-stealing made it as criminal a system as an organized system of murder would have been. The stealing a man is the stealing him from himself ; the buying of him is the receiving of stolen property ; the enslaving of his children is the stealing of them both from themselves and from him, so that the crime is exasperated in its descent ; by transmission, the crime is at once increased in extent and undiminished as to the original iniquity.

This law must effectually and forever have prevented any traffic in human beings. It denies the principle of property in man ; the selling is the assumption of property in the stolen person, and the selling is punishable by death. The stealing alone, if the thief did not sell, might not be the assertion of property, or of the *principle* of property in man ; but the *selling* of him *would* be ; and either stealing and hold-

ing, or stealing and selling, the crime is put on a level with murder. The stealing of human beings *as* property, and the converting of them *into* property, is worse than the stealing *of* property; as much worse as murder is than stealing. Such is the distinction which God makes between this and a common theft, between the stealing of a *man* and the stealing of *property*. The theft of property was punished by fine; but the stealing of a man, by death: "If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep" (Ex. 22: 1). "If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or sheep, he shall restore double" (22: 4). Comp. 22: 9. If slavery had had any existence among the Hebrews, any toleration, if man had been considered as property, then the penalty for such theft could not have been death, but the restoration of five slaves for a slave, or the payment of five times as much as the stolen man would bring in the market. And the near and striking contrast between these crimes and the respective penalties attached to them, must have made men feel that the assertion of property in man was itself a crime.

Accordingly, there is no indication of any traffic in human beings except where it is indicated as a crime, with the wrath of God pointed against it. There was such traffic among other nations, but no approach to it in Judea. The trade in human beings is set down by the prophet Ezekiel as among the commercial transactions in the market-place of Tyre; but no Hebrew had anything to do with it (Ezek. 27: 13). It is set down by Joel as a damning trade of Tyre and Zidon, of the heathen, and the Grecians (Joel 3: 2—8), and every approximation to it, on the part of Israel, is marked for divine vengeance. But no such traffic was allowed, or existed, under the law of God; no such thing as slavery was either recognized or tolerated. There is no instance of the purchase even of servants from a third person, as if they were articles of possession that could be passed from hand to hand, from master to master, without their own agreement. There is no instance of the *sale* of any servant to a third person. There is no indication that masters ever had any power to sell their servants to others, or

to put them away from their own families, except in perfect freedom. Our English translators, and the lexicographers, have indeed, in most cases, *assumed* slavery and the slave-trade as existing in Judea; but the Mosaic laws and the Jewish history demonstrate the contrary. A single assumption, by Gesenius, that the word for souls in Gen. 12: 5 — נַפְשֵׁי (souls that Abraham and Lot had gotten in Haran), means *slaves*, shall be followed, without examination, by other lexicographers, and shall set the tide of opinion to run on without questioning.

But the statute under consideration shines like a sun upon such an investigation, and throws its light backwards as well as forwards in history and law, as a light of supreme defining and controlling principle. *Human beings cannot be treated as property.* There is no restriction; the universality of the law is unquestionable, the subject of it being a man, not a Hebrew man exclusive of a stranger, but a man, whosoever he might be. The universality of this law is as evident as that of the law in verse 12: “*He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall surely be put to death.*” There is no more ground for restricting the application of the statute against stealing a man to the Hebrew stolen, than that against killing a man. So with the statute against killing a servant; there is no restriction. A comparison of this with Lev. 24: 17, 21, 22, makes it still clearer. In this place the statute is also concerning the death-penalty, and the form is as follows: He that killeth any man shall surely be put to death; and it is added: Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger as for one of your own country; for I am the Lord your God. So with the laws concerning the treatment of one’s neighbor; if any man ask: But who is my neighbor? willing to restrict their application to a countryman, the commentary of our Lord in Luke 10: 30, settles the matter. But if so in a smaller injury committed, or benefit required, much more in the greater. Along with this statute is placed the law, Thou shalt not vex a stranger, nor oppress him, Ex. 22: 21; and again 23: 9. But finally, the matter is settled by Paul, in 1 Tim. 1: 10: “The law is made for man-

slayers, *men-stealers*, and others named, without restriction as to lineage or land. The reference is unquestionable; the application, equally so.

He that stealeth A MAN. If it had been (as some modern supporters of the system of slavery affirm) a statute for the support, sanction, and better protection of slavery and slave-property, a statute against stealing *slaves* or servants, the distinguishing word would have been used (had there been a word in the Hebrew tongue signifying slave); and for want of such a word, the nearest approximation to it would have been taken. The statute must have read, *He that stealeth a servant*, עֶבֶד; not, *He that stealeth אִישׁ, a man*. So gross a blunder could never have been committed by the lawgiver as the introduction of the *genus* instead of the *species*, in a case involving the penalty of death; so gross a blunder as that by which the *slave-holder* instead of the *slave-stealer* might have been obnoxious to the penalty. If it had been a law against the stealing of another man's *slaves*, then the slaveholder might have stolen *a man* and *made* him a slave, with perfect impunity; and only the thief who should dare to steal from *him* the slave so *made*, would be subject to the penalty. The law would have been, not against the stealing of a man *as man*, and making him property, but against the stealing of him as property, *after he is so made*. The assumption of those who would maintain that Moses promulgated this law for the protection of slavery, is just this: that man *as man* is not sacred against kidnapping; but man as kidnapped and made property, *man as property*, is so sacred and inviolable a possession, that the theft of him *as a slave* must be punished with death.

An attempt has been made to deny the universality of this first statement against man-stealing, by the other and second statute in Deut. 24: 7, where the application is directly to the Hebrew. "If a man be found stealing any of his brethren of the children of Israel, and maketh merchandise of him, or selleth him, then that thief shall die." But this statute, which was passed forty years after the other, and without any connection with, or reference to, the same,

cannot be regarded as a statute of limitation or interpretation merely, much less of abrogation, as if the specific abrogated the general. Rather, if any such reference were supposed, might it be contended that it having been found in the course of forty years that the first and general law might have been claimed as applying only to the stranger or the heathen, and not to the stealing of a Hebrew, whose servitude, even if stolen, could not last more than six years (so carefully by law was this adjusted), it was found necessary, for greater security and definiteness, to add the second enactment, specifying also the Hebrew. But here again, any limitation of the first statute by the second is forbidden in the same chapter, by the application of verse 14: "Thou shalt not oppress a hired servant that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy brethren, or of thy strangers that are in thy land within thy gates." Now if a hired servant that was not a Hebrew could not be oppressed, any more than a native, much more could not such a one be stolen with impunity, or the thief escape the penalty. He would not be permitted to plead that, because there was a law against stealing *a Hebrew*, therefore the law against stealing *a man* was null and void.

If the law had been against stealing Jews, instead of men, then the apostle, in transferring it, must have said the law was made for Jew-stealers, not *men-stealers*, for *Ἰουδαιονποδισταῖς*, not *ἀνδραποδισταῖς*. And so, if the law had been against stealing *slaves*, not *man*, for the protection and sanction of *slave-property*, and not to declare God's protection of men, as human beings, against theft, or for the security of slave-owners, and not for the sacredness of men as created in God's image; then the apostle, in translating that law into the wider dispensation, and defining its application, must have said, the law was made for *slave-stealers*, *δουλοποδισταῖς*, or *δουλοπατιαῖς*, not men-stealers. The context in Exodus, and context in Timothy, nail the passages as beyond all disputation referring to the same law. In Exodus it lies alongside with statutes against man-slayers, cursers and murderers of father and mother; in 1 Tim. the con-

junction is the same, so that no man can for a moment doubt the precise law in Exodus, which is referred to by Paul in writing to Timothy. He could not therefore, in referring to it, have wholly distorted its meaning, its application. He could not have made so great a mistake as that of levelling against the very foundations of slavery and the slave trade, a law published originally and intended of God for the protection of slave property. He could not have interpreted in behalf of the rights of men against slave-holders, a law intended to secure the rights of slave-holders against men.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE II.

PERPETUAL SIN AND OMNIPOTENT GOODNESS.¹

By L. P. Hickok, D. D., Union College.

How can perpetual sin consist with omnipotent goodness? The apparently inherent contradiction of the two terms of this question, is the Conflict of Ages; the attained harmonious unity of the two will be the Problem Solved.

Merely as a speculation, there is here opened a wide field for profound thinking and ingenious theorizing, which might have secured for itself an unfailing intellectual interest. But the interest in this question has been much more quickened and perpetuated, because it involves considerations which take hold on the most controlling susceptibilities of the hu-

¹ The Conflict of Ages: or, The Great Debate on the Moral Relations of God and Men. By Edward Beecher, D. D. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1853.

The Problem Solved, or Sin not of God. By Miles P. Squier, D. D., Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, Beloit College. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, Corner of Spruce Street and City Hall Square.

man mind, and deal with its deepest convictions and profoundest emotions. If we admit the being of God, we must recognize our subjection to him and our dependence upon him. How perplexing, then, if his very creation and providence intimate that he is destitute of benevolence, or wanting in equity! Or, should we admit the integrity of the Divine character, how perplexing still, if he seem to us to be so bound in the necessities of nature, that he cannot preclude nor control sin and suffering! What distress, if forced to the conclusion that our Sovereign has no power to shut the object of his deepest abhorrence from his realm; or that, having the power, he yet has not the heart to deliver his creatures from their deadliest enemy! Must the fact of sin logically force us to atheism, by directly concluding against either omnipotence or benevolence? Or, if we retain our faith in God, must we be logically shut up to accept the doctrine of universal restoration, against the plain testimony of Scripture? If we reluctate all such conclusions, must we then be obliged eternally to witness sin and misery, and be able to find no principle by which we can defend the honor of God's sovereignty, or the goodness of his government, in the permission of sin, to our own satisfaction or the conviction of others?

We shall not silence such perplexed and anxious inquiries by saying, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight;" for the very inquiry involves the determination whether there be for us a "Father," and that what seems "good in his sight," is at all worthy of him and kind to his children. Nor can we meet the captious and cavilling objections which here originate, by saying, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" Such a reply assumes the admission of a wise and holy God; but the rebuke can have no force against that mind which takes the very existence of sin and misery as an argument against the existence of any sovereignty which is wise and righteous. Neither a desponding nor a cavilling scepticism can be effectually met by any dogmatic reply; for the sources of the doubts are quite back beyond the reach of the dogma vainly

applied to exclude them. We may even say that it is all a mystery, and that we must leave the whole for the light of eternity to explain; but the infidel can then as boldly say: "that coming light will vindicate the witness of sin and misery against the superstition of an assumed existing Deity," as the believer can say: "that his assumed Deity will then vindicate his perfections and clear his character, against all the false inferences that have been derived from the facts of sin and misery."

The pantheist may argue, that a connected justice always follows and metes out the deserved retributions for all the actions of men, and thus all the iniquities of humanity are fully equalized and adjusted by the penalties which come judicially up from the ongoings of nature. The Hegelian pancosmist may say, that sin is the necessary result in the developments of the great world-spirit, and has its uses as really as the thorn on the rose, or the viper-fang and its secreted venom. A fatalist may reason that in the very conception of opposites, one is conditional for the other; and that there can be no even without the odd, no light without darkness, no pleasure without pain, and no virtue without vice, and thus if there be a world with holiness, so also must there be its contrast in sin. And finally, a physical deteriorationist may affirm, that all finite things tend to decay; matter tends back to nihility, and all virtue tends to degeneracy; and if God would have a created material world, he must perpetually renew the creative energy; and if he would have a finite moral system, he must repeatedly infuse new virtue into it, and, at the best, the finite will have evil. But if we keep our faith in the being of a free personal Jehovah, the great conflict of ages on this point cannot be settled, nor the grand problem be solved, till we have found some way of carrying a clear principle through all the facts, and fairly reconciling the creature's sin and suffering and the Creator's power and goodness with each other. This is no easy task, but from the vital importance of the solution, we may safely infer that it cannot be a hopeless undertaking.

In the "Conflict of Ages," Dr. Beecher includes not only the fact of an original entrance of sin, but more especially the perpetuation of it through successive generations of men depraved in infancy. The origin of sin, indeed, is soon passed over as having in itself no great difficulty, and the whole difficulty is made to rest, and the whole attention turned upon the discordance of the divine perfections with the existence of infant depravity. The eye is perpetually fixed upon the opening of human life, and, as in all cases this opening of life is in helplessness and ignorance, and under constant and strong bias and influences to transgression, and with a certain issue in sin of every completed trial, the inquiry becomes most urgent, and is followed up most seriously and anxiously. How can such depravity be consistent with honor and right on the part of God?

An extended and very able and thorough examination is made of the many forms in which the doctrines of original sin and infant depravity have been presented by various theological authors. This is, moreover, accompanied by a very acute analysis of the different philosophical theories, and their modified phases, by which it has been sought to account for, and explain the facts of, human depravity consistently with divine integrity. In this protracted and careful investigation, there is apparent an intentional candor and impartiality, which wins much upon the interest and confidence of the reader. Indeed, the determination to be honest and fair has manifestly, at times, been overstrained, and by an excess of liberality, more has been accorded to theories with which he does not sympathize, and less to those with which he more nearly does, than the exact truth will warrant. There is also a spirit of deep earnestness, seriousness, and at times of tender and touching sadness, which effectually excludes all the sharpness and tartness too often found in connection with theological controversy. This patient and comprehensive examination of declining and of now prevalent theories, leaves his own mind still unsatisfied. They do not reconcile the facts, as given by them, with the claims of honor and right in God. They do not give

to him a Deity whom his heart can love, or his soul revere and worship with confidence and gladness.

In Dr. Beecher's apprehension, the two great moving forces of revelation and christianity are, human depravity, and God's integrity of character, and that those have been most unhappily "misadjusted," and made comparatively ineffective by an early and unfortunate assumption, "that men as they come into this world are new-created beings." The "readjustment" of these great forces is to be secured only by a denial and rejection of such assumption. "If in a previous state of existence, God created all men with such constitutions, and placed them in such circumstances as the laws of honor and right demanded, if then they revolted and corrupted themselves, and forfeited their rights, and were introduced into this world under a dispensation of sovereignty disclosing both justice and mercy, then all conflict of the moving powers of christianity can be at once and entirely removed."

Such fact of preëxistence in sin reconciles, to his mind, with God's rectitude all the attendant circumstances of ignorance and weakness and tempting occasions which the infancy of human life encounters. These infants are already sinners in a former sphere of action, and they deserve even worse conditions of existence and severer retributions than such as are here imposed; and besides, they are placed here under a dispensation of mercy and with the opportunity of a fresh probation, in which multitudes of those already lost spirits will be rescued and brought back to God. The great and glorious employment of this redeemed church, is then to be a ministration of diligent instruction and pious nurture. Myriads of new-created beings successively come under their charge, and the story of the divine dealings with them, and their gracious recovery to righteousness, together with all the holy counsel and culture bestowed, will avail to restrain all those myriads from sin, and keep them in perpetual holiness and uninterrupted happiness. God thus gloriously justifies his ways to men.

Now, it can hardly be questioned that this assumption of

human preëxistence must almost universally, upon its first announcement, meet with incredulity and repugnance. It is so unlikely that such previous agency should have existed without leaving some traces upon our consciousness, that it will be spontaneously rejected by the common mind. In ancient times, and not very unfrequently since, it was proposed to human conception as a pagan superstition, or a philosophical myth, or a veritable christian dogma, but in no form has it been competent to give to it general currency, nor even that it should obtain credence from any considerable number of speculating and imaginative persons. It is a good argument against it, that common conviction always rejects it. It must be worked under the strong pressure of seeking relief from some uncomfortable dogma; or it can never make any progress, even as an hypothesis, and nothing can probably give to it general acceptance as a veritable fact. But there are other direct reasons for rejecting it as a satisfactory method for reconciling human depravity with the divine perfections.

In the first place, the general scope of Scripture statement and teaching is very strongly against it. The history of man's creation carries with it the evidence, that the writer of the first two chapters of Genesis supposed that Adam and Eve then began their being. The statement of their trial and fall has all the directness which belongs to a narration of real occurrences; and if any should be disposed to consider it as a myth, or a figurative representation, such would still be obliged to admit, that the writer meant to comprehend the fall of the race in one progenitor, and not that it can be interpreted as a typical allusion to myriads of distinct and separate transgressors. Neither Moses, nor any other Scripture writer, gives the faintest traces of any recognition that Adam came into Paradise a sinner, nor that this Paradise and fall were in some previous state of being. The most forced and unnatural interpretation must be given to the Bible, on such an hypothesis, carrying with it the evidence that there is some supposed exigency, making it necessary to attain a meaning by violence. It is indeed quite as appa-

rent that such is a forced interpretation, as when the attempt is made to sustain the doctrine of universal salvation to be the meaning of the Bible. Neither of the one nor the other do the writers say any such thing; nor say anything which implies that they thought of it; while they do say many things which evince that they did not believe it.

We have the recognition of preëxistence in the Lord Jesus Christ, but this only for his divinity, not his humanity. We have also the intimation that, in some sense, John the Baptist was Elijah, the old Hebrew prophet; but we are not given to believe that the same soul existed in the two bodies, and that Elias and John were but one and the same person. The spirit and power of Elias came upon John the Baptist, much as his spirit rested upon Elisha when he caught the falling mantle. Once only, is there a pretty fair allusion to the notion of human preëxistence in the Scriptures, and then the notion is at once denied by the Saviour. "Master, who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind? Jesus answered: Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents; but that the works of God should be made manifest in him" (John 9: 23).

But if such supposition give the only method for reconciling the facts of depravity in man with the principles of honor and right in God, the doctrine of preëxistence should have been fully revealed. Nothing else can give the inquiring and anxious mind relief; and this is no principle of reason, which may be attained by careful study and thus applied in elucidation of the mystery. It is a fact beyond consciousness, which no powers of recollection can call up, and no testimony but God's can establish. Surely it should not have been left to conjecture; but have been made a plainly-revealed truth.

Again, if benevolence be the same as honor and right, there is no assistance in the assumption of preëxistence. As a matter of fact, so many of the human race are lost, and so many saved, either without or with this hypothesis. There is no change made in the sum total of human happiness by its introduction. It is introduced for no such purpose as ac-

counting for any changes, or effecting any, after the birth of man upon the earth. It is precisely one and the same fact, one and the same onward progress and issue, with two suppositions of origin. Benevolence really gains nothing by adopting the notion of preëxistence; why then introduce it? you answer: To save the perfections of honor and right in God. But if the highest attainable happiness be the ground of honor and right, they are safe already, and this supposition adds nothing to them. If you are troubled with questions of honor and right, they must come from some other source than considerations of greater happiness, for you actually get no greater happiness by any such hypothesis.

Once more; the assumption of preëxistence recognizes only individuals, and admits of no conception that there is any higher unity in man. All acted and sinned in their isolation on a previous stage, and all begin action here with each his own depravity brought down from a former sphere of being. All stand out in separate individuality, with no headship in Adam, no unity of race, no one humanity, but only manifold and discrete personality. But such is not the Bible representation of man; such is not the philosophical truth; such is not the empirical fact. The Bible repeatedly and most emphatically recognizes some headship in Adam. Philosophy ever contemplates man as a concrete; humanity entire in its unity. Experience, with its broadest inductions, confirms the existence of a law above that which reigns in the individual, and which binds all individuals in one community. The perpetuation of human form, and mental faculty, and relative proportions of sex, and the one stream of historic development for man, all evince that there is a prevalent and persistent causality before and above all individual peculiarity. This higher unity in humanity, above all distinct personality, need not be viewed as holding the sin and guilt of all in the aggregate, and distributing it in positive demerit to each as he emerges in separate identity; but only as holding all under the same generic *liabilities* while leaving each to his own distinct *responsibilities*; and yet such higher unity there is, and it may not be over-

looked in the investigation of what honor and right demand from God in the perpetuations of depravity. Adam's pater-
ternity of the race connects him with all, and has that in it
which conditions all in common, and, quite back of the in-
dividuality and personal consciousness of each, pours its
stream of influence down upon each, and works its modify-
ing results in each, and makes all of a generation not a
mere *collocation* of separate men, but a *concretion* of exist-
ing mankind; and also makes of successive generations, not
a mere *sequence*, but a *linked series* of being. This fact of
generic unity must be regarded in the moral as well as in the
physiological history of the human race, and must throw its
light upon all our philosophizing.

But this assumption of preëxistent sin not merely rejects,
but annihilates, all such generic unities. All originally be-
gan in complete independence of all other; and all sinned
alone under no connections of headship or race; and each
had his completed character and confirmed habit before his
birth from Adam. So far as depravity is concerned, Adam
and all his children stand to each as disjoined as the fallen
angels. Such conclusions are neither consonant with Scrip-
ture, philosophy, nor fact.

But more than all the above, the hypothesis, if true, could
not at all touch the point of perplexity and anxiety. The
great difficulty is with such as are finally lost. They will
justly complain that their trial has not been fair, nor God's
treatment of them honorable and righteous. We now would
shut their mouths by letting them know, what they have all
along been wholly unconscious of, that they sinned in a pre-
ëxistent state where they had a fair trial, and that their pre-
cedent sin has been the ground of all God's severe condi-
tions in their infant temptations and onward trial. Their
old guilt remains upon them, and they have incalculably
augmented this in all their subsequent sinning under a dis-
pensation of grace. The penalty of the whole is now to be
rigorously executed, and their preëxistence and sin is to
make God's whole transaction clear and just when he judges
and condemns.

"It would have been just," any one of them might admit, "to have punished me according to my demerit in my former estate, but why put me in the new state of trial with its augmented responsibilities, and under its hard conditions of weakness, ignorance, and surrounding temptation, and with the certainty that in me the trial would wholly fail, and I should sink at last to a deeper doom?" The answer is: "you deserved harder conditions than those you received, and your severities in a mitigated form were in punishment for your former sins." But he answers: "I knew of no former sins when such penalty was inflicted, and it is the same penal enormity as that which should hang the murderer when he has become an idiot." Besides, "I now see that it was the old depravity which wrought out its issues in my new probation, and that what I brought with me hurried me on in sin when I did not know whence it came, nor that the madness was of my own procuring; and must I now suffer for that?" The answer may be, "yes; it is but holding the drunkard responsible, when sober, for the deeds of his drunken frenzy." But he will reply again: "the drunkard's sin is not in his drunken agency, but in the voluntary pollutions which induced the madness; and here, you yourself have put me into this state of unconscious delirium." Shall he then be told: "but your sin in your new probation was voluntary, and your rejection of offered mercy has been wilful." May he not then answer: "I admit it, so far as sin has wrought out itself in consciousness, and my just desert should follow; but that is cutting off completely all the connections of my preëxistent state, and dealing with me for sins originating entirely within the body."

In conclusion, it may be said, that, if so violent a supposition could be turned to any good account, still it would be unnecessary and undesirable. A better way is more easily opened. The whole difficulty is really in the permission of the first sin, and when we have accounted for the existence of sin at all, we shall be able to meet all consequential difficulties with comparative facility. We cannot regard this hypothesis of preëxistent sin as at all needed; and, more

than this, we would say that it stands out to our apprehension as unnatural, unphilosophical, unscriptural, and even admitting it to have its application, it would be still unsatisfactory.

We turn now to the consideration of what is given to us in the "Problem Solved." Here is nothing of the mental conflict and distressing perplexity which we have witnessed in the former work. Dr. Squier takes at once a position which puts him quite out of the range of such contemplations and conclusions as had disquieted Dr. Beecher. He goes directly and intrepidly to the moral source of all sin, and finds the responsible origination of it ever to be in the finite, and never from the Infinite. He presents God as an Absolute Agent, originating acts unconditioned by anything back and out of himself; and his acts, both of plan and adoption, of purpose and execution, are ever right and worthy of his approbation and acceptance. In his unalloyed holiness he can have no complicity with sin in any way whatever. Sin is altogether separate from, and exclusive of, God's agency, and exists at all only in spite of God's planning, and purposing, and working against it.

Finite creatures are dependent upon God for their being and their natural attributes. They are wholly of his constituting; but as moral beings they have their existence and attributes in such a manner that they themselves are competent to originate actions and events. A moral agent, though dependent in his being, is yet a complete cause, competent from himself to go out in effects without being caused to do so. Such produced effects, or originated events, as come from such agents, are their own, and wholly at their responsibility. Here, and here only, sin originates. It comes from the creature, and is wholly at his responsibility, and there is no occasion to go back of this finite agent and make any inquiries about other responsibilities. The absolute agent only creates and upholds the finite moral agent, while this moral creature as thus upheld puts forth sinful acts in which God has no share, and his character needs no defence from any difficulties or contradictions

which have seemed to grow out of the introduction of moral evil. The tares are in the field with the wheat, but an enemy sowed them while the Lord of the field sowed only good seed; keep, then, this enemy solely responsible for the evil of the existing tares, and give to the lord of the field all the credit for the wheat.

Every sinner is thus viewed as himself the sole author of his sin, and the only responsible actor in anything that has demerit, and there is, therefore, no opportunity to raise the question: How is sin, or infant depravity, consistent with honor and right in God? The question is wholly dispensed with by dissolving all connection between its terms. The problem is solved by altogether separating God from the sin; or rather, by this previous solution, the whole problem is annihilated. Such is a very summary presentation of what we find to be the substance of the "Problem Solved."

Now we admit the truth of the general principle contended for by Dr. S., that sin is wholly from the finite, and not from the Infinite, so far at least as any participation of agency is concerned in that which has any demerit. We recognize the force and admire the clearness with which he sometimes puts his conclusions to our convictions—that God is an originating cause; that he is not the only cause, but that finite agents are also causes competent to originate, and actually do originate sin from themselves. We have also been interested in the manner of putting objections to opposite conclusions, and the point with which he sometimes hits an adversary; but it is wholly a mistake to assume that in all this the real Problem is solved. God is not so wholly disconnected with sin, as to leave no occasion for the question of consistency between its existence and his integrity of character. To go the length to which Dr. S. would seem to carry it, would eliminate sin, not merely from the sphere of his direct agency, but also from his sovereignty and his universal purposes altogether. God is not the actor and originator of sin; but yet the creature who does sin is from God, upheld in being by God when he sins and after he is a sinner, and the conditions under which he sins are

within God's directing agency ; and we need some further solution than any which is effected by merely referring the direct origination of sin to the finite. There must be reasons for creating and so creating and conditioning the finite agent who does sin, that, in their light, the Creator shall stand, to himself and all other intelligent beings, justified and honored.

Sin is in the system of which God is the Author and Governor. He must be the author of very much misery, and inflict grievous suffering on its account. He must have much to do with sin, and endure much from it, and in many ways have circumstantial complicity with it, and hence the question must remain to be settled: How can this be, and his attributes not be impeached by it? An Enemy sowed the tares while men slept; but why did the Lord of the field suffer it? Did he, too, sleep? or was he awake, and, knowing what this Enemy was doing, did he connive at it?

Dr. S. himself sometimes betrays that he feels the necessity for this further solution. He says that which implies that, after all, the Problem is yet *to be solved*: "Certain it is that God will vindicate himself to all goodness and righteousness in the matter of wrong in the finite, and do all that infinite wisdom and benevolence suggest in the premises, if not all indeed that the inherent relations of the subject admit." (p. 178). And he goes on to suggest that "he may let it work out its own problems;" "let sin work for instruction to others;" "for warning to the universe to stand in awe of it," etc.; thereby hinting at modes of solution to a question still remaining, which regards God's integrity, though sin be from the finite. We know, indeed, from clear distinctions repeatedly given in his work, that Dr. S. would attempt no justification on grounds of mere prudential expediency, or considerations of highest happiness, for he lays the basis of all morality in ultimate principles of intrinsic excellency and dignity; but just how he would make such complete solution, he has not told us. He indeed assumes that the Problem is solved in showing that sin is wholly from the finite, but unconsciously admits, at times, that there both needs, and may be, this higher solution. He has gone over

a part of the ground, but by no means the whole of it, nor indeed the most difficult part of it.

Sin is ; God is : these two truths admitted, the inquiry is still left, urgent and irrepressible : How can the two consist with each other ? How can sin and suffering be where Omnipotence and Goodness also are ? Admit the sin to be wholly from the creature, yet the question remains : Could not Omnipotence preclude it ? or, did not the Divine Goodness wish to prevent it ? Leaving, then, the peculiar methods of both these authors, we proceed in our own way to find a solution. The attempt is to attain a thorough and conclusive answer, and for this purpose it will be necessary to go over the whole field opened in the inquiry ; but we will strive to make our course as direct as possible, consistently with clearness and fullness of investigation.

There are two and only two general methods practicable in prosecuting this investigation : one takes *the greatest happiness*, and may be called *THE THEORY OF BENEVOLENCE* ; the other takes *the highest worthiness*, and may be known as *THE THEORY OF RECTITUDE*. The distinction is radical between the *bene* and the *recte*, though commonly entirely disregarded. Most American, and especially New-England theologians, have worked at this problem somewhere within the theory of Benevolence ; and yet in defending or refuting they have perpetually applied principles which can legitimately be found and used only within the theory of Rectitude. That a true psychology teaches such radical distinction, and that it is necessary accurately to mark the sharp discrimination, will be made manifest as we proceed in the discussion.

The theory of benevolence, through all its modifications, has these leading facts : Happiness is gratified susceptibility, and is the desire of all sentient being. The greater amount of sentient life, whether in One Being or in the aggregate of many beings, gives capacity for the greater happiness, and the sum total of sentient existence in its greatest happiness is the highest good, and the ultimate end to be regarded in all action. To wish this is benevolence, and in this is

the essence of all virtue. On the other hand, that the individual should regard his own happiness, in any way, in conflict with the greatest sum total of happiness, is selfishness, and in this is the essence of all sin. To encourage self-denial in the sacrifice of individual for universal happiness, it should be understood that such particular self-denial will react in individual happiness to a greater degree than any self-indulgence could have reached, and thus benevolence is always prudence—a wise expediency for all men in all cases.

If this theory use the words *right, obligation, duty, etc.*, the meaning should be interpreted strictly within the ends of greatest happiness. That is ultimate, and the moral measure of all things. This end is also one with God and all his creatures, comprehending his own infinitude of being and that of all his finite creatures; the highest degree of happiness attainable, in the aggregate, is God's ultimate rule of action. He is benevolent, and in this he is righteous, in seeking the greatest attainable happiness upon the whole. Let it be carefully noted, that happiness is ever gratified susceptibility, supplying a sentient craving; satisfying a want, and that as the nature of the sentient being is, such must be the line to its greatest happiness and the motive to its action. The whole root is in nature; as God or man finds the greatest sum total of happiness to be attainable, that is the end of the inquiry, and the end of duty; the nature found has determined all. And now we say, that on this theory of Benevolence, a number of hypothetical positions may be taken, from which to reconcile the existence of sin with the perfections of God.

The line to be pursued may, at the outset, be indicated. Sin is an evil because of the suffering it induces, and benevolence must desire to exclude all unhappiness, and the power must be exerted to effect it. But if a position can be attained from whence it can be seen that, in the very *nature of the case*, the greatest attainable happiness involves still some unhappiness, and that no conceived application of power can remedy it, then are we at the point we wish. Benevolence gets all the happiness that any power can, and such remaining un-

happiness is no impeachment of any perfection. This is the general guide in the taking of a position, and several such positions may be assumed. The theory itself limits the number, and we may find all and make our examination completely exhaustive. Some of these may be untenable, and we may force the theorist from one to another. We may in fact thus logically drive him through, and out of, the whole sphere of Benevolence, and allow him no rest till he stands fairly and intelligently on the only firm footing of the ultimate Right.

We first assume, under the general theory of Benevolence, a position that looks to *the nature of Benevolence itself*. We suppose, here, that God directed both his creating and controlling agency, in the attainment of greatest happiness, by the nature of Benevolence. The greatest intensity of the benevolent desire is of the most value, inasmuch as it must produce the greatest happiness. This is to be estimated by the trials it will endure and the sacrifices it will make. That being who will practise self-denial strongly and promptly under the application of tempting motives, has a higher intensity of benevolence, and of more value for happiness, than he who perseveres in a benevolent course only amid the most favoring circumstances. God, then, so makes and disposes all the agents in his system, that obedience to the law of benevolence, in those very circumstances, will attain the highest aggregate intensity and value of benevolence, and he, of course, desires and requires obedience in every case.

But he also foreknows, that in these circumstances the motives will not be sufficient to secure benevolent action in all cases. Sin and misery will enter; yet he also foresees, that on this entrance of sin he can introduce other motives of chastisement, punishment, atonement, etc., which shall be sufficient to induce an augmented intensity of benevolence, in the aggregate exactly to counterbalance the evils of the still prevalent selfishness. He, thus, makes the issue equal in intensity of benevolence, and value in happiness, that universal obedience would have originally gained. The problem is herein solved. Sin is; but the interpositions, by

God himself, consequent upon its entrance have attained an equal value in benevolence and happiness to the highest, the entrance and prevalence of present sin notwithstanding.

From such a position, we can reconcile the present degree of sin and unhappiness with the power and goodness of God, if we can stand upon it. But here is the difficulty; the position is assailable and indefensible. To God, it must be a matter of indifference which course should be taken, for it comes out equal in value in both cases; but the Scriptures nowhere tolerate the notion that God was indifferent whether Adam sinned or not. It involves palpable absurdities. Benevolence is right; but here are two courses equal in benevolence, and of course both must be right. It is in itself just as right to have the system with sin as that without. Moreover, the process under the two suppositions necessitates endless absurdities. God desires all to obey on the first supposition, and when he brings in his measures after sin has entered, he still represents himself as desiring obedience and not sin; and if so, he must still keep the alternatives open with equal values on each side. There must then be a perceiving of equivalents through all the permutations of quantity that may be made of all moral agents, and of all points of activity in all moral agents!

But the real difficulty is more radical than its indefensibility; the position cannot be used for its purpose without itself sliding away and changing to quite another hypothesis. While we are applying the nature of benevolence and determining its value, we are obliged to see that no such determination can be made without estimating the motives employed. One set of means will augment, and another diminish, the intensity of the benevolence, so that, after all, the whole must turn upon the nature of the means to be applied, and this logically places us in quite a new position.

We are thus forced to a *second* hypothesis, and find ourselves in this position: *the nature of the means* must have guided the author and governor of this system of benevolence. The nature of the means to be employed cannot be determined without regarding the subjective excitability, and

the congeniality of the objective appliance. Motive has its strength according as the susceptibility is quick and the appliance pungent. Subjective excitability and objective appliance might be so low, as not to endanger selfish gratification, and thus the system would be kept free from all sin; but such a torpid susceptibility and weak appliances would exclude not merely all sin, but also the very means necessary to the highest benevolence. The very measures which minister to the man's or the angel's highest happiness and benevolence, endanger also his selfish perversion and fall into sin. God has therefore so tempered both the subjective and objective motives, as to secure the greatest practicable amount of benevolence with the least selfishness. Better the present order of means with the consequent sin, than any lower means and less or no sin and misery, but with also the less benevolence and happiness. The question is in this solved. Power and goodness attain all the benevolence and happiness that the nature of the case admits. God must work by means, and he gets all the good that the nature of the means to be used can secure, and with as little evil.

We might, perhaps, object to this hypothesis, that, begin with as low excitability as there might be, it is the nature of mental capacity to grow with its own activity, and that, at some augmented stage of susceptible being, selfish gratification would be induced; and sin come in and run on in its indefinite aggravations; or we might suppose that, with a given degree of motive on one side, infinite wisdom and power might effectually counterbalance the conservative motives on the other, and then, though happiness should grow, yet selfishness would never come in, but the real happiness of the position is, as before; it will not stay in its own use. It glides away while we are attempting to take our observations from it; for we are forced, in looking, to see that the means must be estimated altogether by the helplessness that is to be attained. The happiness is in the nature of the sentient system; if we find the greatest amount to be in one order of gratification, the means must conform to it, and the highest intensity of benevolence will be in thus carrying the

wishes forward; but, if we mistake in that which is the highest happiness, we shall doubtless apply the wrong means and dash both the happiness and benevolence forever. We cannot stand looking at the nature of the means, any more than, before, we could at the nature of the benevolence; for the nature of that happiness, to which the system finds itself intrinsically adapted, must determine both.

We are thus logically turned to a new position, and must stand upon *the nature of happiness*. Benevolent happiness must be gratification in imparting, and not in directly receiving; and as this is now to guide in all the agency of the Deity, we have to contemplate its direction in its own tendency according to its own nature. God finds himself with a benevolent nature that can gratify itself only by imparting; and this impartation must be of that which he has to communicate. He is alone in his own benevolent perfections; he must thus create other beings than himself, to whom he may communicate himself. They must be intelligent, as only such can come in communication with him. He must impart, not literally a transfer of his own benevolent perfections, but a manifestation or display of them. He can gratify his benevolent nature in no other manner. This impartation cannot be satisfactory to the benevolent desire by mere narration or description; it must be made in veritable fact. There must be such beings as shall bring out a manifestation of all his benevolent attributes in their own actual experience; and, as this cannot be done by displaying all his perfections in any one case, there must be varieties fitted to each manifestation. Some must display directly the benevolence of God in the various ways of rewarding them for their benevolence; and, as benevolence itself can never adequately manifest itself, but by displaying its hostility and hatred to its opposite, it must have such selfish beings as may afford the opportunity for manifesting this hatred to selfishness, in their punishment. There must, even in the very consummation of divine benevolence, be different vessels, "some to honor and some to dishonor;" "vessels of mercy afore prepared to glory," and "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." The

highest happiness of God's benevolent nature cannot be gained without such displays of both his love and hatred; and the highest happiness of his creatures, in the aggregate, cannot be secured in any other manner. He must have benevolent beings enough for displaying his love, in the varieties of his rewarding, and selfish beings enough for adequately displaying his hatred, in the varieties of his punishing. Thus sin and suffering are in the system to just the degree and manner dictated by Infinite Benevolence itself. The problem is solved: Omnipotence cannot gratify Infinite Benevolence in any other way. God's nature cannot prompt the exertions of his power in any other direction. The necessities of a benevolent happiness are, only in this, met and executed.

Here, then, terminates all legitimate theorizing, under the general form of Benevolence. There can be no other positions taken, in the proposition that Benevolence is the means to highest happiness, but, successively, on the nature of benevolence; its means; and its happiness; and, by a logical necessity, the first two must be determined from the last. The theory of Benevolence culminates in this point; and whatever modifications may be made in any of its three hypotheses, they must at length come out substantially in the above form. An advocate of the theory will, of course, make all its repellances as little prominent as possible; but in the collisions of controversial discussion, they will all be made to disclose themselves in their proper shapes and places. We shall have sin as the necessary means of the greatest good; obedience to the divine law no guide to the best result; the existence of two contradictory wills in the Divine Being, one preceptively forbidding selfishness, and the other decretively securing it; and especially the absurdity of being willing to be damned in order to the securing of the greater good. All these are involved in the system; and, if the foundation in highest happiness be true, they are both justified and reconciled in the system. The lost ought to "wish themselves accursed from Christ," for the sake of others' and God's greater happiness. Yea, they ought to be

the happier in and for their eternal misery; it is only self-denial for highest happiness' sake; bearing the cross, benevolently, for others' greater good. The absurdity is much higher up than in the terms of these propositions, even rooted inherently, in the doctrine itself, of greatest happiness as ultimate end.

The important defect of the whole theory is, that it can possibly give no moral system. It is all founded in a constitutional nature. The happiness is from gratified susceptibility; and as that is, and the motives which reach it, such must the action be. God finds himself with a taste gratified in benevolence, and he is miserable except in following out its impulses; and he goes out, in action, in the same necessity of nature as the ox to his fodder. Motive governs everywhere, both in God and his creatures; and the objective motive is determined in the subjective susceptibility; and this susceptibility is an imposed constitution in the creature, and only not imposed in God's constitution, because the philosophy arbitrarily stops short of the causal constituting, and simply finds it already done and the taste already there. All is *cause caused*, and there is no free originating cause — *a cause causing* — in the universe. Dr. Beecher would ask for "principles of honor and right;" there is no place for them. The Psychology will not admit of them. There is nothing but a want — an appetite; there is no intrinsic worth, no claim as an imperative. The Highest finds himself the most happy in benevolently imparting himself to his creatures, and he has nothing higher to guide him. The simple prompting of this appetite is "honor and right."

Although here is logically the consummation of the theory of benevolence, yet it were not possible that the human mind should be satisfied with it. This susceptibility to benevolent happiness is not the highest principle in man or God. Rational spirit can, from its own insight of what it is, determine at once what is due to it, and what is worthy of it; and can thus sit in judgment and pass sentence upon its benevolent gratifications, and decide whether the happiness that is sought in imparting is a virtue or a vice; con-

sistent with honor and right, or dishonorable and wrong. There is thus a power over, and thereby a freedom in, all this pathological benevolence, and the being knows that he is morally held to control all his happiness, even that of benevolence, by a regard to his own true dignity and worthiness. The man will thus judge his logical theories, and not seldom does he find his logical and his moral convictions directly in contradiction. If his logic irrefragably proves, that the sentient nature determines the motive which must be the strongest and must govern, and that thus he can act only as he is *pleased* to act; his moral being will as irreversibly decide, that he feels the constraint of an imperative above all his sentient being, and that this very *pleasing* to act is still under a liberty that keeps him consciously responsible for it. His rational spirit knows a law and an alternative force, which his logical understanding cannot find nor comprehend. It was thus to have been an anticipated probability, that this spiritual conviction of freedom should induce a higher hypothesis than any which the controlling efficiency of constitutional motives could tolerate, even before it had fully discriminated the peculiarities of its own origin. The nature of free-agency may be taken as a position, and yet all the really contradictory assumptions of the greatest-happiness principle be retained. The advance footstep will be in the theory of rectitude, while still the other foot lingers uncomfortably on the theory of benevolence.

This fourth hypothesis then is, that *the nature of free-agency* is such, that God cannot have more holiness and less sin. The very essence of free-agency is, a power to the opposite; and thus in its nature it is that which may sin in any possible appropriate circumstances of its being. In the absence of all proof but such as can be derived from the nature of free-agency, no one is warranted in assuming that sin is not somewhere incidental to the ongoing of a free system. This may be assumed to have been the only alternative to God, on the morning of creation, no moral system, or a moral system in which sin will be. The free-agency *might* ever keep itself holy, but no one can say from itself¹⁶

that it ever *will*. God, as benevolent, will secure more holiness and happiness on the whole, than sin and misery, or he would withhold his creative act; but all that can be claimed is, that he exclude as much sin and include as much holiness as he can himself. He would desire all holiness and no sin, if his free creatures would voluntarily so act, but inasmuch as they will not, he takes the work into his own hand, and, through the grand means of gospel redemption, recovers from as much sin to as great holiness and happiness as is possible to himself to effect. The question is, then, hereby solved. There is sin; for, from the nature of free-agency it is, to any application of power that does not destroy it, impossible to prevent sin; but benevolence secures all the holiness, and excludes all the sin that is possible. God is good; and this limitation of power, in the nature of free-agency, is no imperfection in the divine being.

The objections to this hypothesis have been mainly by such as have viewed it only from the theory of benevolence, and hence it has certainly been more ably defended than attacked. The objections have been mostly derived from the limitations of power and of blessedness in God which are involved in it, but those are readily obviated by showing that such limitations of power are no defect, and that their own hypothesis involves equal limitations; and that God's blessedness is not diminished by any hindrances to benevolence, which lie in the nature of the case. It is no perfection to assume an ability to do absurdities; and it is no loss of any bliss that is wise, if it could only come through contradictions. It has moreover added to itself, in corroboration, the arguments of analogy, and conformity to Scripture and common sense. Sin has entered the present system, and substantially its elements must be in all systems of moral beings; from analogy we may infer that sin would enter any. The efforts to exclude sin from the present system, and which have been ineffectual, might lead to the safe conclusion that no *ab extra* efforts could exclude it from any. All the facts and declarations of Scripture, and all

the dictates of common sense, it is alleged, harmonize with it.

But the inherent impotency of the hypothesis is, that it is a hybrid, and cannot perpetuate itself in the line of either parent. It cannot retain its greatest-happiness principle, and transmit its freedom; it cannot keep its free-agency and hold on to its paternity in benevolence. If God's highest principle of action is the gratification of a benevolent susceptibility, then he must go on, communicating what he finds within himself as he is prompted by the wants of his own nature, and can never go back and judge this nature by any ethical principles, nor control its working by any considerations of "honor and right." Himself and the benevolent system he makes are both conditioned in a nature already given, and there is no alternative from the creating to the terminating act. There is only the sentient craving and the unerring judgment of what will satisfy it; and the unavoidable issue is that the agency must go out to get it. There is else perpetual wretchedness. God originates nothing; he only develops the nature he finds in himself.

But, on the other hand, if God be truly a free agent and the personal originator of a free system, then must he have seen within himself a principle higher than his want of happiness in the gratification of a benevolent susceptibility, and which both prompted him to, and guided him in, his work, above all the impulses of nature. A higher light must have been given in the insight of what was due to his own essential dignity and glory, and in which he might judge when the going forth of his benevolent impulses were consistent with "honor and right;" and in this only could there have been the free capacity to guide his search for benevolent happiness, and make his benevolence in this way to be, not a constitutional sentiment, but a moral attribute, an ethical virtue. The attempt to stand here, on the nature of free agency, and yet holding that agency by the judgment of what is greatest happiness through the cravings of an inbred nature, will inevitably share the same fate as all the former hypotheses; the position, while taking a full-sighted observa-

tion from it, will logically transmute itself to another, and, instead of the delusive freedom of a constitutional susceptibility, we shall go over to the true liberty of a rational spirit.

We enter then entirely another sphere, and place ourselves completely within the *Theory of Rectitude*.

We contemplate God as an Absolute spirit. He is spontaneous activity ; going out in action from an intrinsic capability of originating, and which does not need a nature already caused, that can only unroll and thus uncover what has been already committed to it. He is First Cause, in the sense of originating cause ; putting out utterly new things without another causality causing him to do so. But he is not mere blind spontaneity ; going out in actions that have no directory. He knows himself thoroughly, and comprehends himself completely. He sees within himself the archetypes of all possible consistent existences, and has thus the patterns or ideals of all possible being, and can thereby work as an architect from his own rules. He has also an exact and immediate insight of what is consistent with the excellency and dignity of his own being ; what is due to himself, and in his own producing, what it will be fit for himself to accept and approve ; and he is thus a moral Being, who finds his own ethical laws within himself. The spontaneous activity, thus, ever goes out in action, self-directed. He is a law to himself. Not, now, is our conception of God as of a being who has a kind and tender susceptibility which craves to gratify itself in acts of benevolent impartation to others ; going out under the impulse of a pathological feeling which must satisfy itself in supplying its want, as an appetite, or be miserable ; but much more elevated : a being with an intrinsic dignity, who acts from a knowledge of his own worthiness, and that he may fulfil the high behest of his own excellency and be holy ; a rational, not a sentient being ; whose motives for imparting good are reasons, not sensations ; and whose acts are virtues, not instincts nor impulses. The Benevolence is no more a sentiment, but a rectitude. God, thus controlling his activity by a self-law, is spiritual, rational, and free.

Under the guidance of what is right, does God, therefore, go out to his work of creating and governing: he makes the material worlds; he superinduces, upon the forces of matter, vegetable life; upon the vegetable, animal life; and upon the animal, human life. He also creates spiritual beings, whose life is not blended in the material and animal being. All rational spirits, whether pure or incarnate, are in his image, rational and free. Each has the capacity to know himself, and what is becoming and due to himself, and each is thus a law to himself, having a conscience excusing or accusing. The material, vegetable, and animal creation is subsidiary to the rational being; and, having no end in itself, this creation finds its end only in ministering to the spiritual.

Holiness and sin can be attributes only of the rational and free, and in their first activity it may be assumed that all new-created intelligences will put forth their action in accordance with the law of right. How, now, shall sin enter? "God cannot be tempted of evil." He has no possible openings as occasions for sin. Pure and absolute reason can possibly find no inducement to act unreasonably. Deity incarnate can endure temptation, but Deity absolute cannot "deny himself." This is not from the want of free capacity, but from the necessary absence of all occasion. Sin cannot enter through God.

It may enter through finite spirits; it must enter through some of them, if it come in at all. Sin is the spirit's activity turned away from the end of its true worthiness, and going out against conscience. As the true worthiness of the finite spirit is in obeying the absolute spirit, so "sin is any want of conformity to, or transgression of, the law of God." One such perversion sets the direction of the spirit, and this disposing the current of the spiritual activity perversely, becomes a permanent spiritual disposition, out of which come, perpetually, specific wrong acts. To pure finite spirits, there is occasion for strictly spiritual temptations. From their relative positions and subordinate stations, there may be jealousies, envyings, hatred, etc.; and so they may, "being lifted up of pride, fall into the condemnation of the devil."

In man, besides the opening to such entirely soul-sins, there are all the appetites of the flesh, to which the spirit may subject itself, and, in any of these directions, turn itself to a disposition of rebellion against God and right. So sin can enter any Paradise.

But how, it may be asked, when God is an omnipotent sovereign, can sin so come in and not implicate him, in either his participation or neglect? We answer, according to our theory of Rectitude, by this general hypothesis, and yet, when clearly apprehended we hardly deem that it can be held merely as hypothesis, but as exact truth: *that sin, in some form and extent, will be a certain result of God's dealings with his creatures according to what is due to himself.* In other words: If God always deal with finite spirits according to principles of "honor and right," there will be sin.

Finite moral beings, even beginning in holiness, must be disciplined to higher measures of virtue. If God act worthily by himself and them, as a Father, he will preside over his household, and propose high standards of attainment and excellency for his children. It is no part of parental dignity and honor to spare his child from the hardy discipline and rough exposures that are necessary to form a manly character. That fondness is ever a weakness, which withdraws its charge from all endurance, and perpetually interposes its own hand when times of trial come. Such neglect of all severe discipline can result in nothing but a weak and irresolute character. There must be times of stern and resolute holding of the child to the struggles and conflicts necessary to fit him for future duties, and give to him that firmness and decision which may be trusted in important enterprises. If the severity of this discipline be properly proportioned to the person and the occasion, the claims of honor and right are satisfied. Incidental to such strict but salutary and requisite discipline may be some disastrous failures; but neither the failing nor the enduring children can reproach the faithfulness of the father.

So God disciplined angels, righteously and honorably; and, while many endured the trial, and in their trial rose to

higher stations, some in their own supineness fell, and blasted the fruit of all this appropriate culture. So God also disciplined Adam, faithfully and fairly subjecting him to a trial every way adapted to his condition, and where manly valor might have earned its bright reward; but he ingloriously fell, and by his own perversion wrought his ruin. Yet in neither case can God be impeached as a cruel or a neglectful Parent. He should not have tried them less; he ought not to have helped them more. He did not love them the less in that he put them to this trial; he only loved the virtue they might and should have attained, the more. He did not desire their fall; he only would do what it behooved him to do for his own worthiness' sake, though they should fall and work their ruin. If he could, by any interpositions of his own power, have softened the rigor of the discipline, and at that time have saved their disastrous delinquency, it would have been at the dearer expense of withholding just that which the occasion demanded, and bringing into his own spirit the consciousness of an unworthy weakness. That stern trial must come again, if the raw recruit is ever to become the hardy veteran; and the confirmed point of unshrinking and unswerving manly valor cannot be reached without actually passing through and enduring the discipline; and the spirit that would cower and fail in one point, when just the right discipline only is applied, if then relieved by some misguided fondness, will doubtless more disgracefully fall in the next certain-coming and necessary exigency. If God do what his own dignity as a father and the highest virtue of his children demand, it may be a certainty, though it is no necessity, that some will basely fail and become sinfully and shamefully unworthy. And then, if God deal with the erring just as "honor and right" demand, it may further be, that the fallen will greatly aggravate their sin and sink in deeper degradation. The interposing power to stop this, had been a moral weakness, and was thus restrained in God by steadfast righteous principle. If sin so come in and spread, neither the holy nor the sinful can impeach Jehovah's power or goodness.

Sin has thus entered both heaven, and our world, and only God's rectitude has restrained God's power to prevent it. And we have only to keep the same principle in view, and we shall find all adequate relief from any distressing embarrassments, in reference to the complete integrity of God's character, in all the facts connected with the perpetuation of sin.

There need be no labored statement to defend the character of God against the perpetuated sin and suffering of fallen angels. If they originally fell, when God was dealing with them just as he must for his righteousness' sake, much less shall he be subject to any reproach when, for justice' sake to them and in salutary warning to all others, he holds them still in being, and visits them in retribution precisely in accordance with their penal demerit. To annihilate them, or to abate any measure of the tokens of his displeasure, would be a weakness and a reproach to himself in his own sight. He is only doing by the fallen angels, now as ever, just what is due to himself. He can do no less in holding them to their misery, and do right.

The great difficulty in reconciling the perpetuation of sin with the integrity of the divine character, will be in the point that has so much disquieted Dr. Beecher, and so many other good and thoughtful men; the facts and circumstances of human depravity. The fact of infant suffering cannot be denied; and the facts that universal depravity abounds, and that men go astray from the opening of their moral character, and that this character opens in weakness and ignorance and under many perverting influences, are all as truly seen in the light of natural experience as in that of divine revelation. How can such perpetuations of depravity be consistent with the power and the goodness of God? Let us follow out our principle here as carefully and completely as we may.

When Adam committed his first sin, it was in the very necessities of the case a fact affecting humanity, as such. This must henceforth settle the question for him and his posterity, if he shall have any, whether they are to stand in

their former and hitherto uninterrupted communion with God or not. It needed no covenant transaction thereby to make Adam a *federal* head of the race; by his very paternity he must be a *public* head of mankind. What he should do must settle many things that God should do with man. If any child had sinned, while he and other children had remained holy, that child's sin could not have reached the race; this can only be effected in the progenitor, and that by his first sin. Subsequent acts can only be as individual, for in the first transgression, the line of the divine procedure with him must have its determination. He must bring the sentence down upon Adam, and thus cut short the race in his perdition; or, if God spare, it must be in some provision of his own, and afterwards deal with Adam and his race on this new footing of his mercy. As regard to what is due to his own excellency, requires that God should execute justice and judgment upon Adam, or that, in providing redemption and sparing him to multiply his posterity, God should regard him and his posterity only within the terms of that plan of redemption which he had settled for them.

It must thus *ethically* follow that Adam's posterity shall begin their life and action under circumstances different and less favorable than he had done. They must be cut off from that direct communion, face to face, which he had enjoyed, and all those tokens of full approbation and complacency and approving care which had appeared in paradise, must now wholly cease. There must also *physically* follow all the natural effects of Adam's sin, and of God's righteous curses for it. "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together," in consequence. Human life begins differently, and terminates differently on earth, and, from the first, runs on differently, from that which had been the experience of Adam, or would have been the experience of his posterity in innocence. Both *moral* and *natural* consequences, which it behooves God to secure, must now flow down to the race, and henceforth man must begin and continue his moral action under them. The principles of rectitude determine all this change of condition.

Now, such ethical and physical changes need not, and should not be considered as making humanity penally guilty in Adam's sin. Others may suffer in consequence of what one does, but penal guilt and demerit can only be personal and individual, and concrete humanity cannot so be guilty. Yet in the sense of liability, there may be such a corruption, or *vitium*, in the concrete race as shall greatly affect each individual's opening activity. This may be to such a degree that, inasmuch as Adam sinned in his condition, *à fortiori*, it may be affirmed, as the Scriptures teach, that all his posterity will thus sin, and become "by nature children of wrath." Our psychology here needs to discriminate the rational in the human soul from the animal, and, while it is quite a ready conception that the animal, as in nature and of nature, may be vitiated in the corruptions of nature, yet the rational can, as such, have no corruption or *vitium* from any casualty in nature, and only a moral debasement from violating the law of conscience which is in itself. Such corruption in the spirit, so far as physical changes can reach, may make it a certainty without any necessity, that the rational soul shall, with its first action, dispose itself perversely. The *psychology* will have thus an included *pneumatology*, and the physical corruption become the occasion for a voluntary moral pollution. Such a vitiated state of humanity is consequent upon Adam's first sin, and a regard to what is due to himself in rectitude requires God to establish and uphold such a connection. The ethical changes he ought to make, and the physical changes he ought not to break up, if he would be true to his own dignity and worth. He must punish in Adam and cut short the race in the progenitor, or perpetuate the race in such corruption.

But though it be not worthy of God to interfere physically and expel the corruption by new natural creations, or new laws of natural generation, yet how worthy of a God that which he did, and in the counsels of eternity always designed to do! The same principle directs in Redemption that had guided in creation; in the discipline of the first man; and in the connections of the first sin with all succeeding de-

pravity; that which his own insight sees to be due to himself; that which will be fit for his own approbation and acceptance in the end. A new headship is introduced into humanity: Immanuel appears, as Deity superinduced upon the human; and, while the old stream of Adam's headship passes down, this new headship throws down also other and recuperative energies, working out their salutary changes under which the action of the corrupted race is widely modified. The Holy Spirit is purchased and sent down, to put the hand over and back of all instrumentalities, and deal directly, but only morally, with the soul. This may act in the first rational agency of the human spirit, and sanctify its first disposing; or, in any subsequent state of the depraved disposition in the flesh, this Holy Spirit may work effectually in connection with established means, and win the lost soul to God through a spiritual regeneration. It would not have been worthy of the divine honor to have gone back and physically mended that which Adam's sin had marred; but oh! how worthy of God, to take occasion, from this sin of man, to put within humanity another and a divine life, which shall work out depravity and work in holiness, till the suffering Redeemer is "satisfied." This new headship, and its life by faith, becomes the central source of all hope and joy on earth, and all love and praise among the redeemed in heaven. The ultimate right, as seen by God in the claims of his own true dignity, has guided his counsels and their execution from eternity.

With God was "the residue of the [creating] Spirit," and it was thus due that what was in the absolute Deity, should be brought out in an existing creation. He governed and disciplined the moral beings he made, under the same ultimate rule as his directory. When man sinned, he followed solely the law of doing that which it became him to execute, and the facts of human depravity were thus connected with the first transgression. With a goodness infinitely higher than any craving of a benevolent susceptibility, or prompting of nature for happiness, and of a wholly distinct kind, even in the broad sense of a goodness that would have all that was

worthy for Infinite Excellency to receive, he planned and executed the work of the sinner's redemption, and only fails of attaining universal salvation in it, from the perverse rejection of sinners, in whose behalf his own honor will not allow his power and grace to work any longer nor any further. In this broad sense, rectitude demands more than justice, more than benevolence; it is a goodness that contains them both, and demands that they both meet and embrace each other for what the Lord Jehovah sees in himself is due to himself. Thus sin was, and much sin and misery ever will be, because divine power must work under the guidance of divine rectitude.

ARTICLE III.

SCIENCE AND THE BIBLE.

A REVIEW OF "THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION" OF PROF. TAYLER LEWIS.¹

By James D. Dana, LL. D., Silliman Professor of Natural History, Yale College.

"THE heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork." Thus spake the Psalmist in view of the revelation which God had made of himself in his works. With deeper emphasis may we now utter the same ascription of praise; for that revelation, as its records have been unfolded in these later days, has opened more and more glorious thoughts of the Almighty Architect, and appears as unfathomable in its truths, as God himself is infinite. The world in general is satisfied to see this glory as exhibited in form, color, magnitude, and other outside quali-

¹ The Six Days of Creation, or the Scriptural Cosmology, with the Ancient Idea of Time-Worlds in distinction from Worlds in Space. By Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek in Union College. 12mo. pp. 407. Schenectady, 1855.

ties. The external attributes of existences have indeed been graciously made so transcendent in beauty and full of harmonies, that "he may run that readeth." But there are also revelations below the surface, open to those who will earnestly look for them. For God's hand was never outstretched to create, but beauty and wisdom appeared in every tracing; and, if seemingly wanting in the outer vestments, they are still profoundly exhibited through the structure beneath, in the ordering of the parts from which the externals are eduved, and in the universal laws there contained; these are literally secrets of the Almighty, to be diligently "sought out of all them that have pleasure therein."

Who are they that are trying to open this book of revelation? 'Men of Science' they are sometimes called; 'Students of Nature' is their true position. Nearly all the world besides pass the revelation by unheeded, almost as if God were only the God of external nature, a maker of pretty forms, colors, and fragrances on a grand scale. Many even speak contemptuously of him, who, in the study of stones, insects, or worms, busies himself with endeavors to read those records of God's wisdom. In the style and spirit of the Atheist, they decry his pursuits, and strive to throw opprobrium on all of the sect. They may think better of some, who deal with worlds, and mountains, and large quadrupeds, perhaps; as if material size were a measure of truth with God. They seem not to know that the minutest living being is as much above a universe of dead worlds as life is superior to matter.

This unworthy spirit is mainly due to prejudice and ignorance. They say that science, after all its claims, is no nearer to explaining the ultimate nature of matter or of life, than centuries ago, and at the same time decry its "boasted" laws. And here is a fatal misconception of science. Has metaphysical or sacred Science yet explained the nature of God or spirit? or has any mind yet measured eternity? The ultimate nature of matter or of life is as much beyond all investigation. Science claims not to fathom it; is not so presumptuous as to hope for success, although examples are

at hand of this prying into mysteries among many writers on the second revelation. These subjects are neither within its bounds or aims. It seeks only to ascertain the laws which God has established in nature, or rather, the methods in which he is constantly working in the universe, his plan or system, ordained in infinite wisdom and sustained in infinite power. Man were presumptuous in his searchings, were he not made in the image of God. Thus endowed, if also teachable in spirit, he may read and understand, and reach onward in his knowledge to brighter and brighter revelations.

Newton, by a flash of his intellect, conceived of the law of gravitation; and as he, inquiringly, looked around and above, he everywhere found testimony that the conception was a fact, a comprehensive truth. At once, cycles and epicycles, and all the cobwebs of past ages vanished, and our planetary system and the vast universe stood forth in its majestic extent, the whole like a vision from on high. After the thousands of years that the world had existed, there was, at last, a correct apprehension of the actual relations in space of the heavenly bodies. He announced the law of attraction and its ratio, called it, for convenience, the law of gravitation; and by it, the great highways in the heavens have been traced. What before had been thought out, and thereupon received as true, proved to be wrong in fact and principle. But who will say that we do not now *know* the relations of the heavenly bodies, and the law of their motions? This law is as immutable as God's will, for it is his ordinance. Newton did not dream about the cause or nature of gravitation; he had read the law, and rejoiced in the revealed truth.

Crystallization opens to us other laws, no less comprehensive. All are familiar with the pretty geometrical forms of some crystals. But the observing eye sees the world full of crystals. When it snows, the heavens are showering down crystals, for every flake is a congeries of crystalline grains, and they are often in elegant symmetrical forms. When the waters freeze, they become a mass of crystals, only so

blended that we distinguish not their outlines. When sea-water evaporates, it drops crystals freely ; for every grain of salt that goes down, is itself a gem. A bar of iron is broken, and its whole texture proves to be an aggregation of crystal particles, showing the angular lines and cleavage of true crystallization. The granite of the hills is but a mountain of crystals ; and every pudding-stone, although made of pebbles, has myriads of crystalline grains or fragments of crystals in and among those pebbles. Finally, the special fact first noted, develops into a general truth or law, that cohesion in the inorganic kingdom producing solidification, is actually crystallization ; that we not merely see nature geometrizing, but matter in its profoundest quality governed by geometrical principles ; and therefore that cohesion in solidification is not a sort of agglutination acting in all directions alike, which would be well enough for making spheres, but an axial or polar attraction, bringing out symmetrical forms according to fixed laws.

Examining further, more definite laws come out : each species or kind of substance, wherever found or however made, proves to have its distinct and constant fundamental crystalline form, so unvarying in angles and structure, although admitting of modifications by simple ratios, that it may be as easily known by it, as an animal by its form. These crystalline forms are cubes, square prisms, rhombic prisms either right or oblique, etc. ; and in each case, the axes of the prisms, that is, their relative dimensions, admit of mathematical calculation.

Thus by widening our field of vision from the single fact to universal nature, we learn that molecules have their specific forms or dimensions, and cohesion in solids its mathematical basis. This fundamental quality of cohesion is sustained by every other characteristic of crystals : the hardness is different in the direction of *unequal* axes ; so also the transparency, elasticity, conduction of heat, and refraction of light ; and all in exact accordance with the law of symmetry in the crystal. Do we not see, here, that the very molecules, of which the universe is built, were modelled variously and

with precision by the hand of Deity? Looking deeper still, we learn that these molecules are not, like the blocks of an architect, squared and cornered for one place alone, but have their laws according to which they are adapted to numberless forms and structures. Gaining entrance to these inner temples of nature, we recognize, everywhere, the appointments of Him whose glories are infinite.

The chemist reads Nature in another of her departments: he watches the changes going on around him, and the changes which Nature, in her work, passes through in his laboratory. He thence learns not merely the absurdity of the ancient fancy that water, air, earth, and fire are elements, and not only that these are true elements, and that water is made of two, oxygen and hydrogen, and so each substance has its elemental constitution; but he goes further: he discovers, as his facts accumulate, that there is a law in these combinations; that oxygen and hydrogen, for example, unite only in certain ratios; that they exist in water in the ratio of 8 to 1 by weight; that, in another compound containing oxygen and iron, the ratio is 8 to 28; in another, containing oxygen and nitrogen, the ratio is 8 (oxygen) to 14 (nitrogen), or else, 8 to 28, 8 to 42, 8 to 56, 8 to 70, equivalent, in parts, to 1 : 1, 1 : 2, 1 : 3, 1 : 4, 1 : 5 parts; and so, throughout Nature, in compounds of all kinds, he ascertains that the elements have their definite combining ratios, and combining weights; and thence he learns to calculate, with the utmost precision, the constitutions of compounds.

Here then is a fundamental law of attraction, at the basis of chemistry, and upon it the science rests. It is a law of numbers and harmonic relations — the ordained will of God, which the chemical student has been enabled to apprehend, and is now endeavoring to follow out into all of its beautiful developments. No future research can revoke that will. The supposed elements may be resolved into others; but all matter, organic and inorganic, is constituted upon this law; and the law must stand, until the Being who said, "So let it be," reverses all Nature and his own enactment.

In the study of Light, the division of the beam into its

component colored rays, was a first fact; the different refrangibilities of those rays, a second. Then came the law that each color corresponds to a specific rate of vibration or of wave motion: the vibrations were measured; and finally, whatever the freaks of light, they were found to be explainable by the interferences and other inter-actions of just such rays with these specific rates of vibration. This established, science says: "*sic Deus vult*," and pays Him the homage due.

Thus we might go on with the departments of physical science, heat, magnetism, electricity, and others; and in all, it would appear, that science has reached immutable laws, simply by comparing one tracing in nature with another, and thus reading the hand-writing of God in his works. The attraction of gravitation, chemical attraction, cohesive attraction, light, heat, electricity, may yet be referred to some higher laws: they may be found to be but the workings of a common law, embracing the whole; and to this, science is tending. But in so doing, what are now laws will stand firm as laws under a more general law; what is knowledge will be knowledge still.

The laws in the kingdoms of life are of similar import, equally intelligible to the humble pupil of nature, and, if possible, more grand in their scope and relations.

The great universal law for all life Moses announced when speaking of the institution of the first life-kingdom, in the words: "*which has seed in itself*;" for this is the fundamental characteristic of living beings, as distinct from inorganic existence.

The evolution of the germ — in its essence, a simple memberless cellule — resulting in a successive individualization of parts: the more fundamental first; then, by degrees, leading on to the completed complex organism in all its details, is an exhibition of another grand law of the highest significance; one, in an important sense, typical of all progress.

The spiral line of development as the initial in evolution, and retained in its perfection in the spiral arrangement of leaves in plants, as well as in the parts of some animals, is

another grand law, which science has evolved from the mass of facts before us in the plant-kingdom. And this law has its more special announcements: follow the leaves, from one leaf (A) as a starting point around the stem, taking the course of the spiral, to another leaf (B) in the same vertical line with the first; and if there are 2 or 3 leaves in the spiral, the spiral goes around but once before reaching leaf B; if there are 5 leaves in the spiral, the spiral revolves 2 times before it reaches leaf B; if there are 8 leaves, it revolves 3 times; if 13 leaves, it revolves 5 times; if 21 leaves, 8 times; and so on, and the converse, by an inflexible rule. Placing the number of leaves above, and number of turns below, the following series expresses the relation:— $\frac{2}{1}$ $\frac{3}{1}$ $\frac{5}{2}$ $\frac{8}{3}$ $\frac{13}{5}$ $\frac{21}{8}$ etc. Now the last 8, the number of revolutions for a spiral of 21 leaves, is the sum of 5 and 3 of the two next preceding spirals in the series; and 21, of 13 and 8 of the same two preceding spirals. In this way the series extends on, in exact mathematical relation. Thus law rises above law, in God's plan, to mathematical harmonies; and when we shall establish the connection between the nature of growth and the production of such spirals, this will be still another law, not obliterating the former, but only opening a profounder view into the mysteries of creation.

In the animal kingdom also, there are laws above laws in a long progression. There are relations of structure or concurrent conditions that run through the kingdom as a whole; others for each class; others still of less profound character, but no less strict or beautiful, for each order, or family, or genus; and then in a species itself there are still other analogies between different parts, which are like higher tones in the grand system of harmonies. These science has partly studied out, and still she labors to comprehend them all.

As one example: after tracing the analogies of parts between the fore and hind limbs of a quadruped, it has gone on and shown that in the Divine plan, one system or type of structure is at the basis of the arm of man, the leg of the horse or lion, the wing of the bird, the paddle of the whale

and pectoral fin of the fish ; and so precisely, that the homologous bones may be traced, and the changes or obsolescence of this or that bone, as the type becomes adapted to its various purposes. There is in this unity of structure an expression of one single fundamental idea.

This kind of research has been further pursued, and it has been found that there is a like parallelism through the whole structure even to the relations of every bone in fishes, reptiles, birds, quadrupeds, and man ; so that there is one type at the basis of all.

Still deeper has investigation gone ; and now we know that in a single vertebra and its appendages, all the elements of the bony structure in these classes of animals are comprised, the repetition and modifications of a type-vertebra, with its accessories, producing all the various results.

Thus God throughout nature has evolved diversity out of unity, eliciting ten thousand concordances out of single profound enactments in His plan of creation.

These laws are universal truths, limited so far only as the range of objects to which they relate is limited. Thus any truth with regard to *life* which characterizes all living beings, is a law in the Science of Life. So as to the leaves of plants, any quality which is found to be a universal truth, as for instance their spiral arrangement, as explained, or their function of respiration, or their general structure, is a law in the Science of Plants. The chemical combination of elements in simple ratio and according to constant equivalents by weight, is another law or universal truth ; and the general truths relating to the dependence of chemical combinations on heat, light, or electricity, are other laws. The parallel relations of structure or homologies between all vertebrates, is another law, universal as regards the vertebrates ; and the other great groups have their corresponding laws. The reciprocal relations between the parts of an animal, due to the fact of type-structures, as between the hoof, leg, teeth, stomach, etc., through the structure, which is so exact, that a knowledge of one of these parts is equivalent to a knowledge of the general nature of all, is another law or universal truth.

Thus there are laws having reference to forces, motion, form, dimensions, general structure, functions, affinities of family, class, etc.; homological type-relations; reciprocal relations between the parts of a structure; development or growth, whether organic or inorganic. And such facts or conditions may be considered also with reference to one another, and afford still other laws; or specially with regard to forces or influences of any kind; and in this line are mainly what we call causalities. They may all be of various grades of generality; and they may be reduced in some instances to mathematical expressions, in which last case we reach nearest to the prototype enactments of Divinity.

Such laws are literally announcements of concordances in nature. They are not in any sense phenomena, but expressions of the relations of phenomena. They proceed from the oneness of system in the universe. They may rise above one another, in a grand series, and all still be true as laws; for they are exhibitions of the lines of truth which run through nature, all emanating from the will of the Supreme Architect.

In electricity, magnetism, and some related departments, the term *fluid* is commonly used, but only as a help in the expression of general truths. The science is not in the fluid, nor is the idea of a fluid a part of the science. The science consists of enunciations of general relations observed, and general methods of action or change; that is, the comprehensive facts or truths which research has developed.

The illustrations which have been given are sufficient to make clear the true goal of science, that toward which it has been moving with unceasing progress since man turned from excursions of fancy, and became an earnest and faithful learner at the footstool of his Maker. Nature, to such a one, is not a mere collection of things, of trees, and rocks, and animals, and man, but of living activities harmonious in plan and action.

These explanations may, to some, seem trite or out of place; and they would be actually so, were there not lamentable ignorance where we have a right to look for knowledge.

The work cited at the head of this Article, is an example to the point. Knowing something of the position and standing of the author, we had opened the book to receive therefrom such light as learning could give on the word of God in Genesis. We found much truth, well expressed and argued, with some philosophical notions as to causalities and phenomena, and much arrogance and error. We had heard that the author sustained the conclusions arrived at by geologists regarding the days of Genesis; and found the conclusions, indeed, but accompanied with sneers at geology and all science, which betokened a mind unfit for research. We found, too, a loose use of the Sacred Record, and a limited comprehension of the grandeur of its truths, which no less surprised us.

On the subject of facts and laws in nature, the author gives us early an exhibition of the depth of his philosophy. In a note on pages 38, 39, he explains his views with some detail. He writes out the mathematical expression :

$$P \quad p_1 \quad p_2 \quad p_3 \quad p_4 \quad p_5 \quad \dots \quad p_n \quad \dots \quad X.$$

as a series representing a higher and higher stage of causation from the fact or directly observed phenomenon P, to X the initial or most remote "act, fact, or energy;" and observes that, on attaining a knowledge of p_2 , a higher energy or causality than p_1 , p_1 then becomes *phenomenal* or a *manifestation*, and so on; so that P, p_1 , p_2 , p_3 , etc., all below p_n are phenomenal to p_n , if that be a known "fact, act, or energy." After thus explaining himself, and adding other illustrations, he says : —

"Making an application of such views to science generally, we might say, the n th terms at the present stage of discovery are to be found in such words as *gravitation*, *magnetism*, *crystallization*, *elasticity*, etc. These do yet stand for *energies* or *causalities*, because there has not yet been discovered that still more remote energy of which they are *manifestations*, and which when discovered will convert them all into *phenomena*, that is, *make them appear*."

Hence, in opposition to all that has been said, knowledge is *not* knowledge. Since science is necessarily finite, and therefore its results cannot reach nearer to X than p_n , *ergo*, not only its present laws, but all the future may develop,

are ephemeral, fated, to the last one, or all but the last, to become "phenomena" in the progress of learning; one charnel-house for the whole, "cycles," "epicycles," "magnetisms," "gravities," "elephants," "turtles," etc. A hopeless prospect ahead for those who reason from or about nature; and we wonder when Professor Lewis was propounding his laws with regard to nature, in the following pages of his work, he did not fear lest they might, hereafter, be doomed to a place by the side of the "elephants."

That we may not appear to misrepresent him, we cite further:

Page 220: "Science may boast as she pleases, but according to her own most vaunted law, she can only trace the footsteps of a present or once-passing causation;" as if the laws of matter and of all existence were as mutable as the changing seasons.

In the same spirit, he speaks of the progress of science (p. 180), rendering "childish and obsolete all the doctrines and all the language in which she now so proudly boasts."

After a very cutting rebuke for the "savans of the nineteenth century" (p. 107), he observes that "the language of science, when it fails or has become obsolete, exhibits always the appearance of childish folly and pretence;" and then, after a few sentences, goes off as follows:

"Science has indeed enlarged our field of thought, and for this we will be thankful to God, and to scientific men. But what is it after all, that she has given us, or can give us, but a knowledge of phenomena, appearances? What are her boasted laws but generalizations of such phenomena ever resolving themselves into some one great fact that *seems* to be an original energy, whilst evermore the application of a stronger lens to our analytical telescope resolves such seeming primal force into an *appearance*, a manifestation of something still more remote, which, in this way, and in this way alone, reveals its presence to our senses. Thus the course of human science has ever been the substitution of one set of conceptions for another. Firmaments have given place to concentric spheres, spheres to empyreans, empyreans to cycles and epicycles, epicycles to vortices, vortices to gravities and fluids ever demanding for the theoretic imagination other fluids as the only conditions on which their action could be made conceivable."

The error of our profound author is plain enough after the remarks which have been made. The connection, in the same category, of ancient dreams with discovered laws,

laws deduced by science after experiencing the vanity of man's imaginings and turning to God's works as a sure fountain of knowledge, is certainly remarkable as a specimen of learning; and it abounds on other pages. We hardly know to what to refer the blindness that cannot see the wide gulf between "vortices" and "gravities."

On p. 170, again, he remarks on the "ever-increasing darkness of science," "unaided by any higher beams," not aware that science is itself an emanation from the Source of light. On page 110, he says well of the Book of God, though in the same perverse tone about science: "This grand Old Book of God still stands, and will continue to stand, though science and philosophy are ever changing their countenances and passing away."

Once more, we quote a forcible illustration, which presents his views in few words: "We may smile," he says, "at the old quackish story of the earth's standing on the back of the elephant, and the elephant standing on the head of a tortoise, etc.; but in our gravities, our magnetisms, our series of fluids, ever requiring other fluids to explain their motions, we have only introduced a new set of modern equivalents."

There is much more of the same sort. At first, this slashing away at science excited amusement, reminding us of the contest between Sancho and the windmill: but then, pain, that an infidel philosophy should have emanated from such a source. This placing in antagonism God's word and his works, or the results of the study of his works, is only fitted to make the young scout the former; for they know the latter has its great truths, having the best of all evidence.

Had the author simply condemned the false that is mixed with science, or the atheism that substitutes force or nature for God, it would have been well. But notwithstanding an occasional admission of good accomplished, he reprobates science in its foundation and essence, and also all who dare to believe,—very much, indeed, in the spirit of the Cardinals who judged Galileo.

But science is still alive; her progress is sure; and in her

readings of God's works, His word is daily finding support, fuller elucidation, and increasing sublimity.

In this attack upon science, which is a sort of by-play quite unessential to the object of the work, geology of course gets double share. And, strange to say, the author is at the same time sustaining essentially the conclusions of geologists. He adopts and proves, on exegetical grounds, that the days of Genesis were long periods of time, and speaks quite freely of the æons and æons, saying that the "feeling of the vast, the indefinite, the unmeasured, once received into the soul [in the opening period], is carried naturally through all the other periods" (p. 96); and, at first, we gathered that he and geologists were agreed. But when all seemed to be flowing on smoothly, suddenly the geologist gets an unmannerly rap for taking too much time. It would seem to be a trivial fault in a case where all is acknowledged to be so "indefinite," and where the periods are periods in the work of a Being who has existed from eternity; and especially since, if we go back even "billions of years" for each day, we get no nearer to the beginning of that eternity. But still it is not pardoned. The author thinks it gives too much time to the age of "Fungi and sea-weeds;" indeed, he says: "it is very strange that fungi, at least some fungi, should exist at all" (p. 172). He is not aware that geology accords somewhat with his notion; for it finds no Fungi whatever until the later periods of the globe. He does not anywhere mention the exact length of time which, consistently with divine wisdom, the periods could have occupied. But, although objecting so decidedly to a long age of Fungi, he thinks that a state of "huge nebulousity," "with an absence of solidity and cohesion," might have been continued "for millions and millions of years" (p. 60). Again (p. 398), he remarks, with some temper (alluding to geologists and the Bible), as follows: "Neither does the Bible mean what you, in your little science and still less Biblical learning, would ascribe to it. Your stale caricatures belong neither to its prose nor its poetry: they are alike alien to its letter and its spirit."

The author exhibits a constant fear lest geology should

teach something, and that thereby a belief, based on truth from such a source (he has it — “on Buckland, Lyell, or Hugh Miller”), should be substituted for a belief grounded on the Scriptures, which would be, he says, “a wretched self-deception ;” — lamentable, indeed, if we should admit of help from God’s works in understanding His writings !

In another place, he says of geology (p. 98) : “ Infidel as her spirit often is,” she is “ driven, more and more, to acknowledge the mixture of the natural and supernatural in the production of the earth : ” very much, we think, as a current is driven by the boat it carries ; for geology first proved that “ the natural ” was involved in creation, and, with a rare exception, has always admitted the supernatural ; and she has finally drawn off exegesis so completely into the same course that some, like Prof. Lewis, as they are hurried on by the current, exclaim in great glee over their wonderful progress, and, in remarkable self-complacency, look down frowning upon the current that they imagine is trying to keep up with them.

As to infidel geology — the science which, almost alone, put down the pantheistic “ Vestiges of Creation ” and its “ development theory,” was geology. Not a geologist, in his writings, has supported the work ; and the facts proving successive creations, in past time, instead of evolutions of species from species, have been uniformly regarded as conclusive against that theory. Yet our author admits that “ a development theory, in the sense of species from species, may be as pious as any other,” and may, possibly, have been true. He needs the bit of science to curb his fancy.

The work is remarkable for the confident air with which it brings forward principles that cautious science is slow to utter, thus dictating to nature in the true style of the old philosophy, while, at the same time, not adopting, or “ caring ” to recognize, any results established by geology or the other sciences. But it is useless to enter into further details.

We come now to the special subject of the work, “ the six days of creation, or a Scriptural cosmology.” We will first give briefly the general course of doctrine in the volume.

The six days are six periods, "indefinite, vast;" still, he says, not so long as "very flippantly and very ignorantly" asserted by geologists.

Creation, in the very beginning of beginnings, was a creation out of nothing. But Moses probably did not mean a real *bona fide* beginning either in the first or second verse of Genesis. The words of our author are (p. 45): "whatever may be believed, in respect to this first origination of matter, whether of the earth or of all worlds, there is good reason for doubting whether it is actually meant to be set forth either in the beginning or in any other part of this account." He says of the primal or originating force, in, or constituting, nature, that it is not "the divine power continually energizing in space;" but that "it is a real entity distinct from God, which God has originated, and to which he has given an immanent existence of its own in space and time." This is "the great ultimate fact of facts in the physical world." (p. 47).

The formless and void earth was probably a "huge nebulosity," as just now cited. But "how it came in such a condition, no one can say; whether it was the result of a progress or a deterioration, we have no means of knowing, either from reason or revelation." The creation of Genesis, was no creation, even *ab initio*, but rather a fashioning in or upon matter previously existing, "a separating, a dividing, a clearing up, a bringing into order, an arranging of outward relations." The original matter may have had only "the dead force of cohesion;" but at "the beginning" to which Moses refers, there was added "an inward power, a separating, arranging, selecting, organic power," and this was "the beginning of life, although, as yet, exhibited only in the chemical aspect, rather than the higher modes in which it afterwards energized" (p. 65).

The first effect of the new life was the elimination of light" (p. 65). And as light succeeded to darkness, a finished work to time when the work was not begun, so by a natural figure, morning succeeded to evening, or light to night, "boker" to "ereb." Thus the first day passed.

Creation thus begun, was throughout, a *growth*, a *generation*, as *Genesis*, in Greek signifies. Accordingly (p. 114), "there are the days or periods of quickening, and then, supervening on them, a season or seasons of repose, in which physical law, the physical law both of the material and the sentient nature, carries on the processes thus begun, or thus renewed. As the *fœtus* grows in this *hidden world*, which the Psalmist compares to the lowest parts of the earth, there is doubtless a most important part performed by nature." The author, seeing himself on the verge of an abyss then adds: "yet if we would avoid the grossest materialism, we must conclude that there are some things, even in this seemingly *natural* process, which nature never could have done, — something to which all her chemistry and all her laws of physical life, could never have given the beginning of existence."

The *second* day was the "evolving from the yet semi-chaotic world, that we now call the atmosphere" (p. 104); "the origination and completion of that apparatus of physical law, or that physical state of things, be it scientifically whatever it may — for we do not yet know in all respects what it is — by which were produced the combined appearances of the clouds, the blue heavens, together with other *outward* revealing phenomena connected with, and representative of, such interior causality." The author in this connection afterwards apologizes for his indefiniteness by a fling at unfortunate science, observing (p. 105), that "the more scientific our statements, the more abstract and conceptionless are they, etc."

On the *third* day, dry land appears coming up out of the waters through natural causes. The consideration of the creation of vegetation is passed over to the *fifth* day.

On the *fourth* day, the sun, moon and stars, long before created, became visible to the earth, or "made their APPEARANCE in the firmament." The sun was perhaps now first brought into the same planetary system with the earth; or else a veil was removed; or it then first became luminous; or the matter of the sun did not before exist; or in some way, the sun became visible.

On these several points, Prof. Lewis says (p. 136): "Science is dumb, and revelation says nothing;" and again as to the establishment of the relation of the earth and the sun at that time, he remarks with equal confidence (p. 144): "science cannot say anything for or against such a view;" and again: "how can science say whether there was then any revolution of the earth upon its axis or not," and so on to a depth the reader can explore on page 145. Science seems to haunt the author like a horrible ghost, and his cudgel is always up. After all this and much more, he adds as follows, in which the remarks on vegetation are noteworthy:

"We may conclude that at this fourth period, partly contemporary with vegetation, and before the earliest dawn of animal life, the sun assumed towards our earth the state and form of a luminous body, and the adjustment of the shorter periodic seasons commenced All that we can say is, that at this period the solar system was lit up, the phosphorescent light which the earth may have possessed went out as the planet became more dense, the veil was taken from the central luminary, in order that now there might be not only light and warmth, which existed before, but such *regulated* diversities of them as would be required for the later vegetation as well as for the animal and human life" (pp. 147, 148).

Between the chapters on the fourth and fifth days, a discussion comes in again on the word *day*, and on time, and the uses of the sun, which it is unnecessary here to consider.

The *fifth* day is now taken up, when the author speaks of the creation of vegetation, and animals generally, exclusive of man. The expressions, "Let the waters bring forth," "Let the earth bring forth," are explained thus:

"In its general effect, [the general effect of the account by Moses,] and still more, in the conceptions which lie at the roots of its most important terms, it forces upon the mind the idea of a *nature in the earth* acting through a real dynamical process of its own, and in periods, which, whether longer or shorter, contain within themselves all the changes and successive stages which we find it impossible to dissociate from the thought of birth and growth. And this, too, of the animal as well as of the vegetable world" (pp. 211, 212).

Preparatory to this conclusion he had said (p. 200): "holding Nature thus to be, in some sense, a self-subsisting, self-

acting power," etc.; also, p. 199, "from the necessity of our laws of thinking, as well as from revelation, we say, that it [nature] is a power given originally by God. But, though thus originated, we can distinctly conceive of it as a nature, only when we regard it as in some manner left to itself and operating by its own laws or methods;" also, p. 204, "if we thus view Nature as a stream of causation governed by a certain law which not only regulates but limits its movements, then the *supernatural*, as its name imports, would be all *above nature*, in other words, that power of God which is employed 'according to the counsel of his own will' in originating, controlling, limiting, increasing, opposing, or terminating nature, whether it be the universal, or any particular or partial nature;" also, "it [the devout mind] loves to read how Nature, ever so obedient to her lord, is sometimes commanded to stand away from his presence."

After this, he observes that a development theory, of species from species, is pious enough, and Crosse's manufacture of *Acari* may be in harmony with law and gospel, provided the law have a divine origination; and in this provision the *naturalism* of the view escapes *atheism*.

The discussions which next follow, as to "what is meant by God's making the plant before it was in the earth," are not particularly edifying. The following chapter, on "the cyclical law of all natures," urges, that, from the analogy of day and night, summer and winter, life and death, sleep and activity, Nature has had its passivity and activity. The author "infers not only the *fact*, but the absolute *necessity* of repeated creative or supernatural acts; and this, not only to raise Nature, from time to time, to a higher degree, but to arouse and rescue her from that apparent death into which, when left to herself, she must ever fall" (p. 241). This is "the cyclical law of all natures." He quotes, approvingly (p. 243), the following thought from Plato's "strange myth," in the *Politicus*: "When God suffers Nature to take her course, all things tend to disorder, decay, and dissolution; when he resumes the helm, Nature moves on in her law of progress,

order comes again from disorder, growth from decay, and youth from age."

Finally, he comes to the *sixth* day, under which head, *having disposed of the quadrupeds in his remarks on the fifth day*, he speaks only of MAN. He thinks that possibly a perfect *primus homo* could have been made, by God, from the earth, like the animals (p. 247); but the record is against it, asserting that man was made in God's image, and therefore he admits that "the origin of man, as *man*, was special and peculiar;" by which he means, as he says, "his distinctive humanity, as separate from all that he has in common with the lower animals" (p. 248). He thinks, further, as follows:

"We are not much concerned about the mode of production of his material or merely physical organization. In regard to this, there is nothing in the expressions, 'He made,' or 'He created him,' or 'He made him from the earth,' which is at war with the idea of growth or development, during either a longer or shorter period. Ages might have been employed in bringing that material nature, through all the lower stages, up to the necessary degree of perfection for the higher use that was afterwards to be made of it. We do not say that the Bible teaches this; we do not think that any one would be warranted in putting any such interpretation upon it. There is, however, in itself, and aside from any question of interpretation, nothing monstrous or incredible in the idea that what had formerly been the residence of an irrational and grovelling tenant might now be selected as the abode of a higher life, might be fitted up in a manner corresponding to its new dignity, might be made to assume an erect heavenward position, whilst it takes on that beauty of face and form which would become the new intelligence, and indeed, be one of its necessary results."

In other words, a monkey may possibly have been curtailed behind and straightened up into a man.

The *seventh* day is regarded as now in progress and as including the period of spiritual existence beyond this life.

The prominent points, then, in the system are:

1. His personifying Nature, after Plato's notion; and, as a consequence, regarding her as, in a sense, "self-acting;" yet needing occasional supernatural acts, to rescue her from the decay or death to which she tends, and having alternately her time of rest and action.

2. Hence making mother earth to bring forth, through her

“parturitive powers” (p. 206), plants and animals, and even man, as far as his physical nature goes.

3. Admitting that matter is not eternal, but neglecting the obvious meaning of the phrase “In the beginning.”

4. Admitting that the higher forms of vegetation were not created before the sun.

5. Regarding the creation of the sun and moon as “phenomenal.”

6. Taking the days of Genesis to be indefinite periods.

7. Admitting the expression “evening and morning” to be metaphorical, and implying progress from the beginning to the full completion of a work, which, on the first day, was literally from darkness to light.

With regard to the last four points, geology can make little exception to Prof. Lewis’s conclusions.

On the first three, the author and the “Vestiges of Creation” are pretty well agreed, except that Professor Lewis is less consistent in his use of Nature; and besides, he admits the occasional need of the supernatural to wake Nature from her slumbers, arrest decay, and give new momentum to her activity.

But is this Scriptural cosmology? We fail to find it in Genesis or elsewhere in the Bible. Successive days of evening and morning are announced; but does this imply that God or Nature needed rest? We have been led, from God’s word as well as works, to conceive of Nature not only as God’s initial work, but his constant work, ever sustained, and never left to go alone; and therefore no more requiring rest than God himself; no more capable of self-acting obedience than as God’s own acts are obedient to himself. The world, in this sense, is full of God, though still not God; for these are only physical manifestations, which he ever continues, through the system he has established; while above all is a Moral Governor, a personal will supreme, which, by this system, which we call Nature, is working out physical, moral, and spiritual ends.

The successive phases or conditions in Nature may have, on such a ground, the character throughout of an evolution,

or the working of a single purpose, in all its lines of details, — as much so as in the opening flower. Yet this is so because God is infinite in power and wisdom, needs not to revise his plan or institute new principles; but, at the inception, saw the end and all the steps leading thereto, as a series or succession throughout perfect in law and harmony. In such a plan we have no right to say that God stands by to see Nature go alone; but that, unceasingly, he sustains and directs the glorious work by his power. We have not to conclude, in order to avoid materialism, that there are “some things” which Nature could never have done; for, in this view, there is nothing which, of itself, or in any sense as a self-existent activity, it can do.

This view, which shines forth from every page of the Bible, is as correctly a growth or Genesis, as that of Prof. Lewis; and all his argument, based on the progress of creation by periods, or on the meaning of the word *Genesis*, or of *φύσις* in Greek, or *natura* in Latin, or the alleged irrationality of any other view, does not go one step towards sustaining his peculiar notion of a huge self-acting something, now and then aroused to progress by God.

Although Prof. Lewis may not regard the fact, we observe that science does not suggest such a view of Nature.

The whole essence of physical Nature is expressed in a molecule; for molecular laws are the laws of physical Nature. The mere aggregation of molecules into stones or earth, however large the amount, does not give powers that are not contained in the minutest particles. Or, if many balls of such stones and earth are set afloat in space, they still do not make “Nature” with higher qualities than the molecular forces; and however great the effort of laboring Nature, we have no right to assume that those forces could make a living germ. The dirt of a laboratory had the misfortune to set afloat the idea of the creation of *Acari*, by Mr. Crosse. But science has yet no reason to deny that physical forces are physical forces.

In fact, life and physical or inorganic force are directly opposite in their tendencies. There are, in compounds, two

extremes : one, the inorganic and stable ; the other, the organic and unstable ; the former, the oxygen extreme ; the latter, the carbon extreme. In inorganic Nature, as oxygen is the element of strongest affinity, the tendency is mostly to combination with oxygen or an analogous change, and this occasions the speedy dissolution of the organic structure when life disappears, and continued interchanges until the stable oxyds are produced. In life, on the contrary, there is a constant rising in the scale ; that is, a movement in just the reverse direction, to compounds of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, or carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen, of greater and greater complexity ; the stem of the plant thus preceding the formation of the higher material of the flower ; or, in the animal, the albumen of the germ preceding the multiplied compounds of the structure and the highest of all compounds, as we believe it, the material of the brain. Inorganic and organic nature thus move in opposite directions.

Again, in inorganic Nature, increase of size is only accretion, and does nothing more than increase gravity. In the plant-kingdom of life, increase from the germ, besides increasing gravity, develops and sustains the organic structure, and produces a rising scale of chemical compositions. In the animal-kingdom, in addition to all the results just mentioned, there is a gradual development of mechanical force, from zero in the germ to its maximum in each species, besides also the force necessary to sustain the growth and functions of the individual, including mental action.

On scientific ground we should, therefore, conclude that physical force could not, by any metamorphosis or genesis, give rise to LIFE.

But again, suppose life to exist. This means simply living beings, as plants and animals, and implies conditions of chemical change, growth, and decay, in such beings. But we have no right to assert that any aggregation of such living beings, or amount of life, is capable of more than simply living and reproducing itself. The greatest possible result is accomplished when a living organism produces its like, in its young ; for it is a result precisely equivalent, in power, to the

parent itself; that is, the power at work. Let there be a universe of worlds, full of living beings, and we still have no authority, from science, to assert the existence of a principle of life actuating that universe, beyond what belongs severally to each living being in it.

A study of Nature gives us, therefore, no basis for the notion of a living universal nature, capable more or less completely of self-development. Suppose the world to be in its condition of inorganic progress; we have no scientific ground for supposing that it could pass to a higher state, possessing living beings, by any parturient powers within. Or if life exists; we still get no hint as to the evolution of the four Sub-kingdoms of animal life from a universal germ; nor as to the origin of the Class-types, Order,—Family,—or Genus-types, or those of Species, each of which is a distinct idea in the plan of creation.

Nature in fact pronounces such a theory of evolution false, absolutely false, as we observe more particularly on a following page. It also proves the Divinity to be present at every step in creation, in the ordering of the globe in each physical feature, as well as in the plan and evolution of the life-kingdoms. The perpetual presence of Mind, infinite in power, wisdom, and love, and ever-acting, is so manifest in the whole history of the past, that the pantheistic theory which makes Nature God, is much the least absurd of the two. It regards Nature more in accordance with the analogies of a being like man, in which mind is uninterruptedly immanent, instead of an entity only now and then roused by an external mind. From the pantheistic doctrine we rise to true theism, by recognizing that whatever perfections belong to Nature, must be in or of God, as his power and attributes, and in an infinite degree. Hence physical attributes do not constitute God: for if we reject the idea that a sense of justice, truth, and love is evinced by the physical world, still man has these moral qualities; and therefore they must be among the attributes of Deity. And in addition, man has over all a free will; and therefore this also, but in its infinitude, must be an attribute of the God of Nature. Such a

Deity is not Nature itself, which is only a plan in development, but a personal being above Nature, while ever *in* nature by his power and wisdom.

Our conclusion therefore is, that Nature, self-existent and self-propagating, now and then requiring a jog from the supernatural, may be an interesting myth, but cannot rise to the same point of view with Biblical truth or sound philosophy.

But let us pass on. We need better argument than Prof. Lewis has brought forward, to convince us that the phrase, "In the beginning," does not mean what it says. We have regarded the announcement, in the first verse, of creation out of nothing by the will of God, a will free, supreme, omnific, as the grand point distinguishing the Mosaic cosmogony from the Egyptian and all others; almost like the very hand itself of God on the first line of the new revelation. But he would have us suppose that matter was made at some earlier beginning; and perhaps had had its ups and downs, and finally was worked over at a new beginning announced in the first verse. It is true the Hebrew word used in this place for *create*, does not signify, necessarily, creation out of nothing. Yet such an inference cannot be resisted without doing violence to the spirit of the text, and the fundamental laws of human belief. We would ask Prof. Lewis, what Hebrew word he could substitute for the one used, that would convey the precise idea of creation out of nothing? When he has found such a one, his reasoning may then demand consideration. "In the beginning" refers directly to the existing "heavens and earth" mentioned in the following part of the verse; that is, the existing universe. We may suspect the existence of a previous universe that came to nought before this began; but it cannot be made a question of reasonable belief, or a basis for argument.

Some other points in Professor Lewis's cosmology (he will excuse us if we substitute his own name for the term "scriptural") demand from us a passing remark.

With singular inconsistency, Professor Lewis admits a "huge nebulousity" for the "formless and void" state of the earth, makes the progress mainly one by natural causes, and

then speaks contemptuously (p. 107) of nebular condensations, the very process required to evolve solidity from his nebulosity. He speaks of the power of cohesion in the nebulous matter as preceding chemical and other kinds of attraction, not knowing but that the existence of cohesion involves the existence of the rest.

Professor Lewis supposes that, on the third day, the world was finished so far as to have its seas and lands, mountains and valleys, and urges a general theory of evolutions; yet he thinks that this does not necessarily imply that, at that time, the central body, to which the earth is a satellite, was already in its place. The worlds, on such a view, were not evolved according to the analogy of embryogeny, by eliminating the systems and then their parts; but first the scattered parts, and then these, were afterwards put into systems. Science, as well as reason, most plainly teaches, that if any evolution-theory is to be adopted (and such our author aims at), the former is the true one.

In the Mosaic record it is said that, on the third day, dry land appeared; but nowhere does it announce, like our author, that the land was diversified with mountains and valleys: and neither does science.

It is remarkable, that, in a work on the six days of creation, the author's system should have led him so far away from the record, as to place under the fifth day, both his remarks on the creation of vegetation (the work of the third day), and all he has to say on the quadrupeds or mammalia (the work of the sixth). The convenience of his theory of *life from the waters and earth*, appears to have been, in part, the occasion of it. But is this reason sufficient, in a work entitled "The Six Days of Creation, or the Scriptural Cosmology," by an author who expresses great devotion to the Scriptures? — a work exegetical, profound, claiming to sift the Hebrew, and offered as a contribution to our Biblical literature? Can we be satisfied that the word of God has been sufficiently studied and apprehended, when not even a mention of the creation of quadrupeds is introduced into the chapter on the sixth day?

Besides this, the author doubts, on grounds he so contemns, —scientific grounds—whether the higher kinds of vegetation, if any, were created before the sun. He says : “ For the development of these, if not for their origination, there is needed the orderly arrangement of the seasons and the regularly-adjusted light and heat of some great luminary.”

Moreover, he mentions no reason for the wonderful fact, that two so diverse creations as that of vegetation and the dividing the land from the seas took place in one day ; nor for the equally marvellous fact, that the creation of quadrupeds took place on the same day with that of man.

On the creation of man, we have the crude speculations that have already been cited (p. 98), a miserable substitute for wisdom that comes from above.

Temptations to remark and criticism follow one, all through the pages of such a work ; there is so much to complain of, in the author's philosophy, his exegesis, his ready way of making the Mosaic record literal or “ phenomenal,” to suit his theory ; his misapprehension of science, and denunciation of established truth. We therefore have had to cull sparingly, not to run to a tedious length.

Is it not a marvel that a learned Professor should accord, in his cosmogony, with the views of science in all their grander points, and yet lose no opportunity to denounce science : should adopt, with science, the idea of indefinite periods for days, and then pick a quarrel because geologists make the days, he thinks, too long ; should build up a system out of Nature and natural causes, or what he supposes to be natural causes, and still abuse a science that also uses Nature and natural causes, and studies not to stretch those causes beyond what is warranted by direct observation ; should attempt to grasp a subject that requires the highest knowledge of natural possibilities, without the least investigation as to what are the actual powers or capabilities of Nature ? An honest doubt of the conclusions of geologists, in the mind of one who has not pursued the subject, is reasonable enough ; but for such a one, in his acknowledged emptiness, to turn around and charge science or the students of Nature with flippancy and ignorance, is at least to prove

himself a subject meriting psychological investigation. Science, it is true, is so far conceptionless as to clip the wings of fancy in world-making; but it is not a fault that should send her to purgatory.

It can hardly be doubted by our readers that the "Cosmology" of Professor Lewis fails of exhibiting the spirit of the original. And we believe it will soon appear, if not so already, that it indicates no adequate comprehension of the philosophy or divine features of that record. It may be good Platonism; but it is, in our view, neither scriptural theism, nor true naturalism.

Having in our *first part* presented a general sketch of science, its aims and its laws, or the laws of Nature, as a basis of comparison with the opinions of Prof. Lewis, we have considered, in our *second part*, the "Cosmology" brought forward by him as an interpretation of Genesis. It now remains, as our *third part*, to mention those points in which science has thrown light on the Mosaic account; light which could have come from no other source. We pursue this method of meeting the views of Professor Lewis on the legitimate uses of science in Biblical interpretation, rather than that of direct argument and criticism.

As introductory, we would first offer a few thoughts on the authority of the Mosaic record, and then endeavor to correct some misunderstandings with respect to geology.

Since geology began to be a science, believers in the Sacred record have gradually divided off into four classes.

1. Those who hold, on exegetical grounds, that the account in Moses admits only of a strictly literal interpretation, and denounce all geological conclusions.

2. Those who take the same view of the record, but admit in the main the results of geological research, and regard the record as a myth, correct in making God the creator, and in the general notion of progress.

3. Those who adopt a liberal interpretation of the record as most consistent with its spirit and truth, and believe both the written word and the testimonies which are gathered from the study of Nature.

4. Those who adopt the liberal interpretation of the last, but with denunciations of geology, while at the same time accepting its main conclusions.

The truthfulness of the Mosaic record is admitted by all the classes here referred to, excepting the second. These, on the ground that the early part of Genesis bears evidence of being a collection of two or three distinct accounts, suppose that Moses adopted that particular ancient or traditional story which acknowledged God as the Creator; and they do not insist upon its being correct in details. It would at first seem as if this liberality of view were a consequence of a firm and well-defined belief in the deductions of science. This is so with some; but with many, it is just the other way: there is a vague opinion that geological facts cannot be set aside; and as the literal rendering of the Hebrew, in their view, is also inflexible, they consequently let the record go, — we can hardly say, as the least of two evils. They thus obtain a sufficient ground for rejecting all attempts to reconcile science and the Bible.

The fact, if it be a fact, that the account was a tradition which Moses adopted, would not necessarily prove it incorrect in any of its statements. The acts in creation had no human witness, and therefore the tradition either was originally from the Being who had before given man a living soul, or else it was only a human conception of world-evolution. If the former, it might still be, throughout, truthful; while at the same time we should naturally infer, in the case of such a tradition, that the exact literality might yield a little to research, provided the spirit of the whole were sustained. If the latter, then the whole is hardly better than a fable, except the grand pervading truth — God in creation. In this last case, the Divine signet is stamped on a false or suspicious document, and thus opens the Sacred Book — false not in mere drapery, for the account is peculiarly free from adjuncts or symbols, presenting a series of definite assertions as to the acts of the Deity himself. Admitting the account as thus untrustworthy, science becomes the only true record of the history of creation; and its facts should hence

have a vastly enhanced interest, especially to the religious world.

But we do not believe in this fabulous origin, as we show beyond. And if but little flexibility is allowed to the Hebrew by the exegetical student, the record will stand firm, sustained by Nature and the God of Nature. We call it flexibility; yet we have the authority of some learned Biblical scholars for concluding that the liberal rendering, required by science, is the only correct rendering of the original words of Moses. Our own faith in both records is the more confirmed, the deeper we pursue our investigations.

We cannot believe that Moses had a full comprehension of the events he narrates, any more than the Jewish prophets, of the spiritual kingdom of Christ which they foretold. The account is but an epitome of creation, in a few comprehensive enunciations. The details God had before inscribed in the earth itself; and science fulfils its end in reading those records and receiving the lessons they teach.

Accepting the account in Genesis as true, the seeming discrepancy between it and geology rests mainly here: geology holds, and has held from the first, that the progress of creation was mainly through secondary causes; for the existence of the science presupposes this. Moses, on the contrary, was thought to sustain the idea of a simple fiat for each step. Grant this first point to science, and what further conflict is there? *The question of the length of time*, it is replied. But not so; for if we may take the record as allowing more than six days of twenty-four hours, the Bible then places no limit to time. *The question of the days and periods*, it is replied again. But this is of little moment in comparison with the first principle granted. Those who admit the length of time and stand upon days of twenty-four hours, have to place geological time *before* the six days, and then assume a chaos and reordering of creation, on the six-day and fiat principle, after a previous creation that had operated for a long period through secondary causes. Others take the days as periods, and thus allow the required time, admitting that creation was one in progress, a grand whole,

instead of a *first* creation excepting man by one method, and a *second* with man by the other. This is now the remaining question between the theologians and geologists; for all the minor points, as to the exact interpretation, of each day, do not affect the general concordance or discordance of the Bible and science.

On this point, geology is now explicit in its decision, and indeed has long been so. It proves that there was no return to chaos, no great revolution, that creation was beyond doubt one in its progress. We know that some geologists have taken the other view. But it was only in the capacity of theologians and not as geologists. The Rev. Dr. Buckland, in placing the great events of geology between the first and second verses of the Mosaic account, did not pretend that there was a geological basis for such an hypothesis; and no writer since has ever brought forward the first fact in geology to support the idea of a rearrangement just before man;—not one solitary fact has ever been appealed to. The conclusion was on biblical grounds, and not in any sense on geological. The best that Buckland could say, when he wrote twenty-five years since, was, that geology did not absolutely disprove such an hypothesis; and that cannot be said now.

It is often asserted, in order to unsettle confidence in these particular teachings of geology, that geology is a changing science. In this connection, the remark conveys an erroneous impression. Geology is a progressing science, and all its progress tends to establish more firmly these two principles. (1) The slow progress of creation through secondary causes, as explained, and (2) the progress by periods analogous to the days of Genesis.¹

¹ The various uses of the word *day* in the Mosaic account of creation are not all mentioned by Prof. Lewis. *First*, in verse 5, the *light* in general is called day, the darkness, night. *Second*, in the same verse, *evening and morning* make the first day, before the sun appears. *Third*, verse 14, day stands for *twelve hours* or the period of daylight, as dependent on the sun. *Fourth*, same verse, in the phrase “days and seasons,” day stands for a period of *twenty-four hours*. *Fifth* at the close of the account, in verse 4, of the second chapter, day means the *whole period of creation*. These uses are the same that we have in our own language.

What other points science in its present state establishes or elucidates, we shall now consider. The best views we have met with on the harmony between Science and the Bible, are those of Prof. ARNOLD GUYOT, a philosopher of enlarged comprehension of nature and a truly christian spirit; and the following interpretations of the sacred record are, in the main, such as we have gathered from personal intercourse with him.¹

The first thought that strikes the scientific reader is the evidence of Divinity, not merely in the first verse of the record, and the successive fiats, but in the whole order of creation. There is so much that the most recent readings of science have for the first time explained, that the idea of man as the author becomes utterly incomprehensible. By proving the record true, science pronounces it divine; for who could have correctly narrated the secrets of eternity but God himself?

Moreover, the order or arrangement is not a possible intellectual conception, although we grant to man, as we must, the intuition of a God. Man would very naturally have placed the creation of vegetation, one of the two kingdoms of life, after that of the sun, and next to that of the other kingdom of life, especially as the sunlight is so essential to growth; and the creation of quadrupeds he would as naturally have referred to the fifth day, leaving a whole day to man, the most glorious of all creations. Prof. Lewis, in making no allusion to the creation of quadrupeds on the sixth day, writes as if it were a mistake that this was not so done. Man, again, would never have separated the creation of light so far from that of the sun, to us the source of light; neither would he have conceived of the creation of the firmament, as that word is usually understood, and was under-

The meaning of the words "evening and morning" we believe to be correctly given by Prof. Lewis.

¹ The views of Prof. Guyot have been presented at some length in this journal by Rev. J. O. Means (numbers for January and April, 1855). They are here brought forward from a different point of view with other illustrations, and additional deductions from the science.

stood by the Jews, without the stars as part of its decoration.

Moreover, there is a sublimity and system in the arrangement, and a far-reaching prophecy, to which philosophy could not have attained, however instructed.

The creation, in the first place, consists, according to the record, of two great periods; the *first three* days constitute the *inorganic* history, the *last three* days, the *organic* history of the earth.

Each period begins with LIGHT; the *first*, light cosmical; the *second*, light to direct the days and seasons on the earth.

Each period ends in a day of two great works. *On the third day*, God *divided the land from the waters*; and he "saw that it was good." Then followed a work totally different, *the creation of vegetation*, the institution of a kingdom of life, a work more unlike that of the former half of the same day than those of any two whole days preceding; as much a new creation when expressed in a sea-weed, as in an oak or apple-tree. So, *on the sixth day*, God created *the quadrupeds* or Mammalia, and pronounced his work "good;" and as a second and far greater work of the day, totally new in its grandest element, he created MAN; and he then pronounced his creation "very good."

There is here no chance parallelism; for God neither in his word or works can be charged with accidental or unmeaning harmonies.

Vegetation, while for physical reasons a part of the creation of the third day, since its main end is physical, was also prophetic of the future, the true organic period, in which the progress of life was the grand characteristic. So again, man, while like other mammals in structure, even to the homologies of every bone and muscle, was endowed with a spiritual nature, which looked forward to another period, that of spiritual existence and immortality. Thus the last day of each great period included one work typical of the period, and the other, while essentially of the period, prophetic of the future.

Surely, philosophy never could have attained to such a

glorious scheme. What now are the special points which God's testimonies in nature have made clear?

I. *The progress of creation mainly through secondary causes.* Time was lengthened back by geology to ages unmeasured. This had before been suspected: geology made it positive knowledge.

II. *The fact that the days of Genesis were as many long periods,* the progression of physical changes and of living beings, being, on this principle, in harmony with the Bible record. The Infinite God worked not by man's time-piece, or by the roll of a ball in space, counting the twenty-four hours, but in his infinitude and eternity, he directed events through the passing ages as if those ages were but moments.

We may remark here, that science explains, and general history also, what we must understand by epochs or periods in history. We learn that the importance of an epoch is generally inversely as its length, or rather, has no necessary relation to length of time. Take the life of a plant, for example: there is the epoch of the stem, that of the flowering, that of the fruit; the first much the longest, and yet the least important in itself. Then, again, the incipient stages of an epoch, are deep in preceding time: the changes leading toward it are at work, and now and then an event strikingly betokens the coming age, and is in fact a characteristic of that age coming up through the darkness of earlier time, foretelling or announcing the future. All history is alike in this; geological history is full of it. An age is marked by its great features, by the cresting of some characteristic; while its limits—its beginning and end—may be, and usually are, indefinite. It is thus that vegetation in the organic division of time was prophetic of the period when life should be the glory of the world.

As to the actual length of periods, geology gives us no definite knowledge.

III. *The true principles or law of development or evolution in nature.* We observe, as Agassiz has well illustrated, that the development of a living being brings out the profounder distinctions and afterwards those more external. First, in the

growing germ or egg appears a character that enables us to note the class; then, that of the order; then, that of the tribe, family, genus, in succession; and finally, that distinguishing the species. It is an individualizing process. We have already alluded to this subject on a preceding page.

Taking the earth alone as an example, geology proves that it was, at one time, a fiery ball in space; and, of course, with no more distinction of parts than in a germ. Then, dry land and seas appear; but the land is of small extent and without its mountains, the waters are all salt, and the climate is one over the whole sphere, the tropics reaching to the poles, for the same tribes of plants covered all zones, even to Melville Island and Spitzbergen. At a much later period, the mountains begin to enlarge, the dry land to expand, and gradually, as time rolls on, a temperate climate settles about the poles; the tribes of animals also become more localized. Then, in the last age before man, the continents take their full breadth, the Alps and Pyrenees are born, and other mountains attain their majestic dimensions; the rivers consequently multiply and increase in magnitude and in their erosive power, and valleys are everywhere formed in great diversity of beauty; moreover, the zones of climate become nearly like our own, and every region of the globe has its peculiar Fauna and Flora and temperature. Finally, the features, and climates, and life, attain all their present variety, as man appears to take his place at the command of his Maker. Thus the earth's features and functions were gradually individualized. The subject is illustrated also in various details in the organic history of the globe, to which we briefly allude beyond.

IV. *The universe one, in system and origin.* Threads of light and attraction bind the universe in one, proving an essential unity in the nature and laws of matter. Attraction of gravitation is the fundamental force of matter; and since the law is, in fact and ratio, the same here as in remote space, we may with reason conclude that matter is everywhere essentially the same, now and from its first existence; for the present system of the universe would be annihilated by a change in this law, and therefore it was begun when the law

was established. Bodies possessed of cohesion, necessarily have gravitation ; and hence a general identity as regards attraction of cohesion is involved in the identity of gravitation. Light being dependent on vibrations, as science has shown, and these vibrations a result of molecular action, therefore, since precisely the same rate of vibrations and identical characteristics belong to the light of the stars, we have proof of the profoundest significance and of the most precise character, as to the identity of all matter in its general laws. Thus it is literally inscribed on nature that, CREATION IS ONE, GOD IS ONE, THE UNIVERSE ONE.

V. *Light necessarily the work of the first day—the signal of creation begun.* From the recent results of science we know that light is dependent not merely on molecular vibrations, but on vibrations of a certain requisite rate ; and also that it is produced only by molecular disturbance, action, or combination ; it is a result of chemical or molecular change, and is no independent entity. Without mutual molecular action there could be neither heat nor light. Matter in such an inactive, forceless state, would be literally dark, cold, dead. But let it then be endowed with intense attraction of different degrees or conditions, and it would produce light as the first effect of the mutual action begun.

The command "Let light be," was therefore the summons to activity in matter. The Spirit of God moved or brooded over the vast deep, an abyss of universal night, and light, as the initial phenomenon of matter in action, flashed instantly through space, at the fiat of Deity. Thus science, in its latest developments, declares as distinctly as the Bible, that "on the first day light was."

Light in its veriest universality, must have been the light created, as light is one and the universe one ; and not light about the earth, a little satellite to the sun.

VI. *"The beginning," the actual beginning.* In the fact that light must have been the first phenomenon in creation begun, and that the universe is one in history, we have all needed evidence that Moses meant "in the beginning," where he so asserts.

“The heavens and the earth,” as before stated, is obviously a comprehensive expression for all existence — then a lifeless existence in the extremest sense. The earth was not the earth in defined outline ; for, if we may take our translation as correct (and Professor Lewis and others give it the preference), it was “without form, and void,” actually formless, and merged in the great “deep,” over which the Spirit of God afterwards brooded.

VII. *The earth gradually brought to a condition in which dry land and seas existed.* Geology, as we have observed, has taught that the earth was once in complete igneous fusion ; and this would imply a heat at the surface equal at least to that of melted iron. Granting this, there are conditions of its waters and atmosphere, and of its rocky mass, which may be partly followed out ; and when we know better than now all the effects of heat on the elements and their compounds, we may perhaps be able to write out the history of those times of chaos. It obviously involved a gaseous condition of the whole ocean, whose waters, if now placed evenly over the sphere, would make a layer averaging two miles in depth. From this state, there would have been a passage to successive stages of condensation, as the cooling went on. Finally, the waters would descend and envelop the surface ; and afterwards, by unequal contractions of the still cooling earth, the dry land would have appeared.

As it would have required a temperature of at least 500 or 600 deg. Fahrenheit to have retained so much water in the state of vapor, the surface of the earth could not have been much below this, when the ocean descended to its place. It was still a highly heated earth and ocean, and the atmosphere must have been dense and murky with foul vapors. In Job there is a sublime description evidently of this period (38: 8—10). Jehovah says: “Who shut up the sea with doors . . . when *I made the cloud the garment thereof and thick darkness a swaddling-band for it*, and brake up for it my decreed place, and set bars and doors, and said, Hitherto shalt thou come and no farther, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed.” From such a state, the earth gradually emerged,

that garment of cloud slowly dissipating. The tides and waves rolled around the sphere in ceaseless motion; and, however incredible it appears, we can point out the strata that were made by that ancient ocean. Geology has brought to light rocks of great thickness, without traces of fossils, and many of them crystalline, which belong to time preceding the creation of animals, after the descending of the waters to the surface. They are called the *Azoic* rocks, or rocks of the Azoic age, because no traces of animals occur in them. Geology proves, too, that before animal life began, large areas of these rocks were dry land, over North America from Labrador westward, and we may almost map out the "dry land" on this hemisphere, which is announced on the *third day*.¹

VIII. *Vegetation part of the physical creation.* The introduction of vegetation on the third day, was one of the mysterious facts in creation until the recent revelations of science. Now we know that the prime mission of vegetation is physical, the removal from the atmosphere of a deadly gas, carbonic acid, and the supply to it of one eminently a supporter of life, oxygen. This it accomplishes by the simple process of growth; upon this great end, its vital functions and structure are based; this single criterion distinguishes all plants from animals. Feeding animals and giving joy by its beauty to the human soul are only concomitant ends of vegetation.

Moses in announcing the creation of vegetation describes plants in general. But the institution of the plant-kingdom was the great event; and if plant-life came forth first in the sea-weed, it was still life, a new feature to the progressing world. According to the records in the rocks, vegetation was for a long age only sea-weeds; then in the coal-period,

¹ We have omitted any special reference to the *second day*, as neither geology nor general science, apart from astronomy and general reasoning, afford much aid in interpreting the account. The step of progress was one between that of light through universal space on the first day, and the separation of the lands and seas on the third. The event of the highest character in that interval, that marking a grand epoch in terrestrial time, was the elimination or separation of the earth itself from the "deep" or "waters," (admitted to mean "fluid" in its most extended sense). See Prof. Guyot's views on this subject, in the article in this journal, for April last, p. 327.

flowerless trees, along with the pine tribe (*coniferæ*) which are almost flowerless; and as the last age before man was about to open, trees of our common genera, oaks, elms, etc., and also the palms, began to diversify the earth's surface.

The proof from science of the existence of plants before animals is inferential, and still may be deemed satisfactory. Distinct fossils have not been found: all that ever existed in the azoic rocks having been obliterated. The arguments in the affirmative are as follows:

1. The existence of limestone rocks among the other beds, similar limestones in later ages having been of organic origin; also the occurrence of carbon in the shape of graphite, graphite being, in known cases, in rocks a result of the alteration of the carbon of plants.

2. The fact that the cooling earth would have been fitted for vegetable life for a long age before animals could have existed; the principle being exemplified everywhere that the earth was occupied at each period with the highest kinds of life the conditions allowed.

3. The fact that vegetation subserved an important purpose in the coal-period in ridding the atmosphere of carbonic acid for the subsequent introduction of land animals, suggests a valid reason for believing that the same great purpose, the true purpose of vegetation, was effected through the ocean before the *waters* were fitted for animal life.

4. Vegetation being directly or mediately the food of animals, it must have had a previous existence. The latter part of the azoic age in geology, we therefore regard as the age when the plant-kingdom was instituted, the latter half of the third day in Genesis. However short or long the epoch, it was one of the great steps of progress.

IX. *The creation of the sun on the fourth day.* By arguments already mentioned, based on the oneness of the universe in origin, the sun, moon and stars are shown to have had their places, when the earth was established. But through a prolonged period, as has been remarked, the earth was shrouded in its own vapors, and warm with its own heat, and there was therefore no sun or moon, days or

seasons. Whenever the sun first broke through the dense clouds, it was a day of joy to the world, standing out as one of the grand epochs in its history.

The sun is almost the heart and brain of the earth. It is the regulator of its motions, from the orbital movement in space, to the flow of its currents in the sea and air, the silent rise of vapors that fly with the winds to become the source of rivers over the land, and the still more profound action in the living growth of the plant and animal. It is no creator of life; but through its outflowing light, heat, and attraction, it keeps the whole world in living activity, doing vastly more than simply turning off days and seasons. Without the direct sunlight, there may be growth, as many productions of the sea and shady grounds prove. But were the sun's face perpetually veiled, far the greater part of living beings would dwindle and die. Many chemical actions in the laboratory are suspended by excluding light; and in the exquisite chemistry of living beings, this effect is everywhere marked: even the plants that happen to grow beneath the shade of a small tree or hedge in a garden evince, by their dwarfed size and unproductiveness, the power of the sun's rays, and the necessity of this orb to the organic period of the earth's history.

The sun therefore leads off, not only in fact, but with peculiar grandeur and aptness, the organic history of the globe.

Thus, at last, through modern scientific research, we learn that the appearance of light on the first day and of the sun on the fourth, an idea foreign to man's unaided conceptions, is as much in the volume of nature as that of sacred writ.

X. *The invertebrates, fishes, reptiles, and birds, the earlier animal creations.* Geology has opened out the fact, that the earliest animals and plants of the globe were wholly water species. There was a long *marine era*, the lands small, the seas nearly universal, the continents marked out it is true in their grand outline, but only partly emerged; the animals only the inhabitants of the seas, as molluscs, corals, and fishes.

This was followed by a *semi-marine*, or *amphibian era*, as

it may be called, when land-plants took possession of the dry land, producing in its earlier half the coal era : but still the continents were at least half the time more or less submerged. Reptiles and birds were then the dominant animal types.

As God has recorded in the rocks by the burial of these races in their successions, so he has written in His word. On the fifth day, He said: "Let the *waters* bring forth," by *waters* implying apparently the marine or amphibian character of the species of life; and then, the account adds: "The waters brought forth *abundantly*," while the rocks testify also to swarming myriads in the seas. The species with few exceptions were oviparous. Prof. Bush shows that the "great whales" were as correctly *reptiles*, the same word *tannim* being used for *dragon* in Ezek. 29: 3, where the figure is drawn from the crocodile of the Nile; also that the word for *fowl*, means rather *flying thing*, whether insect, bird, or flying reptile, all of which occur in this era. He says moreover that the clause in verse 20, translated "and fowl that may fly above the earth" may be as correctly translated *and let the fowl fly above the earth*; so as to disconnect it from the clause, "Let the waters bring forth:" thus it stands in verse 22.

The harmony of geology with Genesis could not be more exact.

XI. *The creations of the tribes not simultaneous but successive, and occurring at many different times, after more or less complete exterminations.* The records in the rocks declare that these creations came not forth all at once, but in long progression. There was an Age when Molluscs (of which shell-fish, snails, and cuttle-fish are examples) were the dominant race, having as associates corals, crinoids, and trilobites. The earth, we may believe, was yet too warm, and the atmosphere too impure for more exalted forms. This was the *Silurian* age of geological science.

There was next an Age when Fishes first filled the seas, the *Devonian* of geology. Then another, when Amphibians (the inferior group of reptiles, including frogs and salaman-

ders, related to fishes in having gills when young) commenced, and land-plants were first in exuberant growth, the *Carboniferous age* (the land-plants, as stated, cleansing the atmosphere from carbonic acid for land animals). Then followed an Age in which true reptiles increased in numbers and diversity, by multiplied creations, until there were reptiles larger than whales in the water, immense leviathan reptiles on the land, and flying reptiles in the air, so that each of the elements was taken possession of by these scaly tribes. This was the *Reptilian age*. In its progress, reptiles passed their climax, and before its close, commenced their decline; the race, since then, has been a comparatively feeble one.

Moreover, in each of these Ages, there were many distinct creations succeeding to exterminations of previously existing life. Through the Silurian, Devonian, Carboniferous and Reptilian Ages in America, the fifth day of Genesis, *fifteen times* at least the seas were swept of their species, so that, in the rocky folios of the succeeding epoch, not a species of the former epoch occurs, or only half a dozen or so out of hundreds. After each, life was again reinstated by the Creative Hand, life in all the departments that had thus far been introduced to the globe, new mollusca, new corals, new crinoids, new trilobites; and if the Age of Fishes were in progress, new fishes also, and so on; making a complete creation for the time. Even in the Age of Fishes alone (the Devonian age), there were *four* such revolutions in America, with new creations throughout. Moreover, there were many partial destructions and restorations at other times. These exterminations can be proved, in many cases, to have been produced, either by the escape of heat, through fissures, from the earth's interior, or the elevation of the sea-bottom to dry land, or some convulsion in the earth's crust. They were, in general, connected with the earth's physical history.

Recapitulating the geological Ages mentioned, and adding those following, they are (naming them, as has been done by Agassiz, from the dominant type):

I. the Age of Molluscs, or the Silurian; II. the Age of Fishes, or the Devonian; III. the Age of Coal-plants and

Amphibians, or the Carboniferous ; IV. the Age of Reptiles, including the periods between the Coal and the Tertiary ; V. the Age of Mammals, or the Tertiary and Post-Tertiary ; VI. the Age of MAN. The progress of Vegetable Life affords : *first*, the Age of Algæ or Sea-weeds, corresponding to the Silurian and Devonian ; *second*, the Age of Flowerless Trees (Acrogens) and Coniferæ, or the age of Coal-Plants ; *third*, the Age of Dicotyledonous Plants, or our common trees (oaks, elms, etc.), beginning just before the age of Mammals.

XII. *A gradual elevation of the successive races involved in the gradual refrigeration of the earth, as also in its other steps of physical progress.* The whole plan of creation had evident reference to MAN as the end and crown of the Animal Kingdom, and to the present cool condition of the globe, as, therefore, its most exalted state. It is hence obvious, that progression in the earth from a warmer to a cooler condition, necessarily involved progression from the lower to the higher races, such as actually took place. This cooling, therefore, implied almost necessarily the complete extinction of some earlier races, fitted for earlier time, as well as of species. The whole fifth day (using the term in Genesis) until its later epochs, was a time of warm climate from the equator to the poles. Not a species of the thousands in those ages now exists. Species and genera appeared and disappeared as time moved on : the last trilobite lived in the Carboniferous seas, and the last *Lepidodendra* in the forests of the Carboniferous continents ; the last ammonite, flying reptile and swimming saurian existed in the Reptilian age, when molluscs as well as reptiles passed their prime, both as to numbers of individuals and rank of species. Even the fishes bear distinctly, in their bodies, the marks of the particular part of the fifth day in which they lived : for they first appear in the Devonian age with the spinal column elongated quite to the extremity of the upper lobe of the tail ; and afterwards it becomes less and less elongated until the middle of the Reptilian age, when, for the first time, species occur with the body cut off square behind, as in existing species ; moreover, the old type of tail disappears, and almost

completely too the Ganoid tribe of fishes, in which it was so striking a characteristic. Thus the world took its successive steps onward, towards the Golden Age, in the then distant future. The earlier races were of lower types, not because the Creative Hand was weak, but for the reason that the times, that is the temperature and condition of the globe, were just fitted, in each case, for the races produced, and the progress of the plan of creation, correspondingly, required it.

As between the hot equator and the frigid zones, tribes now have their limits in geographical distribution, so in geological time, between the warm Silurian age and the cool present, there was a localization of groups in time, a chronological distribution,—an increase and period of maximum at different epochs along the Ages. The Reptilian and Molluscan types attaining their maximum in the Reptilian age, are examples. A few genera reach from the very first dawn of life to the existing period: they are continuous lines, binding creation in one. This oneness also appears most strikingly in the fact that hardly a fragment of a fossil is taken from the oldest rocks that is not at once as well understood as if it were from an existing species.

The intervals of rest in “self-existent” nature, which Professor Lewis speaks of, are not in the records of the earth. The longest suspension of life in North America took place, as nearly as we can learn, between the Coal period and the Middle Reptilian. Moreover, the epochs of revolution in Europe and America were, in general, not contemporaneous; and this implies merely a non-contemporaneity in the convulsions or oscillations of the earth’s crust in the two hemispheres.

XIII. *System of life-evolution.* The facts gathered from nature teach us :

1. That species have not been made out of species by any process of growth or development; for the transition-forms do not occur.

2. That the “original divine power” did not create a generic or universal germ from which all subordinate genera and species were developed; for, with any such system of

evolution, the Creator would have been incompetent to complete the creation begun; each revolution would have frustrated every new effort.

3. That the evolution or plan of progress, was by successive creations of species, in their full perfection. After every revolution, no imperfect or half-made forms occur; no back-step in creation; but a step forward, through new forms, more elevated in general than those of earlier time.

4. That the creation was not in a lineal series from the very lowest upward. The four sub-kingdoms of animal-life, the Radiate, Molluscan, Articulate, and Vertebrate, early appeared in some of their representatives; and the first three almost or quite together. The types are wholly independent, and are not connected lineally, either historically or zoologically; and this is a general principle with regard to subordinate groups. The earliest species of a class were often far from the very lowest, although among the inferior. The gigantic saurians appeared before turtles and serpents; trilobites were superior to many crustaceans afterwards created; and the fish that began the Vertebrata, were powerful species, even superior in attributes of life, though not in type, to some existing Amphibians.

5. That the creation of life was the unfolding of a plan, which involved distinct archetype enactments, and, subordinate to these, and in harmony with them, expressions of purposes or ideas of a less and less general character. The four sub-kingdoms of animal life were the four archetype enactments: they limited the development of the animal creation to these four directions; and every new group came forth in subordination to these established types. So the subordinate groupings, classes, tribes, etc., have the same relation to the groups under them.

6. That the development of the plan of creation, while by successive creations, was in accordance with the law of evolution, as Agassiz has explained, that is, progress from the simple to the complex, from comprehensive unity to multiplicity through successive individualizations. The institution of the Vertebrate type in the memberless fish, embraced in

its idea all those parts and organs, external and internal, which were afterwards brought out, and which have their highest individualization, in man; so that in the bony structure, for example, we may trace the homologies between the human skeleton and the primitive fish-type. The unfolding was, in some groups, a general rising in grade, until the time of maximum, as in the Reptilian type; but embraced expansions both upward and downward, that is, to superior and inferior tribes. In many cases, the original or earliest group was but little inferior to those of later date, and the progress was towards a purer expression of the type. Thus the earliest fishes had reptile teeth, a bony coat of mail, and other reptilian characteristics, foreshadowing the Reptile type afterwards introduced. In the unfolding of the type, the reptilian features were lost, the ancient race became almost wholly extinct, and gradually the fish type came out in its purity and full diversity. This is one of numerous examples of this kind.

The Molluscan type was unfolded, in all its grand divisions in the Silurian or Molluscan age. The Articulate type, on the contrary, appeared then only in the inferior water-species, crustaceans and worms; and gradually, as time moved on, one grand division after another was evolved, until the age of Man, the period of their greatest diversity. A reason for this difference consists in the fact that Articulates are, like Vertebrates, largely land species. Moreover, every new diversity of climate, soil, plant, or animal, enlarged the field for insect life.

7. That hypotheses as to the precise mode of creating a species are presumptuous. D'Orbigny, a distinguished geologist of France, in his *Geology* (1851, vol. II., p. 251), says well: "Quelle est la force créatrice qui a eu cette toute-puissance si extraordinaire? Ici nous devons confesser l'impossibilité complète dans laquelle nous trouvons de répondre à aucune de ces hautes questions. Il est des limites que l'esprit humain ne peut franchir, des circonstances où l'homme doit s'arrêter et se borner à admettre les faits qu'il ne peut expliquer."

XIV. *The revolution closing the Reptilian age in geology a universal one.* Although the catastrophes in the earth's history were seldom universal, that closing the Reptilian age swept both Europe and America alike, and, as far as we know, the whole earth. Its destruction of the life of the Cretaceous period (the last of the Reptilian age) was complete, with scarcely an exception. Thus geology and the Bible both mark the close of the *fifth day*. After such a devastation, the new creation began, that of Mammals or quadrupeds: not, be it understood, of Mammals alone, for all the lower tribes had their various representatives also, by the same creation, from molluscs and corals to fish and reptiles. All, by their new forms, express the character of the age. The climates of the earth, as this age of Mammals opened, were, for the first time, widely diversified; yet the facts show that they were not as cool as now, until the age had half elapsed.

XV. *The creation of Mammals introducing a new element into the world.* The type of animal life which began with this age, the *sixth day*, was that in which the earth was to reach its highest destiny. It was the full establishment of that special type of Vertebrates that was at last to be exalted by the endowment of a soul; that, in which the mutual dependence of the parent and young, indicated in the term *mammalia*, is its grand feature, the principal means, in this age of Man, of cultivating those affections which bind society together and man to his Maker. There is hence the highest beauty and philosophy in the Mosaic record, independent of its historical facts, in thus separating the Mammals from the other Vertebrates.

Some small insect-eating Mammals appeared in the age of Reptiles. They were few (four species have been found) and weak, in striking contrast with the huge Saurians that filled the seas, earth, and air in that age. They have been well called prophetic types, announcements, as has been already explained of the true age of Mammals next to open in its full grandeur. Such seeming exceptions are in fact

part of the system of progress, and afford no objection to the reality of the great Ages.

XVI. *Progress by revolutions, and by successive creations in the age of Mammals; but the revolutions diminishing in extent as the age of Man approached.* The age of Mammals had its revolutions like the Reptilian age and those preceding; but they become less and less general, and the continents more and more stable, and modern in outline and features. The *marine* and *amphibian eras* of the globe had passed; and this was the commencement of the *continental era*.

The quadrupeds did not all come forth together. Large and powerful Herbivorous species first take possession of the earth, with only a few small Carnivora. These pass away. Other Herbivora with a larger proportion of Carnivora next appear. These also are exterminated; and so with others. Then the Carnivora appear in vast numbers and power, and the Herbivora also abound. Moreover these races attain a magnitude and number far surpassing all that now exist, as much so indeed, on all the continents, North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, as the old mastodon, twenty feet long and nine feet high, exceeds the modern buffalo. Such, according to geology, was the age of Mammals, when the brute species existed in their greatest magnificence, and brutal ferocity had free play; when dens of bears and hyenas, prowling tigers and lions far larger than any now existing, covered Britain and Europe. Mammoths and Mastodons wandered over the plains of North America, huge sloth-like Megatheria passed their sluggish lives on the pampas of South America, and elephantine Marsupials strolled about Australia.

XVII. *A dwindling of the race of Mammals as the age of Man approached.* As the Mammalian age draws to a close, the ancient Carnivora and Herbivora of that era all pass away, excepting, it is believed, a few that are useful to man. New creations of smaller size peopled the groves; the vegetation received accessions to its foliage, fruit-trees and flowers, and the seas brighter forms of water-life. This

we know from comparisons with the fossils of the preceding Mammalian age. There was, at this time, no chaotic upturning, but only the opening of creation to its fullest expansions: and so in Genesis, no new day is begun, it is still the *sixth day*.

The continents long before had had their marked characteristics: the Oriental (including Europe, Asia, and Africa) as the continent of *Carnivora*, the highest mammals; North America, of *Herbivora*, a tribe inferior to the Carnivora; South America, of the sloth and armadillo tribes (*Edentata*) still lower in rank; Australia, of the Kangaroo tribe or *Marsupials*, the lowest of all quadrupeds; for these were severally the characteristic races of the continents in the Mammalian age. As the age of Man opens, North and South America and Australia were still essentially the same in their tribes of Mammals, though with new and smaller species; there is no sign of progress. The Oriental lands, on the contrary, which had so prominently taken the lead in the age of Mammals, and even through the whole Reptilian age preceding,—since the species of animals in Europe as indicated by the fossils, were ten times more numerous than in North America,—may be said to have been marked out for the Eden of the world, ages previous to man's creation.

XVIII. *Man, the new creation.* In the living beings of former ages, there had been intelligence and a low grade of reason, affections as between the dam and her cub, and the joyousness of life and activity in the sporting tribes of the land. But there had been no living soul that could look beyond time to eternity, from the finite towards the infinite, from the world around to the world within and God above. This was the new creation, as new as when life began; a spiritual element as diverse from the life of the brute as life itself is diverse from inorganic existence.

The *first* great period of history, was the period of mere material existence and physical progress. Its beginning was far away in the dim indefinite past, when light announced the work of progress begun; and even beyond, in the forceless matter of preceding time; after many changes and

evolutions, it blossomed in the lands and seas and vegetation of the third day. The *second* great period was the period of life and organic progress. Its germs are traced in the vegetation of the former period; but the light of the sun first gave vigor to the growth, and after various developments progressing through long ages, it finally blossomed in the Mammals and man of the sixth day. The *third* great period is the more exalted period of spirit and spiritual progress; whose germs are even now expanding in the soul of man; but whose flowers and fruit will appear, only in time to come. The great evolutions of time are thus so closely in accordance with the evolutions in a living being, although all is by the direct power and wisdom of God as before explained, that we comprehend the system best in language recognizing the parallel relations and oneness of principle.

XIX. *Man the last creation: The day of rest.* Science has no evidence that any living species have been created since the appearance of man on the globe. All facts in nature accord with the Scripture record, that man was the last of the grand series. Ages and ages had rolled by, the world had, step by step, been fitted up, and life had passed through its long succession of forms, ever increasing in rank, until at last man stood up erect, fitted to subjugate the mightiest energies of nature, to read the records of infinite intelligence, to embrace a universe in his sympathies, and reciprocate the love of Heaven. Creation thus ended. God pronounced upon it his benediction and rested from all his work. Analogy with the other days of Genesis, in the light of geology, certainly would lead us to regard that seventh day, not as a simple twenty-four hours, but the period of rest still in progress.

The two records, the earlier revelation and the later, are thus one in their sublime enunciations of the history of creation. There is a like grandeur in the progress of the ages. They both contain conceptions infinitely beyond the reach of the human intellect, and bear equal evidence of their divine origin. The "grand old book of God still stands," and this

grand old earth, the more its leaves are turned over and pondered, the more will it sustain, enlighten, and illustrate the sacred word. The two are independent inscriptions, written in lines of light by the same Sun of righteousness; and the more deeply they are studied and loved for their truths, the higher may we rise towards the effulgence of their eternal source. The universe and the Bible are consecutive parts of one glorious volume; the *former* teaching of infinite harmonies, coming up from the deep past, and of man's relation through Nature to God; the *latter* of man's relation through his own soul to God, and of still loftier harmonies in the eternal future: the *first part*, telling not only of the wisdom and power of God, but also of man's exaltation, at the head of the kingdoms of life, the being towards whom, with prophetic eye, all nature was looking through the course of ages, preparing his earthly abode, arranging every ridge, and plain, and sea, and living thing, for his moral and intellectual advancement, and with so much beneficence that man, when he came to take possession of the domain, found everywhere lessons of love and adoration, and read in his own exaltation a hope, though a trembling hope, of immortality; the *second part*, after a chorus epitomizing the former revelation, pursues its closing thought, Man in his relation to his Maker, makes that hope of immortality sure, and points out the way of life, by which he may enter into everlasting communion with God his Creator and Redeemer. If students of nature fail of that way of life, it is not that science is evil, but man fallen.

ARTICLE IV.

ATONEMENT.

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THE word *atonement* occurs but once in our English New Testament, and is the translation of a Greek word (*καταλλαγὴν*,) which, in every other instance, is rendered *reconciliation*. An atonement therefore, in the sense of our translators, is a reconciliation. But the word has undergone a slight change of meaning, within the last two hundred years. As now used, it denotes, not so much a reconciliation, as that which is done to *open and prepare the way* for a reconciliation. As used by evangelical Christians, it refers to what has been done by our Lord Jesus Christ, to *open a way* for the recovery and salvation of sinful men, that so a reconciliation may be effected between them and their Maker.

There were atonements under the former dispensation; but these were merely of a typical character. The blood of beasts was designed to prefigure, to shadow forth, the great atonement which, in the fulness of time, was to be made by the blood of Christ upon the cross. We shall have no occasion to refer to these typical atonements, except as they serve to throw light upon the important doctrine now before us.

It may be proper to say, in passing, that the word *atonement* is seldom used by the older Protestant theologians, except in reference to the typical atonements of the Old Testament. It does not occur, we think, in any of the confessions or catechisms of the Reformed churches, and probably not in any of the theological writings of the seventeenth century. Not even President Edwards, or Dr. Hopkins has aught to say of the *atonement* of Christ, under that specific name. They have much to say of his work of *redemption*, and what is now called the *atonement* is merged in that.

The separating of the atonement from the more general doctrine of redemption, has tended much to simplify the sub-

ject, and so has been a real gain to theology. The atonement of Chrst is a specific work; it relates to what he did and suffered to *open a way* for the salvation of sinners. Redemption is a more general work, including all that Christ has ever done, or will do, in promoting and securing the salvation of his people. The atonement is universal, as to its sufficiency. Redemption, in the full sense of the term, applies only to the elect. The work of atonement was finished, when Christ bowed his head and gave up the ghost. The work of redemption is not yet finished, nor will it be, until all the elect are gathered in.

In entering upon the discussion before us, our first inquiry is as to *the necessity* of an atonement. There are those who doubt this necessity. The sinner ought to come to a knowledge of his sins, and when he sees them, he ought to repent of them. He is able and is justly required to repent; and when he does repent he may be forgiven and saved. There is nothing in the way of his salvation, but his impenitence, and this difficulty he is well able to overcome. Or, if he is not able of himself to come to repentance, God surely can bring him to repentance, without first resorting to the strange expedient of offering up his own Son upon the cross.

But if the death of Christ was not needed to make an atonement for sin, it is hard to see why he should have died at all. It is agreed by all, that Christ was a perfectly holy being; of course, he could not have died for his own sins. It is agreed, too, that his death took place in the providence of God. And how are we to account for such a dispensation; how vindicate the propriety or justice of it, but upon the supposition of a needed atonement? If Christ's death was necessary to make an atonement for sin, and if, in view of such necessity, he was willing to die; then there is no difficulty. The reasons of the transaction, and the justice of it, so far as the hand of God was concerned in it, are clear; but on any other supposition, we know not what to think of such an event, or how to account for it, in consistency with the rectitude of providence. That God should bring an in-

nocent man to the cross, when he had done nothing to deserve such an infliction, and had not consented to it; bring him there, like any other victim, in spite of himself, and without any indispensable necessity, either on his own account, or that of others; how are we to justify such a transaction? Who can believe it? If it is hard to conceive (as some tell us) why the just should be suffered, with his own consent, to die for the unjust; is it not vastly more difficult to see why he should be made, or suffered, to die for nothing, neither for his own sins, nor for those of the world?

The necessity of an atonement by the death of Christ is plainly and abundantly taught in the Scriptures. Our Saviour himself taught this doctrine. "The Son of man *must* suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders, and be killed, and after three days rise again" (Mark 8: 31). "The Son of man *must* be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and the third day rise again" (Luke 24: 7). "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so *must* the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life" (John 3: 14). "Thus it is written, and thus it *behooved* Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead on the third day" (Luke 24: 47). Paul reasoned with the Thessalonians out of the Scriptures, "opening and alleging that *Christ must needs have suffered*, and risen again from the dead" (Acts 17: 3).

Perhaps it will be said, that the necessity indicated in these passages results only from the fact, that Christ's sufferings and death had been predetermined and predicted, and the prediction must be fulfilled. But this, if it be admitted, only places the argument one step further back. For if there was no *inherent necessity* for Christ's sufferings and death, why were they predetermined? Why predicted? Why did it enter into the eternal purpose of God, that thus it should be?

The necessity of Christ's sufferings as a satisfaction for sin is clearly indicated in what took place in the garden of Gethsemane: "O my Father, if it *be possible*, let this cup pass from me!" "Abba, Father, all things are possible with

thee ; take away this cup from me." And why was not the cup of suffering taken away ? Why was not such a thing possible ? Let those who think an atonement unnecessary answer these questions, if they can.

The necessity of an atonement in order to forgiveness is further taught in the *typical atonements* of the Old Testament. The sacrifice of the victim, in those days, was never intended as a *means* of repentance, or a *substitute* for it. It rather implied and *required* repentance. The offerer must be already penitent, else his sacrifice would not be accepted. Why then, on the ground we oppose, was the sacrifice enjoined at all ? The offerer is already penitent, and penitence, we are told, is enough. Why, then, must the innocent lamb be slain, and his blood be sprinkled upon the mercy seat ? Is not here conclusive proof, that mere penitence is not enough ; that an expiation is demanded, that something must be done to satisfy the law and the justice of God ; or not even the penitent sinner can be pardoned and saved ?

We have further evidence of the same truth, in that *faith* is made one of the indispensable conditions of salvation. Repentance is, indeed, an indispensable condition. We must repent, in order to be forgiven. Except we repent, we all perish. And if mere repentance was enough, this ought to be the only condition. But there is also the indispensable condition of *faith* ; faith in Christ ; faith in a *crucified Redeemer*. "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever *believeth* on him should not perish, but have everlasting life." Now this requisition of faith shows conclusively, that repentance alone is *not* a sufficient ground of pardon. The Son of man must be lifted up. He must bleed and die upon the cross. And he must be accepted, trusted in, *believed in*, as an atoning sacrifice, or there is no salvation for us.

Those who flatter themselves that repentance alone is sufficient to satisfy God's justice, as a moral governor, would do well to apply their theory to another kind of justice ; viz., *commutative* or *commercial* justice, that which regulates the

dealings of man with man. A honestly owes B a sum of money, and justice requires that it should be paid. But A is very sorry that he has got into B's debt. He humbles and blames himself, and heartily repents for so doing. But do his repentings cancel the claims of justice against him, or furnish any sufficient grounds for his being released from his obligations? That would be a summary way of clearing off old debts, for the creditor to release the debtor from his obligations, so soon as he was sorry that he had contracted them. Every one can see that such a principle could not be tolerated in application to commercial justice; and why should it operate any more favorably, when applied to governmental justice? The claims of the latter are not less stringent and inviolable, certainly, than those of the former; and if the principle would work nothing but confusion in the former case, going to dissolve all the bands of commercial intercourse, how can it be shown that it would not work as disastrously, and even more so, in the latter?

The necessity of an atonement is often felt, *deeply, painfully*, under human governments. It was felt by king Darius, when "he set his heart on Daniel to deliver him" from the lion's den, "and labored till the going-down of the sun to deliver him," but could not. Could Darius have hit upon some expedient, by which his law and government would be as much honored in delivering Daniel, as in punishing him; in other words, could he have devised and provided a sufficient atonement for Daniel, he might safely have delivered him. But as this was found to be impossible, nought remained but that Daniel must go into the den of lions.

The same necessity was felt by the elder Brutus, when his sons had conspired against the Roman commonwealth. Could a sufficient atonement have been made for them, they might have been spared; but as none could be devised, the father was obliged to pass sentence of death upon them, and to stand by and see it executed.

The necessity of an atonement is continually and sometimes painfully felt, in smaller governments. A child in a family, or a scholar in school, transgresses some established

law, and is exposed to punishment. The father or master does not wish to punish, and he sets himself to devise some way, some expedient, by which his authority can be maintained, and the infliction be spared. If any such method can be devised, it is of the nature of an atonement. But if none is possible, the infliction must follow, or the authority of the parent or master is weakened, and may be subverted.

We have borrowed these illustrations for the purpose of showing and impressing the necessity of an atonement, if sinners are to be saved under the government of God. But perhaps the strongest argument, after all, for such necessity, grows out of the *fact* of an atonement, as certified to us in the Scriptures. The Bible does teach, in a great variety of forms, and in the plainest terms, that Christ's death upon the cross was of an *expiatory character*; that he died to make an atonement for sin. Thus he is said to have been "wounded for our transgressions," and "bruised for our iniquities." He is said to have "borne our sins;" to have "purged our sins;" to have "suffered for our sins;" to have "died for our sins;" and to have "shed his blood for the remission of sins." He is said to have "redeemed us to God by his blood;" and to have "redeemed us from the curse of the law, having been made a curse for us." He "laid down his life for us." He "gave himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God." He "gave his life a ransom for many." He was "delivered for our offences." "He tasted death for every man." "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." There is no end to representations such as these, taken from all parts of the Bible, and teaching as plainly as words can teach anything, that the death of Christ was an offering, an expiation, an atonement for the sins of men. They teach the *fact* of an atonement, and, by necessary consequence, the *necessity* of it; for, surely, if it had not been necessary, it never had been made. God would not have sent his Son into the world, to take upon himself our nature, and die in our stead, had there been no need of such a sacrifice. He would never

have been at the expense of providing such an atonement, without a most urgent, indispensable necessity.

But if an atonement for sin was necessary, *why* was it necessary? *Why* must the Son of God come down and die, to open a way for the salvation of sinful men? Though these questions have been answered, in part, in the remarks already made, still it may be necessary to give them a more particular consideration. And we answer:

1. An atonement was necessary in order that sinners might *be humbled and brought to repentance*. It is often insisted, as before remarked, that mere repentance is enough to ensure forgiveness, without an atonement. But, without an atonement, who ever had repented? How much true repentance had been found among men? It is in consequence of the atonement that the Holy Spirit is given, without whose influences no human being had ever given his heart to God. It is in consequence of the atonement, that we are favored with the day and the means of grace.

We do not deny the natural ability of sinful men to repent, or (which is the same) that they *can* repent if they will. But *will* they repent, without an atonement? *Have* they? *Where* have they? The devils have natural ability to repent, and are under obligations to repent; but they never did, and they never will. And no more would one of the human race ever have repented, had not an atonement been made for us on the cross.

We would not say that no sinner of our race ever came to repentance, without a *knowledge* of the atonement; though such instances, especially of adult sinners, it is believed, are very rare. It is the preaching of the cross, emphatically, which results in the conversion of souls. It is at the foot of the cross, ordinarily, that the tear of penitence begins to flow. But we do insist and repeat, that, had no atonement been provided, not a soul of our race had ever been brought to repentance. There had been no more true repentance among men on the earth, than there is among the damned in the other world.

But this necessity for the atonement is not, after all, the

most urgent and fundamental. There is a necessity greater than this. We remark, therefore,

2. The atonement of Christ was necessary, to *sustain and honor the broken law of God, to vindicate his authority, and satisfy his glorious justice*. In carrying into effect his eternal purposes, God has undertaken to be, not only the universal Creator and Disposer, but a *moral Governor*. He has surrounded himself with intelligent creatures, free, moral, responsible agents, proper subjects of law and government; and he has undertaken to administer a moral government over them. He has undertaken to govern them, not by physical force, but by laws, motives, and moral considerations; by a system of just rewards and punishments. But in order to the success of this vast undertaking, it is obviously necessary for the Supreme Ruler, as it is for any other ruler, to *sustain law*. He must not suffer his law to be trifled with and trampled on. He must maintain it inviolate, in all its strictness and strength, its authority and purity, or his government of law will be subverted and overthrown.

And here lies the necessity of an adequate atonement, if transgressors of the divine law are to be forgiven and saved. The law can be sustained, by punishing the transgressors as they deserve; by inflicting upon them the threatened penalty. Can it be as fully sustained in any other way? Can any expedient be devised, by which the broken law can be honored, and God's righteous regard for it be displayed, and all the ends of government be secured, as fully, as perfectly, as they would be by inflicting the penalty? Such an expedient (if such an one be possible) would be an atonement, a full and adequate atonement. After such an atonement, God could forgive and save sinners, on such conditions as he was pleased to appoint, and yet not detract one iota from his law. His law would stand as inviolate, and his government as strong, as though the threatened penalty had been executed.

But, without some such expedient, or, in other words, without a sufficient atonement, to pardon and save sinners would be a moral impossibility. It could never be tolerated

under the government of God. It could not consist with the stability and perfection of that government, or even with its continued existence.

At the hazard of repetition, we wish to press this point, and to give it prominence, *the necessity of an atonement to honor and sustain law*. God's law has been transgressed here on earth, flagrantly transgressed. A whole world of sinners have cast off the authority of their Sovereign, and risen up in arms against him. God does not wish to punish them, or one of them. He has no pleasure in their death. But what can he do? His law must be honored. His holy government must be sustained, or be given up. It *can* be sustained by the infliction of the penalty on all those who have transgressed. Can it be in any other way? Is any substitute for this terrible infliction possible? Can any sufficient atonement be made? If an atonement *can* be made, then God may consistently pardon and save sinners. But if not, they must all suffer, or God's law and government must suffer. They must be punished as they deserve, or his holy government must be undermined and subverted.

It is our happiness to know, that, in the infinite wisdom and goodness of God, an expedient of salvation has been devised. An atonement for sinners has been made. It was made in the sufferings and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. When we deserved to die, he died for us. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. Christ did not come into our world, and die here for nothing. He did not die for a trifle. He would not take upon himself our nature and flesh, and endure all the agonies of the garden and the cross, without a most urgent necessity. We have seen that there *was* such a necessity for his death, and the grounds or reasons for that necessity we have pretty fully investigated.

Our next inquiry will relate to the *nature* and *efficacy* of Christ's atonement. In what did it consist? And how does it avail for our redemption?

1. In what did the atonement of Christ consist? Did it consist in his *perfect holiness*, his *perfect obedience to the divine law*? Or in his *sufferings and death*? Or in both?

As the sufferings and death of Christ were *voluntarily* submitted to, they may be regarded as constituting a species of *obedience*; and so they were regarded in the Scriptures. He was “obedient *unto death*” (Phil. 2: 8). But this, which is sometimes called Christ’s *passive* obedience, is not that about which we now inquire. Christ’s “obedience unto death” is the same as his voluntary sufferings and death. But the obedience which has been thought by some to enter into the nature of the atonement, and to constitute a part or the whole of it, is his *personal obedience to the divine law*; or, in other words, his *personal holiness*.

We are disposed to attach a high importance to the perfect, spotless holiness of the Saviour. It was indispensable to the work of atonement. It was that without which he could have made no atonement. He *must* be perfectly sinless himself, or he could not make an acceptable offering for the sins of others. “For such an high-priest became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners; who needeth not daily,” like the priests in Israel, “to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the people” (Heb. 7: 26). Here, the necessity of the spotless holiness of the Saviour, in order that he might perform the work of atonement, is clearly set forth. Still, in strictness of speech, it can hardly be said that the atonement of Christ consisted at all in his personal obedience, or holiness.

In the first place, Christ’s obedience could not meet the chief *necessity* of an atonement, as before explained. That which is needed, is something to sustain law; something to stand in place of the threatened penalty of the law; something which will answer all the purposes of moral government *as well* as the execution of the penalty. An expedient of this nature would be an atonement. Anything short of it would not be. Now it is obvious that the perfect holiness of Christ was no substitute for the penalty threatened to transgressors. It was not adapted to be. It could not be. There was need here of suffering. The penalty of the law consists in suffering, and an equivalent, a substitute, must be of the same nature.

A like view of the subject is presented in the typical atonements of the Old Testament. These all prefigured the atonement of Christ, and may be supposed, so far as they go, to prefigure it accurately. Now it was indispensable to the acceptableness of an offering under the law, that the animal offered should be perfect in its kind. It must be *without spot or blemish*; thus indicating the necessity of the spotless character of Christ. Accordingly, our Saviour is spoken of by Peter as "a Lamb without blemish and without spot" (1 Pet. 1: 19). Still, the typical atonement did not consist in the spotlessness of the lamb, but in *the shedding of its blood*. It was the blood, emphatically, that made the atonement. So the atonement of Christ, prefigured by that of the law, must consist in the shedding of his blood.

We have the same view presented in *the plain language of Scripture*. The utmost stress is laid, everywhere, upon the *cross*, the *blood*, the *death* of Christ, as that in which the expiation, the atonement, properly consists. We hardly need quote passages, after those which have been before given. Christ is said to have been a sacrifice, an offering, an oblation, a propitiation for sin. He is said to have suffered for our sins, to have died for our sins, to have been delivered for our offences, and to have been a curse for us, in his crucifixion. The strongest expressions are used, in different parts of the Bible, to set forth the nature of Christ's atonement, as consisting in his sufferings and death.

And while so great stress is laid on the death of Christ, we find his obedience spoken of in only a few instances; and in most of these, if not all (as the connection shows), the reference is to what has been called his *passive* obedience, or his obedience unto death. "Being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became *obedient unto death*" (Phil. 2: 8). "Yet learned he obedience by the things that *he suffered*" (Heb. 5: 8). "By the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous" (Rom. 5: 19). These are the only passages, perhaps, in which the obedience of Christ is directly spoken of in the Bible. The first two refer, certainly, to his obedience *in suffering*; and, by the most judicious commen-

tators, the last passage quoted is interpreted in the same way.

But it will be said, although we do not find much in the Bible on the subject of Christ's obedience, very much is said respecting his *righteousness*, which amounts to the same thing. "This is the name wherewith he shall be called, The Lord *our righteousness*" (Jer. 23: 6). It is admitted that, in the matter of justification, much stress is laid, in the Scriptures, on *the righteousness of Christ*; but we do not admit that this is the same as his personal *obedience*, or *holiness*. The original words translated "obedience" and "righteousness," are not the same, and not synonymous; neither is this true of the English words. Obedience to the law is the same as virtue or holiness in the general; while righteousness, in its original and proper signification, is *justice, equity, honesty, rectitude, right*. "He shall judge the world with *righteousness*, and the people with his truth" (Ps. 96: 13). "With *righteousness* shall he judge the poor, and reprove with equity for the meek of the earth." "Judgment also will I lay to the line, and *righteousness* to the plummet, and the hail shall sweep away the refuges of lies" (Isa. 11: 4. 28: 17). A principal source of error in regard to this subject has been the confounding of the terms obedience and righteousness, regarding them as of the same import, when they are not. Christ is not called, by the prophet, "Jehovah *our obedience*," but "Jehovah *our righteousness*"; that is, Jehovah through whom we are *justified*; without shutting us up to the notion of justification by the imputed obedience of the Saviour.

But it will be said, again, unless we consider the obedience of Christ as entering into the nature of the atonement, his atonement cannot be a full ground of justification. Justification involves, not merely a remission of the incurred penalty of the law, which is the same as forgiveness, but also a *restoration to forfeited favor and happiness*. And, although the mere sufferings of Christ may be a sufficient ground of the former, they are not so of the latter. We need the imputed *obedience* and *merits* of Christ to lay a foundation for our being restored; and hence his obedience must

be regarded as constituting an essential part of the atonement.

This is not the place to go into a consideration of objections to the doctrine of justification by the imputed obedience and merits of Christ. We pass these over entirely; and would simply say, that the principal ground of difficulty on the subject seems to us to lie, in not rightly conceiving of *the penalty of God's law*. This penalty in its fullest extent, is both *privative* and *positive*. It involves the loss of God's favor, and the incurring of his displeasure; the loss of the rest and happiness of heaven, and the endurance of eternal miseries in hell. Such is the full penalty of the law of God, for the removal of which the atonement of Christ furnishes the sufficient and only foundation. In procuring the salvation of those who embrace it, it removes the *positive* part of the penalty, so that they are no longer liable to suffer the pains of eternal death. It removes, also, the *privative* part, and thus restores them to the forfeited favor of God, and to the happiness of heaven. All this is implied in freeing the returning sinner from the full penalty of the law; or, which is the same, in *forgiveness*; using the term forgiveness in the widest sense. But forgiveness, in this sense, is the same, precisely, as justification; the one *restoring* the subject of it as much as the other. And so the case was regarded by the apostle Paul. He repeatedly speaks of forgiveness and justification as the same: "Through this man is preached unto you *the forgiveness of sins*; and by him all that believe are *justified* from all things from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses" (Acts 13: 38). "Being *justified* freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for *the remission of sins*." (Rom. 3: 24). "David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works," or, which is the same, *justifieth*, "saying, Blessed are they whose *iniquities are forgiven*, and whose sin is covered" (Rom. 4: 6). The apostle here quotes from the thirty-second Psalm, in which David sets forth the blessedness of him who

had humbly confessed his sins, and been *forgiven*, representing such an one as *justified*; which shows that, in Paul's theology, justification and forgiveness are the same.

Calvin and other eminent theologians have taught the same doctrine. "The righteousness of faith," says Calvin, "is a reconciliation with God, which consists *SOLELY in the remission of sins.*" "The Lord cannot receive any one into favor or fellowship with himself, without making him, from a sinner, to be a righteous person. And this is accomplished by *the remission of sins.*" "It appears, then, that those whom God receives are made righteous no otherwise than as they are purified, by being cleansed from all their defilements, by *the remission of their sins*; so that such a righteousness may, in one word, be denominated *a remission of sins.*"¹

From these statements it appears, that justification and full forgiveness are the same; and hence the sufficiency of the sufferings and death of Christ to procure the one, as much as the other. And there is no need of bringing in the personal obedience of Christ, in order to make the atonement a sufficient ground of justification. His obedience or holiness is indispensably *connected* with the atonement, as before remarked; so indispensably, that without it no atonement could ever have been made. Still, the atonement itself consisted, not in the obedience of Christ, but in the shedding of his blood.

We are next to speak of the *efficacy* of Christ's death, or the manner in which it *availed* to make an atonement for sin.

Some have believed that, by suffering for us, Christ literally *paid our debt to divine justice*. So taught Anselm, in the twelfth century, and Aquinas in the thirteenth, and many others of later date, in both the Romish and Protestant churches. But to this theory, there are insuperable objections. In the first place, the demands of strict governmental justice against us are not of the nature of a debt, and cannot be cancelled as such. And then if they were, and if the atonement of Christ had cancelled them, we should owe

¹ Institutes, Book iii. Chap. xi. Sect. 21.

nothing to the law. The law would no longer have any demands against us. We should need no forgiveness, nor would forgiveness be possible; as there would be nothing to be forgiven.

Some have said, that the death of Christ availed to make an atonement for sinners, not by paying a literal debt, but by his suffering for them *the strict and proper penalty of the law*. But to this statement there are insuperable objections. The first grows out of the very *nature* of the penalty in question. This is *eternal death* — an eternal separation from God and all good, and the eternal destruction of body and soul in hell. It involves all the agonies of the bottomless pit; not the least part of which are *the direct results of indulged sin*, the indulgence of the most hateful, painful passions; the stings and reproaches of conscience; dissatisfaction with God and his government; and a perpetual, burning sense of his displeasure. Did our Saviour suffer all these, or any of them? Being perfectly holy, was it possible that he should? How could such a being endure the pains of unsated malice, envy, and revenge? How could he suffer from the stings and reproaches of conscience? In other words, how could he suffer the pains and agonies of the bottomless pit, which go to constitute the proper penalty of the law?

But suppose that Christ did suffer all this. Suppose him to have suffered, not only *as much* as all his elect would suffer in hell forever, but the *very same*, "agony for agony, and groan for groan," would he, even then, have suffered the proper penalty of the law? Manifestly not; and for the very sufficient reason that he was not *the transgressor* of the law. The penalty of the law is denounced upon the transgressor, and upon no one else: "In the day that thou eatest thereof, *thou shalt surely die.*" "The soul that sinneth, *it shall die.*" Such is the language which the law uses, in setting forth its penalty; and we see, from the very terms employed, that *the penalty* can fall upon none but the transgressor. Another may step in, and endure a full *equivalent*, and so make a full expiation; but he cannot endure the proper *penalty*, even though he should suffer in kind and amount the same.

There is yet another objection to the theory in question, the same as that before considered : If Christ has suffered the full penalty of the law for us, then the law has no further demands against us. We need no forgiveness, nor is forgiveness possible. There is nothing left to be forgiven. Forgiveness is a remission of the incurred penalty of the law. But the penalty, on the supposition, has all been endured. It no longer remains to be remitted. God will not exact it twice ; nor can he remit it, when it is no longer due.

But it is argued, on the other side, that justice demands the full penalty of the law, which we, by transgression, have incurred ; nor will it be satisfied with anything less. Hence, if justice is satisfied in the atonement of Christ, he must have suffered the full penalty of the law. But is justice of such a nature, that it can be satisfied with nothing but the infliction of the literal penalty ? Does it admit of no substitute, no equivalent ? Then it precludes, entirely and always, the exercise of *mercy*. The demands of justice must, on this ground, be violated, or mercy is impossible.

But we do not so understand the claims of justice ; nor can they be so understood by any one who hopes in the mercy of the gospel. The demands of justice are answered, when its *ends* are answered ; and these may be as fully answered by a substitute, as in the punishment of the transgressor. And when the ends of justice are thus met and answered ; when the honor of the law is sustained, and the authority of the sovereign is fully vindicated ; now there is room for the exercise of mercy ; now the penalty of the law may be remitted, and no interest will suffer in consequence. The government is as strong in pardoning, as under other circumstances it would be in inflicting punishment. There is no injustice in treating sinners better than they deserve, when this can be done, in consistency with other objects and interests. Injustice rather consists in treating them worse than they deserve ; a mode of treatment most abhorrent to all the ends and aims of the atonement, and which none will ever receive at the hands of God.

It has been objected again to the views which have been

expressed, that the *veracity* of God is pledged to inflict the penalty of the law, in case of transgression; and, if it is not inflicted upon the sinner, it must be upon Christ. There is no other way in which the sinner's salvation can be reconciled with the divine veracity. In reply to this, we would ask, does the setting forth of the penalty of a law, in the form of a threatening, bind the veracity of the sovereign to inflict it? If it does, then certainly it binds him to inflict it on *the transgressor*; and a remission of the penalty is, in every case, a violation of truth. There is no avoiding this conclusion. The law does not merely denounce a penalty, but denounces it upon *the transgressor*; not upon him, or a *substitute*, but upon him *only*. "The soul that sinneth, *it*," and not some other soul, "shall die." Such is the unequivocal language of law; and if this pledges the veracity of the sovereign, forgiveness is forever impossible. God cannot violate his truth; and if his truth is really pledged in the threatening, it must be executed according to the letter; and what sinner can ever be saved?

But does a simple threatening, in all cases, bind the veracity of the sovereign? We think not. A threatening may so stand in connection with a promise, or be so involved in a covenant, as to pledge veracity; but a simple threatening of law, setting forth the penalty of the law, does not pledge it. The subject is not so understood among men; neither can it be so understood in respect to God. In dispensing pardon, a human government does not necessarily violate its truth; neither does the divine government. Just legislation, like justice itself, implies no necessity for punishment, except as *the ends* of punishment may require it. Let these ends be answered, and truth would lose the character of a virtue, if it should now prove a barrier to the free exercise of mercy. The penalty of a law, says John Howe, is "not to be taken for a *prediction* of what shall be, but a *commination* expressing what is deserved, or most justly may be." They who think otherwise, says Calvin, "labor under a delusion as to the meaning of threatenings, which, though they affirm simply, contain in them a tacit condition, depending on the result."

But if the sufferings of Christ did not avail to make an atonement, either by paying our debt to justice, or by his suffering the proper penalty of the law for us; how did they avail? In what does their atoning virtue or efficacy consist?

Before directly answering these questions, let us recur to some of the principles before laid down, when treating of the *necessity* of an atonement. We then said: "The law of God can be sustained by the infliction of the penalty on all those who have transgressed it. Can it be sustained in any other way? Is any *substitute* for this terrible infliction possible? A full substitute would be a sufficient atonement; but can any such substitute be found?"

It is our happiness to know that such a substitute *has been provided*, in the voluntary sufferings and death of Christ. He endured, not the proper penalty of the law, but a complete governmental *substitute* for the penalty. His sufferings and death in our room and stead as fully sustain the authority of law, as fully meet the demands of justice, as fully answer all the purposes of the divine government, as would the infliction of the penalty itself; and consequently are a complete *substitute* for the penalty; or, in other words, a complete atonement.

It is commonly and justly understood among evangelical Christians, that Christ's death was *vicarious*, or that he died as a *substitute*. But a substitute how? and for what? Not that he endured the proper penalty of the law for us, but that he endured an adequate *substitute for that penalty*; so that the penalty itself may now be safely and consistently remitted. Were the penalty all borne, there would be nothing to be remitted. But as it has not been borne, but only a substitute for it; as it has not been removed, but only a way opened in which it may be; there is as much need of forgiveness, and as much to be forgiven, as though the Saviour had not died.

The view here taken as to the manner in which Christ's death avails to make an atonement for us, is believed to be the general prevailing sentiment of evangelical Christians on the subject. For though some excellent men have denied it

in terms, insisting that Christ did bear the proper penalty of the law, yet, when they come to explain, and answer objections, they insensibly fall into the other view, as that alone which will bear a thorough examination. Thus a writer in the late Dr. Green's *Christian Advocate*, says, that "the Redeemer did not endure eternal death," but "the infinite dignity of his person imparted to his temporary suffering, a value that made them a *fair and full equivalent* for the everlasting sufferings of all who shall be finally saved."¹ Dr. Hopkins also, in his excellent chapter on "the Design and Work of the Redeemer," after having said more than once that Christ bore the penalty of the law for us, brings out his real meaning, in language such as this: "He suffered the evil threatened, or *as great* evil, a *complete equivalent*, if not precisely the same evil in every circumstance, which the sinner must have suffered, had the threatening been executed on him. All the ends of the threatening, and of the penalty, are as fully answered by the sufferings of Christ, as they could be by the execution of it on the sinner."² The younger Edwards, too, in his *Sermons on the Atonement*, which we really think the most satisfactory discussion of the subject which has ever been given to the American public, says, that "the atonement of Christ is a *substitute* for the punishment of the sinner, according to the divine law, and is designed to support the authority of that law, equally as the punishment of hell."³ So Dr. Woods, speaking of the penalty of the law, says: "Christ suffered it *virtually*. He suffered that which had a *like effect*, or which had a *like value* in God's moral government. As to the ends of government, it was as though the curse of the law had been endured literally. So that it is sufficiently correct, for common purposes, to say, as Storr and Flatt and a thousand others have said, that Christ endured the penalty of the law; that he suffered the punishment due to sin."⁴ This shows how Dr. Woods understood those writers, who use the

¹ Volume for 1826, pp. 388, 389.

² Works, Vol. I. p. 340.

³ Works, Vol. II. p. 38.

⁴ Works, Vol. II. p. 473.

phraseology of Storr and Flatt. Indeed he says that the view we have taken, — Christ suffering, not the literal penalty, but an *equivalent*, a *substitute*, — is the only reasonable view; the only one which a sober man can take.

Having dwelt thus long on the more essential features of the atonement, we now pass to a consideration of some minor collateral questions.

Our first inquiry will be as to the *extent* of the atonement. Is it *universal* or *particular*? Is it sufficient for all men, or only for the elect?

Without doubt the atonement was intended to be applied, savingly, only to the elect. In other words, it was certain to the mind of God, from all eternity, that none but the elect would embrace it, and be saved by it. Still we believe that, as to its *sufficiency*, the atonement is strictly *universal*. We might infer as much as this from the *nature* of the atonement. It is, in its nature, general, unlimited, we had almost said infinite. It *can* be limited by nothing but the good pleasure of him who made it, or by the extent of the race for whom it was made.

Then the Scriptures decide, expressly, that the atonement was made for *all men*. Christ is said to have “died for all” (2 Cor. 5: 14). He “gave himself a ransom for all” (1 Tim. 2: 6). He “tasted death for every man” (Heb. 2: 9). He is “the propitiation, not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world” (1 John 2: 2).

Again, the offers of the gospel, which are all based on the atonement, are strictly universal: “Ho! every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters.” “Look unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth.” “Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.” “Whosoever will, let him take the waters of life freely.” It cannot be supposed that God would offer salvation to those for whom no atonement had been made, and to whom salvation would be impossible were the offer accepted. Yet he certainly does offer salvation, to all men, in the gospel. All, without exception, are invited to come, and partake of the waters of life freely.

It should be further considered, that all men are actually receiving benefits, in this life, through the atonement. Our very existence in this world of light and hope, the blessings of Providence we here enjoy, our means of grace, our probation of grace, indeed everything we receive which is better than the perdition of ungodly men, all is a matter of grace and mercy, and all comes to us through the atonement and intercession of Christ. The fact that the non-elect here upon earth are now receiving blessings through the atonement, all the blessings they have ever received, or ever will, is proof that the atonement was made for them, and is sufficient, if they would embrace it, for their salvation.

We next inquire for evidence that divine justice is *satisfied* in the atonement, and that it has been accepted of the Father. We have evidence of this fact in the divine and perfect *character* of the Saviour. He would not have undertaken that which he had not the intention and the ability to accomplish. He would not have declared the atonement finished, when he bowed his head and gave up the ghost, if it were still unfinished and incomplete.

Again, the Father openly manifested his acceptance of the atonement by *raising the Saviour from the dead*. Accordingly, Christ is said to have been "delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification." He is also declared to be "the Son of God with power, by his resurrection from the dead."

It may be further remarked, that every believer who has been pardoned and saved through the atonement, every justified soul now in existence, whether on earth or in heaven, is a living witness that the atonement has been accepted. Would God have justified any of our fallen race on this ground, and received them back to his favor and love, if justice were not satisfied, and the work of atonement was not complete.

It may be inquired, in this connection, how much Christ must have suffered in order to satisfy divine justice, and make a full atonement for sin. *How much?* Though we may not be able to answer this question with definiteness

positively, we may *negatively*. Christ did not suffer the same, either in kind or amount, which all mankind must have suffered in hell, had no atonement been made for them. That he should have suffered the same in *kind* is, in the very nature of things, impossible, as we have before seen. In order to this, he must have had the feelings of the lost, and been like them in character. And that he suffered the same in amount, is also impossible, but upon the supposition that his Divine nature suffered, and for the time infinitely. His whole Divinity must have been permeated and filled with suffering. But this terrible supposition cannot be admitted for a moment. It is inconsistent with the nature and perfections of God. That theologians of a certain class have been led to adopt a supposition so monstrous, is evidence only of the straits into which they are driven.

We suppose Christ to have suffered in his human nature only. Still, we believe him to have suffered more, inconceivably more, than any mere man could have suffered in the same time. The Divine nature did not suffer; but by its personal union with the human, it sustained and enabled the man Christ Jesus to endure a weight of suffering, which otherwise must have crushed him in a moment. Though Christ did not endure the proper penalty of the law for sinners, he did endure what God was pleased to appoint and accept as an *equivalent*, a *substitute*, for the penalty. He endured enough, considering the infinite dignity and glory of his person, and his ineffable nearness to the Father, to make as bright a display of the justice of God, of his regard for his law, and of his holy hatred of sin, as could have been made in the eternal destruction of our guilty race. By his sufferings and death, he as fully satisfied all intelligent beings, that God was a righteous moral governor; that he loved his law, and was resolved to sustain it; that he hated sin, and was determined to punish it; as they could have been, had they seen our whole race suffering in the world of woe.

And here we see the reason why, in order to his performing the work of atonement, Christ must have been just such

a personage, God and man, Divine and human, as he is represented in the Scriptures. Had he been a divine person only, he could not have made an atonement, because the Divine nature cannot suffer and die. And had he been a human person only, he could not have made an atonement, because he would have been unable, without the Divine nature, to endure the requisite amount of suffering, and he would have lacked that personal dignity and glory, which impart such a value and efficacy to his death. We see, therefore, the necessity, if Christ was to make an atonement for sin, that he should be, what the Scriptures represent him to be, *God and man*, two distinct natures united in one mysterious and glorious *person*.

It may be inquired yet again, whether the atonement has any different bearing in relation to infants, from what it has in the case of adults. Those who believe that infants have a sinful nature, or a depraved, corrupt nature that is not sinful, commonly insist, that to those of them who die in infancy, the atonement is in some way applied, so as to remove the corruption, and prepare them for heaven. But we can perceive no adaptation in the atonement to produce such a result, nor do we think that it is ever produced in this way. The atonement lays a foundation for the forgiveness of sins, to those who are renewed and recovered from them. Of itself, the atonement saves nobody. It savingly benefits no one, great or small, until his heart is sanctified; and this work of sanctification belongs to the Spirit, and not directly to the atonement. When the appropriate work of the Spirit is accomplished on the heart, and never before, can the saving efficacy of the atonement be realized, in the forgiveness of sins and the salvation of the soul.

If infants are human beings, moral agents, having selfish and sinful affections from the first; then they are capable of holy affections; then they may be sanctified from the womb, as we know that some have been. (See Luke 1: 15.) And when sanctified, they may be forgiven through the atonement of Christ, and saved with the salvation of the gospel. It is on this ground, and this only, that we hope

(as we confidently do) for the salvation of the dying infant. He is purified by the Spirit, and cleansed by the blood of Christ, in much the same manner as the adult.

As to the importance of the great doctrine here discussed, it is difficult to speak in terms of sufficient strength. It is of vast interest and importance in itself. It is important in all its relations and consequences. It is the grand central doctrine of the whole Christian system, without which the rest would lose their significance, and the system could not be held together. It is the ground-work of our present probation of grace, and of that variety of blessings which stand connected with our probation. It is the foundation of all our hopes beyond the grave. It is the corner stone of Zion, on which the whole church rests, and will rest forever.

The atonement is a subject which interests, not our world merely, but the entire moral universe, and will do so forever. Angels are looking into it with admiring attention, and the whole upper world are engaged together in celebrating its wonders and glories. The countless myriads in heaven *know* vastly more of the Supreme Being, they love him better, they enjoy him more, they will be unspeakably more happy to all eternity, than could have been possible, had not a Saviour died.

ARTICLE V.

PLACE AND CONDITION OF THE DEPARTED.

By N. H. Griffin, Professor in Williams College.

"TO-DAY shalt thou be with me in Paradise" (Luke 23: 43). What are we to understand by this language? What does it teach respecting the dead? It will be our object to answer, as we are able, these questions.

We remark, then, that the grammatical construction of this text does not admit of doubt. That pointing which makes the verse read : " I say unto thee this day, that thou shalt be with me in Paradise," in the first place, is contrary to all the textual readings ; secondly, it gives to the Greek adverb an unusual position ; and, thirdly, destroys the special point and pertinence of the reply. The prayer of the penitent thief had been : " Lord, remember me when thou comest *in* thy kingdom," not, as it is translated, "*into* thy kingdom." It is the preposition *ἐν*, not *εἰς*, and does not signify *motion towards*, but *manner*, " when thou comest, in thy kingdom," that is, with power and great glory, as he had said he should one day come. As though the thief had said : " Now thou art in humiliation, and this is the hour of the powers of darkness, yet I know thou wilt, in the end, triumph over them all, and establish a glorious kingdom ; oh, then remember me." To which the Saviour replies : " Thou needest not wait till some distant time for help ; even now, in all my apparent humiliation, am I mighty to save ; to-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." So that whatever of good there was here promised by the Saviour, was, beyond a question, to be entered upon that day. We have, therefore, only to ascertain what was meant by the term *Paradise*, in order to know what was to be the immediate condition of the dying thief after his dissolution, and, by consequence, the condition of all the righteous after death.

What, then, is Paradise ? Here, be it observed, the question is in regard to place, rather than state. It is not, whether there be an intermediate state, meaning by that a state of separation between soul and body, in which the degree of happiness or misery, though in each case entire and unalloyed, is yet less than after their re-union. Such a state we grant. Few deny it, save those who believe either in the destruction of the human soul, or the entire suspension of its powers. Those who speak of " the state of the dead," must mean, by this phrase, one of two things : either the state of being dead, a state of death ; or they must include in it the place of the dead. It is this latter idea, of a *common place of*

the dead, that we call in question. We state it thus distinctly, because it is from confounding these two things, that difficulty on this subject arises. The passages which clearly prove a common intermediate state, are carelessly taken as proofs of a common intermediate place. What then, and where, is Paradise?

We remark, first, that *it is no part of, and has no connection with, what in Scripture is called Hades*. We are aware that our view of Hades stands in opposition to that of most: that, on the one hand, Father Simon and others would limit its meaning to the grave or sepulchre; while, on the other, Dr. Campbell, Bishop Horsley, and perhaps most scholars, take it as meaning the state or place of departed spirits, assuring us that Hades, among Jews and Greeks and Romans, denoted the place of the dead, both good and bad; one portion of it being the abode of the righteous, called Paradise, or Elysium; another, the abode of the wicked, called Tartarus, or something equivalent. This, they say, is its use in the Scripture, Hades denoting the state of the dead indiscriminately.

Is this so? We grant that in classic Greek, the word was so used; yet not exclusively so there. Had it been, we should not on that account have been authorized arbitrarily to transfer this meaning to the Scriptural record. Its meaning in the Scriptures, can be ascertained only by an examination of the passages where it occurs. Such an examination is in this case the more necessary, since the term *Hades* came into the New Testament, not from the classic Greek, but from the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament.

Yet even in the classics, it was not by any means confined to this signification. At first, in Homer's time, it meant the god of the nether-world, Pluto, and this almost exclusively; afterwards, the nether-world itself; then the grave; still later, the world of woe. This last is its signification in that celebrated passage of Plato's Republic, where speaking of death, he says: "When any one is near that time in which he thinks he is going to die, there enters into him fear and anxiety; for then the old stories about Hades, how that the man who

has here been guilty of wrong, must there suffer punishment, torture his soul." So that the question is, not about giving to Hades in the Scriptures, a new signification, one not found in the classics, but merely which of its classical significations predominates; a question which can be determined only by the actual use of the word in Scripture. It occurs in the Septuagint sixty-four times, and in all save four, is the translation of the Hebrew *Sheol*, and may therefore be regarded as substantially its synonym. Indeed, both words etymologically denote an unseen, dark, dismal place. And in exact accordance with this original signification of Hades is its usage; never in a single case, either in the Old or New Testament, expressing or implying anything desirable, but always that which is gloomy and forbidding. Hence it is used first of the *grave*.

This is its most frequent sense. As when the Psalmist speaking of the wicked, says: "Like sheep they are laid in the grave; their beauty shall consume in the grave." "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up" (1 Sam. 2: 6). Says Jacob: "Then shall ye bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave." "But his hoar head, bring thou down to the grave with blood" (1 Kings 2: 9). "For in death there is no remembrance of thee, in the grave who shall give thee thanks?" (Ps. 6: 5.) A question plainly without point, if Hades here denotes an intermediate place like Paradise, where the righteous are supposed to dwell. For they there surely praise and give thanks after death.

It is also frequently used to denote *death*, or a *state of death*. "What man is he that liveth and shall not see death, shall he deliver his soul from the hand of the grave?" (Ps. 89: 48.) "I will ransom them from the power of the grave, I will redeem them from death" (Hosea 13: 14). "Let death seize upon them, let them go down quickly into the grave" (Ps. 55: 15).

Again, it signified a *deep, dark, dismal place, as opposed to heaven*. "It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" (Job 11: 8.) "If

I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, thou art there" (Ps. cxxxix). "Though they dig into hell, thence shall my hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down" (Amos 9: 3). "For a fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn to the lowest hell" (Deut. 32: 22).

Again, it sometimes implies *a place or state of extreme suffering*. "Thou hast delivered my soul from the lowest hell" (Ps. 86: 13). "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God" (Ps. 9: 17). "Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and shalt deliver his soul from hell" (Prov. 23: 14).

We have, then, Hades in the Old Testament, with four different meanings; the common idea of something dark and gloomy underlying them all, viz.: the *grave, death, a dark unseen region in contrast with heaven, and a place of extreme suffering*. Now death and the grave, surely, are the lot of all, good and bad; but other than this, there is no intimation of any common residence. The images, and figures, and concomitants employed, are all indicative of evil; not only so, but if the righteous are spoken of, it is as rescued from these states or places; in this respect, standing in contrast with the wicked. True, Jacob is represented as saying, I shall go down to Hades to my son, mourning. Yet this as it stands, may, without any violence to the language, merely mean, I shall follow my son to the grave, mourning. But properly translated, it reads, I shall go down to the grave, *mourning for* my son. Not only is the Hebrew preposition בָּ often used with this meaning; but see 2 Sam. 1: 24; Josh. 21: 6, where it is so translated, coming as it does here, after a verb of mourning. So translated, the passage affords not a shadow of ground for making Hades mean anything more than death or the grave. The only other passage that occurs to us in the Old Testament, which can, by implication, teach the doctrine of a common receptacle for the souls of the dead, is found in that highly figurative and sublime passage in Isaiah 14: 9, where of the king of Babylon it is said: "Hell from beneath is moved for thee, to

meet thee at thy coming ; it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth." This may be either a bold personification of the grave and its inhabitants, as moved by the appearance of so august a personage as the king, or what is more probable, a direct reference to the world of woe. Certain it is that we have here no mention made of any of the righteous as being in this assemblage. We call attention to this fact, the more as the passage is so often quoted to prove an indiscriminate residence of the dead, which it is so far from establishing, that, as far as it goes, it proves the opposite. All that it brings to light is a gloomy gathering of the Nimrods, and other mighty hunters of mankind, taunting each other for their dark and desolate habitation, their disastrous and dreadful overthrow. But if there be no traces of a common intermediate abode for the spirits of the dead in the Old Testament, how is it in the New ?

The word *Hades* occurs eleven times in the New Testament, and with the same general characteristics as in the Old: sometimes referring to the grave, sometimes to the world of woe; yet always involving something evil, and never with any *necessary* reference to a common abode of the dead. The passage where it has most the appearance of such a reference, is in Acts ii., in a quotation from the sixteenth Psalm, where Christ is represented as saying : " Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor suffer thy holy one to see corruption." The argument is, if Christ went to Hades, then not only do the good go to Hades, but Paradise is a part of it. Yet admitting that Hades here refers, not to the grave (as we suppose, and shall presently endeavor to prove), but to the place of the dead, we still refer it, with its uniformly bad signification, exclusively to the place of *the wicked dead*, and maintain (what we have thus far found true, viz.) that the righteous do not go to, or have anything to do with, Hades, in any other sense than the grave, is the very truth here taught. The Hebrew verb translated "leave in," may, and often does, mean "leave or abandon to," that is, thou wilt not abandon or give over my soul to Hades, wilt not allow me to go there. This translation of the verb is confirmed, on

merely philological grounds, by Gesenius, Alexander, Noyes, and others, who cannot, like ourselves perhaps, be charged with varying the text to suit a theological creed. So that even if Hades refer, in this passage, to the abode of spirits after death, we say that Christ did not go there; and our position is still good, that none but the wicked are spoken of, in Scripture, as going there. Nor does this conflict with what is said in 1 Pet. 3: 19. For the preaching there spoken of, is not said to have been by Christ in person, but by his spirit, viz. the Holy Spirit, speaking through Noah, a preacher of righteousness. Nor was it to spirits *when they were in prison*, but to spirits now in prison, that is, when the apostle wrote. The time when he preached, is added below, viz.: "when once, in the days of Noah, the long-suffering of God waited upon them." The more probable signification, however, of the word Hades, in this passage, is the *grave*: 1. because it is the *common meaning*, while the other is certainly an uncommon one; 2. it completes the Hebrew parallelism, which the other destroys; 3. it better suits the argument of the apostle, whose object in the quotation is to prove the resurrection of Christ from the dead. It was the fact that his body had not remained under the power of death, and that, in thus rising from the dead, contrary to the law of the race, he had proved himself to be the Son of God, and, as such, was at the right hand of God, shedding forth that which his hearers saw and heard. Of the remaining nine places where the word occurs, five have this same signification: Rev. 1: 18, *I am alive forevermore, Amen, and have the keys of death and hell*: that is, the fact of his being himself alive from the dead, is given as proof of his having the keys, or power over death and the grave. 1 Cor. 15: 55, *O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?* What more appropriate, after closing a triumphant argument for the *resurrection of the body*, than this? It was the body that was in question; and the grave had held it, not Hades, or any other intermediate place. It was the *grave*, therefore, that was triumphed over. Rev. 6: 8, *Death and hell followed him*; that is, Death, on the pale horse, was natu-

rally followed by the opening of the grave, to receive whom he had destroyed. Rev. 20: 13, *And death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them.* Here, again, it is the resurrection, not of the soul, but of the body, that is spoken of. The body was in the grave; hence death, which has power only over the body, and the grave, which holds the body when dead, are most appropriately represented as delivering up the dead which were in them. Rev. 20: 14, *And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire.* The meaning is here, necessarily, the same as in the preceding verse. The remaining passages point directly to a penal hell. Luke 10: 15, *And thou Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, shalt be thrust down to hell.* Hades, here, can mean nothing but the extreme of evil, and that, too, as the punishment of wickedness; what else is this than hell? Matt. 16: 18, *And upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.* So far from any allusion being made, here, to the righteous as dwelling in Hades, its inhabitants or powers are spoken of as opposed to and warring against the church. The only remaining instance where the word is used is in the parable of Lazarus and Dives, the latter of whom, we are told, lifted up his eyes in hell, being in torment.

Thus, then, we do not find, in the Scriptures, a passage which requires the term Hades to be referred to any indiscriminate abode of the dead, other than the grave: there is not a passage which speaks of a righteous man as going to it, or being connected with it. It always involves the idea of something dark and dreadful. The wicked are often said to enter it; it is, many times, positively represented as a place of punishment. Surely, then, it could not have been into a place with such characteristics, that the Saviour promised to usher the dying thief! Indeed, the idea of a common residence of the good and bad, after death, was gratuitously borrowed from classic mythology. We say *gratuitously borrowed*, for, it matters not what ideas the Greeks or Romans, or even the Jews, entertained respecting the dead. Their ideas on this, as well as on other subjects, may have been erroneous, mere vagaries of the imagination, and are

only to be received when clearly sanctioned by the inspired Record. We are not, in any given case, to force their idea upon the language which Scripture employs. So far is the language of Scripture, on the subject in question, from naturally or necessarily suggesting the idea of a common intermediate abode, that while, in some few instances, the word Hades will perhaps admit of such a sense being put upon it, there is not a passage where the doctrine is *clearly spoken of*; not one where such a meaning is *at all necessary*; not one which does not admit a *natural and easy* interpretation by some one of the above-named significations. On the contrary, there are many *facts*, and *statements*, and *implications*, as we shall see, which stand in direct conflict with such a view. In fact, we know of *no term, of any kind, in the Scriptures, denoting any place, beyond this world, that is common to the righteous and wicked*. They are all distinctive, denoting either a place of happiness or misery. Even Hades, which etymologically, and from classic usage, *might* include the whole invisible world, is, if the reference be beyond the grave, used of the world of woe. So that, on the one hand, we have the terms "heaven," "paradise," and "Abraham's bosom," all with the same general meaning, and used interchangeably with each other; on the other, "Hades," "the lake of fire," and "Gehenna," equally distinctive and characteristic of the abode of the wicked. The only difference in regard to these latter is, that, while "the lake of fire" and "Gehenna" always refer to the future punishment of the wicked, "Hades" is also often used of the grave. By what law of language can a word which, both from derivation and use, implies something dark and dismal, be made to include the abode of blessedness and joy?

But, secondly, if Paradise be not a part of Hades, the inquiry recurs, What is it? We reply, it is heaven. The word originally signified a park or pleasure-garden, and, in accordance with this, always denotes a place fitted up for special enjoyment; as appropriately, both from derivation and use, indicating the abode of the righteous, as Hades does, from derivation and use, that of the wicked. The word is

found in two other places in the New Testament, and in one of them is, beyond doubt, used of heaven (Rev.2:7): *To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life which is in the midst of the paradise of God.* The other passage is 2 Cor. 12: 4, where the apostle, speaking of visions and revelations, says: "I knew a man in Christ, above fourteen years ago (whether in the body, I cannot tell; or whether out of the body, I cannot tell; God knoweth), such an one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth), that he was caught up into Paradise and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for man to utter." Commentators, it is true, have here found two visions, and, by consequence, made the "third heaven" and "paradise" refer to different places; but, as we think, without sufficient reason; for,

1. The natural impression which the passage makes on the mind, is the other way. We know, by actual experiment, that nine out of ten who read it unprejudiced, and without a theory to support, take "paradise" and the "third heaven" as meaning the same. The words "visions and revelations," are used in the plural, either as introducing the subject indefinitely, as though he had said "I come now to the subject of visions and revelations," or because of the many things seen and revealed during the vision.
2. The Greek text, though unnoticed by commentators, is strongly in favor of one vision. In the expressions "caught up to the third heaven," and "up to paradise," the prepositions used are different: in the first case it is *εως*, "caught up *as far as* the third heaven; in the other, *εις*, "*into* paradise;" the *καί* of the third verse, which many regard as introducing a second vision, we take as carrying forward the vision to a fuller and higher development of the celestial state. That is, he was not only caught up into the third heaven, but introduced into Paradise, that part of the third heaven where the Divine glory is especially manifest, and where, consequently, he would see and hear many things which it was not lawful or possible to utter. This view is confirmed by what is elsewhere said. In Rev.22:2, the tree of life is represented as growing in the heavenly city,

near the throne of God and the Lamb ; in Rev. 2:7, as growing in the midst of the Paradise of God ; making Paradise to be not only in heaven, but in that part of heaven where there are objects of special attraction and delight. This idea of Paradise well accords with all the passages where the word is used, denoting, in all cases, a place where the acme of good is to be realized. Especially does it make the Saviour, in the passage under discussion, utter a most fitting and glorious annunciation to the dying thief : To-day shalt thou, with me, enter the celestial city, and rejoice before the throne of God and the Lamb ; while any other view, even the most favorable, makes him utter what is well nigh absurd, if not preposterous : To-day shalt thou be, with me, in the region of the dead, and there, with other spirits of the just, await, during thousands of years, the morning of the resurrection.

3. That Paradise is heaven, appears further from the fact that Christ is elsewhere represented as going to heaven at the time of his death. On this point that ejaculatory prayer of the expiring Saviour : " Father, into thy hands, I commend my spirit," is well nigh conclusive. We must suppose, that in that prayer he was heard, and that his spirit, instead of going to Hades, or any other unknown realm of the dead, went into the immediate presence of his Father. For in another place, he tells us himself, that the Father heareth him always. The apostle also in allusion, doubtless, to this period of his agony and death, assures us that he was heard, in that he feared. Nor is what is said in Acts ii : " Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor suffer thy holy one to see corruption," any objection to this. For, either that passage without making distinct affirmation respecting the soul as separate from the body, uses the two clauses of the verse as synonymous, to denote the person himself. (And this is no uncommon use of the expression " my soul," even when, as here, the body is also distinctly named. See Psalm lxi : " My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee in a dry and thirsty land," meaning simply, that he thirsted and longed for God ; also, Psalm lxxiv : " My soul longeth, yea, even fainteth for the courts of the Lord, my heart and

my flesh crieth out for the living God," that is, I thirst and cry out for the living God.) So here, "thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor suffer thy holy one to see corruption," means simply, thou wilt not leave me in the grave, nor suffer me to become subject to corruption. Either, we say, this is the meaning, and then the soul is not distinctly and separately alluded to; or if the expression, "thou wilt not leave my soul in hell," is spoken separately of the soul; then, as we have shown in another part of this discussion, the assertion is positive, that his soul should not be abandoned to, but saved from, Hades, and consequently carried to heaven. The very point for which we are arguing.

4. That it was heaven, to which the dying thief went, we also infer from the fact, that Christians in other parts of Scripture, are represented as going thither at death. Enoch, we are told, was not found, for God took him. Whither, if not to heaven? Elijah, it is expressly said, was taken up into heaven. The rich man died, and immediately lifted up his eyes in hell, and saw Lazarus afar off in Abraham's bosom. Dives, as all agree, was in the place of torment; then Lazarus was in heaven, and Abraham in heaven. Thus the Jews understood the phrase, "Abraham's bosom."

Stephen, when dying, "saw the heavens opened and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God," and in full expectation of going thither, immediately yielded up his soul, crying: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Can it be, that, after all, the heavens thus opened, were suddenly closed upon him, and he sent down for thousands of years to dwell in Hades? Paul (Phil. 1: 13,) desired "to depart and be with Christ, which was far better;" plainly expecting to be with him immediately after death. If not till after the resurrection, then death were no gain, it were not far better. It could not hasten his being with Christ at all. He would be with him just as soon, though he should live a thousand years longer in the body. To be with Christ, is to be in heaven. For Christ can surely be nowhere else. The apostle tells us that "he is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God; angels, and authorities, and powers, being

made subject unto him." So another apostle tells us, that "he has entered into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us." Again, what can be more specific than the following? "We know," it is not "*we hope*," but "*we know*" that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were desolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. Therefore we are confident, knowing that while we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord. We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." It only needs, then, that the Christian's earthly tabernacle be dissolved, and he *has*, not will have after the resurrection, but has immediately, a house eternal in the heavens. Is that "house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens," Hades? Being "present with the Lord," is stated as the immediate consequence, the necessary result of absence from the body.

To say in reply, that it was not the personal presence of Christ that the apostle refers to, is an evasion of the plain meaning of the passage. He surely had his presence in every other sense already, while in the body; there was nothing else left for him to desire, but his personal and immediate presence in heaven.

Again in Heb. xii., "The spirits of just men made perfect," are spoken of as being in the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, along with an innumerable company of angels, and Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant. So in the Revelation: (and at a period, too, antecedent to the Judgment) what was that "great multitude which no man can number, of all nations, and kindred, and people, and tongues, standing before the throne of God and the Lamb, clothed in white robes, and palms in their hands," but ransomed spirits who having gone before us, have already reached their Father's mansion? In the same celestial place, were the souls of those that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held. Nay more, not only are the saints represented, on leaving the body, as going to be with the Lord, but as coming back in intimate

union with Him at his second coming. So that, in all these cases, if there be a heaven spoken of at all in the Scriptures, these individuals are in it, and in no other state or place. They are not in a state or place of transition, which is neither heaven nor hell. They have reached the end of all trial, and entered into the heavenly rest. And this is not only what the Scriptures teach, as we read them, but it is what is fitting, what we might expect, it is what Christ prayed for: "Father," said he, "I will that those whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory."

Nor is there any objection to this, from what Peter says of David, that he had not ascended into heaven (Acts ii.). For what is the proof he adduces? He has not ascended into heaven, because, "he is both dead and buried, and his sepulchre is with us to this day." This would of course be no proof that David's *soul* had not gone to heaven, unless we take the apostle as saying, that his *soul* was both dead and buried, and enclosed in the sepulchre to that day, which no one ever supposed. But it was proof conclusive that his body had not gone to heaven, but had seen corruption, and that therefore the Psalm quoted, could not strictly apply to David, but had its primary reference to Christ, and was a prophecy of his resurrection. Nor is that expression of the Saviour: "No one hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man who is in heaven," any objection to our view. For, interpreted from its connection, its meaning plainly is: no one has ever ascended to heaven to bring down a knowledge of heavenly things, but the Son of man who came down from heaven, reveals the counsels of God, and tells you of heavenly things.

After what has been already said, we need not speak, at length, of the *condition* of the departed dead. That it is one of *full consciousness and activity*, scarcely admits of doubt. This has been the general belief of men, in all ages, whether barbarous or civilized, pagan or Christian. The untutored Indian, that roams through the forest, on passing into the

spirit-land, expects not to lie down in a dreamless sleep, but to enter, there, upon other and better hunting-grounds.

Ulysses is represented, in the nether-world, as conversing with his mother and the shades of slain warriors. Socrates tells us, that he there hoped to find and hold converse with Homer, and Hesiod, and Palamedes, and Ajax, and Ulysses, and ten thousand others, both men and women, with whom to converse and associate, would be an inconceivable happiness ; adding, " Those who live there, are more happy than those here." So also the Scriptures represent the state of men, not as in a state of insensibility, or sleep, but full of life and activity. This is implied in all the passages quoted in proof of our previous position. As respects the *righteous*, not only is the soul represented as returning to God, who gave it, but as entering upon a state of *blissful enjoyment* : " To-day shalt thou be, with me, in Paradise." But if the soul, at death, passes only into an oblivious insensibility, this language of the Saviour would not only not be a ground of consolation and joyful hope, but rather of cold and heartless mockery. Did Stephen, in yielding up his soul to the Lord Jesus, pass, the same moment, into an unconscious sleep, which was to last for ages ? Was that what he meant by the words : " Lord Jesus, receive my spirit ?" Was that what Paul had in mind when, jubilant with hope and big with expectation, he desired to depart and be with Christ, earnestly desiring to be absent from the body, that he might be present with the Lord ? Was it the laying aside of his conscious existence, that he longed for ? was it even conscious, nay, a *happy* existence or intermediate abode that he longed for ? No ; it was the blissful presence of Christ, in heaven : " not," says he, " that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon," the entrance upon a higher, more blissful state of existence. It is in view of this immediate fruition of heaven, that he exclaims : " I am now ready to be offered ; and the time of my departure is at hand." The appearance of Moses and Elias, on the mount of transfiguration, exhibits them in a state of *blessed intercourse and enjoyment*. The spirits of just men made perfect, in the heav-

only Jerusalem, are congregated in the presence of God, the Judge of all (Heb 12: 23). So also the multitude of those who came out of great tribulation, and had washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb, are before the throne of God, and serve him day and night, in his temple (see Rev. 7: 14, 15, and the context, which is a prolonged description of their happy state). Lazarus was not only taken to Abraham's bosom, but, we are told, comforted. That the righteous dead not only live, but are also in the highest state of enjoyment, is implied in Christ's answer to the Sadducees, who held that spirits did not exist in a separate state. Quoting from the Pentateuch the passage : " I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob," he adds : " God is not the God of the *dead*, but of the *living*." With this corresponds that declaration of our Saviour : " He that believeth on me, though he were dead yet shall he live ; and he that liveth and believeth on me shall *never* die. Again, 1 Thess. 5: 10, " who died for us, that, whether we wake or sleep," that is, as appears from the context, whether we live or die, " we should live together with him." What more direct than this ? Christians, though *dead*, are still *alive*, and live with Christ, in heaven, where he lives. They who have fallen asleep in Christ, then, are not perished. Their calm and peaceful exit, from life's troubled scene to the rest above, is most fittingly described under the figure of a sleep ; for they pass to a nobler, fresher life than " we, which remain." They are *blessed* (Rev. 14: 13). That the wicked also continue conscious and active, is equally true and equally implied in the preceding discussion. Nor would we add anything further, except as there are many among modern sects who maintain that, by the destruction or punishment of the wicked, in Scripture, is meant the cessation of their existence at death. In proof of this, they allege such expressions as the following : " the wicked shall perish ;" " the wicked shall be utterly cut off ;" " shall utterly perish in their own corruption ;" " the transgressors shall be destroyed ;" " all the wicked will he destroy ;" " whose end is destruction ;" " the wages of sin is death ;" " the soul that sinneth, it shall

die ;" assuming that the language employed in these and like passages, is used solely in its literal sense : a method of interpretation which they do not, themselves, carry out on other topics. But who does not know that the language used in such cases, is metaphorical, and that, in strictness of speech, we could not express the idea in question, or any other that relates to the spiritual and invisible state, without borrowing figures and terms from the scenes of the present life ? The destruction, or death, spoken of, is that of the soul. When used of the body, the meaning of the words "death," "destruction," "perishing," and the like, is plain. But when, with a wider range, they are used of the soul, as the punishment of sin, what is their meaning ? Is it annihilation ? What must be the meaning in that passage where the subject of death is first introduced into the Scripture : "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die ?" This, it being the word of God, must have met its fulfilment, in the day of Adam's transgression. Though it did not necessarily pre-announce all that should come upon him ; yet, what it did announce, the veracity of God required should take place. We suppose it granted, then, that Adam, in the day that he ate the forbidden fruit, died. What was that death ? It could not have been the death of the body that was *directly threatened* ; for, in this respect, he did not die. It could not have been the annihilation of the soul, that was meant *at all* ; for this did not take place at all. The death spoken of, therefore, must have been the separation of the soul from God, through sin, with all the woes involved in and consequent upon this, whether experienced in this life or the life to come. This passage is the key to all the language of Scripture on this subject ; and hence when death or destruction is spoken of in reference to the soul, or the future life, it cannot be its annihilation, or even the temporary suspension of its powers, that is meant ; but its exclusion from God and heaven. So understood, the above passages give no support to the idea which some entertain respecting the destruction of the wicked. On the contrary, there are multitudes of passages which, by their very terms,

preclude the idea of destruction in the sense of annihilation. It is said, for example, "the wicked shall be driven away in his wickedness;" "shall be turned into hell;" "they shall go into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels;" "shall go away into everlasting punishment;" "dwell with everlasting burnings;" "the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever;" they are to "rise to shame and everlasting contempt." These passages and many others necessarily imply continued existence. There are others still more direct on this point, which not only imply existence in the general, but specify individuals who exist, and exist, too, in a state of suffering, in the world of spirits, suffering immediately consequent upon leaving this world. Not to dwell upon the case of the wicked antediluvians, who are said by the apostle Peter to be in prison, in connection with the fallen spirits who are reserved in chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day; nor upon that passage in Isa. xiv., where the hosts of hell, on the approach of the king of Babylon, are represented as taunting each other in their misery, and glorying in each other's sufferings, we have the case of Judas, who, it is said, "went to his own place," and that a place of such a nature that it were *better for him that he had not been born*, surely then, a place of suffering: while of Dives it is expressly said that "he lifted up his eyes, in hell, being in torment." If our understanding of this matter be correct, the wicked, at death, go immediately to the world of woe, "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." While, on the other hand, the souls of believers pass immediately, not into any unconscious or intermediate state, but into glory, where, joining with the heavenly throng in the service of the upper sanctuary, they joyously await the glorious and triumphant issues of redeeming mercy.

But in reply to all this, it may be asked, if the souls of the righteous and wicked have already reached their places of ultimate destination, wherefore the need of a general judgment? Plainly, because a full judgment of any one case even, could not take place before. The mere acts of a man's life, exhibit but a small portion of the results for which he is

responsible. These acts set in motion influences which operate to the end of time. And while the Omniscient one foresees all the issues, and in the meantime assigns accordingly to each individual his proper place, *even he cannot fully exhibit these issues to others*, until they have worked themselves out, and the whole scheme becomes complete. Then, and then only, can each individual case be distinctly seen. Hence *that is not only the proper but the earliest possible period* that could be fixed upon for a public official announcement of the results of individual cases, and of the great scheme as a whole. Then only, can a public official bestowment of rewards and punishments take place, and the whole universe be let into the knowledge of all the results ; so that, although each individual destiny may have been long settled, yet an official "*revelation of the righteous judgment of God*" cannot take place at an earlier period. In this there is nothing very unusual, nothing contrary to what occurs among men. In the Olympic games, for instance, we have what is precisely analogous. Those who conquered, received applause in so doing, and took their stand among the victors, immediately on reaching the goal. Yet there they must stand, with the applause and joyous exultation, that naturally attended success, and wait for an official crowning, and an official announcement of their victory, till the end of the games. There was no suspension, or turning off, of the attention from the great trials that were going on, in order to crown officially an individual victor. The set time for this was when the results were all in.

We may further add, that this objection, so far as it is an objection, bears as much against an intermediate abode, as against the soul's going immediately to heaven and hell. The one view no more supersedes, or conflicts with, a general judgment than the other. According to *both views*, the righteous and the wicked are supposed to occupy separate abodes during the interval between death and the judgment, the righteous in a state of happiness, the wicked in a state of misery ; consequently both imply that a judicial, discriminating sentence is passed upon all at death, while both ex-

pect a more complete and final award to be officially announced and carried into effect at the last day.

But it may be asked again, if the righteous and wicked go at once to their places of happiness or misery, what need of a resurrection of the body, afterwards? We reply, it is necessary, in order to bring on a full and complete triumph over the works of the devil. Were the body left in its state of dissolution and decay, the triumph over the ruins of the fall, would be incomplete. Not only so, but it is fitting that the body, which with the soul has suffered and struggled through the trials of the mortal, should also share in the triumphs and joys of the immortal, state, and so the reverse of this in the case of the wicked.

That the triumph both of the soul and of the body, should take place, each in its own time, yet both be triumphant in the end, well accords with the progress and development of the whole system, as we now see it moving on about us. There is seemingly in it no haste, everything has its season, one thing waiting for another, each as a part looking forward to, and waiting for, the incoming of a final and glorious consummation.

And here, without touching upon the many associated topics, such as the recognition and reunion of friends in the spiritual state, their employments, and what may still be their relation and intercourse with the living; we close our discussion of this subject, a subject to us full of mystery, respecting which nature says nothing, and philosophy is as silent as the grave; on which revelation alone sheds any light, and yet a subject so deeply interesting, so important to us as pilgrims, who are soon to pass into that unseen state. Oh! that when the time of our departure shall come, and we shall find ourselves on the confines of that world, we may then, like the thief on the cross, find a friend in the King of that country, and like him also have administered to us an abundant entrance into the heavenly Paradise.

ARTICLE VI.

NATIONALITY.

By Alpheus S. Packard, Professor in Bowdoin College.

WE propose to offer some remarks on the subject of Nationality. The attention of the civilized world has, within a short period, been directed to inquiries suggested by this topic. The subject has claims on the ear of every citizen of the Republic.

We cannot but notice, in regard to this spirit of nationality, that it is an *all-pervading and most sensitive element of national character*. It pervades the body politic like the life-blood in the human body, and is quick to feel, like the tissue of nerves, which is spread over the whole human frame. How was this illustrated, a few years since, when the spirit of both American and English nationality was kindled into a flame in consequence of the burning of the *Caroline*, in our western waters, by a party of Canadians, and the death of two or three individuals in the affair, and the arrest, subsequently, of a worthless British subject, and his trial before our courts for his participation in that matter! Thus a transaction, really paltry in itself, but touching as it did the nerve of the two nations already in an irritable state, came near involving them in the most formidable of national calamities. A more striking illustration of this point has, more recently, attracted the notice of the civilized world: an individual who, but for his part in the affair, would probably never have been heard of, a Hungarian by birth, was forcibly seized, in the harbor of Smyrna, taken on board an Austrian vessel of war, with the design, on the part of his captors, of conveying him to Austria as a State criminal. Two or three years before, he had taken refuge in this country, had declared his intention to become a citizen, and had taken the preliminary measures for naturalization. It was but an inchoate citizenship, not a full and perfect title, which he could maintain;

and yet enough to insure him the protection of this Government. The Government, in the person of its only representative on that distant shore, reached forth its arms for his rescue, and, in justification of that novel and bold act, there was aroused, from one end of the land to the other, a fervid, exulting national spirit, which the proudest absolutism of Europe was compelled to respect. It was the boast of Cicero, that "the body of every Roman citizen was inviolable" (Pro Rabirio, § 4). It was guarded by a most sensitive and jealous spirit of nationality, which pervaded the whole Roman empire. In two instances, the apostle Paul alarmed the magistrates who had scourged him in Judea, more by an appeal to his rights as a Roman citizen, which they had outraged, than if he had summoned a legion of armed men to his rescue. The spirit of Roman nationality had been wronged, and they trembled for the consequences of the rash and illegal acts.

Another point regarding this spirit of nationality, which has been impressed on the memory of a generation not yet gone, by one of the most deplorable events in the history of nations, is its *lasting*, we might almost say its *indestructible*, power.

On the 5th of January, 1810, the French ambassador at the Court of Russia (Coulaincourt) signed a form of convention, which formally put forth : 1st, that the kingdom of Poland should never be reëstablished ; 2d, that the names of Poland and Polish should be forbidden on all occasions." Napoleon would not ratify the doings of his ambassador ; but the Czar of Russia maintained, with terrible tenacity, his purpose concerning unfortunate Poland. The dreadful retribution with which the noble and unexampled struggle of the Poles, in 1830 and 1831, to regain their standing among the nations was visited by Russian vengeance, is well remembered. No method which military and civil despotism, triumphant and revengeful, could devise, was spared. Their most eminent citizens, after a mock trial, were executed like common soldiers, or were banished to Siberian wilds ; their names were taken from them (the individuals,

when it was necessary, being designated by numbers), and they were not allowed to converse of their homes or of their sorrows, or to have any correspondence. Nothing Polish, whether civil or military, was suffered to remain. Everything was made Russian. The national language, in all legislative acts, was supplanted by that of Muscovy. Young men, if destined to military service, were incorporated into Russian regiments; or, if they chose a civil life, were compelled to receive education in a Russian university. The university of Poland was abolished; her schools were subjected to a surveillance fatal to their prosperity. Nicholas caused a fortress, which might contain forty thousand men, to be erected at the gates of Warsaw; between Warsaw and St. Petersburg a line of telegraphs was established, by which, even at night, by illuminated disks, intelligence might be communicated, in an hour and a half, from one city to the other, a distance of more than five hundred miles, so that in case of an insurrectionary movement, in a few hours orders might be received to reduce Warsaw to ashes. The commercial interests of the Poles, whose name was not to be uttered within the dominions of the Czar, were annihilated. Thus, in utter disregard and defiance of solemn, repeated treaties with other powers, stipulating the integrity of the Polish nation, the Autocrat did all that man could do, to efface the name of Poland from the thoughts of men, as it has already disappeared from the map of Europe. An effort on such a scale, to exterminate a nation, is without precedent in the history of the world. And yet is Polish nationality annihilated? Thousands of her exiles are dispersed over Europe; many, even, have fled to this country, who fondly cherish and cautiously reveal their hopes, that divine Justice does not sleep, that a day of freedom will yet come; and they are watching, with aching hearts, for the signal to gird on their armor for the liberation of their devoted country. The spirit of nationality cannot be easily crushed; it has survived through conquest and dismemberment of country, the violent overthrow of national institutions, and the dispersion of the inhabitants over other lands. It lives in the most dreary exile.

A mad project was entertained, in Germany, just before the opening of the French revolution, by some of her self-styled philosophers, under the semblance of enthusiasm for humanity, to abolish this spirit of nationality. Cosmopolitism, or citizenship of the world, was arrayed against patriotism or love of country, which was pronounced to be a low and selfish sentiment. Love of one's own people was to be merged in love of the human race, the individual nation in universal humanity. The advocates of this celestial virtue aimed to overthrow hierarchy, monarchy, and aristocracy, and yet further to fuse all nations and races, as it has been expressed, into one free, equal, unpartitioned humanity. The well-known association of the Illuminati, which had its origin in Bavaria, and spread over Germany, enlisting multitudes in its wild fanaticism, issuing great numbers of atheistical and grossly immoral writings, and which extended its baneful influence into France, under the auspices of the notorious Baron Holbach, was the chief organ of this new philosophy. One of the renegades of this philosophism, Anacharsis Clootz, at one time president of the Jacobin club in France, disowned his father-land and his German name and title, and styled himself "the orator of the human race." In entire consistency with the doctrine, he proposed to prohibit any one from calling himself a Frenchman; and that each citizen should assume the appellative "universal," to designate the common relation held by all to the whole race. The folly of this madman is well depicted by the sarcastic pen of Carlyle, in the following characteristic passage :

"One scene," i. e. when the different orders and classes of the people were sending their committees to claim or offer a representation in the great national league, or federation, about to be made, "one scene, the hastiest reader will momentarily pause on—that of Anacharsis Clootz, and the collective sinful posterity of Adam. It occurred to the mind of Anacharsis that, while so much was embodying itself into club or committee, and perorating applauded, there yet remained a greater, and greatest; of which, if it also took body and perorated, what might not the effect be ?

— Humankind, namely : In what rapt creative moment the thought arose in Anacharsis's soul ; all his throes, while he went about giving shape and birth to it, how he was sneered at by cold worldlings, but did sneer again, being a man of polished sarcasm ; and how he moved to and fro, persuasive in coffee-house and *boireé*, and dived down assiduous—obscure, in the great deep of Paris, making his thought a fact ; of all this, the spiritual biographies of that period say nothing. Enough, that on the 19th eve of June, 1790, the sun's slant rays lighted a spectacle such as our foolish little planet has not often had to show. Anacharsis Clootz entering the august *Salle de Menége*, with the human species at his heels,—Swedes, Spaniards, Polacks, Turks, Chaldeans, Greeks, dwellers in Mesopotamia ; behold them all ; they have come to claim place in the grand federation, having an undoubted interest in it."

France had too much of the spirit of nationality to receive this philosophy of dreams. Clootz, and his German friends, as worthless foreigners, fell under the guillotine. Cosmopolitism disappeared in France, and, soon, everywhere else.

A third point regarding the spirit of nationality, has attracted the attention of later historians, and students of history, which is, its great influence in the history of nations and people.

The history of conquest and oppression affords many illustrations of the power of this element, and of its influence on the history and destinies of men. It will explain many revolutions that have agitated the political world, which otherwise are insoluble problems, or which have been ascribed to inadequate causes. The long and bloody conflicts in the history of our English ancestors, which have been attributed by older historians to the restless ambition of individuals, assume a new aspect, and a new meaning when regarded as the conflict between the nationalities of the conquered Saxons and their Norman conquerors, as has been shown in a fine spirit of philosophy by Thierry. Whenever we boast of our Saxon origin, if such boast has any meaning

at all, it is because the spirit of Saxon nationality has not been extinguished, although the form under which it first had its origin has long since passed away.

We have referred to the madness of certain reputed philosophers of Germany, as shown in the project of uprooting all national preferences and attachments, and implanting in their place a general love of the human family. The history of France and Germany during the period extending from 1780 to 1815, illustrates the power and importance of a high-toned national feeling. As has been already remarked, France was saved by her spirit of nationality from the disastrous fanaticism of the Illuminati, and preserved her integrity as a nation during the most violent convulsions which ever agitated a people. Germany at first embraced the absurdity, and, as its first and immediate fruits, was trampled under foot by the French armies, until, oppressed and crushed, her spirit of nationality was rekindled; and the union of her States, in 1813, first checked the ambitious and victorious career of him who was conqueror in a hundred battles. Yet more; to the popular ferment of that period may be referred that revival of her nationality which has ever since been at work, and has more recently manifested its power in the project of reconstructing a Germanic empire, the capital to be Frankfort on the Maine, the purpose of which was to give Teutonic Germany free scope and influence among the nations. It aimed to make Germany a dominant power; or, as it was well expressed by a contemporary, the purpose was to cause "the voice of Germany to be heard in full tones, instead of being split into the squeaking trebles of thirty provincial States.

We must discriminate, however, between the influence of race and of nationality. The Gypsy race have no home, no political institutions, and therefore no proper nationality; and yet their spirit of race alone has preserved them as a distinct people in different lands where they sojourn. The thieves and vagabonds of the countries in which they live, four hundred years have wrought no change in their peculiarities, whether physical or moral, and have produced no

contamination by admixture with the people around them. In penury and degradation, their hands against every man not of their blood, and every man's hand against them, yet are they bound together by indissoluble bonds of brotherhood. Among many illustrations of the power of race in this singular people related by Borrow in his work on the Gypsies of Spain, we select the following—a narrative of an encounter given, by a Spanish Gypsy, to Mr. Borrow himself:

“I served,” says the Gypsy, “as a soldier in the war of independence against the French. It happened, once, that we joined in desperate battle, and there was a confusion, and the two parties became intermingled, and fought sword to sword, and bayonet to bayonet; and a French soldier singled me out, and we fought for a long time, cutting, goring, and cursing one another, till at last we flung down our arms, and grappled; long we wrestled, body to body; but I found that I was the weaker, and I fell. The French soldier's knee was on my breast, and his grasp was on my throat; and he seized his bayonet, and he raised it to thrust me through the jaws, and his cap had fallen off; and I lifted up my eyes wildly to his face, and our eyes met, and I gave a loud shriek and cried, *Zincalo! Zincalo!*” (one of the names by which the race is called), “and I felt him shudder, and he relaxed his grasp and started up; and he smote his forehead and wept, and came to me, and knelt down by my side, for I was almost dead; and he took my hand and called me brother, and *Zincalo*; and he produced his flask, and poured wine into my mouth, and I revived; and he raised me up, and led me from the tumult, and we sat down on a knoll; and the two parties were fighting all around, and he said, ‘Let the dogs fight, and tear each other's throats till they are all destroyed; what matters it to the *Zincalo*? They are not of our blood, and shall that be shed for them?’ So we sat for hours on the knoll, and discoursed on matters pertaining to our people. So we sat until the sun went down, and the battle was over; and he proposed that we should both flee to his country, and live there with the *Zin-*

calo ; but my heart failed me. So we embraced, and he departed to the French, whilst I returned to our battalions."

As illustrative of the influence of race, on political movements, we may bring to the notice of the reader the following facts, now attracting the attention of the European world. A few years since a writer, in view of the feeling of nationality, as he termed it, which was developing itself among the Slavonic people, predicted a revolution in Austria on the death of Metternich. The prediction was fulfilled, being hastened by the French revolution of February, 1848. Krasinski, moreover, a Polander, wrote a book, entitled Panslavism and Germanism, the design of which is, to show the power and political tendencies of this same Slavonic people, in order to convince the Teutonic Germans, and Europe generally, that they are worthy of consideration. The total number of this race is nearly eighty millions, thus distributed among the governments of Europe : Poles, nine millions (of whom five millions are subject to Russia, two millions to Austria, and two, to Prussia) ; seventeen millions are in the Austrian empire ; six millions in Turkey, and in Russia forty-eight millions. For several years the educated Slavonians have been stimulated to cultivate a brotherhood, through their common language and their ancient literature. The writer argues that such a mass of people, of common origin, with a common language perpetuated in a venerable literature, are not to be despised, certainly not to be exasperated. In May, 1848, a festival of fraternity was appointed for the Slavonians, apparently with reference to the long-cherished idea in some leading minds, of consolidating a great Slavonic empire, which, under the lead of Austria detached from Germany, or under Russia, might overbalance the Teutonic or German empire. This may be a dream of visionaries, but it reveals agencies which may be of great moment in the future history of Eastern Europe. We see, however, in the events which have been referred to, the exemplification of the power of race attempting to array itself against what we should choose to denominate the power of nationality. Of the Slavonians, except the Poles and Bohemians, few have

political institutions or recollections; little, besides the influence of race, to stimulate them. And in respect to the formidable project of a Germanic empire — where the influence of race has ever been intense — a fatal obstacle to the success of the scheme lay in what we term the nationalities of the different German States. The Prussian, or the Austrian, or even the Würtemberger, could not become a German and forget the friendships, the enmities, the traditions, the history, and renown of his former name. There was also a yet more serious obstacle, in the fact that a large part of Austria, and a less considerable portion of Prussia is Slavonian, and could not be merged in a Teutonic nationality. Thus, in the two leading powers of the new empire, there were combined, against the project, both the race and nationality of some twenty millions of people.

We may refer, for illustration of this power of race, to the conflict between Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, as a conflict between the Scandinavian and Teutonic races, and also to the Hungarian struggle, which was complicated and embarrassed, perhaps defeated, by the jealousies existing between the Magyar and Slavonian races.

We ourselves are witnesses of the power of this spirit of race: perhaps it may cost us more trouble than we have been accustomed to anticipate. Every one knows, how futile have proved the efforts to amalgamate the aborigines of our country with the European settlers of this continent. It is more than a conflict of barbarism and civilization. Furthermore, the sufferings and oppression of Ireland have driven to our shores the Celtic race; and how slow is the process of incorporation! Romanism is largely in fault, and recent events have shown that our people have been aroused by the plainly-manifested determination of the Romish hierarchy to maintain the entire separation of their subjects from the Protestant community. Still there is the conflict of races. The Celtic and the Saxon cannot preserve their distinctive characteristics, and harmonize; and our only ground for hope is the predominance of the Saxon element

to such a degree that, in time, the Celtic will become merged and disappear. But besides this, a strong sentiment of nationality, awakened by a community of interests, undoubtedly tends to weaken, and finally (and that at no distant day) to terminate the conflict between these two races.

Now we remark, in view of the striking facts which have been adverted to, that, in any nation or state, where there are gathered different people, unless there be a strong and all-pervading spirit of nationality, we cannot expect long-continued prosperity. The innate power of race will triumph over the weaker sentiment of nationality. This sentiment, so fresh, and vigorous, and universal in our land, it would seem, may counteract the adverse and (as some regard them) formidable evils which the influx, within a few years, of some four millions of a foreign population has introduced. But when, in our zeal for progress, we talk of annexing a new nation, and an entirely new people, a distinct race, to our already extended domain, it is a question which young America, perhaps, has not much thought of; but it is a grave question, which the history of the past, and the present aspect of Europe propounds: what will be the influence of still another conflict of races, on the harmony, and of course on the welfare, of this country? Mental and moral enlightenment, more than all, the all-pervading influence of a pure gospel, and, what *must* be thought of, and what we, as good citizens, must do our part to cultivate, a *strong sentiment of nationality*, may make us still *one* and, therefore, a *strong* people. The *nationality* of the Hungarians has preserved them a distinct people during the injustice, and intrigue, and perfidy, and oppression of the house of Hapsburg, for more than three hundred years. One of the Austrian emperors, Joseph II., attempted to incorporate them into the empire. His attempt failed. He promised to submit to the ceremony of coronation as king of Hungary, and he restored the regalia of Hungary; thus doing feigned homage to Hungarian nationality. The sacred crown of St. Stephen was received, at Buda, in the midst of universal acclamations and the roar of cannon, as the symbol of Hungarian nationality, to be

guarded, in the castle of Buda, as the palladium of the rights and national existence of Hungary. It may be remembered that this crown of St. Stephen, in the Hungarian revolution, disappeared, and that the reason alleged, by the Austrian authorities, for the seizure of Koszta was, that he knew where the crown was concealed.

We have said enough to illustrate the importance of the sentiment of nationality, as an element of national welfare. No nation has attained to distinction, or left a name to be remembered, which has not been pervaded by a strong nationality. National character cannot be developed without it. Imagine a nation of cosmopolites, such as the German Illuminati, in their folly, wished to form ; a nation, the members of which have no common bond or sympathies. Individuals among them may do something worthy of themselves ; but nothing great or noble can be produced by such a dismembered body. What national act of moment in the sum of human affairs, can proceed from that which has no unity, no concentration of purpose or effort ; which, after all, scarcely exists or acts, as a nation ? It has been observed, that no colony, a distant dependency of a great empire, has ever accomplished much in art or literature. In the political world, it is a mere cipher. No colony has ever reared a great poet, or artist, or statesman ; and for the reason, that it has no distinct nationality. Everything of native growth, in such a dependency, suffers from a withering sense of inferiority. There is little to excite effort, because there is little to reward it. The strong sentiment of nationality, which soon sprung up in the bosoms of the American colonists, bound them together, and, by its rapid and healthy growth, overpowered or absorbed that older and fondly-cherished spirit of nationality which, as we know, long bound them to the home of their fathers ; or rather, it supplanted what had been deeply rooted in their breasts.

Now *what is this spirit of nationality?* We have indicated some of its characteristics ; *what is the true idea of it?* *What is its nature?*

It is not mere love of home. It may exist in those who have no home. Witness the Jews : homeless these eighteen

hundred years, vagabonds in the earth, a by-word and a hissing among the nations, the scorn of believer and infidel, exposed to the most remorseless exactions and the most relentless persecutions among every people ; yet their spirit of nationality is as strong and steadfast as when their beloved city was the glory of the earth.

This nationality of feeling may revolve around various objects as its centre ; as, in the case of the Jews, a common religion and a common destiny in anticipation, which have become inwrought in the conscience and whole being of the people ; or a civil polity, consulting the interests and enlisting the sympathies of the people ; or common danger and sufferings, a common oppression, may be the bond of union ; as we have experienced in our own history. Whatever produces, in a people, a feeling of common interest and sympathy, begets nationality. Without, however, attempting a strict analysis of the sentiment, it is enough for our present purpose to say, that it is an instinct of our nature, implanted by our Creator, as truly, as love of kindred. It pertains to man as a social being. It is not the result of any social compact. The Indian, the Arab, the European, loves his own people, not because he has agreed to do so, nor even because it is for his interest to do so ; but because he cannot help it. He loves them for the same reason that he loves his kith and kin : God has so constituted him. To be destitute of the sentiment, is as monstrous a violation of nature, as to disown one's children or one's parents.

So much for the true idea of nationality. It is the love of what one feels to be his own.

We now proceed to specify some of the circumstances and conditions which serve to enkindle and strengthen it. We have just said, that its foundation is an instinct of our nature. But it is of great importance to know what circumstances tend to develop it. The discussion may open views interesting and profitable to us as citizens. There is much empty declamation about love of country, even from those who, unconsciously it may be, in some of their movements are, in fact, doing all in their power to uproot that which

nourishes true nationality. Every citizen, then, should form an intelligent appreciation of what best fosters that nationality of feeling, which is essential to the permanency of political institutions, and which is his pride and boast.

One source of national sympathy will probably at once suggest itself to every one; *historical reminiscences*, whether preserved by traditions or monuments, or historic records. Happy that people who can foster the sentiment of nationality by memorials of the bravery, the virtue, and the wisdom of their ancestors! They have a strong bond of union. An English poet declares it to be enough to satisfy the ambition of a common man, that he is the countryman of Wolfe, and speaks the language of Chatham. Says William Howitt, speaking of the influence and power of historic associations: "There is no part of England in which you do not become aware that, there, some portion of our national glory has originated. The very coachman, as you traverse the highways, continually points out to you spots made sacred by men and their acts. There, say they, was born or lived Milton or Shakspeare, Locke or Bacon, Pope or Dryden; that, was the castle of Chaucer; there, now lives Wordsworth, Southey, or Moore; there, Queen Elizabeth was confined, in her youth; here, she confined Mary of Scotland, in her age; there, Wicklif lived, and here his ashes were scattered in the air by his enemies; there, Hooker watched his sheep, while he pondered on his Ecclesiastical Polity; here was born Cromwell or Hampden; here was the favorite retreat of Chatham, Fox, Pitt, or other person who, in his day, exerted a powerful influence on the mind, or fortunes, of his country. Thus it is, all England through. Who," he asks, "shall not feel proud to own himself of its race and kindred? and, if he can secure for himself a moderate share of its common goods, be happy to live and die in it?"

Who of us does not cherish the remembrance of our revolutionary struggle, rejoicing that he has descended from such a generation, and is a fellow-countryman of those who boast such a parentage? Who does not perceive a

proof of the unity of the American people in the feeling, of which himself is conscious, that he has a personal property in the glory which our fathers gained, by their sacrifices and efforts, in achieving our national independence, though he be unable to trace his lineage from them? What citizen of New England can visit the Rock of Plymouth and not feel that, where the Pilgrims first set foot on these shores, is to him a consecrated spot? Or, who can stand on Bunker Hill or on the Plain at Yorktown, and his bosom not swell with emotions of admiration for those who wrought the great work, commenced and ended on these fields?—with deeper reverence, also, and warmer love for the institutions which the scenes, enacted there, contributed to establish?—and with pride that he is a citizen of that land which can boast of such events in her history? Such reminiscences bind us, as a people, to the institutions we cherish, and to one another.

We felt a lively interest in the erection of the monument which now crowns Bunker Hill. In sight of that noble structure our love of country, our veneration for her institutions, and especially for the great principles evolved in the struggle for her independence, are kindled anew. The bloody fight, which steeped that soil in gore, always comes up to view; the haughty foe, the few rustic, undisciplined, dauntless defenders of their rights, the burning town, the neighboring heights covered with anxious, breathless spectators of the work which fathers, brothers, husbands, and sons were doing in their behalf;—but all this soon passes away. We think of the momentous principles which were then in conflict.

Such monuments are ever teaching their great lesson; reminding the citizen less of the particular events which they are designed immediately to commemorate, than of the truths and principles, which, alike under sunshine and storm, in solemn grandeur, they steadily, silently, faithfully inculcate; and impressing his obligations and duties as a citizen of a land most favored of Heaven.

During a session of Congress, a few years since, much

form and ceremonial attended the presentation of the sword of Washington, and the staff of Franklin. The Hall of Representatives was thronged. The office of making the presentation, by common consent, was committed to one whose long life and most distinguished public service, whose undoubted, long-tried patriotism, and whose wonderful powers and attainments made him, beyond any other, the revered and honored of all. Hearts beat with emotion. Tears flowed in view of the scene. But why all this, about a gilded piece of steel and an oaken staff? Reminiscences of the past, big with destinies of the future, clustered around that sword, and that staff; and who can doubt that every member of that assemblage, which embraced the heads of influence in the land, retired from the scene truer to his obligations as a citizen of the Republic, which the counsel and valor of Washington, and the profound, sagacious wisdom of Franklin, contributed so much to establish?

A few years since was opened near Ratisbon, on a hill overlooking the Danube, the Walhalla, a grand national temple, consecrated to the memory of celebrated Germans. The busts of one hundred and fifty eminent men were at once placed within it. The design was conceived by the King of Bavaria. Said the King, in his speech, at the consecration: "May it serve to develop and consolidate German nationality. May all Germans, to whatsoever race they belong, feel that they have one common country; a country of which they may be proud; and may each individual labor, according to his faculties, to promote the welfare and honor of his country!"

Another source or fountain of national feeling is found in the *literature of a nation*. In science, there can be no nationality. Founded on immutable, eternal relations, science is not susceptible of the modifications which spring from the peculiarities of national character. The literature of a nation takes its form and impress from the peculiarities of the people. It is the voice of the nation uttering itself; and may therefore cherish the nationality of a people. It

moulds, too, the national mind. How much even the lightest, most fugitive forms of literature, popular songs, contribute to this effect, we know among ourselves. Our own national song, vulgar though it be, did much to foster the spirit of the revolution. "Scots wha hae with Wallace bled," "Ye Mariners of England," the Marseillaise Hymn, in certain seasons, have been, and are, like the sound of a trumpet or like a bugle note, stirring the innermost heart of a whole people. In a remote Canadian village, let the band strike "God save the King," and we shall see the whole audience rise, and uncover their heads. It is the spirit of nationality doing reverence to their lovely and beloved Queen over the waters! We are republicans; but we honor such loyalty, not as homage to a crowned head, but as the act of a faithful, patriotic people rendering due respect to their constituted head. The nation that cherishes not a spirit of allegiance to the representative of its government, be he king, president, consul, archon, or governor, is unworthy of the name of nation, and will not possess it long, as we may subsequently more fully show.

The chief merit of Burns,—his chief influence as a poet, lies in his songs. A remarkable increase of nationality in British, especially in Scottish literature, has been noticed since his time, and may doubtless be ascribed, in part, to the influence of his songs, which are peculiarly domestic and national. He speaks of himself as ever cherishing

—— "A wish (I mind its power),
A wish, that to my latest hour
Will strongly heave my breast;
That I, for poor auld Scotland's sake
Some useful plan, or book could make,
Or sing a sang at least."

"Sing a sang!" A small offering, it might seem, and yet, sung in hut and hall, it might arouse a realm. In the rising of Germany against Napoleon, a youthful writer sent a song to Blücher, the Prussian Marshal. He applauded the effort of the young man; and thus expressed his sense of the value of popular songs in his brief, emphatic way: "They

scatter fire among a people. The people must be roused ; some with a sword, some with a song."

Literature, in its highest walks, may be a most copious fountain of national feeling. The Niebelungenleid has ever been cherished by the Germans as a National treasure, like the Iliad of the Greeks, and the Aeneid of the Romans. Its hold on the German mind was seen during the period to which we have referred, more than once, when, in the general union against Napoleon, the new-born nationality of German feeling rose to an unexampled height, and led to an excessive admiration for everything that belonged to German antiquity. Nothing can exceed the delight with which this old poem was then read and studied. This, and other treasures of her literature, revived all the great historical reminiscences of the German people. It roused them from their despondency by pointing back to the old popular heroes, and to their struggles for liberty. Learning and poetry combined their energies in the revival of Nationality.

We need not multiply illustrations on this point. Is it of no moment to an Englishman, that Shakspeare or Sir Walter Scott was a fellow-countryman ? Who, from Land's End to John O'Groat's, that can read at all, does not claim some property in the genius and labors of these men ? In the words of a living, popular though eccentric, writer of England : " England, before long, will hold but a small fraction of the English ; — in America, in New Holland, east and west to the very antipodes, there will be a Saxondom covering great spaces of the globe. And now what is it that can keep all these together into virtually one nation, so that they do not fall out and fight, but live at peace, in brotherly intercourse, helping one another ? This is justly regarded as the greatest practical problem, — the thing all manner of sovereignties and governments are here to accomplish ; what is it that will accomplish *this* ? Acts of Parliament, administrative prime ministers cannot. America is parted from us, so far as Parliament could part it. Call it not fantastic, for there is much reality in

it; — Here, I say, is an English King whom, no time or chance, Parliament or combination of Parliaments, can dethrone. This King Shakspeare! does not he shine in crowned sovereignty over us all, as the noblest, gentlest, yet strongest of rallying signs; indestructible; really more valuable, in that point of view, than any other means or appliance whatsoever? We can fancy him as radiant aloft over all the nations of Englishmen, a thousand years hence. From Paramatta, from New York, wheresoever, under what sort of Parish Constable soever, English men and women are, they will say to one another: ‘Yes, this Shakspeare is ours; we produced him; we speak and think by him; we are of one blood and kind with him.’” Or to come home to ourselves; what American would consent to surrender the citizenship of Edwards, or Irving, or Prescott, and blot out the record of their American birth? Their genius, their studies, their honors are a part of our national treasures. They enter our dwellings; are the companions of the fireside; are cherished with pride by every American heart; they nourish the sympathies which bind us, as a people, together.

A yet more important source of common sympathy, a stronger bond of union, and, of course, a more fruitful source of nationality, is found in the system of *public education*.

The Prussian system of education is the most perfect now known. But a prominent object, avowedly kept in view by Hardenburg, the Minister of Instruction, to whom it is indebted for its perfection, was to *awaken a national spirit*. This system has been denominated, by some one, “a wonderful machine of state-craft,” so great is its influence in wedding the subject of it to whatever is national. But in our system of free schools there is a source or element of power, which the Prussian has not, nor any other: it not only emanates from the people, but it is managed by the people. Neither Government, nor church, opens school-houses, provides teachers, and bids parents send their children. What we do is, indeed, under the sanction and authority of Government; but the will of the Government is our will, and that will we execute ourselves. We choose our committees,

our agents, and every man feels that he has not only an interest, but a voice in the management of this vast engine of free, popular education. Kossuth, in his speech at the "Editorial Banquet," in New York, pronounced our system of popular education to be, in his view, our proudest monument. With his words would we rebuke those less worthy exiles who have come to us, not as visitors, but to seek an asylum in our institutions, who, with ready grasp, seize whatever privilege these institutions, with open heart and hand, afford them, and then, with unblushing impudence, assail that which has ever been their distinguishing feature, *a system of free education* for the whole people. But we can almost forgive the bigotry and meanness of this simultaneous assault which Romanism, or rather its hierarchy, has made upon our free schools, when we contemplate the spirit with which the outrage has been met and rebuked; developing, as it did, how sensitive is the American heart to any encroachment on the right of the people, and with what resistless force the masses will throw off the power, however formidable or insinuating, that shall dare to lay hands on privileges and institutions which have been cherished, from the first, as a national birth-right. But to return: what a nursery of deep-toned national spirit is found in this system of popular education! A feeling of common interest and sympathy is engendered in the subjects of a common discipline; and, in our free schools, a large proportion of our people receive their education. The sons of rich and poor, here, meet on the same level; no distinction is known, in studies or in rank, except what merit creates; and the child of the poorest inhabitant may bear away the palm.

The same tendency to a national spirit is equally seen in our higher seminaries of learning. In them also, rich and poor, high and low, if such a distinction be known among us, meet together. No aristocracy will be, or can be, tolerated within their precincts; and the distinctions, if any, are won most frequently by those whose only inheritance is talent and worth. Here, as in the common school, all pursue the same studies, anticipate the same destinies; and in all this

we perceive the nurture of a true brotherhood, a deep sympathy for one another, which shall survive the influence of time and separation; and of true nationality also, in the warm attachment which is enkindled for that political system which so bountifully and impartially provides for the greatest wants of its children.

Let us remark, here, how senseless is the cry, occasionally heard, against our higher institutions of learning. There are those who must and will obtain the highest education. The wants of the country, of every civilized, refined community, demand men of high education; and if our sons cannot obtain it at home, they will seek it abroad. What would be the effect of a policy which should drive our young men of hope and promise to foreign lands to educate themselves? It was a favorite project with the Father of his country to establish a national university, and to endow it liberally, in order that the youth of the land, under its influence, might forget sectional prejudices and imbibe mutual sympathies and attachments, and thus be led to cherish a common sentiment of nationality. It is manifestly the dictate of sound policy, in its bearing on national feeling, to foster our higher as well as our lower institutions. To denounce the former is the impulse of a narrow spirit, which, in its professed zeal to reduce all to a level, would take the most effectual method of quenching the nationality of some thousands of our youth, year by year, by sending them to other lands to obtain what they are denied at home; of those, too, whose influence will ever be most important to our national welfare.

The Autocrat of Russia showed his keen policy, in furtherance of his design to crush the nationality of Poland, by the act of abolishing the Polish university, and so of controlling the education of that devoted people; that, if possible, no seeds of Polish nationality may germinate under its influence. Without this final stroke, his armies, his fortresses, his telegraphs, by night as well as by day, would be ineffectual. Let it be observed, his aim was not, to prohibit education of Polish youth; but education at home; education of Polish youth together. They may be educated, if

they desire it ; but it must be abroad, and in Russian schools. In imitation of this high example, the emperor of Austria has decreed that instruction in all the colleges of Hungary shall be given in German exclusively.

It must not be overlooked, that religious influence is, or ought to be, prominent in a system of national education. "How can religion be divorced from education?" asks one, and he no bigot. "An irreverent knowledge is no knowledge. A knowledge that ends in barren self-worship—comparative indifference or contempt for all God's universe except one insignificant item thereof;—what is it?" By education we mean, not merely that obtained in schools or colleges; but that whole system of training, by which the man, the citizen, is formed and nurtured. It begins with the cradle, ends with the grave. Regarded in this broad sense, no one can refuse assent to the assertion that, in our system of national education, religion is the conservative element. Our religious institutions are the vital part of our political system. Our ministry constitute a main pillar in the state. In some countries the church forms, politically, a part of the State. It is not so with us; yet we reassert that the Christian ministry in this land, where no intelligent, reflecting, honest man ever raises the cry of Church and State, the Christian ministry is a main pillar in the State. The Christian minister did as much as the civilian, or the soldier, to prepare the way for the American revolution, and to sustain the spirit of the revolution. If Christian ministers had not preached and prayed, there might have been no revolution as yet; or, had it broken out, it might have been crushed. The deep, dauntless, uncompromising, trustful, hopeful, religious spirit of our fathers, who revered, and whose love gathered around, their ministers, imparted to the revolution its most striking characteristic—a calm, resolute, indomitable spirit, which rose above disaster and defeat, ever hoping against hope, because it trusted in that God of the Pilgrims, who had "brought out a vine from a distant land, and cast out the heathen, and planted it, and caused it to take deep root; and the hills were covered with the shadow of it, and the boughs thereof

were like the goodly cedars." And now, though the pastor may not defile himself with the partisan warfare of politics, his ministrations are indispensable to the permanency of our institutions.

To return to our point: the religious element elevates and purifies the sentiment of nationality, just in proportion as it exalts and purifies the man himself. Again, it quickens this sentiment and imparts to it life, just in proportion as it warms into life and strengthens the social nature of man. Whatever imparts healthful vigor to the sensibilities and stirs the fountains of feeling within us, makes better neighbors and citizens. A heartless man is an indifferent neighbor and a cold patriot. Religious culture teaches, as its second great lesson, to sympathize with others; which is the basis of true public spirit and nationality.

Again, we may consider the influence of religious institutions on men in their associated character. They present a centre, around which cluster the strongest sympathies of our being. Men can assemble under no circumstances better adapted to nourish the feeling of a common interest than those offered by the various occasions of religious instruction and worship. Of every age and condition, however sundered elsewhere by the different and often opposing interests in life, they here find a common object, a common cause, infinitely transcending in importance the most weighty concerns which elsewhere occupy the attention; that which is the safest foundation of individual and public prosperity. Together they seek the same great blessing for themselves and their country; together they receive the same great lessons of duty, share in the same consolations, are urged to the same faith, and invited to partake of the same hopes, the same peace, the same joy. What bond so strong to bind a people together? This, alone, has sustained the nationality of the Jews, through ages of scorn and oppression. The power of this principle of union has been seen wherever the religious rights of a people have been assailed. Their religious faith and institutions have bound the Scotch to each other, and to their native hills, with bands of iron. So it was

with our pilgrim fathers : civil oppression could not sunder them, united as they were by a common religious faith. They preferred to exile themselves to a wilderness, beyond the waste of waters, rather than to surrender rights dearer than life. And now, among the scenes which ever come up amid the cherished recollections of the New Englander, in his distant home and wanderings, is the congregation with which his parents and himself, in his childhood and youth, worshipped. A peculiar principle, an essential feature of our religious institutions, the voluntary principle as it is termed, has tended, unquestionably, to foster the spirit of nationality ; under the influence of this principle, every good citizen feels, that he has a personal concern in cherishing and sustaining those sacred institutions which, established by God on the earth, his providence has committed, in this land beyond any other, to the free-will offering of the people. He recognizes, here, a divine right, not for others to lord it over his conscience, but which, without interfering in the least with the great principles of civil and religious liberty, demands of him due reverence for the ordinances of divine appointment, and that personal effort for their maintenance, which divine Providence enables him to render.

Another most powerful bond of union, and most copious fountain of nationality, is the government, the constitution, and laws of the land : with us, beyond all other people, peculiarly pervasive and energetic ; for, with us, every citizen is a part of the government, every one feels that he has a personal agency in the affairs of State. He is not a passive recipient of blessings from the constitution and laws ; he has something to bestow, in return.

One main result of every wise government is, to promote a harmony of sentiment and opinion, or common sympathies ; and this is but another expression for nationality, itself the basis of political union. The political institutions are the fixed point around which centre the interests and sympathies of the people. There must be some fountain of supreme authority, something fixed and held sacred in the institutions of the State, which shall attract the allegiance

of the community, or there cannot exist true national feeling. It matters not, what the political constitution may be, whether monarchical or republican, ; if it be well established, and wisely administered, it will beget national sympathy in its behalf, and be a strong bond of union. Let any one reflect how the interests of every individual citizen, among ourselves, is affected by the statutes and ordinances of our government. When we buy and sell, whatever be our occupation, our interests are protected by the government under which we live. A statute of government may quicken the energies of the manufacturing corporation in which we are concerned, or paralyze and crush them ; it may send our ships to whiten, with their sails, distant seas, or dismantle them and leave them to rot at our wharves.

But there is one thought of great importance, which is naturally suggested, and that is, that the principle of allegiance to the supreme authority of the land, essential to the permanency of our institutions, is also essential to the existence of a spirit of true nationality. It follows, then (what is not much thought of, in our day certainly), that a sacred regard, a profound reverence for public law, is an important element of nationality. Public law is the most solemn act of national sovereignty ; national sovereignty thus utters its voice. It is only thus, that it ensures public order, and, of course, public welfare. It thus protects the citizen in his rights, encourages industry, fosters talent and enterprise, represses crime, compels individual interest to yield to the public good, and thus cherishes mutual sympathy and a feeling of common interest. To bow, therefore, with reverence, when the sovereignty of the nation lifts up its voice in public law, *unless it conflicts with the law and will of God*, is the dictate of a true national spirit ; just as a sacred regard to the parental will, is the impulse of a truly filial spirit. He, then, who violates, or endeavors to paralyze the energy of, the laws of the land, or to annul legislative acts, or to evade their authority, or to secure his own ends or the ends of those with whom he acts, by means and measures which contravene the statutes or constitutional principles of the government, is no

patriot. He may be an artful and successful demagogue, a good partisan, but he is no patriot. He may not be aware of it; but, in pursuing a course which necessarily tends to dishonor the national sovereignty and thus to weaken the sentiment of a high-toned nationality, he is a traitor to the vital interests of his country, and to his highest obligations as a citizen. He sets up his own will against the public will, his own interests against what the supreme authority of the land has pronounced to be the public interest; and what is this, but opposing the dictates of a pure nationality? Suppose every individual should do so, what would our nationality, our noisiest patriotism, be worth?

But unjust laws and statutes may be enacted; and shall not the people expose their injustice and resist their execution? Must the people be dumb,—sit in mute reverence when their rights are assailed? Certainly they may expose the injustice of such acts and use the proper means to rescind them; but they may not resist them until all methods to rescind them have been faithfully tried and failed. The public voice is not unheard or disregarded in our legislative halls, and we always have a remedy short of revolt or treason. Better suffer injustice for a short year, or for years, than set the example of rebellion. One act of rebellion may, if unrebuked, it will, do us, as a people, more harm than years of unjust legislation. We repeat it, we have a remedy, and that should be first and faithfully tried. Disobedience and revolution is the last resort. Our fathers tried the virtue of years of forbearance,—of remonstrance repeated again and again, which had to be borne over the wide Atlantic up to a distant throne, before they took the last terrible resort of revolution. This forbearance was not policy with them. No one will dare to call it weakness. It was principle, springing from sacred regard to the government under which they lived.

The appeal, so often heard, to the Constitution, has a meaning. To revere the Constitution is a dictate of true nationality. When men have come to trample that sacred palladium under foot, our nationality has lost its centre of

attraction. It has no object on which to fasten. Men must obey the supreme authority, or how can they respect it? How can they administer it in this land, particularly, where every citizen may be called to administer public law? There can be no freedom without law; none, surely, where law is not obeyed. We quote, again, the words of a popular writer: "Whoso cannot obey, cannot be free; still less, bear rule. He that is the inferior of nothing, can be the superior of nothing, — the equal of nothing." And again: "Obedience, little as many may consider that side of the matter, is the primary duty of man. It is not a light matter when the just man sees himself in the tragical condition of a stirrer up of strife. Rebel, without due, and most due cause, is the ugliest of words. The first rebel was Satan." Just and noble sentiments for this day! — when men too often show an impatience of authority, human or divine, and cry for liberty, when, in fact, they mean unbridled license; when, in the city, organized mobs set law and order at defiance; and, in the country, under the disguise of lawless savages, they trample on vested rights older than our existence as a nation, and as sacred as any established by human governments; when, even, the supremacy of the Constitution of State and nation is made to yield to the will of a numerical majority.¹

¹ The ancient philosophers rebuked what they termed the ἀκολασία, the *licentiousness* of the ancient democracies. The following passage is from a note appended to Dr. Arnold's Sixth Lecture on Modern History, by Professor Reed: "Aristotle describes in various passages the kinds of democracy in which the ἀκολασία prevails; when, for instance, the multitude has the mastery over the laws, and the equality is by numbers, and not by worth; and justice is made to mean whatever the majority please; — whenever the supremacy of the constitution is made to yield to mere votes or decrees, which is brought about by the demagogue who corrupts the popular government, as the flatterer spoils a king; the supremacy of the multitude over the law being encouraged for selfish purposes by the demagogue, who makes everything a subject of direct appeal to the people, whose opinion at the same time he can fashion or control. This is that absence of law which destroys a polity. Aristotle shows, moreover, that when a popular government becomes extravagantly democratic, intractable licentiousness will surely engender tyranny. This ἀκολασία, the vice of the ancient republics, appears then to have been the undisciplined, ungovernable condition of deliberate and habitual *lawlessness*, by which is meant that state of things, where

We have thus adverted to the most important sources of national spirit, historical reminiscences, national literature, the system of public education, embracing religious institutions, and the political constitution and laws of the land.¹ So far as one fails to cherish these sources of national character and welfare, so far does he fall short of the standard of true patriotism. He, who proclaims himself a no-government man, or, who would disarm laws of their sanctions, and justice of its power, and would bring into contempt the administrators of public law; he, who derides religion and its institutions, who scorns education, or, in his zeal for the instruction of the mass, would pull down our higher seminaries of instruction; we may add, he who, in a narrow, selfish spirit is ready, at any opposition to his favorite views of policy or of certain peculiar institutions, to sit down, in a petulant humor, and count the cost of national disunion or dismemberment, is not a patriot! He might make a cosmopolite, and enroll himself under the banner of some "orator of the human race"! but he lacks one or more of the elements of pure, high-toned nationality, and, so far, lacks that which constitutes the character of a good citizen.

It is well for the citizens of the Republic to be reminded of what nourishes this sentiment. We are taught thus,

men make a law of their own passions, impatient of authority, human or divine; what Milton calls the 'Senseless mood that bawls for freedom,' but meaning 'license when they cry liberty.' The doctrine of the Stagyrite is none the worse for being old."

¹ Kossuth, in a speech delivered in New York, in a passage in which he referred to the sources of nationality, thus indicated, substantially, the points which have been suggested in this article, which was written for a different object several years ago :

"It is not language only which makes a nation. Community of interests, community of history, communities of rights and duties, but chiefly community of institutions among a people bound together by its daily intercourse in the towns, the centres of their home commerce and home industry, the very mountain ranges and system of rivers and streams, the soil, the dust of which is mingled with the ashes of those ancestors who bled on the *same* field, for the same interest, — the common inheritance of glory and of woe, the community of laws, tie of institutions, tie of common freedom or common oppression; — all this enters into the definition of a nation."

what are the foundations of national welfare, and what are the great interests, which, as good citizens, we ought to encourage and support. An intelligent, elevated national feeling is essential to the permanency of any political system. Such a spirit is quick to perceive whatever threatens evil, or promises good, to the State. It is jealous of national honor. Whatever tarnishes that, it feels, as its possessor would a stain on private character. It is ready to yield whenever private interest interferes with the public welfare. It takes broad views. It shakes off the trammels which hamper the man of mere party zeal, or the bigot of sectional prejudice. It rebukes unprincipled ambition, and mad lust for place and power. At the ballot-box, in the legislative hall, in official station, its ends and aims are pure and elevated, and the important trusts committed to it fulfilled for the general good.

On the monument erected in honor of Commodore Decatur are inscribed these words: "A man who always maintained the cause of his country, right or wrong." Many imagine, that a true nationality requires this of every patriot. "England against the world," was once pronounced to be a motto suitable for the guidance of every Englishman. It is as good for the Frenchman, and the Russian, and the Austrian. Where were justice among nations, if this becomes national justice? It is much as if an individual should resolve, beforehand, never to acknowledge himself in the wrong. For nations, as for individuals, there is a *right* and a *wrong*. We cannot see how association, or community, makes wrong to become right; or how the vote of a majority can change black into white; and we must think that the nation, like the individual, that contemns justice, will, sooner or later, reap the recompense of injustice. The nationality of which we have spoken, does not, necessarily, imply a love of ourselves, as a people, to the exclusion of due regard for other nations and people. True patriotism does not imply jealousy or contempt towards foreigners. A Chinese or a Japanese patriotism is fit only for semi-barbarians. It is a selfish, sordid passion, unworthy of

civilized man. No country which fosters such a spirit can attain the highest respectability or prosperity. The purest spirit of nationality is entirely compatible with a generous regard for the rights and welfare of other nations ; just as, in the individual, the purest and most devoted love of one's own may co-exist with the most elevated and diffusive spirit of love for the race.

The Christian religion has modified essentially the laws which regulate international intercourse. The selfish, overbearing, all-grasping spirit of conquest and dominion, which in former ages has desolated and oppressed the world, the Gospel utterly condemns. But while it requires us to love our fellow men, it is as far from quenching peculiar love for our own land and institutions, as peculiar love for our kindred.

As was remarked in the beginning of our discussion, true nationality is an instinct of our being. Our Creator designed that we should exercise and cherish it. We add, in conclusion, that there is a manifest tendency to ideas of unity in the human mind for higher ends than will be developed, probably, in the present state of our being. The family is one throughout its generations. The honor or distinction of an ancestor we feel to be a portion of our inheritance. So is it with the nation. That is one. We perceive this sense of oneness in our quick sensibility to national glory or disgrace. Why should a national victory or defeat cause us to exult, or fill us with mortification, when we had no personal share in either ? Why cherish pride in our eminent citizens, or feel humiliation if a fellow countryman, in conspicuous station, has exposed to the world his inefficiency, or want of skill, or character ? Their wisdom or their folly is not our wisdom or folly. Why exult or be humbled ? Because, whether we will or not, we have within us a feeling of unity with all associated with us under the same institutions or laws. All are part of one great whole. It is not a mere fancy, a mere prejudice ; it is ordered so by our Creator ; and, when we urge to the cultivation of national feeling, we but carry out His designs.

All are interested in whatever affects national character and welfare; and this is the important point to which we conceive an enlightened, true-hearted spirit of nationality tends. The honor of the nation is reflected back on ourselves; the shadow of her disgrace falls upon ourselves, likewise. It is, then, a duty to cultivate a spirit of true nationality for the general good; for our own good. Every citizen should cherish the feeling that his interests, as a member of the political system, are identified with the interests of the whole. Still, let him not forget that his individual responsibility is not, cannot be, merged in the general responsibility. If the nation violates justice and equity, a part of the sin lies at our door; if we ourselves trample law and good morals under foot, our country suffers for our folly and our sin.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. TULLOCH'S PRIZE ESSAY.¹

"MR. BURNETT, a merchant in Aberdeen, whose character appears to have been marked by a rare degree of Christian sensibility and benevolence, among other acts of liberality, bequeathed certain sums, to be expended at intervals of forty years, in the shape of two Premiums, inviting to the discussion of the evidences of religious truth, and especially to the consideration and confirmation of the attributes of Divine Wisdom and Goodness." Preface, p. vii.

On a previous occasion, "the first of the Premiums was awarded to the late Principal Brown, of Aberdeen, and the second, to the Rev. John Bird Sumner, Fellow of Eton College, and now Archbishop of Canterbury.

On this occasion, the First Premium of £1,800 has been adjudged to

¹ Theism: the Witness of Reason and Nature to an All-wise and Beneficent Creator. By the Rev. John Tulloch, D. D., Principal and Primarius Professor of Theology, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1855. 12mo. pp. 431.

the Rev. R. A. Thompson, M. A., Lincolnshire; and the second, of £600, to the present writer;—the judges having been Mr. Isaac Taylor, Mr. Henry Rogers, and the Rev. Baden Powell." Preface, p. viii.

This volume gives evidence of independent thought and extensive investigation. It is divided into four Sections; the first treats of the "Principles of Inductive Evidence;" the second, of "Illustrative (Inductive) Evidence;" the third, of "Moral Inductive Evidence;" and the fourth, of "Difficulties regarding the Divine Wisdom and Goodness." Perhaps it would be a valid criticism to say of the second Section, that it is too condensed; the vast amount of material collected in it, fails to make its due impression. The mere intimations which it gives, ought to be expanded in order to exert their needed influence. The chief interest of the volume lies in the first, third, and fourth Sections. To all the statements in these Sections, we are unable to subscribe. To many of them we yield our full assent. As a whole, the Sections are peculiarly interesting, not only in the mental power, and fine moral feeling which they develop, but also in the evidence which they afford of the philosophical spirit cherished by the religious writers of Great Britain. We learn from this volume the theological tendency of such men as John Tulloch, Isaac Taylor, Henry Rogers, and Baden Powell. It is not the tendency which begins to develop itself among certain writers in our own land, to an obscure compound of mediæval scholasticism with modern Hegelianism; but it is a tendency to a system sanctioned by common sense, a sound conscience, and the inspired word. We think that, in some respects, the direction of these writers is not exactly what it should be, but in all respects it merits our careful observation.

The second chapter of Dr. Tulloch's first Section is devoted to the doctrine of causation. He rejects the idea that causation is mere antecedence. He affirms that a cause must be an agent, a *mental* agent, a rational and *free* mental agent. The idea of causation, he affirms, resolves "itself into that of the operation of a rational will or mind in nature," p. 47. A cause has "its primitive type in the Ego, the living root of our being," and is "specially represented in that which constitutes the highest expression of our being, Free Will," p. 43. The chief argument adduced for this statement, is the fact that, so far forth as we have any direct knowledge of causation, of power, it consists in mind, in free will. "Causation, therefore, implies power. What we mean by a cause is something quite different from a mere antecedent, however we may define the conditions of its relation to the consequent. It is peculiarly an AGENT.

"But in order to see this more fully, it will be necessary to consider whence we have the idea of power, which we have seen to constitute the main element of causation. That this idea is not derived from without, that it does not come through any phase of sensational experience, is already clear in the fact admitted on all hands, that we only perceive succession, that we are only conversant, through the senses, with the two terms of a sequence. But if not from without, it must be from within; we must have the idea of power given us in our own mental experience. This we

hold to be the fact; and recent psychological analysis has pretty sufficiently explained the more special origin of this prime intellectual element. It flows from the depths of our self-consciousness; or, more truly speaking, it is nothing else than the ideal projection of our self-consciousness. With the first dawn of mind we apprehend *ourselves* as distinct from the objective phenomena surrounding us; the Ego emerges, face to face, with the non-Ego. And in this springing forth of self, so far back in the mental history as to elude all trace, is primarily given the idea of power.

"What is commonly called the Will, therefore, is, according to this view, the ultimate source or fountain of the notion of causation. We apprehend ourselves as agents, and in this apprehension we have already, in the fullest sense, the idea of cause. Had we not this apprehension, it seems impossible that we could have ever risen above sequence, as the obvious fact given us in outward observation. With this apprehension lying at the very root of our being, and constituting it essentially, it is equally impossible that we can hold by that fact as furnishing' the exhaustive conception of the Universe. According to the radical and imperative character of our mental constitution, we *must* recognize a deeper life than mere sequence, however grand and orderly, in the phenomena of nature; and this deeper life is just what we mean by a cause. Not sequency, therefore, but agency, or, in other words, efficiency, is the attribute commensurate with our notion of causation.

"The question before us then really passes into the old one as to the origin of our knowledge. Let it only be admitted that our knowledge is the product of a spiritual as well as a material factor, and then it is quite beside the question to argue that because cause, according to our interpretation of it, is not given in external nature, the notion of it is not a valid and real portion of human knowledge; on the very contrary, it becomes, in such a case, only an obvious and expected conclusion that we should find more in outward phenomena than they, so to speak, contain. The subjective brings its element of knowledge as well as the objective; and it is not merely what we apprehend by the senses, but what, through the whole mental life awakened in us by the original contact of subject and object, spirit and matter, we intuitively know or believe to be the truth—that we must hold as the truth. The only available argument against this position, save on a basis of pure materialism, would be to dispute the reality of any such primitive mental experience as we have asserted, the fact of that consciousness of agency, which we have assumed as indisputable." pp. 35-37.

Coincidentally with this principle, Dr. Tulloch defines Providence, or the course of nature, to be "nothing else than a continued forth-putting of originally creative energy," p. 92; and says that a law of nature, "instead of explaining the phenomena which *seem* to issue from it, is merely the general condition in which these phenomena express themselves, and apart from which it has no existence. Instead of the law explaining the phenomena, therefore, it might be more truly said that the phenomena explain the

law, just as a sum in arithmetic gives the answer, rather than the answer the sum. The true realities are the separate parts. The law is only the summary expression by which we hold these facts before our mind." p. 76.

The tenth chapter of Dr. Tulloch's second Section, introduces the subject of sensation, and this suggests the topic of Divine Goodness. The phenomena of sensation, it is said, "possess a special interest for the Theist. Their peculiar significance consists, not in the fact that in them also we see wisdom, but that in them, for the first time, we perceive goodness. In this new reality of creation we have a new testimony to the Creator. With the dawn of sense, we have the kindling of the light of love around the great First Cause. We behold no longer a merely exquisite mechanism, nor even the elaborately beautiful action of unconscious life, but the yet higher and richer workings of sentient being. In these workings there emerges for the first time the fact of enjoyment, and this fact in nature it is which alone enables us inductively to find goodness in God. Apart from this fact, Paley has said, with his wonted brief simplicity, 'the attribute has no object, the term has no meaning.' It is only the presence of a sentient subject in organism, which enables us to pronounce that the tendency of its design is beneficial. It is only its relation to consciousness which makes anything good or evil," p. 221. According to Dr. Tulloch, then, the capability of happiness is the first object which calls into our view an exercise of the divine goodness. As a moral attribute, Dr. Tulloch regards this divine goodness as completing itself in the divine righteousness. In a subsequent part of the volume, while considering the phenomena of *conscience*, he says: "But the divine goodness, to which conscience testifies, is at the same time divine Righteousness. This is a further very significant and wholly peculiar element of theistic evidence disclosed in conscience. The Supreme Good interprets itself here as the Supreme Right. This idea of Right is one which, hitherto, we could not possibly have encountered; for it only finds an application in the region of free moral life, where it emerges correlatively with duty. It is the idea in which alone duty finds its complement, and so becomes the sacred bond which holds our moral being in harmony. The element or attribute of righteousness is one, therefore, which a comprehensive natural theology must ever recognize in the Divine Being. The broad and earnest mind of Dr. Chalmers did, perhaps, especial service in making this clear and prominent. And it has since become more and more a matter of conviction, that Theism is not only bound to take up this element, but that it furnishes, to some extent, the key to the profound mysteries which lie around the special attribute of divine goodness. For in order to perceive a benevolent meaning in much that would otherwise seem opposed to benevolence, we have only to see that goodness completes itself in righteousness, and can never validly come short of it. The conception of goodness becomes thus not only exalted, but discriminated. Whereas, in the lower regions of sentient and intellectual life, the former attribute is apparent merely as a disposition to bestow happiness; here, in

the light of the further conception into which it rises, it appears before us as something which may, in the highest sense, assert itself, not certainly irrespective of happiness, yet apart from its immediate bestowal—yea, even in the bestowal of partial and temporary unhappiness. For, as the good is at the same time ever the right, as love only sustains itself in holiness, so it becomes conceivable that, where the right has been invaded, and the holy desecrated, goodness may express itself more distinctively in suffering or punishment," pp. 316,—318.

In a still subsequent chapter, while considering the phenomena of sin, our author asserts: "In the law of conscience we found that good interprets itself as the right. The moral good which commands us in conscience is righteousness. The one idea only sustains itself in the other, and finds its complement in it. The attribute of Divine goodness becomes, accordingly, in relation to moral life, also Divine righteousness. The two conceptions are essentially inseparable. If we regard sin, then, in this higher theistic light, we will at once see that suffering is its necessary mark of punishment. Asserting itself in opposition to the law of conscience, it thereby directly opposes itself to the righteous will of God, of which that law is the expression, and so provokes His punishment. Existing only as a rebellious infraction of Divine will, it necessarily calls forth the Divine wrath. In its very character, wherever it occurs in the universe of God, sin accordingly is, and must be, marked by His displeasure. It must bear the brand of suffering. It must have its doom written on it. And in this point of view, so far is suffering from constituting a valid objection to the Divine goodness, that it is truly a manifestation of that goodness. Rightly viewed, the Divine punishment of sin is merely another side of the Divine goodness. For inasmuch as goodness only completes itself in righteousness, were sin or unrighteousness not visited with punitive suffering, the Divine goodness could not be the reality which conscience demands. It might remain a vague and beautiful dream of the imagination; but a goodness which in any respect came short of righteousness would, in the very nature of the case, prove a vanishing shadow—a mere fiction, on which the heart could never rest. Let the one idea be lost sight of, and the other will altogether fail to legitimize itself, or keep its ground. A goodness which does not rest on justice, and embrace it, would, in the highest meaning of the attribute, be no goodness—our own moral conscience being judge—and would leave, therefore, no real foundation for that happiness in whose behalf it is sometimes emptied of this essential element. In all this view, therefore, the Divine goodness is seen not only to be consistent with, but to be expressly called forth in, human suffering as the punishment of sin," pp. 383, 384. The reader will notice the partial coincidence between these views of Dr. Tulloch, and the course of thought pursued in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. x. pp. 705–738.

No Treatise on Natural Theology can be complete, which does not grapple with the problem of the existence of sin. Dr. Tulloch expressly rejects the dogma, that sin is necessary on the part of the sinner. "For sin being necessary, it is no longer morally blamable. If it spring out of the essential

limitations of our being, it is no longer a fault, but only a misfortune," p. 393. Dr. Tulloch also teaches, that "in the very fact of trial, there lies the possibility of failure—of a sinking below the good, as well as a rising to higher measures of it. In the simple fact of moral action, there lies the contingency of wrong action, and of all that moral imperfection that actually exists in the world," p. 369. "In the mere fact of moral development, evil is contingent, and consistently with the nature of that development, could not have been absolutely excluded," p. 376. The position that Omnipotence cannot prevent sin, we regard as untenable, and unnecessary for the proof of the doctrines which our author wishes to establish. He adds: "The worst of the social evils from which man has suffered in the past, or still suffers, are not in any sense to be regarded as a part of the Divine constitution of the world, but really infringements thereof, taking their rise in the invasion of that constitution by man's impious selfishness. The misrule, and the servile and unhappy bondage of mind and body, of which so many are the victims, are felt to arise, not from the Divine appointment, but from the direct violation and contempt of it," pp. 373, 374.

In agreement with these assertions, several of which, we think, ought to have been modified, Dr. Tulloch regards the existence of sin as an inexplicable mystery. "Such," he says, "being the true character of sin, it must be obvious in its very definition, that we cannot bring it into inductive relation with the course of our evidence; or, in other words, that we cannot find any argumentative solution of it. For how can we intelligibly relate that to God, whose very essence consists in opposition to Him? How can we explain that which in itself, in its very conception, presents the uttermost contradiction? In order that anything may be capable of explanation, it must exhibit some ground of reason; but here is all unreason. That any creature should revolt against its Creator, can only present itself as the most awful and unfathomable folly. Sin, therefore, baffles all explanation. Every attempt that has been made to throw any light upon it, or to resolve it inductively, has ended, in the very nature of the case, in denying it. All that we can say or know is, that the possibility of sin lies in the fact of human freedom. Man being made free to choose good or evil, the choice of the latter was possible—but further all is darkness; and if we insist for a moment in carrying our logical explanations up into this region, we only plunge into deeper and more hopeless darkness.

"But in this very confession of the utter unintelligibility of sin, is not our argument relieved from its difficulty? We cannot give any theistic explanation of it. But why? Because in its very essence, it is anti-theistic. It is in God's creation, but it is there as a blot upon it—in direct violation of the Divine order which otherwise prevails. In its nature it wholly separates itself from God, and is, therefore, whatever we may make of it, not entitled to reflect injuriously on the Divine character," pp. 386, 387. "All that we can know is, that the possibility of sin lies in the fact of personality; in other words, in the fact of human freedom," p. 395.

These views with regard to the existence of sin, prepare us to expect a

very different theory with regard to the nature of human responsibility from that which prevails among many theologians of Scotland and of America. "It is no doubt true," he says, "that it is only through special Divine agency that the Gospel everywhere makes progress, and that it is possible for us to conceive such a forth-putting of this agency as might speedily bring the whole world under its sway; yet it is no less, and in the very nature of the case, true, that this agency everywhere only works in coöperation with the free agency of man. It is a persuasive power, eliciting and strengthening man's spirit, but in no case forcibly overbearing it even for its most holy purposes. 'The whole course of history, as well as the express teaching of revelation, prove that God has ever dealt with man, not by the strength of an irresistible power crushing all that is contrary to it, but by the moral strength of those Divine influences by which He seeks to draw every inferior will into true harmony with His own perfect will. And no doubt this is so, because, consistently with the blessed perfection of God, it could not be otherwise; because He is most glorified in being served by a world of created beings, who are indued with the mysterious power of willing good or evil, and who, through His grace and goodness, have been each one brought into true harmony with Him.' It is not difficult to see, indeed, that the idea of a forcible and compulsory advance of the Gospel is not for a moment tenable even as a supposition. For in the very statement of this idea there is already implied the annihilation of the moral quality in man, which alone constitutes the Gospel so great a blessing to him, or even makes him possibly a subject of it. Unless man were truly possessed of a will, the Gospel would lose all meaning, as man would lose all distinction from the objects of nature around him. In such a case, it has been well said, 'There could be really no true living being in the world except God. For to have a will is in truth to live. What are all things without this but mere machines, which must do the order of the one Will which acts through them? What are they but mere shadowy figures of being cast forth from the one Being? If we do not believe that there are separate wills, with this awful power of resisting the one Will, we must either make the perfectly good God the direct cause of evil, or we must admit a second first cause from whom that evil springs.'

"Here, therefore, we come back to the final mystery of creation, the fact of human freedom. In this fact is contained at once man's glory and the possibility of his fearful revolt and shame. It is this alone which at once makes him a subject of Divine grace, and enables him to oppose that grace. Forcibly to destroy the capability of opposition, would be to destroy the very character of his being, and to leave him incapable of good any more than of evil. It is the awful peril of freedom, that while man may rise into union with God, and become a partaker of the Divine nature, he may no less harden himself against God, and fall away from Him into an ever deeper revolt and abandonment of selfishness," pp 418-421. Again he says: Most necessitarians "mean not only to assert that man's rational activity displays itself under the same law of cause and effect as the course of na-

ture does, but that there is really nothing more in it than this display. Volition goes forth under motive; motive, again, is dependent on organization, or at least on some external cause; and this is all. The whole question plainly lies in this higher region. What constitutes motive? What is the spring of the order which is universally admitted to obtain among the facts of man's spiritual being, no less than among all other facts? Is that spring in nature, and bound to its immutable sequences? or is it deep in the central being of the man himself, and essentially separated from nature? The materialistic necessitarian holds as his cardinal principle the former of these views. He knows nothing beyond the mere series of phenomena which collectively he may call Mind. Any spiritual unit or soul beneath the multiplicity, and therein expressing itself, while yet essentially distinguished from it, has no place in his system; and quite consistently so. The theological necessitarian of course shrinks from this conclusion, but his language has not unfrequently been such as to bear it out. Carrying up with an iron hand the phenomenal law of cause and effect into the region of spiritual life, he may have seemed to gain a temporary triumph over an adversary; but he has done so too often at the risk of total peril to his faith, and to the very ground and condition of all religion," pp. 296, 297.

We are interested in some of the verbal discriminations which Dr. Tulloch makes throughout the present volume. Thus he says: "The continuation of *alarm*, not merely the first movement or flutter of the soul, but the prolonged emphasis of the emotion, becomes *fear*, *apprehension*, inciting to escape from danger." "*Terror*, which sometimes stands for the generic emotion, seems certainly more correctly regarded as its highest excess, betokening the comparative feebleness of the subject of it. The danger is so imminent and threatening that the mere guardian impulse loses itself in that species of convulsive agitation which we specially denominate *terror*. *Panic*, again, is contagious alarm. The simple emotion has a tendency to propagate itself from heart to heart, and as it propagates, it kindles into intenser forms, till it becomes that general and helpless movement of fear which we call *panic*," p. 263.

Is Dr. Tulloch correct, however, when he says, on page 266, that "*Resentment* is the deepened and prolonged form of *anger*." Is not the reverse more exactly the truth? Can "*indignation*, as an individual emotion," be defined to be "*anger* restraining itself from a sense of the unworthiness of the object exciting it," "a kind of magnanimous anger," p. 266. Or is it rather a modification of resentment? See Bishop Butler's Sermons, particularly the eighth and ninth.

We cannot say that we coincide with Dr. Tulloch in his views of *Pride*, *Vanity*, *Humility*, and *Modesty*. He says: "Of this class of emotions, *pride* is one of the most distinguishing. In its most general form, it seems to be simply self taking the measure of its own claims alongside those of others. It always implies this element of comparison. When the comparison is made with fairness, we recognize the propriety of the feeling, as in the

common expression, a proper pride. Where, again, the comparison is grossly mistaken and over-estimated by self in its own favor, the feeling assumes that excessive form, in which it becomes so odious to others, and often such a source of misery to its subject. Vanity seems again to be the simple pampering of self-complacency, self dwelling on its own image till it can scarcely find interest or beauty in any other.

"Directly converse to such emotions are those of humility and modesty. The former may be defined to be the simple opposite of pride, the retirement of self from the assertion even of rightful claims which it might prefer before others. It, too, seems always to involve an element of comparison; and, in a similar manner to pride, it may so greatly and obviously mistake the comparison as to become disagreeably excessive. The only case in which it can never do so, is in reference to the Supreme Being, before whom the most extreme retirement of self is not only appropriate, but demanded. And hence we recognize the primary importance of this emotion in religion. Modesty is also, may we not say, a species of self-denial, self-shrinking from the acknowledgment of claims of which it is yet dimly conscious. It is self-repressive, peculiarly; and yet self does not, as in humility, retire out of sight. It is this curious balance of emotion, in which self is negated, and yet, with a vaguely conscious justice, stands forward (the internal conflict betraying itself in the suffusion of the face with blushes), which gives to modesty that special charm which all recognize in it," pp. 272, 273. We think that there is no justifiable pride, for pride is always an indulged excess of self-esteem; that a man may be "too proud to be vain," for vanity always implies an undue choice to secure the good opinion of others; that the virtue of humility is never at variance with a *rightful* esteem of our constitution or character, but is always consistent with all truth; and that modesty never conflicts with the acknowledgment of all the gifts with which God has endued us. Our constitution is really so insignificant, and our character is really so base, that the utmost humility and modesty are exercised in feeling toward ourselves precisely as we *ought* to feel. It is of the highest importance to remember, that all true humility, and all true modesty, are in accordance with *justice*. We *deserve* to be humble; we must be grossly unfaithful to ourselves, if we are not modest.

II. BRODIE'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRIES.¹

"There runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings," says Bishop Berkley. "In this chain, one link drags another; the meanest things are connected with the highest. The calamity, therefore, is neither strange nor much to be complained of, if a low, sensual reader shall, from

¹ Psychological Inquiries: In a Series of Essays intended to illustrate the Mutual Relations of the Physical Organization and the Mental Faculties. By Benjamin Brodie, Bart. D. C. L., V. P. R. S., Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, etc. Second edition. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. 1855. pp. 275. 18mo.

mere love of the animal life, find himself drawn in, surprised, and betrayed into, some curiosity concerning the intellectual." The volume of Dr. Brodie gives many beautiful illustrations of the subserviency of psychological science to the science of mind and morals. It is written in the form of dialogues, and in a chaste, easy, flowing style. It contains many just and wholesome views of psychological and ethical laws. We can give our readers no better idea of the volume, than will be suggested by the following references to some of its more important instructions.

Sir Benjamin treats, in a very judicious manner, the theory of Moral or Instinctive Insanity, "a state of mind in which they say that there are no illusions, nor any affection of the intellect; but in which there is simply a perversion of the moral sentiments; the individual laboring under an impulse to perform certain extravagant and outrageous acts, injurious to himself or others, such impulse being irresistible; so that he is to be held as being no more responsible for his conduct than an ordinary lunatic." "It seems to me," says our author, "that juries have not unfrequently been misled by the refinements of medical witnesses, who, having adopted the theory of a purely moral insanity, have applied that term to cases to which the term *insanity* ought not to be applied at all. It is true, that the difference in the character of individuals may frequently be traced to difference in their organizations, and to different conditions as to bodily health; and that therefore one person has more, and another has less, difficulty in controlling his temper and regulating his conduct. But we have, all, our duties to perform; and one of the most important of these is, that we should strive against whatever evil tendency there may be in us, arising out of our physical constitution. Even if we admit (which I do not admit, in reality) that the impulse which led Oxford [whom the jury acquitted, for his attempt to take the life of the Queen, on the ground of moral insanity] to the commission of his crime, was, at the time irresistible; still the question remains, whether, when the notion of it first haunted him, he might not have kept it under his control, and thus prevented himself from passing into that state of mind which was beyond his control, afterwards. If I have been rightly informed, Oxford was, himself, of this opinion; as he said, when another attempt had been made to take the life of the Queen, that 'if he himself had been hanged, this would not have happened.' We have been told of a very eminent person, who had acquired the habit of touching every post that he met with in his walks, so that at last it seemed to be a part of his nature to do so, and that if he found that he had inadvertently passed by a post without touching it, he would actually retrace his steps for the purpose. I knew a gentleman who was accustomed to mutter certain words to himself (and they were always the same words), even in the midst of company. He died at the age of ninety, and I believe that he had muttered these words for fifty or sixty years. These were foolish habits; but they might have been mischievous. To correct them, at last, would have been a very arduous undertaking. But might not this have been easily done, at the beginning? And if so, if, instead of touching posts, or uttering unmeaning words, these indi-

viduals had been addicted to stealing or stabbing, ought they to have been considered as absolved from all responsibility?" pp. 98—100.

On pages 122—133, are many interesting observations on the phenomena of death. It seems to be the opinion of Dr. Brodie, stated perhaps with too little qualification, that men, in their last hours, have ordinarily more of mental activity, and less of either physical or spiritual pain, than we are accustomed to suppose. With the exception of certain cases, as those of *tetanus*, *delirium tremens*, *hydrophobia*, and some others, the general rule is said (by Ergates, in the dialogue) to be, that "the mere act of dying is seldom, in any sense of the word, a very painful process." "Both mental and bodily suffering terminate long before the scene is finally closed. Then as to the actual fear of death: it seems to me that the Author of our existence, for the most part, gives it to us when it is intended that we should live, and takes it away when it is intended that we should die. Those who have been long tormented by bodily pain, are generally as anxious to die as they ever were to live." "I have, myself, never known but two instances in which, in the very act of dying, there were manifest indications of the fear of death."

On the phenomena of dreams, many valuable remarks are found on pp. 144—156. Lord Brougham is inclined to the opinion that "we never dream except in the state of transition from being asleep to being awake. But I own that this seems to me to be a mistake. First, there is no sufficient proof of its being so; and secondly, we have a proof of the contrary, in the fact that nothing is more common than for persons to moan, and even talk in their sleep, without awaking from it. Even in the case of a dog who is sleeping on the rug before the fire, if you watch him, you can scarcely doubt that he is sometimes dreaming, though he still remains asleep. I should, myself, be more inclined to doubt, whether we ever sleep without some degree of dreaming. At any rate, not to dream seems to be not the rule but the exception to the rule, for it rarely happens that we awake without being sensible of some time having elapsed since we fell asleep; which is, in itself, a proof that the mind has not been wholly unoccupied. That, in such cases, we have no distinct recollection of our dreams, proves nothing. Referring, again, to the instance of persons who talk in their sleep, we often find that they have not the smallest recollection of their having dreamed afterwards."

We often read of surprising discoveries made in a state of sleep. "I have heard," says Crites, in the dialogue before us, "of mathematicians who have solved problems, and of others who have composed poetry in their sleep. An acquaintance of mine, a solicitor, was perplexed as to the legal management of a case which concerned one of his clients. In a dream he imagined a method of proceeding which had not occurred to him when he was awake, and which he afterwards adopted with success." To this, it is very judiciously replied: "Further, I suspect that, in many of the stories of wonderful discoveries made in dreams, there is much of either mistake or exaggeration; and that, if they could have been written down at the time, they would be found to be worth little or nothing. Knowing how imagina-

tive a person Coleridge at all times was, I may, I hope, be excused for saying that it is more easy to believe that he imagined himself to have composed his poem of *Kuhla Khan* in his sleep, than that he did so in reality. I may here refer to the experience of a distinguished physiologist on this subject. "Sometimes," says Müller, "we reason more or less accurately in our dreams. We reflect on problems, and rejoice in their solution. But, on awaking from such dreams, the seeming reasoning is found to be no reasoning at all; and the solution, over which we had rejoiced, to be mere nonsense. Sometimes we dream that another proposes an enigma, that we cannot solve, and that others are equally incapable of doing so, but that the person who proposed it, himself gives the explanation. We are astonished at the solution, which we had so long endeavored to find. If we do not immediately awake, and afterwards reflect on this proposition of an enigma in our dream, and on its apparent solution, we think it wonderful; but if we awake immediately after the dream, and are able to compare the answer with the question, we find that it was mere nonsense. I have, at least several times, observed this in my own case."

Dr. Brodie's treatment of phrenology is scientific and decisive. It is found on pp. 226—249. Several interesting facts are here detailed. When Dr. Gall visited Sir Francis Chantrey's studio, "he pronounced the head of Sir Walter Scott (who had not the smallest turn for mathematics) to be that of a great mathematician; that of Troughton, the mathematical instrument maker, to be the head of a poet." "If ever there was a race of thoroughly remorseless murderers in the world, such were the Thugs of India. Generation after generation, they were born and bred to murders. They looked to murder as the source not only of profit, but of honor. Dr. Spry sent the skulls of seven of these demons, who had been hanged at Sauger, to some phrenological friends in Scotland. To their surprise, destructiveness was not a predominant organ in any one of them. But the anomaly was soon explained: the Thugs, it was said, had no abstract love of murder, but murdered for the sake of robbery." "Some very stupid persons, within my own knowledge, have had very large heads. On the other hand, if we may trust to the authority of the bust of Newton, in the apartment of the Royal Society, the head of that mighty genius was below the average size; and Moore describes the head of Byron as having been unusually small, with a narrow forehead; the fact being confirmed by an anecdote, related by colonel Napier, of a party of fourteen persons having tried to put on his hat, and having found that it was too small to fit any one of them." "A large development of the organ of destructiveness, in the head of Hare the murderer, explained how it was that he was led to murder sixteen human beings, that he might sell their bodies. But, in the head of another person, who never committed a murder, it is sufficient to find that it exists in combination with a disposition to satire, or to deface mile-stones; and in the beaver and squirrel, it explains how it is that these animals are impelled to cut and tear in pieces the bark, leaves, and branches of trees, for the innocent purpose of constructing their cabins and nests. So the large size of

the organ of acquisitiveness, not only leads one person to be a thief and another to hoard, but it also explains the habits of the spendthrift (who does not hoard at all); and it impels storks and swallows to return, after their emigrations, to establish themselves in the same locality."

We have rarely seen a more satisfactory reply to the phrenological theories, than is contained in the following paragraphs :

"There are two simple anatomical facts, which the founders of this [phrenological] system have overlooked, or with which they were probably unacquainted, and which of themselves afford a sufficient contradiction of it: First, They refer the mere animal propensities chiefly to the posterior lobes, and the intellectual faculties to the anterior lobes of the cerebrum. But the fact is, that the posterior lobes exist only in the human brain, and in that of some of the tribes of monkeys, and are absolutely wanting in quadrupeds. Of this, there is no more doubt than there is of any other of the best-established facts in anatomy; so that, if phrenology be true, the most marked distinction between man on the one hand, and a cat or a horse or a sheep on the other, ought to be, that the former has the animal propensities developed to their fullest extent, and that these are deficient in the latter. Secondly, Birds have various propensities and faculties in common with us; and, in the writings of phrenologists, many of their illustrations are derived from this class of vertebral animals. But the structure of the bird's brain is essentially different, not only from that of the human brain, but from that of the brain of the mammalia generally." "In the mammalia, the name of *corpus striatum* has been given to each of two organs, of a small size compared with that of the entire brain, distinguished by a peculiar disposition of the gray, and the fibrous or medullary substance, of which they are composed, and placed under the entire mass of the hemispheres of the cerebrum. In the bird's brain, what appears, to a superficial observer, to correspond to these hemispheres, is found, on a more minute examination, to be apparently the *corpora striata* developed to an enormous size; that which really corresponds to the cerebral hemispheres, being merely a thin layer expanded over their upper surface, and presenting no appearance of convolutions. It is plain, then, that there can be no phrenological organs in the bird's brain, corresponding to those which are said to exist in the human brain, or in that of other mammalia. Yet birds are as pugnacious and destructive, as much attached to the localities in which they reside, and as careful of their offspring, as any individual among us; and I suppose that no one will deny, that if there be any special organs of tune or of imitation in man, such organs ought not to be wanting in the bullfinch and parrot."

The preceding quotations indicate the popular style in which the work of Dr. Brodie is written. The reader will not expect to find, in such a volume, those recondite discussions which are the staple of Sir William Hamilton's Essays. Sound sense, however, and healthy sentiment, expressed in plain language, reward the perusal of almost every page in the volume.

III. LIPPINCOTT'S PRONOUNCING GAZETTEER OF THE WORLD.

THIS is a volume of over two thousand pages, containing notices of over one hundred thousand places, in every portion of the globe. After a somewhat careful examination of this work, we are prepared to give it the preference over all others of the kind, with which we are acquainted. It bears marks of thorough editing and compilation upon every page. The editors, Messrs. Thomas and Baldwin, of Philadelphia, have been assisted by other gentlemen specially competent for the task, and particularly by persons connected with the bureaus at Washington. Among the features of the work we notice the following:

1. Special attention has been given to orthography and orthoëpy. The pronunciation of the foreign name is given as spoken by the native, and also as Anglicized by the best authorities. Much labor has evidently been expended upon this part of the subject, especially with regard to European and Asiatic names.

2. The descriptions are remarkable for the comprehensiveness and density of their detail. As examples we would refer to the immense amount of statistical matter embodied in the eighteen pages devoted to "The United States;" in the nine pages devoted to the "British Empire," together with three additional pages upon "England;" in the eight pages devoted to "France," and the seven allotted to "London."

3. Particular attention has been paid to our own country. Full accounts are given of each State, making this Gazetteer a valuable reference book for all kinds of information pertaining to the past growth of the United States.

4. The work is remarkable for the distinctness of the type, and the general elegance and nicety with which the publishers have performed their task.

IV. BAUMGARTEN'S HISTORY OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH.¹

THIS is an expansion of the Acts of the Apostles, for the purpose of obtaining a connected account of the apostolic church, from the only reliable document now in existence relating to it. The author, a Doctor of Philosophy and Theology in the University of Rostock, has performed his work with good judgment and fidelity. His idea of inspiration is higher than is common in his own country, and his general attitude towards the supernaturalism of the early church more firm and decided than that of many investigators in this branch of church history. The work maintains a constant reference to the hypotheses, and conjectural criticism, of the Tübingen school, and is very satisfactory in its refutations of them. It will

¹ The History of the Apostolic Church by M. Baumgarten. Clark's Foreign Theological Library. 3 Volumes.

form an excellent accompaniment to the work of Neander upon the same subject, making up for some deficiencies in it, and at the same time finding its own completion in the "Planting and Training" of this author. The translation is by Morrison, one of the best of the English translators from German, and the publication is in the well-known excellent style of the Edinburgh printers.

V. ARCHBISHOP WHATELY ON A FUTURE STATE, AND ON GOOD AND EVIL ANGELS.¹

EVERYTHING from the pen of Archbishop Whately is marked by good sense, profound learning, and a very remarkable degree of frankness. He never allows his imagination to lead him astray; his learning is too thorough ever to degenerate into pedantry; and he has too much of independence ever to suppress or disguise an opinion which he really entertains. His style admirably corresponds to his character. It is direct, simple, and transparently clear; he says just what he means, no more, and no less; and it must be a very perverse reader who can ever find himself in the least doubt as to the meaning. With the exception of Archdeacon Paley, we know not the dignitary of the English church who equals him in these very desirable but exceedingly rare qualities, in combination with a real elevation of style. If we may believe the declaration of the archbishop himself, his simplest sentences have cost him the greatest amount of severe labor. Amid all the flimsy verbosity of the religious press, it is really refreshing to find such volumes as these; and after being overwearied with the voluminous emptiness of Dr. Cumming, we are again reconciled to pious reading by the condensed paragraphs of Dr. Whately.

Not the least excellence of these lectures is found in the exceedingly neat and appropriate rendering of several texts of the New Testament, which are but imperfectly, or at least clumsily, translated in our authorized version. For example: "thou sowest not that body that shall be, but *a mere seed*; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain." How much neater, and truer to the original, than the *bare grain* of our English Testament! Again: "we now see *by means of a mirror, darkly*; but then, face to face." How much more exact and appropriate, than the *through a glass darkly* of our common translation! Glass that could be *seen through*, was, in the apostles' time, wholly unknown, and the mirrors were made of polished metal.

Dr. Whately has been suspected of holding the doctrine of universal

¹ A View of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State, by Richard Whately, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blackiston. 1855. 12mo. pp. 300.

A View of the Scripture Revelations concerning Good and Evil Angels, by Richard Whately, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blackiston. 1856. 12mo. pp. 174.

restoration, somewhat after the manner of Professor Maurice. In his lecture on Rewards and Punishments, he distinctly disavows every such idea, and most explicitly affirms that the Scriptures cannot, by any fair criticism, be made to countenance such a doctrine. Still he shows himself not disinclined to believe in the final annihilation of the wicked; but he very frankly admits that the Scriptures do not directly teach the doctrine, and goes on to give very good reasons why they should not, even if it were true. He treats, in precisely the same way, the idea of the sleep of the soul between death and the resurrection. His notions of the millennium are strongly *rationalistic*, just like himself. All that he affirms positively is very true, but a great deal more than that is true; and all his exegetical skill, and mastery of logic, and extensive erudition, cannot force the twentieth and twenty-first chapters of Revelation, and other parallel prophecies, into the exceedingly narrow enclosures which he has provided for them. Still he has argued that side of the question with more ability than any other recent writer; and in most that he says against the common theories of the *pre-millennial judgment, and an earthly kingdom of Jerusalem*, we entirely sympathize.

His arguments in proof of the existence and agency of fallen spirits, and of the reality of the demoniacal possessions of the New Testament, are both logically and philologically unanswerable; and there is no way of eluding their force but by affirming (as all consistent disbelievers do) that the Bible, on these subjects, teaches what is not true.

In our view, Archbishop Whately is too rationalistic, and, on many points, does not believe enough; and where he *guesses*, we think he sometimes *guesses wrong*; but what he does positively believe, and distinctly affirm, is, for the most part, the very finest gold of scriptural truth.

One of the most striking examples of the tendency of Dr. Whately's mind to disbelief, is the pertinacity with which he maintains, after the example of Warburton, that the doctrine of a future life is nowhere revealed in the Old Testament.

These volumes are handsomely printed, and appear in a very neat and readable style, for which the publishers are entitled to all commendation.

VI. PROF. SCHAFF ON THE UNITED STATES.¹

THE deliberate judgments of so shrewd an observer, and of a man so truly learned and pious, as Dr. Schaff, who has lived with us long enough to become well acquainted with our character and institutions, and likes us well enough to conclude to spend his life among us, are well worthy of our seri-

¹ America. A Sketch of the Political, Social, and Religious Character of the United States of North America, in two Lectures delivered at Berlin, with a Report read before the German Church Diet at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, Sept. 1854, by Dr. Philip Schaff. Translated from the German. New York: C. Scribner. 1855. 12mo. pp. 291.

ous attention. He is independent and fearless, and speaks his mind without reserve, as he ought. He has told us many truths, some agreeable, and some not so, and the last none the less truths, because they are unpalatable. We are much obliged to him for both kinds of truth. We cannot subscribe to all his judgments as entirely correct, but we can and do commend his book to an attentive and candid perusal.

VII. GIESELER'S CHURCH HISTORY, LAST VOLUME.¹

THIS volume, published since the author's death, carries on his Church History, from the year 1814 to 1850. Though it has the disadvantages of a posthumous publication, it is altogether the liveliest, and so far as this goes, the most interesting, volume of the series. Its predecessors were mostly notes with very little text, but this is all text and no notes. The ecclesiastical affairs of the thirty-five years over which the volume extends, so far as Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, are concerned, are set forth in a manner exceedingly entertaining and instructive. We know of no other volume from which, on these matters, so much may be learned. The statements in regard to other countries are not so satisfactory; the notices of our own nation, are mere caricatures, superficial, unreliable, and of very little value.

VIII. WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY.²

DR. WORCESTER is well known as a faithful and persevering student of the English language. He has attended, with great care, to the orthography and pronunciation of English words. It is a rare merit of his dictionaries that, while they encourage a healthy conservatism in the methods of writing and pronouncing the language, they also foster a spirit of progress. Their aim is to favor innovation, as far and as fast as it introduces acknowledged improvement. It is another excellence of Dr. Worcester's dictionaries, that they present to us, in a very succinct form, the opinions of various orthoepists with regard to the pronunciation of doubtful words. The student is aided in ascertaining the best and the true usage, by learning the opinions of our best lexicographers. Each of these lexicographers has ex-

¹ Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte von Dr. J. C. L. Gieseler, fünfter Band, aus seinem Nachlasse herausgegeben von Dr. H. R. Redepenning. Bonn, bei Adolph Marcus, 1855. 8vo. pp. 408 and lvi.

² A Pronouncing, Explanatory, and Synonymous Dictionary of the English Language, with: I. Pronunciation of Greek and Latin Proper Names. II. Pronunciation of Scripture Proper Names. III. Common Christian Names, with their significations. IV. Pronunciation of Modern Geographical Names. V. Abbreviations used in Writing and Printing. VI. Phrases and Quotations in Latin, French, Italian, and Spanish. VII. The Principal Deities and Heroes in Greek and Roman Fabulous History. By Joseph E. Worcester, LL. D. Boston Hickling, Swan, and Brown, 1855.

amined the pronunciation adopted by particular circles at particular times, and thus each contributes to us some data, from which we may form our own judgment. We are, also, much pleased with the method which Worcester has adopted, of noting the degree of authority which doubtful words possess. By the signs which he uses, for denoting what words have not yet been "Anglicised," what are "obsolete," what are "rarely used," what have been added by Dr. Worcester himself, etc., the student is aided in the formation of a pure style.

The present Dictionary is substantially an enlargement of the Comprehensive Dictionary, which was first published in 1830, revised and enlarged in 1847, still further improved in 1849. It is a valuable work for ready and easy reference. In an octavo form, of only five hundred and sixty-five pages, it will be taken up by students who leave a ponderous quarto unused. Of course it cannot supersede our larger Dictionaries, but it is a very convenient introduction to them.

We have been pleased to notice, in the present Dictionary, a statement of the distinctions between words ordinarily regarded as synonymous. Some of these distinctions are finely drawn. The mere notice of them has a good influence. This feature of the Dictionary will introduce, we trust, a marked improvement in the lexicography of our language. When we compare the lexicons now in use, with the best which were accessible fifty years ago, we are surprised as well as gratified in noticing the progress which has been made in English philology; and we cheerfully acknowledge our obligation to Drs. Webster and Worcester, of our own land, to Mr. Smart and others of the mother country.

IX. WORKS ON DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND PREDESTINATION.¹

THE first of these works whose titles are given in the foot-note, is a theoretico-practical treatise on the Sovereignty of God. It fails just where such a treatise ought not to fail, in its definitions of terms. In fact, very few definitions are given, and these few are indefinite and obscure. It abounds with Biblical quotations, but the texts cited are not clearly explained. An excellent religious spirit pervades the volume; but where the thoughts are in a chaotic state, and are but feebly illuminated, the influence of a devotional temper is sadly impaired. We think that the author of the volume should have chosen a different subject for his meditations, or

¹ The Sovereignty of God, as Revealed and Recorded in the Scriptures of God the Holy Ghost. By Rev. F. Silver. London: Clarke, Beeton and Co., 148 Fleet Street. 1853.

The Doctrine of Scriptural Predestination, briefly stated and considered, in its tendency to promote Unity, and in contrast with the Theories which have been substituted for it. With some remarks on the Baptismal question. By Robert Knight, Perpetual Curate of Warton. London: Samuel Bagster and Sons; Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. Oxford: J. H. Palmer.

else should have labored more earnestly in defining the theme on which he has ventured to expatiate.

The second of these treatises is altogether more learned than the first, and exhibits a commendable religious spirit. It has faults, however. It contains a Paraphrase of the Epistle to the Ephesians; and from this Epistle deduces what it denominates the Doctrine of Scriptural Predestination. This doctrine the author supposes to be intermediate between what he terms the Augustinian, Edwardean, feto-predestinarian, supra-lapsarian scheme, on the one hand, and the Pelagian, Arminian precisional scheme, on the other. "It denies the existence of any decree terminated directly in individuals, either from eternity, or at any period of their existence in the present life. It maintains that the only direct decree is one terminated in Christ, the Son of God, and to the means of salvation as hidden in him" (p. 18). The work proceeds on a radical misunderstanding of the Edwardean theory, and on a hazy view of the theory which the author himself would advocate.

Both these works are here noticed as useful exemplifications of the fact, that the great principles involved in the doctrines of Divine Sovereignty and Predestination will always arouse the curiosity of men. They are themes of popular interest. Mr. Knight asserts, that "the Predestinarian controversy has itself been, for some time, almost abandoned; but it is not exaggerating its importance to assert that it underlies, as a foundation, the most important controversies within the church" (p. vi, Preface). This remark contains much truth. The author immediately adds, that "the philosophical necessity with which it [Predestination] has been linked, by Edwards, lies at the bottom of much of the atheism and infidelity which prevail without" [the church]. This remark suggests another reason why these works are here noticed. They both furnish evidence that their authors have never analytically studied the doctrines of which they treat, and there is always danger of producing a false impression by discussing such themes without the sharpest examination of them. The themes *will* be considered; they are liable to be misunderstood; the misunderstanding of them is fraught with mischief; therefore they should be examined, by the men who write or preach upon them, with a rigidly logical, as well as an humble and devout spirit. The prejudice which many attempt to excite against a metaphysical theology, is a hurtful prejudice. It leads men to adopt loose habits of thought, and thus to misinterpret the statements of the Bible and of philosophers on the intricate themes of religion. If Mr. Knight had carefully analyzed the Edwardean system, he would have found it a safeguard against, rather than an incentive to, atheism and infidelity. Infidels have doubtless been comforted in their error by the speculations of good men, who misinterpret Edwards; but they would have been saved from much of their perverse speculation, if they had diligently investigated the works of Edwards himself.

X. HACKETT'S ILLUSTRATIONS OF SCRIPTURE.¹

WE had prepared a lengthened notice of this work, but an unanticipated want of space prevents our insertion of it.

We have seldom, if ever, read a volume of Biblical Illustrations, with so much interest as we have felt in perusing this work. Prof. Hackett's accuracy is proverbial. We can rely on his statements with a confidence which is, itself, a pleasure. His acquaintance with the volume to be illustrated, is extensive and minute. He knows and appreciates the wants of his readers. Therefore, he explains the texts which need explanation, and, on the authority of his own vision, imparts to his readers the knowledge which they require. His taste, also, is delicate and correct. He gives us life-like pictures, instead of dry details. The varied information which he communicates, he arranges in a beautiful as well as lucid order, and thus charms while he instructs. His selection of words is remarkably apposite, and his rich thoughts are clothed in a winning garb.

The volume of Prof. Hackett abounds with proofs of the authenticity of the Bible: see some remarkable instances on pp. 180—183, 190. Sometimes he makes an impression, of which the poetical element is as decided as the historical: see pp. 176—7. Many of his Illustrations have an important bearing on polemical theology: see, for example, p. 106. Several of them show the value of exact Biblical learning for the fine arts: see pp. 134, 139. Our sacred hymnology and our sacred eloquence would be essentially enriched, if our poets and orators would become more intimate with the archæology, etc., of the Bible. Prof. Hackett pays an elegant and affecting tribute to the memory of the late Prof. Edwards of Andover, with whom he intended to make the tour, of which this volume is one result: see p. 149. His notice of the late Prof. Fiske of Amherst, whose grave he visited, on Mount Zion, is touching and instructive: see p. 286. We regret our inability to comment, at length, upon other features of this volume; but we are obliged to part from it, with the mere but earnest expression of a hope, that our readers, lay as well as clerical, may add the volume to their libraries, as a book which will be at first perused with interest, and subsequently consulted with profit as a book of reference.

¹ Illustrations of Scripture, suggested by a tour through the Holy Land, by Horatio B. Hackett, Professor in Newton Theological Seminary. Boston: Heath & Graves, No. 79 Cornhill, 1855. 12mo. pp. 340.

ARTICLE VIII.

THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

THE more important of the recent contributions to the department of Biblical Exegesis comprise :

Part 16 of the Exegetical Handbook to the Old Testament, containing the Song of Solomon, by Dr. Ferd. Hitzig, and Lamentations, by Dr. Otto Thenius.

A new edition of Bengel's Gnomon.

"The meaning of the word *Σάρξ* in the New Testament. Part 1 its use by Paul," by Dr. C. Holsten.

"Christologiæ in epistola ad Hebræos propositæ particula II. Jesus Messias propheta qui locum filii Dei tenet;" by Prof. C. B. Moll, of Halle.

Third improved and enlarged edition of Meyer's Commentary on Mark and Luke.

A new Catholic Commentary on Matthew, by Prof. Arnoldi.

Commentary on Solomon the Preacher, by Ernest Elster.

Vol. first of Hupfield's new Translation of the Psalms, with Elucidations.

"Sulamith, or the Song of Songs of Solomon, freely translated for the first time in eight and twenty centuries, from the language of Dreams, into ordinary speech, and explained in accordance with its import," by S. F. W. Lippert.

Complete Commentary on the History of the Passion of Christ, by the Four Evangelists, by Prof. J. Wichelhans.

In the department of Church History and Biography, we have to record :

A Synchronistic History of the Church and of the World, in the Middle Ages, 7th vol., by J. F. Dumberger. The author is a Catholic. In his work he is assisted by other scholars.

The 3d Lieferung of Rabbi Herzfeld's History of the Jewish People, from the completion of the second temple, to the elevation of Schimon to the High Priesthood.

A universal History of Religion, viewed from the position of Christian Revelation, by Franz Peterson.

Vol. 2d, of Bindeman's Life of St. Augustine, containing his life from his baptism to his election as Bishop of Hippo.

The People of Israel, under the rule of the Kings; a contribution towards introducing an organic comprehension of Israelitish History, by Dr.

Eisenlohr. Only the first part has appeared, embracing the development and flourishing age of the Theocracy.

The Ethics of Christianity in its chief historical forms; a contribution to the History of Theology and Morals, by Emil Fenerlein.

Primitive Christianity in the chief crises of its development, with special reference to the latest investigations of Hase and Baur, by Prof. A. Hilgerfeld.

Ulrich Zwingli; The character of his Theology, exhibited with special reference to Picus Mirandula, by Dr. C. Sigwart. It is the design of the author, a Repetent at Tübingen, to correct the views respecting Zwingli, which have been presented by Prof. Zeller, of Marburg.

Peter Abälard, a study in the Church History of the Middle Ages, by Dr. C. A. Wilkins.

Part 2d of Cunz's History of German Hymns, from the 16th century to the present time.

In the department of Dogmatics, nothing of importance has appeared.

Among the Miscellaneous Theological works, may be mentioned:

A small volume of Selections from Channing's Writings.

An Academic Discourse by Dr. Karl Hase, on the Development of Protestantism.

"Clementis Alexandrini de λόγῳ doctrina. Cimentatio historica, theologica," by Dr. Hugo Laemmer. A work which gained the Royal Prize at Leipsic, in 1854.

"De Clementis Romani epistola ad Corinthos priore disquisitio," by Dr. R. A. Lipsius.

Meditations on the Revelation of the Glory of God in His Church, and especially on the Presence of the glorified Body and Blood in the Holy Communion, by Dr. Ernest Sartorius.

Second enlarged edition of Weisse's Treatise on the "Christology of Luther, and the Christological task of Evangelical Theology."

The 4th cheap edition of Otto von Gerlach's translation of Baxter's Saint's Rest.

Second edition of Hengstenberg's Christology.

140th and 141st Hefts of Wetzer and Welte's Church Lexicon or Encyclopædia of Catholic Theology.

"Goethe's relation to Religion and Christianity," by Ludwig von Loncizolle.

3d and 4th vols. of the Translation of Theodore Parker's Works.

28—32 Hefts of Herzog's Real-Encyclopædia of Protestant Theology.

Prof. Baur has published a Letter to Dr. Karl Hase in reply to his recent pamphlet on the "Tübingen School."

Several of the Lectures delivered before the Evangelical Union of Berlin, during the last and preceding winter, have been published. Among them are some on "The Prophet Isaiah," by Hengstenberg; and "Philip Melancthon," and "Religion as the moving and ordering power of the World"-History," by Nitzsch.

Vol. 3d of the Latin Hymns of the Middle Ages, by F. P. Moore.

The Religious Lays of the Evangelical Church of the 16th century. Edited by Dr. Julius Mützel.

Chevalier Bunsen has found time to turn aside from his labors on the Old Testament, to publish two volumes, in the form of Letters to a friend, on the "Signs of the Times," in which he discusses various questions respecting Spiritual Liberty, in their bearings upon recent developments in Germany. The work will appear in an English translation.

A beautiful edition of Augustine's Confessions, edited with notes from the Oxford edition, by Parker, has recently been published.

The Tübingen Jahrbücher, which has played so important a part in the recent theological movements of Germany, ceases to exist at the close of the present year. It is certainly one of the not least significant signs of the times that a journal conducted with so much ability and learning, no longer receives popular support.

Among the philosophical works we notice :

Prolegomena to Speculative Natural Science, by George Blassmann.

New Exhibition of Sensualism, by Dr. Heinrich Czolbe.

A new edition of Erdmann's Psychological Letters.

3d and 4th vols. of Furtmair's Philosophical Real Lexicon, continued by Dr. J. N. Ushold.

The chief points in the Philosophy of Franz Baader, by Dr. J. Harnberger.

The epicreative System of René Descartes, its excellences and subjects, by Prof. J. H. Loewe.

Machiavelli's Religious and Political opinions exhibited in full Quotations from the "Discorsi," by Dr. H. Plato.

"Grammar, Logic, and Psychology, their Principles and their Relation to each other," by H. Steinthal. The author is Privat-docent at Berlin.

"The Scientific and Artistic Form of the Platonic Writings exhibited in their heretofore unobserved Characteristics," by Privat-docent G. F. W. Luckow.

"The Genetic development of the Platonic Philosophy," by Privat-docent Franz Susemihl.

"Platonis de rationibus quae inter Deum et ideas intercedunt doctrina," Dissertatio Philosophica, by A. Erdtman.

Plato's Complete Works, translated by Jerome Müller.

Part 2d of Weigert's Modern Philosophy, containing Schelling, Hegel, and Feuerbach.

History of the Philosophical, Ethical, Legal, and Political Theories of the English and the French, inclusive of Machiavelli's, and with a short View of Modern Moral and Social Theories in general," by Franz Vorländer.

"Polignosy and Poliogy, or a genetic and comparative civil and legal Philosophy," by Dr. Karl Völlgraff.

A new System of Psychology, by Prof. C. H. Shultz Schultzenstein.

2d Heft of the Philosophy of the Second Sources of Christianity, by J. el.

The Revolution of Science in Russia, with especial reference to Stahl, and the Replies of his opponents Braniss and Erdmann. By F. H. T. Allihz, Privat-docent at Halle.

The whole number of works relating to Religion and Theology, published in Germany from April to October, amounts to seven hundred and four. Of these a large proportion, of course, are reprints, sermons, and occasional publications of little or no value. Two hundred and eighty-three are by Catholics, mostly devotional works. The promulgation of the Decree of the Immaculate Conception, which has not been received with favor by all the Catholic scholars of Germany, and the great Festival in honor of St. Boniface, have probably drawn forth a larger proportion of publications, during the last summer, than usual, from the Catholic Communion. A number of works have also been contributed by Jews.

ENGLAND.

Bloomfield's Greek Testament, with English Notes, ninth edition, two vols. 8vo. with the volume of supplementary annotations incorporated. This has been a useful book in its day. But since the appearance of Alford's Testament, its day is passed. To junior students, it may still be of some service; but it is far behind the state of modern investigation respecting the text and meaning of the New Testament.

Von Bohlen's Introduction to the Book of Genesis, with a Commentary on the opening portion; translated from the German. Edited by James Heywood, M. P.; two vols. 8vo. This is an old book on Genesis; old at least in Germany. And it is worthless, besides; or rather, worse than worthless. It is ultra sceptical. Mr. Heywood must either be very ignorant of what has been published in Germany, on the Book of Genesis, since Von Bohlen's work; or he must presume largely on the ignorance of German theology, prevailing in England; or, lastly, he must have a wondrous predilection for neology. Certainly his money might have been better spent than in introducing to English readers a book of this kind. We charitably hope that he is such a novice in theological matters as not to be able clearly to distinguish between true and false doctrine. If he wanted better German commentaries on Genesis, why did he not take Tuch's, or Knobel's, or Delitzsch's?

Lyra Germanica: Hymns for the Sundays and chief Festivals of the Christian Year; translated from the German by Catherine Winkworth. This is a pleasing volume, containing many fine hymns and sacred songs of Germany, well translated.

Patriarchy, or the Family, its constitution and probation; by the Rev. John Harris, D. D. 8vo. A carefully written volume, which will repay the theological, and also the general reader. It is one of a series, the next after 'Man Primeval.' Republished in this country.

The Promises of Christianity; an Essay. By W. Kay, D. D. Here, no new light is thrown on the promises.

S. Joannis Chrysostom Homiliae in Epistolas Paulinas. Tom. V. continens Homilias in Epistolas ad Philippenses, Colossenses et Thessalonicenses. 8vo.

Sermons preached at St. Mary's, Oxford, by Rev. C. P. Eden, M. A. Mr. Eden writes remarkably well. His sermons are anything but commonplace.

An Inquiry concerning Religion ; by George Long.

The Life of Luther, in forty-eight Historical Engravings ; by G. Koenig. With explanations by Archdeacon Hare and Susannah Winkworth. 4to. This is a beautiful book. Only a few pages were written by Hare ; Miss Winkworth has worthily completed what that learned writer began.

The Whole Evidence against the Claims of the Roman Church ; by Sanderson Robins, M. A. This work contains a mass of appropriate and useful information, brought together from a variety of sources. In some cases it needs sifting.

The Absence of Precision in the Formularies of the Church of England scriptural, and suitable to a state of Probation ; being the Bampton Lecture for 1855. By I. E. Bode, M. A. The choice of such a subject, and the manner in which it is treated, combine to make the book very valuable to many, in the church of England, at the present time.

Memoir of the Right Rev. David Low ; by the Rev. William Blatch.

Men and Women ; by Robert Browning. 2 vols. These volumes contain new poems by a well known writer.

Ballads of Ireland ; by Edward Hayes. 2 vols. A good contribution to the National Poetry of Ireland.

Mr. Murray is issuing a new edition of Byron's poetical works, in six volumes 8vo.

Analytical Ethnology : the Mixed Tribes in Great Britain and Ireland examined, etc. By R. T. Massy.

First Lines in Chemistry : a Manual for Students. By Albert I. Bernays. A good compend.

The Relations of Science ; by John M. Ashley.

The Mystic, and other Poems ; by Philip James Bailey, author of Festus. We are inclined to put Mr. Bailey above any living poet. The present volume is worth a hundred 'Mauds.'

A Collection of the Customs and Tariffs of All Nations, based upon a translation of the work of M. Hubner, augmented by additional information. By C. M. Newdegate, M. P. 4to.

The third and fourth volumes of James Montgomery's Memoirs, by Holland and Everett, are published. The execution of the work is below the subject of it.

The seventh and eighth volumes of Moore's Memoir, Journal, and Correspondence. Edited by the Right Hon. Lord John Russel. The whole is now completed.

Geological Facts, by the Rev. W. G. Barret. A useful little book to those who wish to study geology.

Memoirs of Lieut. Bellot, with his Journal of a Voyage in the Polar Seas, in Search of Sir John Franklin. 2 vols.

The second volume of Arago's Works, translated, is now published, containing the commencement of his popular Astronomy.

The Life and Works of Goethe, with Sketches of his Age and Contemporaries; by G. H. Lewes. 2 vols. 8vo. What Mr. Lewes writes, he writes well, as far as style and diction are concerned. But he undertakes subjects for which he is unequal. Certainly he is not the man to write a Life of Goethe. Few are equal to the task. Thomas Carlyle is one of the few. Republished in this country.

Life and Travels of Herodotus, in the Fifth Century before Christ. By L. T. Wheeler. 2 vols. In this imaginary biography, the ancient history, manners, and customs of many ancient tribes and nations are illustrated. It is tolerably well written.

The History of Piedmont, from the earliest times to September, 1855. By Antonio Gallenga. 8 vols.

The Tribes of the Caucasus; with an Account of Schamyl and the Murids. By Baron Von Haxthausen.

The British Paleozoic Rocks and Fossils. By Rev. Prof. Sedgwick and Prof. McCoy. 4to, with a volume of Plates. A beautiful book, which no geologist can afford to dispense with.

The Law of Nature and Nations, as affected by Divine Law. By Leone Levi. A small book of sterling value.

Cambridge Essays. 8vo. By various Writers, on different Subjects. In general, the topics are not very interesting, though they are ably treated.

A new volume of Bohn's Classical Library contains the Greek Romances: Heliodorus, Longus, and Achilles Tatius; translated from the Greek.

Spicilegium Syriacum, containing Remains of Bardesan, Meliton, Ambrose, and Mara Bar Serapion. Now first edited, with an English Translation and Notes, by Rev. W. Cureton. Every student interested in patristic literature, will be glad to procure a copy of this work, which has been edited by Mr. Cureton, from manuscripts, with his well known ability and accuracy.

Cicero's Orations, with a complete Commentary, by George Long, M. A.; being the second volume of Cicero. Admirably edited.

Lectures to Ladies on Practical Subjects. These are by various writers, clergymen, lawyers, and physicians; and are marked by a good knowledge of the subjects treated.

A new Journal has lately commenced, called the Saturday Review, of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art. It is marked by considerable ability.

The Hebrew Text of the Old Testament, revised from Critical Sources; being an attempt to present a Purer and more Correct Text than the Received one of Van der Hooght, by the aid of the Best existing Materials; with the principal Various Readings found in Manuscripts, Ancient Versions, Jewish Books and Writers, Parallels, Quotations, etc. By Samuel Davidson, D. D. 8vo. S. D.

UNITED STATES.

MESSRS. James Munroe and Company, Boston, have recently published "Outlines of Chemical Analysis, prepared for the Chemical Laboratory at Giessen; by Dr. Heinrich Will, Professor of Experimental Chemistry, in the University of Giessen; Translated from the Third German Edition, by Daniel Breed, M. D., of the United States Patent Office, late of the Laboratories of Liebig, Löwig and Will, and Lewis H. Steiner, M. A., M. D., Professor of Chemistry, National Medical College." The translation is dedicated to Professor E. N. Horsford, of the Lawrence Scientific School, Cambridge, Mass. The Laboratory at Giessen is deservedly celebrated throughout the world. It has contributed much to the advancement of Chemical Science in our own, as in other lands. The first German edition of the present work has been favorably received in England and the United States. The third edition has been much improved, and will doubtless attract the general attention of scientific men.

Phillips, Sampson and Co., Boston, have published the first and second volumes of the History of the Reign of Philip the Second, King of Spain, by William H. Prescott, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, of the Royal Academy of History at Madrid, etc. This admirable work bids fair to eclipse all the preceding volumes of Mr. Prescott.

Little, Brown and Co., have recently published Prof. Norton's work on the Internal Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels; also his Translation of the Gospels with Notes. A more particular notice of these volumes, prepared for our present number, is necessarily deferred until the number for April.

We barely announce the appearance of a new work entitled: The Communion Sabbath; by Nehemiah Adams, D. D. Boston: published by John P. Jewett, and Co., 1856. 12mo. pp. 208. We hope to notice this elegant volume more extendedly in a future number of this periodical.

The same firm have recently published Dr. Allen's History of India, in one octavo volume. Dr. Allen has been well known as a faithful missionary, and the present volume indicates many results of his careful observation and study.

A new edition of the Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation, with an Introductory Essay by Prof. Stowe of Andover, has been recently published by Gould and Lincoln of Boston. It contains a Supplementary Chapter by Mr. Walker.

The same firm have also published a superb octavo, of 369 pages, entitled: Extracts from the Diary and Correspondence of the late Amos Lawrence, with a brief account of some incidents in his Life. Edited by his son, William R. Lawrence, M. D. It is a volume of rare excellence, worthy of a place in the library of every merchant and philanthropist.

A volume of discourses on the Parables of the New Testament, is soon to be published from the pen of Rev. Edward N. Kirk, D. D., of Boston.

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ARTICLE I.

THE MORAL FACULTY.

By Rev. Joseph Haven, Professor in Amherst College.

THE subject proposed is one of which it would not be easy to decide which is the greater, the importance or the difficulty. Its importance is seen in the fact that it concerns, at once, the psychologist, who would explain the laws of the human mind; the moralist, who would propound a system of ethical truth; the theologian, who would base his doctrines on a correct philosophy of mind and of morals; and, more than all, the individual man, who seeks to conform, in the practical government of the conduct, to the dictates of his moral nature. Its difficulty is apparent from the fact that it has, for so long a period, employed the energies of the ablest minds, giving rise to so many questions, so many discussions, by so many writers, with conclusions so diverse.

In entering upon the investigation of this subject, it is hardly necessary to raise the preliminary inquiry, as to the *existence* of a moral faculty in man. That we do possess the power of making moral distinctions, that we do discriminate between the right and the wrong in human conduct, is an obvious fact in the history and psychology of the race. Con-

sciousness, observation, the forms of language, the literature of the world, the usages of society, all attest and confirm this truth. We are conscious of the operation of this principle in ourselves, whenever we contemplate our own conduct or that of others. We find ourselves, involuntarily, and as by instinct, pronouncing this act to be right; that, wrong. We recognize the obligation to do, or to have done, otherwise. We approve, or condemn. We are sustained by the calm sense of that self-approval, or cast down by the fearful strength and bitterness of that remorse. And what we find in ourselves, we observe also in others. In like circumstances, they recognize the same distinctions, and exhibit the same emotions. At the story or the sight of some flagrant injustice and wrong, the child and the savage are not less indignant than the philosopher. Nor is this a matter peculiar to one age or people. The languages and the literature of the world indicate, that, at all times, and among all nations, the distinction between right and wrong has been recognized and felt. The *τὸ δίκαιον* and *τὸ καλόν* of the Greeks, the *honestum* and the *pulchrum* of the Latins, are specimens of a class of words, to be found in all languages, the proper use and significance of which is to express the distinctions in question.

Since, then, we do unquestionably recognize moral distinctions, it is clear that we have a moral faculty. For a faculty is simply the power of doing something; and, if we find ourselves in possession and use of the power, we conclude that we have the faculty.

Without further consideration of this point, we pass at once to the investigation of the subject itself. Our inquiries relate principally to the *nature* and *authority* of this faculty. On these points, it is hardly necessary to say, great difference of opinion has existed among philosophers and theologians, and grave questions have arisen. What is this faculty as exercised: a judgment, a process of reasoning, or an emotion? Does it belong to the rational, or sensitive part of our nature: to the domain of intellect, or of feeling, or both? What is the *source* and *origin* of these ideas: how come we

by them ? What *constitutes*, in what consists, the right and the wrong of actions : what is the difference ? What is the *ground of our obligation* to do, or not to do, any given thing ? What is the value and correctness of our moral perceptions, and especially of that verdict of *approbation*, or *censure*, which we pass upon ourselves and others, according as the conduct conforms to, or violates, recognized obligation ? Such are some of the questions which have arisen respecting the nature and authority of conscience.

A careful analysis of the phenomena of conscience, with a view to determine the several elements, or mental processes, that constitute its operation, and then a careful examination of those several elements, in their order, may aid us in the solution of these questions.

Analysis of an Act of Conscience.

Whenever the conduct of intelligent and rational beings is made the subject of contemplation, whether the act thus contemplated be our own or another's, and whether it be an act already performed, or only proposed, we are cognizant of certain ideas awakened in the mind, and of certain impressions made upon it. First of all, the act contemplated strikes us as *right* or *wrong*. This involves a double element an idea, and a perception or judgment. The idea of right and its opposite are, in the mind, simple ideas, and therefore indefinable. In the act contemplated, we recognize the one or the other of these simple elements, and pronounce it, accordingly, a right or a wrong act. This is simply a judgment, a perception, an exercise of the understanding.

No sooner is this idea, this cognition, of the rightness or wrongness of the given act, fairly entertained by the mind, than another idea, another cognition, presents itself, given along with the former, and inseparable from it, viz. that of *obligation* to do, or not to do, the given act: the *ought*, and the *ought not*—also simple ideas, and indefinable. This applies equally to the future and to the past, to ourselves and to others : I ought to do the thing ; I ought to *have done* it

yesterday. He ought, or ought not, to do, or to have done it. This, like the former, is an intellectual act, a perception or cognition of a truth, of a reality, for which we have the same voucher as for any other reality, or apprehended fact, viz. the reliability of our mental faculties in general, and the correctness of their operation in the specific instance.

There follows a third element, logically distinct, but chronologically inseparable, from the preceding: the cognition of merit or demerit in connection with the deed, of good or ill desert, and the consequent approval or disapproval of the deed and the doer. This also is an intellectual perception, an exercise of judgment, giving sentence that the contemplated act is, or is not, meritorious, and awarding praise or blame accordingly.

This completes the process. I can discover nothing in the operation of my mind, in view of moral action, which does not resolve itself into some one of these elements.

Viewed in themselves, these are, strictly, intellectual operations; the recognition of the right, the recognition of obligation, the perception of good or ill desert, are all properly acts of the intellect. Each of these cognitive acts, however, involves a corresponding action of the sensibilities. The perception of the right awakens, in the pure and virtuous mind, feelings of pleasure, admiration, love. The idea of obligation becomes, in its turn, through the awakened sensibilities, an impulse and motive to action. The recognition of good or ill desert awakens feelings of esteem and complacency, or the reverse; fills the soul with sweet peace, or stings it with sharp remorse. All these things must be recognized and included by the psychologist among the phenomena of conscience. These emotions, however, are based on, and grow out of, the intellectual acts already named, and are to be viewed as an incidental, and subordinate, though by no means unimportant, part of the whole process. When we speak of conscience, or the moral faculty, we speak of a *power*, a faculty, and not merely a feeling, or susceptibility of being affected. It is a cognitive power, having to do with realities, recognizing real distinctions, and not merely a pas-

sive play of the sensibilities. It is analogous to the power of memory which gives us the actual past ; of perception which gives the actual present as external and material ; of imagination which gives us the ideal. Like these, it has its own proper sphere and province, logically distinct from all others. Like these, it brings before us what we should not otherwise know. It is simply the mind's power of recognizing a certain class of truths and relations. As such, we claim for it a place among the strictly cognitive powers of the mind, among the faculties that have to do with the perception of truth and reality.

This is a point of some importance. If, with certain writers, we make the moral faculty a matter of mere feeling, overlooking the intellectual perceptions on which this feeling is based, we overlook and leave out of the account, the chief elements of the process. The moral faculty is no longer a cognitive power, no longer in truth a faculty. The distinctions which it seems to recognize are merely *subjective* ; impressions, feelings, to which there may, or may not, be a corresponding reality. We have at least no evidence of any such reality. Such a view subtracts the very foundation of morals. Our feelings vary ; but right and wrong do not vary with our feelings. They are objective realities, and not subjective phenomena. As such, the mind, by virtue of the natural powers with which it is endowed by the Creator, recognizes them. The power by which it gives this, we call the *moral faculty* ; just as we call its power to take cognizance of another class of truths and relations, viz. the beautiful, its *aesthetic* faculty. In view of these truths and relations, as thus perceived, certain feelings are, in either case, awakened, and these emotions may with propriety be regarded as pertaining to a part of the phenomena of conscience, and of taste ; full discussion of either of these faculties will include the action of the sensibilities ; but in neither case will a true psychology resolve the faculty into the feeling. The mathematician experiences a certain feeling of delight in perceiving the relation of lines and angles, but the power of perceiving that relation, the faculty by

which the mind takes cognizance of such truth, is not to be resolved into the feeling that results from it.

As the result of our analysis, we obtain the following elements as involved in, and constituting, an operation of the moral faculty :

I. The mental perception that a given act is right or wrong.

II. The perception of obligation with respect to the same, as right or wrong.

III. The perception of merit or demerit, and the consequent approbation or censure of the agent, as doing the right or the wrong thus perceived.

Accompanying these intellectual perceptions, and based upon them, are certain corresponding emotions, varying in intensity according to the clearness of the mental perceptions, and the purity of the moral nature.

As we proceed now to discuss, more in detail, these various elements which the preceding analysis has furnished, the several questions already suggested will naturally present themselves for consideration.

As to the perception of the moral quality of actions, it will be in place to inquire : what is the *origin* of such perception, on our part ; whence we derive our ideas of right or wrong ; how we come to make such a distinction.

As to the element of obligation, it will be in place to inquire : what is the *ground* of such obligation.

As to the decision of approval or condemnation, it will be pertinent to consider : what is the value, and what the power, of such verdict.

To these points, accordingly, our attention will be mainly directed as we proceed to examine one by one, in their order, the several mental processes now indicated.

I. *The perception of an act as right or wrong.*

When we direct our attention to any given instance of the conduct and voluntary action of any intelligent and rational being, we find ourselves, not unfrequently, pronouncing upon its character as a right or wrong act. Especially is this the case when the act contemplated is of a marked and unusual

character. The question at once arises, is it right? or, it may be, without the consciousness of even a question respecting it; our decision follows instantly upon the mental apprehension of the act itself; this thing is right, this thing is wrong. Our decision may be correct or incorrect; our perception of the real nature of the act may be clear or obscure; it may make a stronger or a weaker impression on the mind, according to our mental habits, the tone of our moral nature, and the degree to which we have cultivated the moral faculty. There may be minds so degraded, and natures so perverted, that the moral character of an act shall be quite mistaken, or quite overlooked in many cases; or when perceived it shall make little impression on them. Even in such minds, however, the *idea* of right and wrong still finds a place, and the understanding applies it, though not perhaps always correctly, to particular instances of human conduct. There is no reason to believe that any mind, possessing ordinary endowments, those degrees of reason and intelligence which nature usually bestows, is destitute of this idea, or fails altogether to apply it to its own acts, and those of others.

But *whence come* these ideas and perceptions; their origin? How is it, *why* is it, that we pronounce an act right or wrong, when once fairly apprehended? How come we by these notions? The fact is admitted; the explanations vary. By one class of writers our ideas of this nature have been ascribed to *education* and *fashion*; by another, to *legal restriction*, human or divine. Others again, viewing these ideas as the offspring of nature, have assigned them either to the operation of a *special sense*, given for this specific purpose, as the eye for vision; or to the joint action of certain associated emotions; while others regard them as originating in an exercise of judgment, and others still as natural intuitions of the mind, or reason exercised on subjects of a moral nature.

The main question is, are these ideas *natural*, or *artificial and acquired*? If the latter, are they the result of education, or of legal restraint? If the former, are they to be referred to

the *sensibilities*, as the result of a special sense, or of association, or to the *intellect*, as the result of the faculty of judgment, or as intuitions of reason?

1. *Come they from education and imitation?* So Locke, Paley, and others have supposed. Locke was led to take this view, by tracing, as he did, all simple ideas, except those of our own mental operations, to sensation, as their source. This allows, of course, no place for the ideas of right and wrong, which accordingly, he concluded, cannot be natural ideas, but must be the result of education.

Now it is to be conceded that education and fashion are powerful instruments in the culture of the mind. Their influence is not to be overlooked in estimating the causes that shape and direct the opinions of men, and the tendencies of an age. But they do not account for the *origin* of anything. This has been ably and clearly shown by Dugald Stewart, in answer to Locke; and it is a sufficient answer. Education and imitation both *presuppose* the existence of moral ideas and distinctions; the very things to be accounted for. How came they who first taught these distinctions, and they who first set the example of making such distinctions, to be *themselves* in possession of these ideas? Whence did *they* derive them? Who taught *them*, and set *them* the example? This is a question not answered by the theory now under consideration. It gives us, therefore, and can give us, no account of the origin of the ideas in question.

2. Do we then derive these ideas from legal restriction and enactment? So teach some able writers. Laws are made, human and divine, requiring us to do thus and thus, and forbidding such and such things, and hence we get our ideas originally of right and wrong.

If this be so, then previous to all law there could have been no such ideas of course. But does not law *presuppose* the idea of right and wrong? Is it not built on that idea as its basis? How then can it originate that on which itself depends, and which it presupposes? The first law ever promulgated must have been either a just or an unjust law, or else of no moral character. If the latter, how could a law

which was neither just nor unjust, have suggested to the subjects of it any such ideas? If the former, then these qualities, and the ideas of them, must have existed *prior* to the law itself; and whoever made the law and conferred on it its character, must have had already in his own mind the idea of the right and its opposite. It is evident that we cannot in this way account for the *origin* of the ideas in question. We are no nearer the solution of the problem than before.

In opposition to the views now considered, we must regard the ideas in question as directly or indirectly the work of nature and the result of our constitution. The question still remains however: in which of the several ways indicated does this result take place?

3. Shall we attribute these ideas to a *special sense*? This is the view taken by Hutcheson and his followers. Ascribing, with Locke, all our simple ideas to sensation, but not content with Locke's theory of moral distinctions as the result of education, he sought to account for them by enlarging the sphere of sensation, and introducing a new sense, whose specific office is to take cognizance of such distinctions. The tendency of this theory is evident. While it derives the idea of right and its opposite from our natural constitution, and is so far preferable to either of the preceding theories, still, in assigning them a place among the sensibilities, it seems to make morality a mere *sentiment*, a matter of feeling merely, an impression made on our sentient nature—a mere subjective affair—as color and taste are impressions made on our organs of sense, and not properly qualities of bodies. As these affections of the sense do not exist independently, but only relatively, to us, so moral distinctions, according to this view, are merely subjective affections of our minds, and not independent realities.

Hume accedes to this general view, and carries it out to its legitimate results, making morality a mere relation between our nature and certain objects, and not an independent quality of actions. Virtue and vice, like color and taste, the bright and the dull, the sweet and the bitter, lie merely in our sensations.

These sceptical views had been advanced long previously by the sophists, who taught that man is the measure of all things, that things are only what they seem to us.

It is true, as Stewart has observed, that these views do not necessarily result from Hutcheson's theory, nor were they probably held by him; but such is the natural tendency of his doctrine. The term *sense*, as employed by him, is in itself ambiguous, and *may* be used to denote a *mental perception*; but when we speak of *a* sense, we are understood to refer to that part of our constitution which, when affected from without, gives us certain sensations. Thus the sense of hearing, the sense of vision, the sense of taste, of smell, etc. It is in this way that Hutcheson seems to have employed the term, and his illustrations all point in this direction. He was unfortunate, to say the least, in his use of terms, and in his illustrations; unfortunate, also, in having such a disciple as Hume, to push his theory to its legitimate results.

If, by a special sense, he meant only a direct perceptive power of the mind, then, doubtless, Hutcheson is right in recognizing such a faculty, and attributing to it the ideas under consideration. But that is not the proper meaning of the word *sense*, nor is that the signification attached to it by his followers. But if he means, by sense, what the word itself would indicate, some adaptation of the sensibilities to receive impressions from things without, analogous to that by which we are affected through the organs of sense, then, 1. It is not true, that we have any such special faculty. There is no evidence of it; nay, facts contradict it. There is no such *uniformity* of moral impression, or sensation, as ought to manifest itself on this supposition. Men's eyes and ears are much alike, in their activity, the world over. That which is white, or red, to one, is not black to another, or green to a third; that which is sweet to one, is not sour, or bitter, to another. At least, if such variations occur, they are the result only of some unnatural and unusual condition of the organs. But it is otherwise with the operation of the so-called special sense. While all men have probably some idea of right and

wrong, there is the greatest possible variety in its application to particular instances of conduct. What one approves as a virtue, another condemns as a crime.

Nor, 2. have we any need to call in the aid of a special sense to give us ideas of this kind. It is not true, as Locke and Hutcheson believed, that all our ideas except those of our own mental operations, or consciousness, are derived ultimately from sensation. We have ideas of the true and the beautiful, ideas of cause and effect, of geometrical and arithmetical relations, and various other ideas, which it would be difficult to trace to the senses as their source; and which, equally with the ideas of right and wrong, would require, in that case, a special sense for their production.

4. Shall we, then, adopt the view of that class of ethical writers who account for the origin of these ideas by the principle of association? Such men as Hartley, Mill, Mackintosh, and others of that stamp, are not lightly to be set aside in the discussion of such a question. Their view is, that the moral perceptions are the result of certain combined antecedent emotions, such as gratitude, piety, resentment, etc., which relate to the dispositions and actions of voluntary agents, and which very easily, and naturally, come to be transferred, from the agent himself, to the action in itself considered, or to the disposition which prompted it; forming, when thus transferred and associated, what we call the moral feelings and perceptions. Just as avarice arises from the original desire, not of money, but of the things which money can procure; which desire comes, eventually, to be transferred, from the objects themselves, to the means and instrument of procuring them; and, as sympathy arises from the transfer to others of the feelings which, in like circumstances, agitate our own bosoms; so, in like manner, by the principle of association, the feelings which naturally arise in view of the conduct of others, are transferred from the agent to the act, from the enemy or the benefactor, to the injury or the benefaction, which acts stand afterward, by themselves, as objects of approval or condemnation. Hence the disposition to approve all benevolent acts, and to condemn the opposite; which dis-

position, thus formed and transferred, is a part of conscience. So of other elementary emotions.

It will be perceived that this theory, which is indebted chiefly to Mackintosh for its completeness, and scientific form, makes conscience wholly a matter of sentiment and feeling; standing in this respect on the same ground with the theory of a special sense, and liable in part to the same objections. Hence the name *sentimental* school, often employed to designate collectively the adherents of each of these views. While the theory now proposed might then seem to offer a plausible account of the manner in which our moral *sentiments* aim, it does not account for the origin of our *ideas* and *perceptions* of moral rectitude. Now the moral faculty is not mere sentiment. There is an intellectual perception of one thing as right, and another as wrong; and the question now before us is: whence comes that perception, and the idea on which it is based? To resolve the whole matter into certain transferred and associated emotions, is to give up the inherent distinction of right and wrong as qualities of actions, and make virtue and vice creations of the sensibility, the play and product of the excited feelings. To admit the perception and idea of the right, and ascribe their origin to antecedent emotion, is moreover to reverse the natural order and law of psychological operation, which bases emotion on perception, and not perception on emotion. We do not first admire, love, hate, and then perceive, but the reverse.

The view now under consideration, while it seems to resolve the moral faculty into mere feeling, thus making morality wholly a relative affair, makes conscience itself an acquired, rather than a natural faculty, a secondary process, a transformation of emotions, rather than itself an original principle. It does it, moreover, the further injustice of deriving its origin from the purely *selfish* principles of our nature. I receive a favor, or an injury, hence I regard with certain feelings of complacency, or the opposite, the man who has thus treated me. These feelings I come gradually to transfer to, and associate with, the act in itself considered, and this with other acts of the same nature; and so at last I come to have

a moral faculty, and pronounced one thing right, and another wrong.

This view is quite inadmissible; at variance with facts, and the well-known laws of the human mind. The moral faculty is one of the earliest to develop itself. It appears in childhood, manifesting itself, not as an acquired and secondary principle, the result of a complicated process of associated and transferred emotion, requiring time for its gradual formation and growth, but rather as an original instinctive principle of nature.

Adam Smith, in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," has proposed a view which falls properly under the general theory of association, and may be regarded as a modification of it. He attributes our moral perceptions to the feeling of *sympathy*. To adopt the feelings of another is to approve them. If those feelings are such as would naturally be awakened in us by the same objects, we approve them as morally proper. Sympathy with the gratitude of one who has received a favor, leads us to regard the benefaction as meritorious. Sympathy with the resentment of an injured man, leads us to regard the injurer as worthy of punishment, and so the sense of demerit originates; sympathy with the feelings of others respecting our own conduct gives rise to self-approval and sense of duty. Rules of morality are merely a summary of these sentiments.

Whatever credit may be due to this ingenious writer, for calling attention to a principle which had not been sufficiently taken into account by preceding philosophers, we cannot but regard it as an insufficient explanation of the present case. In the first place, we are not *conscious* of the element of sympathy in the decisions and perceptions of the moral faculty. We look at a given action as right or wrong, and approve of it, or condemn it *on that ground*, because it *is* right or wrong, not because we sympathize with the feelings awakened by the act in the minds of others. If the process now supposed intervened between our knowledge of the act, and our judgment of its morality, we should know it and recognize it as a distinct element.

Furthermore, sympathy, like other emotions, has one *imperative* character, and, even if it might be supposed to suggest to the mind some idea of moral distinctions, cannot of itself furnish a foundation for those feelings of *obligation* which accompany and characterize the decisions of the moral faculty.

But more than this, the view now taken makes the standard of right and wrong *variable*, and dependent on the feelings of men. We must know how others think and feel, how the thing affects them, before we can know whether a given act is right or wrong, to be performed or avoided. And then, furthermore, our feelings must agree with theirs; there must be sympathy and harmony of views and feelings, else the result will not follow. If anything prevents us from knowing what are the feelings of others with respect to a given course of conduct, or if for any reason we fail to sympathize with those feelings, we can have no conscience in the matter. As those feelings vary, so will our moral perceptions vary. We have no fixed standard. There is no place left for right, as such, and absolutely. If no sympathy, then no duty, no right, no morality.

We have, as yet, found no satisfactory explanation of the origin of our moral ideas and perceptions. They seem not to be the result of education and imitation, nor yet of legal enactment. They seem to be natural, rather than artificial and acquired. Yet we cannot trace them to the action of the sensitive part of our nature. They are not the product of a special sense, nor yet of the combined and associated action of certain natural emotions, much less of any one emotion, as sympathy. And yet they are a part of our nature. Place man where you will, surround him with what influences you will, you still find in him, to some extent at least, indications of a moral nature; a nature modified indeed by circumstances, but never wholly obliterated. Evidently we must refer the ideas in question, then, to the intellectual, since they do not belong to the sensitive, part of our nature.

5. Are they then the product and operation of the faculty

of judgment? But the judgment does not *originate* ideas. It compares, distributes, estimates, decides to what class and category a thing belongs, but creates nothing. I have in mind the idea of a triangle, a circle, etc. So soon as certain figures are presented to the eye, I refer them at once, by an act of judgment, to the class to which they belong. I affirm that to be a triangle, this, a circle, etc.; the judgment does this. But judgment does not furnish my mind with the primary idea of a circle, etc. It deals with this idea already in the mind. So in our judgment of the beauty and deformity of objects. The perception that a landscape or painting is beautiful, is, in one sense, an act of judgment; but it is an act which presupposes the idea of the beautiful already in the mind that so judges. So also of moral distinctions. Whence comes the *idea* of right and wrong which lies at the foundation of every particular judgment as to the moral character of actions? This is the question before us, still unanswered; and to this there remains but one reply.

6. The ideas in question are *intuitive*; suggestions or perceptions of reason. The view now proposed may be thus stated: It is the office of reason to discern the right and the wrong, as well as the true and the false, the beautiful and the reverse. Regarded subjectively, as conceptions of the human mind, right and wrong, as well as beauty and its opposite, truth and its opposite, are simple ideas, incapable of analysis or definition; intuitions of reason. Regarded as objective, right and wrong are realities, qualities absolute, and inherent in the nature of things, not fictitious, not the play of human fancy or human feeling, not relative merely to the human mind, but independent, essential, universal, absolute. As such, reason recognizes their existence. Judgment decides that such and such actions do possess the one or the other of these qualities; are right or wrong actions. There follows the sense of obligation to do or not to do, and the consciousness of merit or demerit as we comply, or fail to comply, with the same. In view of these perceptions emotions arise, but only as based upon them. The emo-

tions do not, as the sentimental school affirm, originate the idea, the perception; but the idea, the perception, give rise to the emotion. We are so constituted as to feel certain emotions in view of the moral quality of actions, but the idea and perception of that moral quality must *precede*, and it is the office of reason to produce this.

There are certain simple ideas which must be regarded as first truths, or first principles, of the human understanding, essential to its operations, ideas universal, absolute, necessary. Such are the ideas of personal existence and identity of time and space, as conditions of material existence; of number, cause, and mathematical relation. Into this class fall the ideas of the true, the beautiful, the right, and their opposites. The fundamental maxims of reasoning and morals, find here their place.

These are in a sense intuitive perceptions; not strictly innate, yet connate; the foundation for them being laid in our nature and constitution. So soon as the mind reaches a certain stage of development they present themselves. Circumstances may promote or retard their appearance. They depend on opportunity to furnish the occasion of their springing up, yet they are nevertheless the natural, spontaneous development of the human soul, as really a part of our nature, as are any of our instinctive impulses, or our mental attributes. They are a part of that native intelligence with which we are endowed by the author of our being. These intuitions of ours, are not themselves the foundation of right and wrong; they do not make one thing right and another wrong; but they are simply the reason why we so regard them. Such we believe to be the true account of the origin of our moral perceptions.

We have directed our attention, thus far, to the first of the several elements that constitute the moral faculty, viz. the perception of the right and wrong in actions. We proceed, now, to discuss the second of these elements or mental processes.

II. *The perception of obligation.*

No sooner do we apprehend a given act as right or wrong,

than we recognize, also, a certain *obligation* resting on us with respect to that act, either to do, or to avoid, the same. It is a conviction of the mind, inseparable from the perception of the right. Given : a clear perception of the one, and one cannot escape the other. The question arises here, *what is the ground of this OUGHT*, what *constitutes* it ; what is that, in any given action, that imposes on me the obligation to do, or not to do, the same ? I ought to do this, and that. *Why* ought ?

Whatever answer we may give to this question, we must come back ultimately to the simple position, we ought, *because it is right* ; the *rightness* of a given course constitutes the obligation, on our part, to adhere to the same. Given : the one ; given, also, the other. The question, then, What constitutes obligation ? resolves itself into this : What constitutes right ?

This is a question of no little moment. It has received, at different times and from different writers, widely different answers ; and these various answers constitute so many different theories of morals. They lead us over an interesting and important field of inquiry, involving one of the deepest and most difficult problems in the whole range of philosophy.

This is altogether a distinct question from the one already discussed, though often confounded with it by ethical writers. The question is not, now : Whence our *ideas* of right ? but, What *makes* right, what is right itself ? It is quite possible that what is, to me, the source of the idea of right, may not be the foundation of right itself. I derive my idea of time from the succession of events, my idea of space from extension ; but succession does not constitute time, nor extension space ; on the contrary, time is necessary to succession, and space to extension. The latter presuppose the former, and could not be without them. So with respect to moral distinctions : I may, or may not, be indebted for the idea of right, as it exists in my mind, to that which is the foundation of right itself.

The principal theories of morals, or grounds of obligation, proposed by different writers, may be reduced, perhaps, to

these four: 1. Utility; 2. Law; 3. The nature and character of God; 4. The eternal and immutable nature of things. Each of these has been regarded as the true ground on which to place the distinction of right and wrong, and the consequent moral obligation. The two former of these, again, have each a twofold aspect: Utility, as the ground of right, may denote either the *happiness*, the pleasure accruing from a given course (which is itself a species of utility), or the more direct *advantage* resulting from it. Or, if we place the matter on the ground of legal enactment, the law which makes the right and the wrong, may be man's law, or it may be God's.

We leave, then, these divergent paths opening before us, each proposing to conduct to the true solution of our problem, each trodden by many a mighty man in the domain of thought: the *utilitarian* theory, with its twofold aspect, the pleasure and the advantage of the thing; the *legal* theory, twofold also, as of human or Divine authority; the theory which makes the *Divine character* the foundation of right; and, finally, that which bases it on the immutable and eternal nature of things.

Let us, then, examine these several theories in their order:

1. The *utilitarian*. Understanding by this term, in the first place, *pleasure*, rather than advantage, the doctrine is this: the reason why we pronounce one thing right, rather than another, is, that we find the one act to be attended, uniformly, with pleasure to the doer; the other, with pain; one contributes to his happiness, the other detracts from it. Now the pursuit of happiness, it is contended, is the grand motive and spring of all human action; and if it be once established that the actions which we call right, are such, invariably, as to promote our happiness, no other reason need be assigned why we thus regard them. And this, it is contended, is the case. If we select any instance of what we call right action, we find it to be an action which is accompanied with pleasurable emotion. And this is the ground of our approval, the reason why we pronounce the action right.

Now it is not to be denied, that to do right brings with it a present satisfaction and true happiness. Such is the constitution of our nature. The question is, whether this tendency to produce happiness is what *makes* a given act right. Is the thing right *because* it produces happiness? or does it promote our happiness *because it is right*? Which is the true statement? When I pronounce some past act of my life to be right, and approve it as virtuous, is it because I remember that it gave me great pleasure? and when I cherish the feeling of self-reproach and remorse, in view of past conduct, is it on the ground that the given action was accompanied with unpleasant and painful sensations?

The simple statement of the question would seem sufficient. We feel, instinctively, that our decision and approval rest on far other and higher grounds. Virtue and happiness are, by no means, identical. We have different terms for them, and mean different things by them. The one cannot be resolved into the other. If it be true that all right things are pleasant, it does not follow that all pleasant things are right, much less that their pleasantness makes them right. Many are the propensities of a corrupt nature, the indulgence of which is attended with present gratification, which still are evil and only evil; and in their pleasantness consists the very strength of the temptation they present. The man who yields to the force of such temptations, however, by no means approves the course that he pursues. He goes to the commission of the wrong, not with a conviction that he is doing right, but under a protest from his conscience, and with a feeling of self-reproach and self-condemnation. This ought not to be, according to the theory now under consideration. He ought rather to approve his conduct, on the ground that he was seeking, therein, his own happiness; and his self-approval ought to rise and increase, in proportion to the pleasure he receives.

Nor is the case materially altered by substituting the happiness of others, in place of personal happiness, as the ground of right. No doubt right action contributes to the happiness of the community, and swells the sum total of the world's en-

joyment ; but is it this, that constitutes the rightness of the act? Is the noble consciousness of doing right, with all its power to sustain the spirit of a man under the pressure of the heaviest calamities, and the gloom of the darkest hour, merely this : the conviction that somehow, in consequence of what he has done, men will, on the whole, enjoy themselves better? Independent, and irrespective of all such considerations, is there not a far nobler satisfaction in having done that which was right, in itself considered, and for its own sake?

The view now considered was the distinctive tenet of the ancient Epicurean philosophy; and has been held, in later times, by Hume and Shaftsbury in England, and by their followers generally.

Considering, now, utility as denoting *advantage* or *expediency*, we come upon somewhat different ground; capable, however, of attack and defence by essentially the same arguments. In fact, the former view may be regarded as a modification of the latter, the one specific, the other generic, in its form; pleasure being, itself, a species of advantage, at least in the opinion of those who make it the rule of right. Hence, very generally, the advocates of the former view are advocates also of the latter. Still the latter is, of the two, the broader and higher ground.

Self-love, according to this view, is the grand motive of human action. Men do what they think for their advantage. Now it is found by experience that a certain course of conduct is for the advantage, and the opposite for the disadvantage, of the doer, and of all concerned. Hence they come to regard the one course as right, and to be pursued, the other as wrong, and to be avoided. In a word it is the utility or expediency of the thing that constitutes the ground and reason of its rightness. Such is the doctrine of Bentham and his followers.

And here it is admitted, on all sides, that virtuous action does contribute to the advantage, in many ways, of the doer. The question is, whether this is what *makes* it virtuous, whether this constitutes its rightness. Is it right because expedient, or expedient because right?

Let us see what follows from this theory. (1) If expediency is the ground of right, then *interest* and *duty* are identical in idea, synonymes for the same thought. To prove a given action right, all that is necessary is to show that it is advantageous to the doer. The same act performed from the same motives, with the same spirit and intentions, is right to one man, and wrong to another; nay, is right to one and the same man, at one time, and wrong at another, according as it turns out for his advantage or not. We can never be sure that we are acting virtuously, until we know how the action is to affect our personal interests. Men have acted from the highest and purest principles, yet have been in reality far from virtuous, because what they did proved not for their own interests. They ought therefore to cherish feelings of self-reproach, and remorse, in view of their conduct.

(2) It follows from this theory, that there is no such thing as *intentional* wrong-doing. Men always act, it is said, from the principle of self-love. They do what they think is for their own advantage. Finding by experience that certain actions tend to their advantage, they come to regard such actions as right, and the opposite, for the same reason, as wrong. What have we here for a syllogism!

Man acts always with reference to his own good. To act with reference to one's own good, is to act right. Therefore, man invariably acts right! He may mistake, and do what is in the end disadvantageous; but it was a mistake, an error of judgment, and not an *intentional* wrong. This is on the whole a very favorable view of things, and may serve to relieve somewhat the sombre aspect in which the world and poor erring human nature, present themselves to a certain class of minds. Men are not so bad, after all. They do as well as they know how. They *mean* to be selfish, and to consult their own interests, and if they sometimes come short of duty in this respect, it is an error of the head and not of the heart.

(3) It follows also, that there is no such thing as *disinterested* virtue. Utility is the ground of rectitude, the foundation of

obligation. We ought, therefore, to give a man credit for his conduct, just in proportion as we perceive him to have been governed throughout by a regard to his own personal advantage. To act thus is to act right, and to comply with the claims of duty. There can be no virtue which springs not from this source. The more fully a man promotes his own interests, and seeks his own personal advantage, in all he does, provided only there be no direct violation of the rights of others, the higher esteem ought we to cherish for that man in our hearts. On the other hand, where an action is of such a nature, that we are not quite sure whether the man *was really seeking his own* advantage or that of *others*, in what he did, we ought to withhold our approbation.

But strange to say, selfish as the world is, it does not so decide. It does sensibly diminish our moral approbation of any act, to see, or suspect even, that self-interest was the leading motive of conduct; it heightens our admiration and esteem, to perceive that the act was performed without the least regard to that, but from entirely different motives.

And this leads us to remark, in general, that the theory under consideration *contradicts the facts of consciousness*. If utility were the ground of moral obligation, the foundation of right, then whenever we recognize such obligation, we should be *conscious* of this element as the basis of it; should be conscious of perceiving the tendency of the given act to promote the personal happiness, or the personal advantage of the doer, and that our conviction of obligation, in the case, arose from that circumstance; whereas, in fact, we are conscious of no such thing, but in many cases of directly the reverse. The sense of obligation exists, not only irrespective of the idea of happiness or of advantage to be derived from the given act, but often in opposition to it; the desire of happiness, or of personal advantage, drawing us in one direction, the sense of obligation, in another. It is not true that duty and interest are identical. We have different names for them, we mean different things by them. We are conscious of acting, now from one, now from the other, of these principles. It is not true, that men never intentionally

do what they know to be wrong. This was the capital defect in the ethical system of Socrates and also of Plato, who make virtue a matter of science, and sin to be merely ignorance. Whose consciousness does not testify the opposite of this? Who will not say with Ovid:

“Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor;”

or with Euripides: “I know that what I am about to do is evil, but desire is stronger than my deliberations.” Surely the facts in this case are more nearly right than the philosophers. Who has not reason to say with Paul: “That which I do, I allow not.”

Neither is it true, that we act always from personal and selfish considerations. We are conscious of the opposite, conscious of doing that which is right, *because* it is right, and not for the sake of personal advantage. Nor in such cases is the verdict of conscience against us; but on the contrary, it is precisely such actions that draw forth the testimony of her warmest approbation; so far from reproaching us for not acting with more direct and uniform reference to our own advantage, conscience more frequently condemns us for having acted from no higher principle.

We cannot but regard the facts of consciousness, then, as altogether at variance with the theory under consideration.

Suppose, now, we give the term utility, a still wider extension, meaning by it, not the advantage of the *individual* merely, but the good of the *greatest number*, does it become, in this sense, the foundation of right and of moral obligation? There are still insuperable objections.

In the first place, how can it always be known, what *will* promote the interests of the greatest number? The tendencies and results of actions, are often hidden from human perspicacity. We do not know how they will affect the interests of any considerable number of persons. A laborious calculation of consequences, would, in most cases, be necessary, in order to such a conclusion, and even then, we could never arrive at certainty, never be sure that our reasonings

and conclusions were correct. We should be in suspense, therefore, as to the morality of actions, unable to decide whether they are right or wrong, until we could first know their ultimate bearing on the general welfare. Such a calculation of consequences is quite beyond the capacity of the mass; only the more enlightened and far-seeing, are competent to form such judgments, and even they, not with any certainty. Only the few, therefore, are competent to form ideas of right or wrong, and apply them to human conduct, while the vast multitude are left without any such faculty to guide them.

Furthermore, it may be justly objected to this theory, in the form in which it is now stated, that it is directly at variance with the facts in the case. As a matter of fact, we *do not* always calculate the consequences of an action before we pronounce it, in our minds, right or wrong. We are conscious of no such procedure. We do not stop to know what bearing it is likely to have on the public welfare. We do not raise the question at all. We neither know, nor care. Instinctively we decide as to the propriety and rightness of the given act; we approve and condemn without reference to consequences, and on other grounds than that of expediency.

It is fatal to this theory of utility, in whatever form it is stated, whether as referring to the happiness of the individual, or the happiness of the community; to the advantage of the individual, or the advantage of all, that, so far from being conscious ordinarily of any such considerations, in our estimate of the morality of actions, we are conscious of quite the opposite. Our moral decisions are often pronounced under circumstances which preclude the *possibility* of all such prudential considerations. Narrate to a child, just old enough to understand you, some story of flagrant injustice and wrong, the flush of indignation, the glow of resentment, are visible at once on that cheek; the decision of that moral nature, its verdict of disapproval and condemnation, is to be read at once in that eye, that brow, that clenched hand, the whole mien and aspect of the miniature man. Has it been

calculating the expediency and utility of the thing, the consequences to society of what its outraged nature condemns?

But there is a further objection to making utility, in any of its significations, the ground of moral obligation. It is, that all these principles, as thus applied, virtually *presuppose* the existence of moral obligation, and therefore cannot be the ground of it. I perceive such a course to be conducive to happiness; therefore, says the advocate of this view: I am under obligation to pursue that course. But why *therefore*? Why *ought*? Suppose I chose to do that which is *not* on the whole for my happiness; what then? Whose business is it but my own? Either there is no manner of obligation in that case, or else it lies out of, and back of, the principle now supposed. The same may be said of utility in the sense of advantage. It presupposes an obligation to do what is seen to be useful and advantageous, and the question still remains: what is the *ground* of that obligation which the doctrine of utility presupposes?

2. Let us look, now, at the theory which places the foundation of moral obligation on the ground of *positive enactment*. Laws have been made, human and Divine, requiring, forbidding, etc. Hence our approval and condemnation of actions, and our conviction of obligation. The just and the unjust, the right and the wrong, in human conduct, are simply its conformity, or want of conformity, to law.

Of those who take this ground, some look no higher than to human enactment, as the ground of rectitude and the foundation of moral obligation. The laws of man make the right and wrong of things, and are the sufficient and ultimate standard of morals. There is no higher law. No other reason need be given, why I should do, or not do, a given thing, than that the laws of my country require it.

Such, among the ancients, was the doctrine of Epicurus and of the Sophists. Plato, in the "De Legibus," and Aristotle, in his "Ethics," make mention of the doctrine as maintained by some in their day.

Among the moderns, Gassendi and Hobbes are almost the

only writers of distinction who have had the boldness to avow, and the consistency to maintain, a doctrine at once so shameless, so obnoxious to the common sense and common honesty of mankind, and so destructive of the first principles of morality. Occasionally, indeed, the spectacle is presented of some one, more patriotic than discreet, who, in his zeal to defend the constitution and laws of his country, so far forgets himself, in the pressure of the exigency, as to take the general position that the laws of the land are, to us, the final court of appeal, and that we are to look no higher for authority. Even such persons, it is to be presumed, are not fully aware of the true nature and legitimate consequences of this doctrine, nor of the company they keep in maintaining such a position. They would shrink, it is to be hoped, from the doctrine, reduced to its simple elements, and affirmed as a principle in ethics, that *might makes right*, a sentiment that even a German rationalist has pronounced *infernal*, and from the atheism that discards the Deity, and overlooks the moral nature of man, while proclaiming human law as the standard of morals, and the foundation of right.

If it were of any use to reason against a doctrine so little deserving the name of philosophy, or the notice of a calm reply, it were sufficient, perhaps, to ask how it is possible, on this principle, since law is, itself, the source and foundation of right, to compare one law or code with another: those of Draco, e. g., with those of Solon or Lycurgus; the edicts of Nero with those of Constantine; and because one system is mild and humane, another barbarous and inhuman, pronounce one to be more right and just than the other. If law is its own authority, if it makes right, if back of it there is no appeal, no ultimate standard of rectitude, then, of course, everything which is once enacted, and obtains the sanction of established law, is right and binding, no matter what it may be — one equally so with another — and it is absurd to make a distinction between them. The commands of the veriest despot are as just and right, as obligatory on the conscience, as those of the wisest and mildest ruler. Law is law, and that ends the matter. A law morally wrong is an

impossibility, an absurdity. Inasmuch as laws vary, moreover, in different lands, what is right in one country is wrong when you cross a river or a mountain; what is a virtue in Holland, is a sin in Belgium.

Much more reasonable and philosophical is the view of those who regard the *Divine* will and law as the foundation of moral rectitude. This view was maintained by Occam among the scholastics, by Paley and many others among the moderns. Yet, even to this view, insuperable objections arise :

(1) If this view be correct, then we have only to suppose the will of Deity to change, and what is now wrong becomes instantly right : the good and the bad, the virtuous and the vicious, change characters at once. We have only to suppose him other than he is, and to have commanded other than he has ; to have reversed the decalogue, and the things now commanded would then have been wrong, and the things now forbidden would have been right. Murder, adultery, false witness, theft, covetousness, would have been virtues, commendable and obligatory ; while to honor our parents, and to love our neighbor as ourselves, would have been morally wrong. In other words, there is no difference, in respect of moral character, between these actions in themselves considered ; the difference lies wholly in the fact that one is commanded, and the other forbidden ; they are right or wrong, only as they are, or are not, the will of Deity.

It is no answer to this, to say that God is holy, and therefore will not command that which is evil ; nor, that he is immutable, and therefore will not change ; the question is not as to the *matter of fact*, but as to what *would* be true, in case he and his law were not what they are. If it were possible for God to throw around sin the sanction of his law, would it, because of that sanction, *cease* to be sin, and become holiness ? Does the rightness of an act consist wholly and simply in its being lawful ?

(2) It follows also, that, had there been no Divine law to establish the character of actions, human conduct had been neither virtuous nor vicious, neither good nor bad, but all

actions would have been alike indifferent: to hate our neighbor, to take his property, his good name, or his life, would have been not only allowable, but equally as commendable and meritorious, as the opposite. Nothing would have been unjust, nothing wrong.

(3) There is no propriety or sense in speaking of God's law as just and good, in affirming that his statutes are right, his commandments holy, etc.; for moral approbation is wholly misplaced and uncalled for. It is without meaning. For, if there is no standard of right, and no ground of obligation but the law itself, how can its requirements be any other than right and binding, whatever they may be? To say that his statutes are just and right, is to say, simply, that his statutes are his statutes. More than this; when we speak of the law as holy, just, etc., do we not attribute a moral character to the law itself? But how can this be? If the law creates moral distinctions, how can law itself possess a moral character? how can it be either right or wrong? This is to suppose right to exist before it was created.

4. Further: for the same reason we are shut out, on this principle, from attributing to Deity himself any moral character. Law is the foundation of right, and law is from God. Back of his will there is no law, and, of course, no ground of rectitude. God has himself, therefore, aside from his own law, no moral character, no virtue; for, beyond his own will and pleasure, there is no *law* imposing obligation, and constituting, for him, the right and the wrong. One thing is as right as another, for him; everything is equally right; and, strictly speaking, nothing is, for him, either right or wrong. It is language without meaning when we say, with one of old: "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God, just and true are all thy ways." Before he enacted the first law, there was no such thing as right. It depended entirely on his pleasure whether to enact that law. There was no obligation to enact it, for no law, as yet, existed to create obligation. Suppose he had not done it. Right would not have existed; and of course, in that case, could not have pertained to the divine character. Not until he creates the right, by making

law, can he, by any possibility, possess a moral character; and even then it is a moral character which he himself creates, and imposes upon himself, by arbitrary enactment. Had he made a law precisely the reverse of the actual one, it would have been equally right and binding, and himself equally holy. But it is difficult to see how the thing made can put the maker himself under obligation; how, from his own work, he can derive the foundation of a character which he had not, in himself, prior to the work. It is difficult to estimate the intrinsic excellence of that holiness which owes its origin to a purely arbitrary enactment; which might just as well never have been made, or have been entirely other than, and the reverse of, what it is; a holiness which, when strictly viewed, amounts merely to this: that the being who possesses it, *does what he does*.

It may be supposed, perhaps, by some, that the divine law, while it may not absolutely create the distinction of right and wrong, does nevertheless create the *obligation*, on our part, to do, or not to do, the things required; that it is to me the sufficient reason why I ought to do thus and thus. This is a view entitled to a careful consideration. I must do thus, *because* such is the will of Deity. The question is now as to this word *because*. Granting that the will of Deity is as affirmed, what has that to do with my conduct; wherein and how does that place me under obligation to do what the Deity wills? Where lies the binding power of the law itself? Manifestly not *in itself*, as law, but in something else. There must be something to make the law binding, or it can bring with it no obligation to obedience on my part. And in saying this, we really *abandon the position, that law is, itself, the basis of obligation*.

This something, we may find in one of three things: It may be in the *character* of the law given; a holy, just, and good law, and one which we ought therefore to obey. But this is to place the ground of obligation, not in the law itself, but in something else, viz. moral rectitude. I am bound to obey, not because there is a law, but because there is a *holy and just law*.

Or we may turn the binding power of the law to the *rela-*

tion which the Deity sustains to us. He is our creator, preserver, benefactor, and as such has the right, it is said, to control and govern us. But does this, we reply, give him the right to govern and control, *irrespective of moral distinctions*? If it does, then right and wrong are the mere arbitrary creations of his will; a view which we have already considered and rejected. If it does not, then the ultimate ground of obligation is to be found in the *rectitude* of the divine requirements. In either case, it is not the law itself that constitutes the obligation.

Does, then, that which constitutes the binding force of the divine law consist in this: that the Deity is in himself such a being as he is, the greatest, the wisest, the best; and therefore his will is obligatory on other beings? This again is to recognize moral distinctions as lying back of the law itself, and as giving to that law its character and its force. When you say that God is good, just, holy, the best of beings, and, on that account, ought to be obeyed, you abandon the position, that law itself creates moral distinctions, and that it contains in itself the ground of obligation. His being and nature are prior to his law, and the foundation of it; and if his being and nature are themselves good, then certainly it is not his law that makes them so; and if it is from them that our obligation to obedience springs, then certainly not from the law itself.

Whatever view we take, then, of this matter, we are compelled to give up the position that the divine law is the ground of moral obligation. An action is right, not *because* God wills it; on the contrary, *he wills it, because it is right*.

The distinction between the rightness and the lawfulness of an act, is admitted by some, who still place obligation on the ground of law. This is the case with Chalmers. In general it may be remarked, that no writer breathes, throughout, a higher moral tone and purpose, or utters truth with more eloquence and earnestness than he. His style is an avalanche broken loose, a sea of expression, rolling sentence after sentence, wave upon wave, with a loftiness and force quite irresistible. It is the style of the orator, however,

rather than of the philosopher, indicating fervor and strength of feeling, rather than precision and clearness of thought. There is a certain nobleness of sentiment that wins our admiration. We feel sure that some leviathan is ploughing up those waters, and making them to boil; but it is a leviathan not willing to be caught and classified, for purposes of science. In the present case, Dr. Chalmers, if we understand him, derives *obligation* from the divine law, but *right* from the divine character; thus separating the two. While he rejects the view of Paley, that makes the divine command the foundation of right, he still makes that command the foundation of our *obligation to do* the right. Not until Deity interposes with his authority in its behalf, does the right become obligatory.

It is difficult to perceive the justice of this distinction. In the first place, it limits the term *obligation*, to a strictly *forensic* use, a sense to which it is by no means restricted. A wider sense belongs to it. We are under obligation, ethically speaking, to do many things not specifically required by law. But more than this, it seems to *divorce* obligation from right, as if right did not carry in itself a corresponding obligation, but was dependent on law to come in and give it authority; or as if, on the other hand, obligation might sometimes, or might at least be supposed to, run counter to right.

We cannot think such a distinction either necessary or allowable. On the contrary, we regard right and obligation as coëxtensive, and on a common basis. The foundation and origin of the one, is also the source and foundation of the other. Given: the right, and there is given along with it, the obligation to do the right. We cannot conceive them separate; the former, without the latter; a right thing which we are under no obligation to do, or a wrong thing which we are under no obligation to avoid. This obligation is universal, absolute, complete. Law cannot add to it, or make it more perfect than it already is. Law may indicate and enforce, but cannot create, moral obligation. Show me that a thing is *right*, and you show me a reason, and the

best of all reasons, why I *ought* to do it. The moment I perceive the rightness, I perceive also, the obligation. If the one is founded in law, so is the other; if the divine character is the foundation of the one, it is the ground of the other also.

It is admitted, that, in respect to matters in themselves indifferent, as for instance the ceremonies of a ritual observance, law may impose an obligation not previously existing. But such is not the case now under consideration. We are concerned, in this discussion, only with such matters as come under the cognizance of the moral faculty, as being in themselves right or wrong; and the question is: what *constitutes* the obligation to do, not a thing indifferent, but a thing which we perceive and know to be right? Our answer is: the very *rightness* constitutes the obligation. The question returns then: on what does the *rightness* depend? Not on utility, not on law. An action is right, not because expedient, but expedient because right. It is right, not *because* God wills it; on the contrary, *he wills it because it is right*. What then constitutes rightness?

3. It may be said that right and wrong lie not in any of these things: not in the pursuit of happiness or of personal advantage; not in law, human or Divine; but in the nature and character of God himself. This, as we have already stated, is the view of Chalmers. It is the view, also, of many others. We have discussed so fully the previous theories, that there is no need of dwelling long upon this. The same objections that lie against the theory of Divine law, as the source of obligation and the ground of right, apply with equal force to this view. God's law is but the expression of his will; and his will is but the expression and transcript of his character. It is his nature in action. To say that his law constitutes right, then, is virtually saying, in another form, that his nature and character are the ground of right; and whatever objections lie against the one view, are, in reality, equally objections to the other.

If right or wrong depend, ultimately, on the character of God, then we have only to suppose God to change, or to

have been originally other than he is, and our duties and obligations change at once : that which was a virtue, becomes a crime ; that which is a crime, is transformed into a virtue. Had he been precisely the reverse of what he is, he had still been, as now, the source of right, and his own character would have been as truly good, and just, and right, as it is now. This is, virtually, to rob him of all moral character. We may still say that he is holy, and that his ways are right ; but we mean by it only this, when we come to explain : that he is what he is, and does what he does. The holiness of his acts consists, not at all in the essential character of the acts themselves, but only in the circumstance that they are *his* acts.

It does not meet this objection to say that God is holy, holy by a necessity of his nature ; and that he can never be otherwise ; that is not the question ; but simply, whether his being what he is, is the ground of all rectitude and of all obligation ; whether that which he does is right *because it conforms to his character*, or whether his character is holy *because it conforms to the right*. This is a very important distinction.

We have this objection, then, to the view which resolves virtue into the Divine character, and makes right inherent originally in the Divine nature ; that while it seeks to honor God by making him the source of all excellence, it really takes away from his character the highest excellence and glory that can pertain to it, that of conforming to the right.

4. We seem to be driven, then, to the only remaining conclusion, that right and wrong are distinctions immutable, and inherent in the nature of things. They are not the creations of expediency, nor of law ; nor yet do they originate in the Divine character. They have *no* origin : they are eternal as the throne of Deity ; they are immutable as God himself. Nay, were God himself to change, these distinctions would change not. Omnipotence has no power over them, whether to create or to destroy. Law does not make them, but they make law. They are the source and spring of all law and all obligation. Reason points out these distinctions ; the moral nature recognizes and approves them. God's law, and will,

and nature, are in conformity to these distinctions ; else that law were not just and right, nor that nature holy. Our moral nature is in conformity to these distinctions ; hence we approve and disapprove, as we do, the various actions of men. The deeds are right, not *because* we approve them ; on the contrary, we approve them *because they are right*. They are right, not *because* they are commanded ; but they are commanded *because they are right*.

There is a sense in which Deity himself is subject to this eternal and immutable law of right. There are things which it would not be right for even Deity to do. So fully does his moral nature approve the right and abhor the wrong, that the Scriptures declare it impossible for him to do evil. There is no purity like his ; no approval of the right, no condemnation and abhorrence of the wrong, so strong and intense as his, in the whole universe. This his moral nature is to him a law, the highest possible and conceivable, placing him under obligation, not indeed to another, but to himself, to adhere ever to the eternal principles of right, and truth, and justice.

In their anxiety to honor and exalt the Divine Being, some have shrunk from the idea that there is any law or obligation, resting on the Deity, to do one thing rather than another ; that there is, or can be, anything which it would be wrong for him to do. But which most honors and exalts God, to resolve the distinction of right and wrong into the arbitrary decisions of his will, thus leaving him without moral character, or to regard that distinction as immutable and eternal, extending even to the throne and will of him who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters, and hangeth the earth upon nothing ? Which most honors him, to make his nature and his will the foundation of right, or the eternal principles of right and justice the foundation of his character and his law ? Which gives the noblest and most exalted conception of the Divine Being ? Which of these two views imparts the loftier significance to that sublime anthem of the angels, that goes up unceasingly before his throne, and shall yet go up from the entire universe : " HOLY, HOLY, HOLY, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come ; " and to that song of the redeemed

that stand upon the sea of glass : "*Just and true* are thy ways, thou king of saints. Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name ? "

It may be said, perhaps, that to make right and wrong inherent in the nature of things, is virtually to place their foundation and origin in God, since the nature of things depends, after all, on him. He who made all things, is the author of their nature also.

This objection derives its force from the somewhat indefinite expression, " nature of *things* ; " a phrase used with great latitude of meaning. As used to denote material objects and their qualities, it is true that both *things*, and the nature of things, are the work of God. As used to denote finite intelligences, the same is true ; they are the work of the Divine Intelligence, they and their original nature. But when we speak of things, and the nature of things, as applicable to this discussion, we do not, of course, refer to material objects, nor yet to spiritual intelligences, but to the actions and moral conduct of intelligent beings, created or uncreated, finite or infinite. We mean to say, that such and such acts of an intelligent voluntary agent, whoever he may be, are, in themselves, in *their very nature*, right or wrong. Now God does not create the actions of intelligent free agents, and, of course, does not create the nature of those actions. To say that the moral character of an act is created by Deity, is simply to beg the question in dispute.

When we say that right and wrong are inherent, then, in the very nature of things, we simply assert that certain courses of conduct are, in themselves, in their very nature and essence, wrong, certain others, right ; that they are so, quite independent and irrespective of the consequences that result from them, or of the sanctions and authority with which they may be invested ; that they are so, not because of the laws, either human or Divine, that give them force ; that they would be so, were there no law, or were it the opposite of what it is ; that even the actions of Deity himself, fall within the range of this universal principle ; and that it does not depend on his will, or even his nature, much less on his

power as Creator, to establish or abolish this immutable distinction.

We say it is in the very nature of things, that the whole is greater than a part; that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. We cannot conceive the opposite to be true. It does not depend on the will of Deity whether these things shall be so or not. He does not create these relations. They are eternal and necessary truths. In like manner there are certain truths pertaining to the conduct of all rational and intelligent beings, certain moral distinctions, which we regard as immutable and eternal, inherent in the very nature of things. And on this firm eternal basis, rests the foundation of our moral obligation.

We have discussed, as yet, but two of the elements, or mental processes, into which our analysis resolved an act of conscience. It remains to notice briefly the third.

III. *The perception of merit and demerit, with the consequent approbation or censure of the agent.*

No sooner do we perceive an action to be right or wrong, and to involve, therefore, an obligation on the part of the doer, than there arises also in the mind, the idea of merit or demerit, in connection with the doing; we regard the agent as deserving of praise or blame, and in our own minds do approve or condemn him, and his course, accordingly. This approval or censure of ourselves and others, according to the apprehended desert of the act and the actor, constitutes a process of trial, an inner tribunal, at whose bar are constantly arraigned the various deeds of men, especially our own, and whose verdict it is no easy matter to set aside.

It is in point here, to consider how far these decisions are correct and reliable; what authority they have for the control of the conduct; and what is their actual influence over us.

The question arises, as to the correctness and reliableness of the decisions of the moral faculty. This question, though pertaining directly to the final verdict of approval or condemnation, relates also to the previous perceptions on which

that verdict is based, and so covers in fact the entire ground of the operations of this faculty. The final verdict will be correct or not, according as the previous judgments are so. If conscience correctly discerns the right and the wrong, and the consequent obligation, she will be likely to judge correctly as to the deserts of the doer. If she mistake these points, she may approve what is not worthy of approval, and condemn what is good.

How are we to know, then, whether conscience judges right? What voucher have we for her correctness? How far is she to be trusted in her perceptions and decisions? Perhaps we are so constituted, it may be said, as invariably to judge that to be right which is wrong, and the reverse, and so to approve where we should condemn. True, we reply, this may be so. It may be that I am so constituted, that two and two shall *seem* to be four, when in reality they are five; and that the three angles of a triangle shall *seem* to be equal to two right angles, when in reality they are equal to three. This may be so. Still it is a presumption in favor of the correctness of all our natural perceptions, that they are the operation of original principles of our constitution. It is not probable, to say the least, that we are so constituted by the great author of our being, as to be habitually deceived. It may be that the organs of vision and hearing are absolutely false; that the things which we see, and hear, and feel, through the medium of the senses, have no correspondence to our supposed perceptions. But this is not a probable supposition. He who denies the validity of the natural faculties, has the burden of proof; and proof is of course impossible; for the simple reason, that, in order to prove them false, you must make use of these very faculties; and if their testimony is not reliable in the one case, certainly it is not in the other. We must then take their veracity for granted; and we have the right to do so. And so of our moral nature. It comes from the author of our being, and if it is uniformly and originally wrong, then he is wrong. It is an error, which, in the nature of the case, can never be detected or corrected. We cannot get beyond our constitu-

tion, back of our natural endowments, to judge, *à priori*, and from an external position, whether they are correct or not. Right and wrong are not indeed the creations of the divine will; but the faculties by which we perceive and approve the right, and condemn the wrong, are from him; and we must presume upon their general correctness.

It does not follow from this, however, nor do we affirm, that conscience is infallible, that she never errs. It does not follow that our moral perceptions and judgments are invariably correct, because they spring from our native constitution. This is not so. There is not one of the faculties of the human mind that is not liable to err. Not one of its activities is infallible. The reasoning power sometimes errs; the judgment errs; the memory errs. The moral faculty is on the same footing, in this respect, with any and all other faculties.

But of what use, it will be said, is a moral faculty on which, after all, we cannot rely? Of what use, we reply, is *any* mental faculty, that is not absolutely and universally correct? Of what use is a memory or a judgment, that sometimes errs? We do not wholly distrust these faculties, or cast them aside as worthless. A time-keeper may be of great value, though not absolutely perfect. Its authorship and original construction, may be a strong presumption in favor of its general correctness; nevertheless its hands may have been accidentally set to the wrong hour of the day.

This is a spectacle that not unfrequently presents itself in the moral world—a man with his conscience pointing to the wrong hour; a strictly conscientious man, fully and firmly persuaded that he is right, yet by no means agreeing with the general convictions of mankind; an hour or two before, or it may be, as much behind the age. Such men are the hardest of all mortals to be set right, for the simple reason, that they are conscientious. ‘Here is my watch; it points to such an hour; and my watch is from the very best maker. I cannot be mistaken.’ And yet he is mistaken, and egregiously so. The truth is, conscience is no more infallible than any other mental faculty. It is simply, as we have

seen, a power of perceiving and judging, and its operations, like all other perceptions and judgments, are liable to error.

And this which we have just said, goes far to account for the great diversity, that has long been known to exist, in the moral judgments and opinions of men. It has often been urged, and with great force, against the supposed existence of a moral faculty in man, as a part of his original nature, that men think and act so differently with respect to these matters. Nature, it is said, ought to act uniformly; thus eyes and ears do not give essentially conflicting testimony, at different times, and in different countries, with respect to the same objects. Certain colors are universally pleasing, and certain sounds disagreeable. But not so, it is said, with respect to the moral judgments of men. What one approves, another condemns. If these distinctions are universal, absolute, essential; and if the power of perceiving them is inherent in our nature, men ought to agree in their perception of them. Yet you will find nothing approved by one age and people, which is not condemned by some other; nay, the very crimes of one age and nation, are the religious acts of another. If the perception of right and wrong is intuitive, how happens this diversity?

To which we reply, the thing has been already accounted for. Our ideas of right and wrong, it was stated, in discussing their origin, depend on circumstances for their time and degree of development. They are not irrespective of opportunity. Education, habits, laws, customs, while they do not originate, still have much to do with, the development and modification of these ideas. They may be by these influences aided or retarded, in their growth, or even quite misdirected, just as a tree may, by unfavorable influences, be hindered and thwarted in its growth, be made to turn and twist, and put forth abnormal and monstrous developments. Yet nature works there, nevertheless, and in spite of all such obstacles, and unfavorable circumstances, seeks to put forth, according to her laws, her perfect and finished work. All that we contend is, that nature under favorable circumstances, develops in the human mind, the idea of moral

distinctions, while, at the same time, *men may differ much in their estimate of what is right, and what is wrong*, according to the circumstances and influences surrounding them. To apply the distinction of right and wrong to particular cases, and decide as to the morality of given actions, is an office of judgment, and the judgment may err in this, as in any other of its operations. It may be biassed by unfavorable influences, by wrong education, wrong habits, and the like.

The same is true, substantially, of all our natural faculties and their operations. They depend on circumstances for the degree of their development, and the mode of their action. Hence they are liable to great diversity and frequent error. Perception misleads us as to sensible objects, not seldom; even in their mathematical reasonings, men do not always agree. There is the greatest possible diversity among men, as to the retentiveness of the memory, and as to the extent and power of the reasoning faculties. The savage, that thinks it no wrong to scalp his enemy, or even to roast and eat him, is utterly unable to count twenty upon his fingers; while the philosopher, who recognizes the duty of loving his neighbor as himself, calculates with precision the motions of the heavenly bodies, and predicts their place in the heavens for ages to come. Shall we conclude, because of this diversity, that these several faculties are not parts of our nature?

We are by no means disposed to admit, however, that the diversity in men's moral judgments is so great as might, at first, appear. There is, on the contrary, a general uniformity. As to the great essential principles of morals, men, after all, do judge much alike, in different ages and different countries. In details, they differ; in general principles, they agree. In the application of the rules of morality to particular actions, they differ widely, according to circumstances; in the recognition of the right and the wrong, as distinctive principles, and of obligation to do the right as known, and avoid the wrong as known, in this they agree. It must be remembered, moreover, that men do not always act according to their own ideas of right. From the general neglect of virtue, in any age or community, and the prevalence of great and revolting crimes,

we cannot safely infer the absence, or even the perversion, of the moral faculty.

It is important to bear in mind, throughout this discussion, the distinction between the idea of right, in itself considered, and the perception of a given act as right; the one a simple conception, the other an act of judgment; the one an idea derived from the very constitution of the mind, connate if not innate, the other an application of that idea, by the understanding, to particular instances of conduct. The former, the idea of moral distinctions, may be universal, necessary, absolute, unerring; the latter, the application of the idea to particular instances, and the decision that such and such acts are or are not right, may be altogether an incorrect and mistaken judgment. Now it is precisely at this point that the diversity in the moral judgments of mankind makes its appearance. In recognizing the distinction of right and wrong, they agree; in the application of the same to particular instances, in deciding *what* is right and *what* is wrong—a simple act of the judgment, an exercise of the understanding, as we have said—in this it is that they differ. And the difference is no greater, and no more inexplicable, with respect to this, than in any other class of judgments.

We have admitted that conscience is not infallible. Is it, then, a safe guide? Are we, in all cases, to follow its decisions? Since liable to err, it cannot be, in itself, we reply, in all cases, a safe guide. We cannot conclude, with certainty, that a given course is right, simply because conscience approves it. This does not, of necessity, follow. The decision that a given act is right, or not, is simply a matter of judgment; and the judgment may or may not be correct. That depends on circumstances, on education partly, on the light we have, be it more or less. Conscientious men are not always in the right. We may do wrong conscientiously. Saul of Tarsus was a conscientious persecutor, and verily thought he was doing God service. No doubt many of the most intolerant and relentless bigots have been equally conscientious, and equally mistaken. Such men are all the more dangerous because doing what they believe to be right.

What, then, are we to do? Shall we follow a guide thus liable to err? Yes, we reply, follow conscience; but see that it be a right and well-informed conscience, forming its judgments, not from impulse, passion, prejudice, the bias of habit, or of unreflecting custom, but from the clearest light of reason, and especially of the divine word. We are responsible for the judgments we form in morals, as much as for any class of our judgments; responsible, in other words, for the sort of conscience we have. Saul's mistake lay, not in acting according to his conscientious convictions of duty, but in not having a more enlightened conscience. He should have formed a more careful judgment; have inquired more diligently after the right way. To say, however, that a man ought not to do what conscience approves, is to say that he ought not to do what he sincerely believes to be right. This would be a very strange rule in morals.

Another point to be noticed, before we leave the subject, is the *power* of conscience, the influence which its verdicts of approval or condemnation exerts over the human mind. Very great is this power, as evinced in operation. We all know something of it, not only by the observation of others, but by the consciousness of our own inner life. In the testimony of a good conscience, in its calm, deliberate approval of our conduct, lies one of the sweetest and purest of the pleasures of life; a source of enjoyment whose springs are beyond the reach of accident or envy; a fountain in the desert, making glad the wilderness and the solitary place. It has, moreover, a sustaining power. The consciousness of rectitude, the approval of the still small voice within, that whispers, in the moment of danger and of weakness: "*you are right*," imparts to the fainting soul a courage and a strength that can come from no other source. Under its influence the soul is elevated above the violence of pain and the pressure of outward calamity. The timid become bold, the weak are made strong. Here lies the secret of much of the heroism that adorns the annals of martyrdom and of the church. Women and children, frail and feeble by nature, ill fitted to withstand the force of public opinion, and shrinking

from the very thought of pain and suffering, have calmly faced the angry reproaches of the multitude, and resolutely met death in its most terrific forms, sustained by the power of an approving conscience, whose decisions were, to them, of more consequence than the applause or censure of the world, and whose sustaining power bore them, as on a prophet's chariot of fire, above the pains of torture and the rage of infuriated men.

Not less is the power of an accusing conscience. Its disapprobation and censure, though clothed with no external authority, are more to be dreaded than the frowns of kings or the approach of armies. It is a silent constant presence that cannot be escaped and will not be pacified. It embitters the happiness of life, cuts the sinews of the soul's inherent strength. It is a fire in the bones, burning when no man suspects but he only who is doomed to its endurance; a girdle of thorns worn next the heart, concealed, it may be, from the eye of man, but giving the wearer no rest, day nor night. Its accusations are not loud, but to the guilty soul they are terrible, penetrating her inmost recesses, and making her to tremble as the forest trembles at the roar of the enraged lion, as the deep sea trembles in her silent depths, when her Creator goeth by on the wings of the tempest, and the God of glory thundereth. The bold bad man hears that accusing voice, and his strength departs from him. The heart that is inured to all evil, and grown hard in sin, and fears not the face of man, nor the law of God, hears it, and becomes as the heart of a child.

How terrible is remorse! that worm that never dies, that fire that never goes out. We cannot follow the human soul beyond the confines of its present existence. But it is an opinion entertained by some, and in itself not improbable, that, in the future, conscience will act with greatly increased power. When the causes that now conspire to prevent its full development and perfect action, shall operate no longer; when the tumult of the march and the battle are over; when the cares, the pleasures, the temptations, the vain pursuits, that now distract the mind with their confused uproar, shall

die away in the distance and cease to be heard, in the stillness of eternity, in the silence of a purely spiritual existence, the still small voice of conscience may perhaps be heard as never before. In the busy day-time we catch, at intervals, the sound of the distant ocean, as a low and gentle murmur. In the still night, when all is hushed, we hear it beating, in heavy and constant surges, on the shore. And thus it may be with the power of conscience in the future.

ARTICLE II.

THE DEMANDS OF INFIDELITY SATISFIED BY CHRISTIANITY.

By Samuel Harris, D. D., Professor in Bangor Theological Seminary.

You are associated,¹ gentlemen, to inquire respecting the interests of Christ's kingdom; to study its dangers and the means of averting them; its resources and the means of making them available. At this moment no enemy threatens the churches so deadly in its nature, or so formidable in its position and resources, as infidelity. It is befitting this occasion to consider how this enemy may be most successfully opposed.

It may aid us to consider, for a moment, the true relation of Christianity to heathenism. The heathen religion is not unmingled diabolism. It is the expression, though distorted, of universal spiritual wants which Christianity alone can satisfy; wants buried, with their immortal life in them, beneath mountains of error and depravity, and therefore manifesting themselves, like Enceladus beneath Aetna, only in volcanic groans and struggles that terrify the world; and

¹ This Article is an Address delivered in the Seminary Chapel at Andover, on the Anniversary of the Society of Inquiry, July 31st, 1855.

yet wants of the spiritual nature which can never die.¹ Heathenism also prefigures Christianity; it shadows the facts which Christianity alone reveals and the truths which it alone expresses — adumbrations monstrous indeed; like fantastic shadows from a flickering fire dancing on the dimness of a kitchen wall, and yet shadows of divine reality. Therefore there is an important sense in which Christianity may address to the heathen world the words of Paul: “Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.”

And Christianity is to be vindicated, not by claiming that it teaches the contrary of all that man ever desired or thought, but by showing that it meets the wants of the spiritual nature uttered in all religions, and reveals the realities which they have dimly shadowed; that whatever of good the Greek philosophy taught, whatever of beauty the Greek mythology embodied, whatever of sublimity the Eastern mysticism dreamed, is taken up in Christianity and set forth in its reality, and in its harmony with God’s actual work of redemption; that thus not Aethiopia only, but all nations have stretched forth their hands unto God; that thus Christ has been, as the Scriptures declare, “the Desire of all nations,” and “in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”

These views of the relation of Christianity to heathenism, have of late been gaining the assent of Christian scholars. It is not yet clearly understood,—to some minds, the assertion may seem both startling and untenable,—that Chris-

¹ A missionary, hoping to facilitate his work by introducing the arts of civilization, caused an American plough to be imported, and carefully taught the rude natives its use. They danced in ecstasy, and, at the missionary’s request, took it away to their own fields. On visiting them a few days afterwards, the missionary found to his amazement that, instead of ploughing with the plough, they had set it on end, daubed it with red paint, and were worshipping it. A missionary recently returned from Bombay stated to the writer that, whenever the cars leave the station, natives may be seen prostrating themselves in adoration of the locomotive. Facts like these exemplify the truth that the wants met by religion exist earlier than the wants met by civilization, and are more prompt, extensive and powerful in their action; and that it is necessary to satisfy, guide, and develop these religious wants in savage and partially civilized tribes, in order to the most expeditious and effective civilization.

tianity sustains the same relation to infidelity itself; that it is to triumph over this its most formidable foe, not merely by disproving its arguments, but also by satisfying the wants which it unconsciously utters, and by realizing the ideas which it is blindly groping to grasp. It is easy to say that infidelity is the result of human depravity. But if this is true, it is a proposition too general to be of service in our endeavors to remove the evil. We must know more specifically in what principles of the mind, in what laws of thought and feeling it roots itself in the soul, and from what it draws the nutriment of its vigorous growth. In itself, it is a mere negation. As such, it can have power, only as it allies itself with the devilish in man, to deny and resist Christianity because it is divine. But this negative character, even when energized by its alliance with depravity, is insufficient to account for the prevalence and power of infidelity both in the schools and the shops. There are real and universal wants of the soul which it aims to meet, and true ideas which it aims to express. By pressing into its service these real wants and true ideas, it acquires a positive character not intrinsically its own. It rejects Christianity, on the supposition that it is inadequate to meet these wants and to realize these ideas.

But whatever strength infidelity gains in this way, it draws from misapprehension of the actual comprehensiveness of the Christian system; misapprehensions legitimately arising, it may be, from an inadequate appreciation and presentation of Christianity on the part of its believers. The religion of Christ comprehends the true satisfaction of every legitimate want of the human soul. It is capable of satisfying the one great class of minds, which, speculative like the Greek, seek in Christianity, wisdom; it is equally capable of satisfying the other great class of minds, which, practical, like the Jew, seek in Christianity, signs. To the former, it presents the true rationalism, it solves their profoundest problems, harmonizes their chaotic systems, and carries reason into fields of thought, vaster than reason ever discovered. To the latter, it presents itself the true wonder-worker,

proving its divine power, by perpetually performing divine works.

We can cope with infidelity successfully, only as we can reveal Christianity in its true comprehensiveness, both as a system of truth, and a power of life; only, as we can make the thinker see that it meets all the legitimate demands of his reason; only as we can make the worker see that it furnishes both the light and the power to realize all that he legitimately demands for his work. So only can we silence the pretensions of infidelity, to possess a positive character of its own, prove that it has no right to exist, from the necessity of filling up what is lacking in Christianity, and drive it back, as a bare negation, to depravity and Satan as its only allies.

This is the subject which I have chosen for this evening: *The capacity of Christianity to satisfy all the legitimate wants, and to realize all the true ideas of the human mind, of which modern infidelity is more or less consciously the exponent.*

I. The first source of modern infidelity, is the demand of the human mind for an established law, order, or course of nature in all things. It is the demand that whatever claims to be religion be a development and not an interruption of this order or course of things; not above it, nor parallel to it, but a part of it, evolved out of it, one with it, subject to its law and expressing its unity.

This is the source of the infidelity of modern science. Christianity is rejected, because it is falsely supposed to be incapable of satisfying this demand; because its miracles are regarded as merely supernatural, its law merely a positive and arbitrary enactment, its redemption a forcible intervention of a *Deus e machina*, and its final consummation the destruction and not a new development of the universal order of things.

This demand is legitimate. However browbeaten as the pride of intellect, it can be silenced only by being satisfied. The capability of Christianity to satisfy this demand I am now to show.

In order to proceed intelligently, however, I must premise,

that there is an exclusiveness in the demands of science in this connection, which it must be compelled to abandon. It acknowledges but one source of knowledge, the senses : but one method of knowledge, induction : and but one sphere of knowledge, material phenomena. It must remain infidel, and even atheistic, till it is driven from this exclusive position.

Christianity, more comprehensive, recognizes both reason and faith¹ as sources of knowledge, as deep in the constitution of man as the senses themselves ; it presses its weight on every law of belief ; the very act of believing it, gives development and scope to every power, and calls into action every hidden law of the intellect. There is no controversy

¹ The tendency to believe testimony is as constitutional as the tendency to believe the senses ; and it does not oftener lead to error.

Man's normal state is holiness, and in that state he is surrounded only by holy beings. He is made, therefore, to believe implicitly. It is only the knowledge of evil that teaches man to disbelieve. Hence the credulity of children. It is the spontaneous action of a law of belief belonging to man's normal state. "Heaven lies about us in our infancy."

God, in forming man's constitution, formed him to believe in testimony as really as in the senses ; and so prepared him to be the recipient of revelation. Walking by faith has its foundation in the human constitution as really as walking by sight.

Belief in testimony, or the confidence of men in one another, is the bond of society, without which the social state would be impossible.

God, in communicating his revelation through testimony, seems to throw himself on the confidence of his creatures. He seems to say : "Behold, ye are in a world of falsehood and tempted to have no faith in man. You were made for a world of truth, where every word is worthy of belief. Your very constitution adapts you to a world of universal faith. Behold, I send you messengers of the unerring truth of the world from which you are fallen. Believe their testimony. From the suspicion and scepticism engendered by your knowledge of evil, turn to the truth which you were made to believe." Thus God casts himself on the confidence of his creatures, to win them to believe and trust him ; and in so doing he draws out and strengthens that confidence which is one of the noblest elements of man's normal state, and which even here is the bond of society. Infidelity, on the contrary, says to men : "Behold, you are in a world of lies ; for this you were made ; there is nothing in your constitution that prompts you to trust others ; you are made only for falsehood and unbelief." And so it crushes that confidence which is necessary to elevate man to his normal state, and even to make society tolerable here.

The fact that all the constitutional laws of belief do continually lead men to error is a proof that man is fallen from his normal state.

here, between reason and faith ; they act in alliance to vindicate their own authority and existence against a destructive science which discards both.

Equally exclusive is science in its teachings respecting the method and sphere of knowledge. Inductive science is incapable of making known the existence of any substance, whether the inquirer's own existence or that of the external world ; it cannot verify any source of knowledge or law of belief ; it cannot show why even the senses are to be trusted, or the uniformity of nature believed. It takes no cognizance of either efficient or final causes. Bacon rejected the latter from science, as being like vestal virgins, sacred to religion, and therefore barren. Comte, carrying out the system more consistently, excludes efficient causes also from the sphere of knowledge, and thus denies that we can have any knowledge, not merely of a personal God, not merely of an impersonal first cause, but of efficiency or power itself. The boasted inductive method,—philosophy it may not be called, since it makes philosophy impossible,—whenever logically and exclusively carried out, is destructive, not of revelation merely, nor even of philosophy, but of belief itself. The argument of Hume respecting miracles, is a legitimate inference, proving the impossibility of supernatural revelation ; the misnamed Positive Philosophy of Comte, is its fair and legitimate statement, proving the impossibility of philosophy ; and universal scepticism is its legitimate and ultimately necessary result.

Here is no conflict of philosophy and revelation ; they act in alliance, to vindicate their own existence and the possibility of knowledge against a destructive science, fatal alike to both. On this point, the demands of science are not to be satisfied, but silenced ; science must remain sceptical till it will confess and abandon its own bigoted exclusiveness.

When this is done, and it has thus become possible to believe in a God and to admit the idea of a revelation as a possibility ; when the sources of knowledge, the laws of belief, and the methods of investigation which philosophy and revelation alike vindicate, are recognized, and the mind begins to ex-

patiate in the comprehensive sphere of knowledge thus opened, then returns the demand for the unity of one all-embracing law. The mind, adopting the method of induction, to which it always spontaneously resorts in dealing with facts—and before the days of Bacon, not less than since—attempts to classify the grand facts made known through the senses, the reason, and faith, and to reduce them all to general laws. It demands that the particular facts disclosed by revelation shall harmonize, in detail, with the teachings of science and philosophy. It demands, also, that science, philosophy, and revelation shall not be merely three isolated spheres of knowledge, each having a unity of its own, but that they shall be parts of one system, the unity of which the mind discerns; and that, through all the facts of science, the intuitions of reason, and the deductions of philosophy, and through all the inward experience of the divine power in the heart, and all its outward revelations of the world unseen, be discerned the unity of one all-pervading law, and the harmony of one all-embracing plan. Here reason and philosophy are found allied with science, and insisting that, till Christianity proves itself able to satisfy these demands, it shall not be accepted as divine. This, I am to show, that it is able to do.

In the first place, Christianity discloses the true comprehensiveness of that order or course of things, in which the unity of the universe is found.

The error of Naturalism lies in taking the course of nature as the only course or order of events in the development of universal being, and the law of nature as the one all-comprehending law. Therefore it strives to find a place for Christianity in the course and law of nature; and failing, rejects it as having no right to be. But this is an attempt to incorporate the whole into one of its own parts. The truth is, that the course of nature is but one course or order of the Divine manifestation; the natural is but one part of that universal Divine action which, when exerted beyond the course of nature, we call supernatural, and which at once encompasses and permeates the natural, as the ocean encompasses and permeates its own currents. Thus Christianity is not to be taken up into the course of nature, but

the course of nature itself is to be taken up into that universal course of the Divine procedure which Christianity reveals. Miracles and direct interpositions of God's Spirit, though they transcend the course of nature, are only the penetration of it by a broader law, in which itself is comprehended. The course of nature is, as I just now intimated, like a current in the ocean. It has its own limits, course, and law ; but is also subject to the law of the ocean in which it moves, and a part of which it is ; it heaves with the ocean's billows ; the swell of distant storms, unseen in all the course of the current, sweeps across it, and the ocean-tides, raised by heavenly attraction, exhibit its phenomena, inexplicable to one who knows only the course of the current, but themselves the natural course of the ocean in which it moves. So the course of nature, which science reveals, is but a current in the ocean of God's universal action ; if miracles sweep across it, and tides of heavenly influence swell within it, though transcending its law and unaccountable to one who looks only at its course, yet are they but the result of a broader law and the course of an all-comprehending action, sweeping across the stream of time, and to higher intelligences manifesting, and not interrupting, the law which is the harmony of the universe.

Therefore, while science reveals the course of nature, Christianity reveals the acts of God and the law of his action in that unseen infinitude in which, as in an ocean, the course of nature winds its way ; it shows how these divine acts from the unseen sweep through the course of nature, and reveals what are its position in, and its relations to, God's universal manifestation of himself in action.¹

¹ It is remarkable that, however incredible the Scriptural miracles would seem in any other book, we are never conscious of surprise, never regard them as incredible, incongruous or unexpected, when we read of them in the Bible. The central thought that this is the record of God's feelings and acts in saving men, is so vast, the truths opened to us are so stupendous, the scenes disclosed so sublime, every step in the progressing story is so manifestly the step of the Almighty, that these great miracles harmonize with the grandeur of the whole revelation ; they seem to us no more surprising or incredible, than the rainbow with which God adorns the retiring storm or the stars with which he nightly gems the sky.

As Christianity reveals the comprehensiveness of the law or course of things, so also it recognizes those elements essential to the very idea of a plan, efficient and final causes. Physical science, discarding these, is incapable of grasping the idea of a universal plan. It discloses only a causeless and aimless succession of phenomena, connected only by juxtaposition and uniformity of sequence. So far as it teaches us, the earth, rolled aimless and unguided through space, is but as a wreck, helpless on the heaving ocean, to whose sides its wretched inhabitants cling for a season in dismal expectation, and over which the surging days break unceasing, like blind billows, each sweeping off its thousands, to sink forever in the fathomless abyss. Philosophy, seeking the cause and purpose of things, grasps the idea of a plan, but is incapable of disclosing what the plan is. Christianity recognizes all the elements of a universal system; it reveals its source in the personal God; the deepest law of its administration or evolution in the divine love, and its final purpose in God's glory, or the ever developing expression of what God is.

It is this broad plan which is recognized in the great Calvinistic, the Augustinian, the Pauline doctrine of the eternal purpose of God, foreordaining "whatsoever cometh to pass." This doctrine itself is objected to as destructive of the very idea of a course or law of nature, and as resolving all events into the isolated results of arbitrary and ictic volitions. But it does express the very law which is the unity of the universe. It teaches that every purpose of God's will is the expression of God's eternal character; that every purpose of his will expresses the eternal bent or intention of the mind of God, concentrates in itself the energies and affections which glow eternal in the Godhead, and impel him to action. It teaches, therefore, that all which he does is the expression of his eternal and holy nature intelligently evolving itself in action; and that all his works, the least as well as the greatest, come out of the inmost mind and heart of the Eternal. As in the finger's end are felt the pulsations of the heart, so in the remotest act of God, pulsate the eter-

nal energies of the Godhead. It teaches, therefore, that God does not reveal himself by words, but by deeds; not suddenly, but in the slow development of himself, and of his purpose in action; that planets and suns, miracles and revelations, redemption and providence, are acts in which he is evermore expressing his nature, and evolving his eternal purpose; letters in which he is evermore writing his eternally incommunicable name; that alike the creation and the incarnation, natural events and miracles, the birth of men, and their new birth, all the development of history, all that science teaches, all that inspiration reveals, are parts of the one plan and purpose of God, in which the unity and harmony of the universe are found. Therefore whatever apparent disagreement there may be for a time between science, philosophy, and revelation, they will certainly be seen to agree at last, even in their details, because they do but disclose in their several spheres, the acts of God, in which he develops his unchanging character and his eternal purpose.

Infidelity objects that it is inconsistent with what science teaches of the vastness of the universe, and the fixedness of its laws, that a single individual, so insignificant as a man, should be so prominent in the thoughts and action of God, as Christianity represents; or even that the earth itself, should have been the theatre of transactions so stupendous. But since the energies of the Godhead move him to express himself in action, every act however minute, can be nothing less than an expression of God, and must therefore bear the impress of his infinitude. When God acts, he must act as God; and therefore the action must reveal the grandeur of God. The mystery encompassing even a blade of grass, or a grain of sand, is the finger-print left on it by the infinite hand that made it. To ripen a grain of wheat, he employs the grandest agencies of omnipotence; the sun is laid under contribution for light, the ocean for moisture, the earth and the air for food; electricity is compelled to lay aside its thunders, and minister to its growth; the power of attraction which binds the universe together, must toil in its little vessels to draw up its juices; chemical affinities elaborate its

nutriment; the mysterious principle of life presides within the stalk, over the toil of these tremendous agencies; and thus concentrating the powers of the universe in its service, God perfects the grain of wheat, and yet in all this vast preparation and agency to effect a special and minute result, he interrupts no law of nature, turns aside no universal power from fulfilling its constant and universal ends, but only carries out in the special work the universal law.

It is not wonderful, therefore, that still wider are the range and grander the power of those divine energies, which bring into being, and advance to maturity, the mustard-seed of grace within the soul. God's eternal love is concerned with that soul's regeneration; the Son of God became man, and died for it; the divine Spirit has changed it, and dwells in it; divine revelation guides it; eternity furnishes it motives; the ministry of angels is given it; the action and attributes of God centre on it, as if its salvation were the one work of God's omnipotence, and the one end of his counsels; and yet it all is no interruption of the great plan which embraces all worlds and their destiny, and evolves itself evermore in the steady course of nature and the equally uniform and more comprehensive course of grace.

It is not only in storms that the ocean reveals its strength; but in the calmest day its gentlest swell moves in upon the beach with a majesty which could only have been acquired by traversing the ocean's breadth, and concentrating in itself the ocean's power. So every act of God is majestic with the love and power of the Godhead; whether creating a world or redeeming it, raising or prostrating kingdoms, or bringing in mighty reformations, or giving gracious consolation to the afflicted, or drawing a child to himself, or listening to the sighs of the penitent, it is all the acting of godlike majesty and love, which has swept across the ocean of God's eternal counsels, and gathered into its gentlest movement, the eternal power and love of God. And thus each individual act, like the universal plan in its wholeness, expresses the power which is the eternal source of all, and the love which is the eternal and constantly evolving law of all, and

looks forward to, and advances, the glory of God in the complete and eternal expression of himself, which is the great end of all. The greatness of God's works on this earth, and in individuals, is therefore no argument against Christianity, but an argument for it. It shows the absolute unity and completeness of this plan, that, while God cannot express himself fully short of eternity, yet every act of God is an expression of God; that there shines in it the fulness of the divine; and each divine act in the advancement of his plan, is itself a germ of the whole plan, and reveals microscopically the divine source, the divine law, and the divine end of the whole plan.¹

¹ That there is such a plan, permeating and transcending the causeless and aimless sequences of science, is written in nature as well as in the Bible. While the Bible claims that all material phenomena are subordinate to God's spiritual designs, nature itself discloses the far-reaching thought of God looking through material forms and natural laws to spiritual uses and ends.

Without the recognition of final causes, Cuvier could not have realized the splendid results of comparative anatomy, nor could geologists prove that fossils were not created fossils in the Mosaic creation.

It is their connection with the uses of man which give dignity to the details of science.

The material world shows an evident adaptation to human uses. Light, air, and vegetation are nicely adapted to human functions. The physical formation of the globe determines human destiny. The Greeks could never have attained their civilization on the vast table-lands of Asia, but only in a country surrounded and penetrated by the sea. God's foreordination is written in bays, rivers, mountains, and oceans, as really as in the decrees of his will. The configuration of continents and the history of men reveal the unity of one all-embracing plan.

Both revelation and nature teach that God is wont to work towards the realization of ideals. A rough draught, so to speak, is first thrown off. It is repeated and continually improved till the perfect ideal is at last realized. The Patriarchal church received its more full development in the Jewish, and the Jewish in the Christian; and the Christian church still looks forward to its perfect ideal in heaven. Types of the coming Saviour were produced for centuries before he came. In the lives of men who were themselves saviours, like Moses and David; in the offices of men, like the high priest; in the sacrifices; in the Mercy-seat were types of Christ, of his offices and his work, representations more or less approximating to the ideal which at last was realized in him. Infidels sometimes object to this doctrine of types, as teaching a departure from the uniformity of nature, and unworthy of God. And yet precisely the same method of procedure appears in nature; types are always thrown off before the archetype appears; outline sketches before the ideal is realized. Geologists and comparative anatomists love to trace the gradual elaboration of the vertebrate skeleton through unnumbered forms and unmeasured geological cycles till the ideal is realized in

Thus Christianity satisfies every demand of the mind for system and unity. To do this is the boast of science; but in contrast with Christianity, science is, on this very point, feeble and impoverished; incapable of presenting the elements of a real plan, and bewildering its votaries in the innumerable details which acquire importance only as they are associated with the uses of man, and illustrate the plans of God.

II¹ Infidelity bases itself on the want of a religion for man, fitting him for this life and this world. It demands a religion adapted to develop every human capacity and susceptibility, and to fit its subject, not to be winged, and crowned, and clothed in white, and to shine and sing forever, in a sphere entirely future and unseen, but to be a man, presenting, in the veritable duties and toils of actual life, all that is genial, beautiful, and strong, in human nature. Says a German infidel: "The soul's immortality can have no object in man, nor in his life. It merely holds up the church and religion; and as an honest investigation of nature brings out its untenableness, we may hope soon to see the fall of the whole structure which has been reared on this hollow foundation." So infidelity tests every doctrine by its fitness to man and

man. So is this method carried out that, in the opinion of many naturalists, configurations preserving the type appear in animals in which they are of no use, and for the introduction of which no end can be conjectured, except to preserve the type. Thus nature and revelation disclose the same method of procedure, and the unity of the same plan. Thus both the natural and the spiritual disclose the divine thought continually reaching forward to realize a divine ideal. And we have continual opportunities to see that the ideals of the natural world become the materials and instruments of realizing the higher ideals of the spiritual.

It may be fanciful to add that, although we know not what the spiritual body will be, yet it is an ideal hereafter to be realized, of which the natural body is but a coarse model, an incomplete type. Therefore it may be that one divine plan or thought will yet be traced through all the forms disclosed by the researches of science, through the human form which is the ideal of these, up to the realization of a more glorious ideal in that spiritual body of which this is but the type.

"For what if things in heaven to things on earth
Are like, more than on earth is thought."

¹ This division of the subject, and a few paragraphs in the first division, were omitted in the delivery of the Address.

to his life. Hence it claims to be the special champion of human nature and human development; it has much to say of hero-worship; it arrogates to itself the name of "the religion of humanity." It rejects Christianity on the misrepresentation, that it substitutes faith for virtue, that it proposes as its end, not human perfection, but deliverance from misery; that it is ghostly, and not human; that in zeal to fit men for death and eternity, it forgets to fit them for life and time; in its zeal to make men divine, it forgets to make them human; and, in striving to make them angels, fails to make them men.

These are legitimate demands, which Christianity must satisfy; but they must be satisfied on the principle of Christianity, not on the principle of infidelity.

Christianity is a system of redemption and faith; infidelity is a system of human sufficiency and virtue. Christianity meets man as a sinner ruined; it presents to him God the Redeemer of sinners, made known as such in all the acts of redemption, in which God has expressed his own disposition towards sinners, and the inmost law of his Godhead respecting them; and it demands faith in God the Redeemer as the foundation of all human virtue, development, and salvation. Infidelity meets man as imperfect but sufficient, of himself, to his own complete development. Christianity must maintain its position as a system of redemption and faith, or it ceases to be essentially distinguished from infidelity itself. On this position it is sufficient, and it alone is sufficient, to a perfect human development.

It is so because, in the normal state of man, faith in God is necessary to human perfection. Christianity requires man as a sinner to trust in God; but, beneath that, is the deeper necessity that as a man he should trust in God.

I speak, now, of faith in its evangelical sense, as trust in a personal God. I affirm that, in presenting faith, in this sense, as the foundation of virtue and of all complete development, Christianity recognizes a necessity and law of the normal state of man; and that all virtue and development, not springing from faith, are abnormal, and therefore essentially and radically wrong.

The condition of a creature is necessarily a condition of dependence. Faith is the recognition of this dependence, and the confidence in the Creator which conscious dependence demands. It is the normal state of man, as a rational creature, to be a constant recipient from God, and therefore to trust constantly to God in conscious dependence; just as the rose is made to live in the light, and to lift its face to the sun. Without this, his growth must be abnormal, like that of a plant in darkness.

So inspiration teaches: "Of God, and through him, and to him, are all things." And in this it only teaches what is a necessity in the relation of Creator and creature. All things are of him, as their source; through him, not only as the ever-acting efficiency, but because his character, ever unfolding in action, is both the energy that impels and the law that determines, the universal course of things; and to him, as their end, all things expressing and revealing him, and showing him to be glorious. Faith is the recognition of this necessary relation of the creature to the Creator. It is the principle which brings the life of man into conformity with his necessary condition as a creature. In making faith central, Christianity only requires, as the centre of the Christian life, that which is the necessary law of all created and rational life, and which normally, by virtue of the fact that man is a creature, is the germinating centre of all human development.

Every system that rejects faith from this central position, necessarily centres in self-sufficiency. There can be no alteration. It teaches man to recognize himself as the source, the law, and the end of his own development; and to say: "Of ME, and through ME, and to ME, are all things; and to ME be glory forever."

Therefore every life which is not a life of faith, is necessarily abnormal and fatally wrong. Harmony in the relation of Creator and creature, is no more possible. It is man's repudiation, not merely of his condition as a sinner, but of his position as a creature. It is, necessarily, enmity against God, rebellion against him, and an assumption of his independ-

ence and throne. It necessarily throws the man out of harmony with God, with the course of the universe, and with himself. Therefore the Scriptures recognize that self-sufficiency, which is the contrary of faith, as the essence of all sin. The first sin on earth was in the purpose to realize the Satanic promise : " Ye shall be as gods ;" and when the Scriptures describe its highest development, the very " man of sin and son of perdition," they only unfold the same self-sufficiency : " who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped ; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God."

When Christian teachers condemn acts of natural affection and honesty, as lacking the essential element of virtue, because they are not founded in faith, and evince no regard to God, they are thought to express an exceedingly nice and unimportant distinction. But it appears that faith in God and self-sufficiency are, respectively, the vital centres of two irreconcilable systems ; that the life of faith, in the conscious dependence befitting a creature, is a life of harmony and communion with God, of harmony with the course of the universe, and harmony of man with himself. But the life without faith, being a life of self-sufficiency, is necessarily in antagonism to God, and to the course of the universe, and to the very nature and condition of man himself. Therefore every development of that life, being abnormal, is essentially defective and wrong.

This is precisely the point on which the conflict against Christianity centres. No religious or moral system ever lost favor with men on account of the strictness of its moral requirements. Stoicism found favor with its lofty demands. Pharisaism with its wearisome minutiae of service. Asceticism with its severity of self-mortification. Christianity is not prejudiced by its severe requirements of virtue, and self-denial. Infidelity, while rejecting the essence of the Christian system, extols it as the purest and most advanced yet realized in the progress of man. Any system, however severe, finds favor so long as it is a system of self-sufficiency, and permits man to regard himself as the source, the law,

and the end of his own endeavors. Christianity is opposed because it is a system of redemption and of faith; because it casts men upon God, demands that they look to him as the source, the law, and the end of all their endeavors, and requires that as men, and much more as sinners, they trust him as the first condition of all development.

And precisely this is the distinguishing characteristic of infidelity. It is the gospel of human sufficiency and virtue. Every system, even if it calls itself Christian, and proposes to receive the Bible as in some sense God's word, every system is essentially infidel which founds itself on man's sufficiency for himself, unfolds itself only as a system of morality, and repudiates the Redemption, which man needs as a sinner, the faith which is the recognition of his dependence as a creature, and the personal fellowship with God which these doctrines imply. Every such system legitimately tends to the rejection of a supernatural revelation, for which it recognizes no necessity, and ultimately to Atheism, the final development of the self-sufficiency of man. There are but two systems on this point, the Christian system of redemption and faith, and the infidel system of human sufficiency and morality. Whoever, for the sake of a religion more perfectly human, abandons faith in the Redeemer, as the first element of development, abandons Christianity itself, and seeks a development of man abnormal, and therefore fatal. Every such system necessarily gravitates towards naturalism.

Christianity, therefore, is adequate to be the religion of humanity, because it is founded on the recognition, both of man's actual state as a sinner, and his normal state as a creature; because it bases his development on that trust in God, and communion with him in which is found, even in his normal state, the primal element and germ of all spiritual life and growth, and of all human excellence. Thus it opens his soul to the quickening of a divine power, invigorates his virtue by the loftiest motives, and ennobles the pettiest acts of life by the consciousness of communion with God, and of service rendered to him.

It may be, that the human side of Christianity has not been appreciated. Coming to a world absorbed in its worldliness, and more insensible to God than the ox and the ass are to their owners, the endeavor of Christians has been to awaken men to think of God, and to feel their spiritual necessities; to this end it has poured on the human mind all the most exciting motives that eternity affords. In its struggle, too often ineffectual, to awaken the spiritual sensibility, it may too little have urged on its own disciples, the beauty of a complete human perfection. But this perfection it proposes as its end, and is adequate to secure. This it must do in vindication of itself. It must consecrate the shop, not less than the church; the parlor and kitchen, not less than the closet. It must teach men to recognize God's presence, to feel the restraining of his authority, and the cheering of his love in all human affairs. It must ennoble every act by consecrating it to God. It must unfold magnanimity, generosity, gentleness, courage, integrity, honor, and all the beauty of Christian charity. As the sun's power is not demonstrated far from the earth in the cold of the upper air, but by its reflection from the earth and the objects that deversify its surface; just so Christianity is chill and dark when separated from the practical concerns of humanity, and proves its power to warm and vivify all, only as its light and warmth are reflected from the affairs of daily life.

And because Christianity secures the vital germ of all human growth, it has come to pass that, however imperfect its presentation has been, it has realized the nearest approach to human perfection. While in secular history, heroes who have sacrificed fortune and life for principle, or for the good of others, are few; such heroism fills whole ages of the history of Christianity, and its heroes, both men, women, and children, are numerous, and bright as the stars of evening. And unnoticed, in every Christian hamlet may be found exemplars of Christian virtue, whose beauty makes them the ornaments of their humble sphere in this life, as it

will fit them to be among the Lord's jewels, in the life that is to come.¹

III. As Christianity must prove itself adequate to the development of the individual man, so it is rightfully demanded that it prove itself adequate to secure the true progress and healthy development of society. Modern infidelity largely arises from the mistake that Christianity is inadequate, and even hostile, to this. Of popular infidelity, of infidelity out of the schools, this is probably, at the present moment, the most prolific source.

But Christianity is the religion of human progress; right-

¹ No Christian people have been reproached with failing to exhibit the human side of religion more than the Puritans of New England. The homely lines addressed from prison to his children by John Rogers, just before his martyrdom, ought to refute this :

"Give honor to your mother dear;
Remember well her pain;
And recompense her in her age
With the like love again.

Be always ready for her help,
And let her not decay;
Remember well your father all,
Who would have been your stay.

Impart your portion to the poor
In money and in meat;
And send the feeble fainting soul
Of that which you do eat.

Defraud not him that hired is
Your labor to sustain,
But pay him still without delay
His wages for his pains.

And as ye would that other men
Towards you should proceed,
Do you the same to them again,
When they do stand in need."

The religion, which led its martyrs to occupy their last hours in recording their dying advice in these and similar lines, and which led to their insertion in the New England Primer for the instruction of childhood, could not have been essentially defective either in its estimate or its requirement of virtue in human relations.

ly understood, it leaves no pretext on this ground for the existence of unbelief.

Man may be considered either as an individual, or as a part of an organization. These two poles have determined the two great currents of human thought. Both views are right; but held each exclusive of the other, or with their mutual relation inverted, they have been the source of perpetual error. The one, merging the individual in the race, has produced a theology destructive of human accountability and freedom, and even of personality; it has opened the way for reducing all the history of man and of the natural creation to a blind development by law; it has given us a church, through which all blessings descend from God by virtue of its organization; through which rules one all-pervading spiritual despotism, and by which, and for which, every member, like the limb of a body, exists. It gives despotism in the State; and a social condition, stagnant and corrupting. The other, carried out with equal exclusiveness, gives us a theology in which dependence on God is depreciated, and not only the personality, and individuality, but the sufficiency of man is taught; in which morality is substituted for piety, ethics for theology, and ability for redemption; and which, through its exaggeration of individual personality and sufficiency, prepares the way for the rejection of revelation as needless to the all-competency of man, and in a cold rationalism, having completed the circuit, meets and coincides with scepticism which had come round to the same extreme in the opposite direction. It gives us Munzerism in the church, or at best, a church not distinguished from a school or a voluntary association; it gives us Jacobinism in the State; and in society violent convulsions and revolutions, instead of a healthy progress.

But both views must be accepted, if we are to escape error. The one, which recognizes the individuality of man, is the principle of reform; the other, which recognizes him as part of an organization, is the principle of conservatism; the one is the element of progress, the other of stability; the one carries society forward and develops its resources, the other

binds it, through all its agitations, in unity, order, and law. Without the former, progress is impossible, and society stands, like Niobe, desolate in stony immobility; without the latter, reform is destructive, like the daughters of Pelias, easily tearing society in pieces, but incapable of restoring it to the unity of an organic life.

But as, in the order of nature, man is an individual before he is a species, the recognition of man's individuality takes precedence of the recognition of his organic relations. The former is primary in its influence, the latter secondary; the former must create before the latter can organize. This order must be recognized, alike, in every practical effort and every speculative theory pertaining to human advancement. It is not the life of the organization that determines the life of the individual; but it is the life of individuals which flows into, determines, and in fact constitutes, the life of the organization.

A distinguished living writer,¹ worthy to be called a scientific philosopher, and not merely a man of science, remarks that, in the Divine working, the order of development is from homogeneousness to diversity, and from diversity to organic unity. In an egg is, first, a homogeneous fluid; next, its diversification into rudimental organs; next, the union of these diversified organs in a living organization. In the creation was, first, the homogeneousness of chaos; next, its diversification—the light, the separation of the waters from the waters, the land, the air; and next, its combination in that complete order which justifies the name of *κόσμος* given, by the Greeks, to the creation. The same law (itself a beautiful exemplification of the unity of plan which pervades all departments of God's works) seems applicable to social progress: first, the homogeneousness of barbarism; next, its diversification by the elevation of individuals; and last, the organic unity of a civilized state.

This is precisely the method of Christianity. It finds men in the homogeneousness of a common depravity; all the organic influences of the family, of society, of the State, and

¹ Prof. Guyot.

of the race, have been seized by evil, and help to crush the man in ruin; Christianity comes to men, one by one, to lift them from this state of evil, and to inspire them with a power to resist it. Its instrumentality is individualizing: "Preach the gospel to *every creature*." Its agency and method are individualizing, the Spirit of God renewing men one by one. In the natural propagation of the race, each child derives life from its parents; thus the life of each generation is, in an important sense, the development of the life of the first man and of the race. In this view, the common comparison of the development of the human race from Adam to the development of oaks from the primitive acorn, indicates a complete resemblance, because both are the development of natural life. Christ is also the source of spiritual life to his spiritual seed; and, in this respect, the Scriptures recognize an important analogy between the first and the second Adam. But there is this fundamental difference, that, while the development of the race from Adam participates in the natural, the development of the spiritual life from Christ belongs entirely to the sphere of the Spirit.¹ The very corruption of the race in which the human will is enthralled, is, in the Scriptures, represented as a corruption "by nature." Christianity, according to its essential idea, is the approach of spiritual forces to man, to rescue him from this ruin. Therefore its entire method of procedure is characterized, not by the law of nature, but by the law of the Spirit; not by necessity and blind development, but by intelligence, will, and freedom. Therefore, the analogy of the development of the spiritual seed from Christ to the development of the race from

¹ The church has its visible ordinances and organization; it also avails itself of the family relation. But the benefit of these is obtained, not by a *natural* connection of cause and effect, but by virtue of the spirit acting through them. The organic is subordinate to the individual. A contrary theory of organic unity and development, is essentially, however disguised, a theory of *natural* unity and development. It necessarily implies that there is a natural virtue in the sacraments and in ordination, independent of the work of the Spirit in connection with them on each recipient. It places the ordinance above the Spirit, and not the Spirit above the ordinance. And it allows logically no stopping-place short of the atheistic system of the development of all things by law, which throughout the universe recognizes nature alone.

Adam, necessarily leads to fatal error, if, in carrying it out, the essential distinction is forgotten, that, while the latter participates in the natural, the former is entirely spiritual. It leads to a theory of organic unity which subjects the spiritual itself to the necessity of natural law, and thus destroys its distinctive characteristic as spiritual. Accordingly, while the human race is propagated from parent to child, the spiritual seed are not born of any human parentage. They are not propagated, from generation to generation, by the church. Their life is not the life of Christ, flowing into them through the church and its sacraments, as the life of Adam flows into his posterity by natural generation.¹ But every renewed man is born immediately of God; his life comes to him directly from the divine Spirit; and the Christian, born of God to-day, sustains a relation to God just as direct as the first convert of the Christian faith. When Christ preached, his doctrine was new to the Jews. When the apostles preached Christ to all nations, the doctrine was new to their generation. But it is just as new to every generation, and to every individual, coming into this world of sin equally ignorant of its truths and equally without experience of its divine power. Regeneration is, in all ages, a *new birth*. In each individual case, it implies a spiritual act originating a new spiritual life.

In the love and purpose of God, Christianity originates eternally; but in the soul of man, it originates ever anew. It is not the fire burning evermore on the altar of the church; but it is the fire coming down from heaven to light, afresh, the altar of every Christian heart. It is not the life of the church developed into the life of successive generations

¹ I can attach no precise meaning to the doctrine of the believer's life-union with Christ, except as it recognizes the fact that the Holy Spirit, ever proceeding from the Son, originates in the believer a new and spiritual life specifically the same with the life of Christ. Christ lives in us only as we have the spirit of Christ. This doctrine of the Holy Spirit must determine the meaning of the doctrine of the life-union. I see no possibility of determining it otherwise, without elevating the organic above the individual, and thus coming to a position of thought from which the Romish doctrine of salvation through the church is logically inevitable.

of saints ; but it is the life of God coming down, ever new, into the souls of men. And no contrary doctrine can be maintained without destroying the significance of personal regeneration by the Holy Spirit. There is, indeed, in the advancement of the church, a unity ; but it is found, not in the church, but in the eternal love of God, declared in the purpose of the Father, manifested in the person and work of the Son, and evermore evolved in the work of the Holy Ghost.

Thus beginning with the individual, Christianity proceeds to the organic, and subordinates all its influences to herself. Christ, coming to a world sunk in sin, with all its individual and its organic forces alike against him, approached men, one by one, and called them to himself. At his death, the church was little more than eleven disciples and five hundred brethren, without organic force. The apostles and brethren continued to approach men and win them, individually, to Christ ; and, gradually, the church assumed an organic unity and acquired an organic force of its own ; and, as it advanced, it laid hold on the organic forces of the family, of society, and, lastly, of the State. Through the same process Christianity must always toil, in making its way among a heathen people. Among us, Christianity is not upheld merely by our individual exertions ; it is itself, now, an organic force, working through its churches ; and it has penetrated all the organic forces of society, which work for Christianity when we sleep, compel its enemies to serve it, and, if the life of Christianity should decline, would long preserve its forms and many of its influences. And the time is coming when it will lay hold on the organic force in the unity of the race. This is hostile as yet, and will always be hostile, so far as the unity of the race is merely natural. But when mankind become one in the love and life of Christ, this spiritual unity will produce organic influences antagonistic to man's natural corruption and helpful to Christianity.

So in every attempt to advance it, or any moral reformation incidental to its progress : while we begin with individuals, we must, as rapidly as possible, lay hold on the or-

ganic forces of society. Individual effort cannot tear away abuses, by main strength, as Samson tore away the gates of Gaza; but the reform must master individuals first, and through them penetrate society, and lay hold on these organic forces, which work with something of a divine steadiness and power. To attempt to advance Christianity, or any reform incidental to it, in neglect of this, is to subject ourselves to Luther's impetuous rebuke of those simple ones who think the heavens will fall unless they stand, all the time, and hold up its pillars. But whatever organic unity and power Christianity acquires, it must never be forgotten that its theory and its history both prove that it is the work of the Spirit regenerating individuals which produces the church, and not the church which produces the work of the Spirit and the regeneration of men; that it is the life of individuals which flows into the church, and not the life of the church which flows into individuals; that the church was made for men, and not men for the church.

As the instrumentality, the agency, and the method of Christianity are individualizing, so also is its doctrine. It teaches that each man is of more worth than a world; that God holds him to a personal accountability, rewarding even his idle words or the gift of a cup of cold water; that, even in his ruin, he is an object of infinite solicitude to God, manifested in the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, and the continued striving of the divine Spirit; that he is renewed by the Holy Ghost, justified by his own personal faith, admitted to free communion with God in prayer, and privileged with the constant indwelling, support, and consolation of the Spirit of God: in a word, it reveals to the Christian, with a startling distinctness, God as the God with whom he, individually, has to do.

These doctrines, applied to the various necessities of human life, are the elements of liberty and human progress. They give us, in the sphere of intellect, free inquiry and the right of private judgment, and the right of every man to read God's word; in morals, the supremacy of conscience; in society, the obligation to universal philanthropy and the duty

of striving to elevate the most degraded ; and in politics, the equal and inalienable rights of man. They strike at the root of all oppression, and necessitate the inspired command : " Honor all men."

Accordingly, a year after the crucifixion had not expired, before rulers were amazed by hearing, from prisoners arraigned before their most august courts, the announcement of that fundamental doctrine of all liberty and christian manliness, that allegiance to God takes precedence of allegiance to man ; that the individual has a right of appeal to God, which no government can supersede ; and an obligation to obey God, which no human law can annihilate. And it is an interesting fact, that an argument much urged in the early ages, by heathen writers against Christianity, was, that its principles annihilated the privileges of kings and nobles, and gave to the ignoble and servile classes equal consideration with the great. And so vital is this sentiment in the Christian doctrine and life, that even the corruptions of Christianity could scarcely eradicate it. If the priesthood became a hierarchy, yet, for centuries, access to that powerful order was open to all classes, not excepting slaves. If kings and nobles superstitiously made pilgrimages to kiss the mouldy bones of saints, they kissed, it may be, the bones of a laborer or a servant.

But, after the lapse of ages, the Romish church was fully developed. Its genius, like that of the old Roman Empire, which it succeeded, was the genius of organization ; its whole development was a steady process of sinking the individual in the organization ; and when it stood forth, in its full-grown monstrosity, it was only the full embodiment of the error, that the life of the individual flows from and is determined by the organization of which he is a part ; that organic influences control and absorb individual agency. Hence the action of the individual was superseded by the action of the church. He was made a Christian by her gift of baptism and the eucharist ; the prayers and sacrifices that he needed were offered, in his behalf, by her ; he was admitted to no communion with God, except through her intercession ; his will, his conscience, his opinions, were in her

keeping; his whole life came to him out of the church; and thus through all Christendom, at last, was heard nought but the dismal roll of a spiritual machinery grinding, evermore, all individual life into one homogeneous pulp.

Protestantism was the reassertion of the old christian doctrine of the personality, the worth, the responsibility, and the rights of the individual. It was the reassertion of the principle that the true method of speculative theologizing and of practical endeavor begins with the recognition of man's individuality, and assigns a secondary, though not unimportant, position to his organic relations. This is the fundamental idea of Protestantism, which, however it may have failed of distinct enunciation, gives unity to the diversified manifestations of Protestantism, and makes it, wherever it appears, the religion of human progress. The very act of breaking away from the ancient church, was an assertion of this principle. The very doctrines of the Reformation were instinct with it. Luther asserted it in the doctrine of justification by faith, annihilating the very idea of salvation through the church, and bringing every man face to face with God, to be saved by his own personal faith, through his own personal regeneration by the Spirit. Calvin brought it out more fully, by the clearer assertion of the supremacy of the Scriptures above all tradition, of the right of private judgment, and of the doctrine of the Christian's eternal and personal election. The Puritans still further unfolded the principle, bringing out, in sharper lines, the distinction between the renewed and the unrenewed, and giving more distinctness to the individualism of all human transactions with God. The interest of the Puritans in the Old Testament, their habit of applying to themselves its descriptions of God's special care of the Israelites, and his special commissions to them; their habit of considering themselves appointed by God to do the work in which they were engaged; their habit of finding special providential interpositions, are all the legitimate, though it may be, the unintelligent, expression of the great idea of each individual's relation to God, and God's personal dealings with each individual.

With them, Protestantism found in the memorable words of John Robinson,¹ clearer and more conscious utterance of itself as the religion of progress than ever before.

Thus possessed of a more conscious apprehension of its position and work, the New England mind has more distinctly defined, and more thoroughly vindicated the Protestant principle, and carried it out more completely in all its applications to the great doctrine of human rights, human liberty, and human development in the church, in the state, and in social life. Especially the New England Theology has concerned itself in defining and vindicating the doctrine of individual personality and responsibility; it has pruned from Protestant theology inconsistencies which have come down from the old system based on organic influences as the centre of all thought and action; it has descended into the profoundest discussions of psychology to vindicate human free-agency, and into the profoundest discussions of

¹ "Brethren, we are now quickly to part from one another, and whether I may ever live to see your faces any more the God of heaven only knows; but whether the Lord has appointed that or no, I charge you before God and his blessed angels, that you follow me no farther than you have seen me follow the Lord Jesus Christ.

"If God reveal anything to you by any other instrument of his, be as ready to receive it as ever you were to receive any truth by my ministry; for I am verily persuaded that the Lord has more truth yet to break forth out of his holy word. For my part I cannot sufficiently bewail the condition of the reformed churches, who are come to a period in religion, and will go at present no farther than the instruments of their reformation. The Lutherans cannot be drawn to go beyond what Luther saw; whatever part of his will our God has revealed to Calvin, they will die rather than embrace it; and the Calvinists, you see, stick fast where they were left by that great man of God, who yet saw not all things.

"This is a misery much to be lamented; for though they were burning and shining lights in their times, yet they penetrated not into the whole counsel of God, but, were they now living, would be as willing to embrace further light as that which they first received. I beseech you to remember, it is an article of your church covenant, that *you be ready to receive whatever truth shall be made known to you from the written word of God*. Remember that and every other article of your sacred covenant. But I must herewithal exhort you to take heed what you receive as truth, examine it, consider it, and compare it with other scriptures of truth, before you receive it; for it is not possible the Christian world should come so lately out of such thick antichristian darkness, and that perfection of knowledge should break forth at once." — Neal's Puritans, Vol. II. page 146.

ethics to define the nature of virtue. It is the legitimate, and as yet, the most complete utterance of the central idea of Protestantism. If it has been charged with being metaphysical rather than Scriptural, and ethical rather than theological, it has incurred these charges only in defence and development of the essential principle of Protestant theology; only because these metaphysical and ethical discussions were necessary to demonstrate the grounds of man's personality, responsibility, dignity and rights, and thus to vindicate the doctrine of man's direct and personal relations to God, the justice of his condemnation as a sinner, the propriety of free offers of salvation to all, and the consistency of the doctrine of justification by faith. If it has been charged with an inclination to rationalism, it is only because it insists on seeing the reason of its faith. If it is charged with innovation and heresy, it is only because it makes Protestantism consistent with its own fundamental principle. If it demands distinctly defined conversions, and delights in special revivals and remarkable providences, it is because it thoroughly believes and earnestly teaches that God is a God "with whom we have to do." If it meddles with politics, it is because it knows itself to be the guardian of human rights. If it easily runs into reforms, it is because its whole life is the development of the essential principle of human progress. If it is not preëminently churchly, it is because its vital principle makes Ecclesiasticism impossible, because it believes that the church comes from God's Spirit, and not the Spirit from the church; that the principle of church unity and development is the continual presence of God's Spirit regenerating men to be its members and calling men to be its ministers. — "*Successio Spiritus Dei, doctrinæ et ministerii divini.*"

Christianity then recognizes the true principle of human progress and assigns to it its proper position. The great work of Protestantism has been the reassertion of this principle and the restoration of it to its proper preëminence. Accordingly, the whole course of Protestantism has been marked by awakening the mind to activity, by developing

and using the strength of individuals, and by the steady advancement of all the interests of humanity.

And organization has followed, in the place to which the genius of Protestantism necessarily assigns it, incorporating into society the ideas which the progress of Christianity has put forth, and reducing to the unity of order and law, the energies which it has developed. The organization demanded by the genius of Protestantism is one, not artificial, but the spontaneous growth of the expanding life, comprising only the organs into which the life spontaneously embodies itself, and which are necessary for its functions; not a fetter put on from without, nor even a garment, but a living embodiment of the life itself; and because it is so, easy in its action, instinct with the energy and expression of the beauty of the life, attracting no attention to itself, but carrying the mind through itself to the soul that speaks and acts in it, and like the human face divine, that most perfect embodied expression of the soul, easily taking on itself every varying expression of the spirit within. Such an organization, the polity of the New England churches most nearly realizes; and therefore it is the organization that most completely embodies the essential idea of Protestantism. Some, beholding its simplicity, its freedom, its incapacity to attract attention to itself, and its necessity of turning attention to the animating spirit, its continual expression of the personality, the responsibility, the dignity and the rights of individuals, have declared that it is not entitled to the name of an organization, and that the religion which it indicates is purely spiritual. We may, perhaps, pardon a mistake analogous to that of a poet describing a face beautiful for its intellectual expression:

"Her pure and eloquent blood
Spoke in her cheek and so distinctly wrought
That one might almost say her body thought."

It is because the organization is merely the spontaneous outgrowth of the spiritual life, that it may easily be mistaken for a part of the spiritual life itself; and because the spirit

expresses itself through it so perfectly, it may easily be, that only the spirit attracts the attention of the observer.

Thus our Protestantism giving utterance (the clearest, as yet) to the essential ideas of Christianity, possesses the principles essential to secure the advancement of man, and to give to it order and stability. Thus it is capable of satisfying the demands of infidelity for popular progress.

At the same time the contrast between its attitude and that of infidelity is a perpetual exposure of the inconsistency and incapacity of the latter. Christianity, not lifting up its voice in the streets about the great work which it is doing, busies itself primarily in the renovation, the education, and complete development of individuals, working on the only principle and in the only method of human progress. Infidelity, noisy in its demands for reform and progress, concerns itself primarily with the organization of society, demanding, first, new constitutions of government, and, in the various forms of Fourierism, a new organization of society; thus acting on the very principle, and in the very method, which always tend to despotism in church and state, to stagnation of social progress and the deterioration of humanity. Christianity, recognizing the sacredness of man as an immortal creature of God, busies itself to protect the widow and the fatherless, to gather outcast children into homes and schools, to follow the tide of population with the preaching of repentance and of salvation through Christ, to seek the heathen in his idolatry and the savage in his bestiality, to demand liberty for the slave, and to hold up, over all the oppressed, the ægis of human rights. Infidelity, denying man's immortality and accountability, and sometimes his personality, destroys all ground for the reverence of man, makes human rights and equality a fiction, and is, by virtue of its principles, what it has usually been in fact, a sneering Mephistopheles. Incapable of recognizing anything great in man, it lays the foundation for the cruelty which found its legitimate utterance in the sneer of a celebrated infidel: "What is taking life, but turning a few ounces of blood from one channel to another?" and its realization in the Reign of Terror.

The Christian believes the depravity of man, and yet reveres him. The infidel denies depravity and believes man's natural goodness, and yet despises him. Reverence for man is the element of Christianity; contempt is the element of infidelity. Comté is an example of this inherent inconsistency. He arrogates to himself the title of "The Founder of the Religion of Humanity;" yet he is incapable of appreciating the first elements of human rights. A traveller, who recently had an interview with him, reports him to have said: "I am one of the most advanced and illuminated persons of the time; and yet, from my first setting out till the present time, I have done nothing but denounce the sovereignty of the people. The doctrine of equality is an absurd and mischievous falsehood. As for universal suffrage, it is founded on a cerebral deviation. Rights of man! I deny that he has any rights; he has only duties."¹

Against the idea which has thus far controlled the life of Protestantism, a reaction has lately developed itself, not only in the Church of England, which never grew out of this idea, nor ever thoroughly incorporated it into its life, but also in the Reformed churches, both in Europe and in this country. The charge is reiterated that Protestantism is a failure, that it has a necessary tendency to rationalism, that it annihilates the distinction between a church and a school or a voluntary association, that it is istic, atomic, and unhistorical, that it has no proper unity, that its proper results are Jacobinism, disorganization, and Pantheism. And it is charged that these are necessary issues of its essential individualism. And these charges are urged most strenuously against those churches in whose theology and polity Protestantism finds its most consistent expression.

These charges are grossly exaggerated. In recognizing the connection of all men with Adam, Protestantism, as I have already intimated, recognizes man as a member of the race, whose organic force is all exerted to perpetuate his ruin. In rescuing men from this ruin, it aims to make the church

¹ Notes of H. B. Wallace.

an organic power, and also to avail itself of all the particular organic forces of society. In its doctrines and its practice it clearly recognizes man's organic relations. Its history also refutes these charges. I need only point, in proof, to the polity, in church and state, which it has established in New England, where it has given the fullest development to its individualism ; to the beauty and order of society in connection with the largest individual liberty, and to the degree to which, without any restraint on freedom, it causes all the organic forces of society to uphold Christianity. And, though we hear but little, in these churches, of the sentimentalities about our holy mother, the church ; yet, in them, a true churchly spirit is powerful and pervasive. That sentiment has found no more beautiful uninspired utterance than in Dwight's version of the 137th Psalm ;¹ and nowhere are those lines oftener or more enthusiastically sung than in the churches of New England.

Still I will not deny that there may be some foundation for these charges. That doctrines and practice derived from the exclusive recognition of man as an individual, become monstrous errors, I have already admitted ; that Protestantism is, as yet, in any of its aspects, as comprehensive as Christianity, may properly be questioned ; that dangers may threaten us, justifying a revision of our position, we may well believe ; in re-asserting the doctrines belonging to man's individuality, which Romanism had annihilated, Protestantism may have failed adequately to recognize the truths clustering around the other great centre of human thought, the principle of organic unity.

But if so, what is to be the remedy ? Shall we recognize the organic as primary and preëminent, and sink the individual to a secondary and subordinate position ? Shall we set our faces towards the unity and catholicity of Rome, by reviving, in a new form, the very principle of her life and growth ? Shall we make the unity and development of the race, participating as it does in the natural, the measure of

¹ "I love thy kingdom, Lord," etc.

the unity and development of the spiritual seed, born of the divine Spirit? Shall we confound the spiritual with the natural, and, in our theories, subject the spiritual itself to the necessity of a natural law? In our new-born zeal for organic unity, shall we thus adopt a principle which obscures the limits of responsibility, confounds sin with calamity, blurs the distinctness of personality, and prepares the way to discard a proper creation, and to resolve the history of both men and nature, as well as the creation itself, into a mere development by law? No. It is not in this direction that deliverance is to be found. It is too late in the life of the world to make it possible to find it here. The essential erroneousness of this principle, it was the work of a thousand years of corruption and despotism to demonstrate. When Protestantism broke away from Rome, it broke away from this principle forever. It put its very life into its protest against it. It committed itself to the work, sublime in its conception, divine in its achievement, of making the world blessed by making its inhabitants individually wise and good. Henceforth all subterfuges became impossible for compelling belief by suppressing inquiry, for hiding evil in the organization instead of eradicating it from the individual, and for securing unity by organic uniformity. Henceforth there could be no belief but what was founded on conviction, no goodness but in the actual renovation of men, no unity but the unity of the Spirit. This work Protestantism undertook; and it has no alternative but to prosecute it to success, or give the world up either to unbelief or to spiritual despotism.

It is well that Christian scholars are attending to this subject. And, after the experience of three hundred years, it may be possible to bring into a more satisfactory union the systems of thought evolved from these two centres, and to produce a theology more comprehensive and harmonious. But it must not be merely one of those blind reactions to which the human mind is prone: the abandoning of one extreme to rush into another. The inquiry can be safely prosecuted only by holding fast the essential element of Protestantism, and carrying it out to its full development; only

by making man's individuality primary and preëminent, and giving to his organic relations a secondary and subordinate, though still an important, place.

It may be, that in advancing the interests of man, Protestantism has been, to some extent, the occasion of Jacobinism, anarchy, and revolution; of unsettling the old foundations, and spreading confusion. But let not the storms of spring make us sigh for the stability of winter. There is no alternative, but to carry through the work begun. Having shown her supernatural power by evoking the spirit, she must continue to prove her power by controlling it, and compelling it to produce the beauty which she called it forth to effect. The progress of Protestantism, like that of early Christianity, has been attended by many sects. But as life shows itself in diversity first, and then in unity, we may not arrest the living process because the embryo organs are yet divided; but look and labor for the time when, with all their diversity, they are to be made one in the unity of a perfect life.

Doubtless we have something to learn respecting the unity, the harmony, and the comprehensiveness of God's work on earth, and the law which binds all its parts in one. But the attentive ear cannot cease to listen to that voice, hoarse as the voice of many waters, coming up from workshops and factories, club-rooms and lecture-rooms, which demands that Christianity shall be a religion of reform, and the rights of man and human progress, or it shall not be at all.

IV. Modern Infidelity, in one of its aspects, grows out of the demands of æsthetic emotion and culture, and rejects Christianity because it is believed to be incapable of meeting these demands.

The mind, in which the moral element predominates, considers what ought to be; the mind characterized by the æsthetic element considers what is. The scientific mind considers the relations of things; the practical mind considers their uses and capabilities; but the æsthetic mind considers only their expression. Minds of this stamp regard the uni-

verse, not as governed by a moral law, not as existing for a definite end, not as a scene of moral obligation and earnest endeavor, but chiefly as the expression of an infinite beauty. Such minds are essentially Pantheistic in tendency. They do not easily recognize God as a personal will, but only as a plastic form, expressing itself in ceaseless manifestations of beauty. They are uninterested in any presentation of God, as the intelligent Creator and disposer, the holy governor, or the loving Father and Saviour of the world. Their sense of sin is not enough to make them feel the need of Christianity as a way of pardon, and their aspirations after holiness have not been awakened so as to make them appreciate it as a way of sanctification. If they recognize God at all, it is only as a plastic beauty, revealing itself in the stars, and the clouds, and the blue deeps of heaven, in the ocean, in the snow and frost, in flowers and trees, in hill and valley. To them the universe, in its perpetual evolution of God, is as it was to Goethe, the garment which God is ever weaving in the loom of time, for us to see him by. In looking on the material world, they realize the beautiful description given of a mind of this class; and "he stands before a curtain only half-opaque, watching the shadows thrown on it from behind, by the ceaseless play of infinite thought." In such persons, the religious susceptibilities are not extinct; but are manifested only through their peculiar temperament. They turn away from the Bible and the churches, to

"Worship nature in the hill and valley,
Not knowing what they love."

They are repelled by the exhibitions of evil which Christianity makes, by its legal exactions, by its life of duty and toil; they reject it, because they imagine that it does not present, either in God or man, any life spontaneously evolving itself in beauty. They turn away from the gospel of redemption to luxuriate in a gospel of beauty.

These are legitimate demands of the soul, and Christianity is rightly required to satisfy them. I do not mean that this class of emotions alone can constitute a true piety.

Every Christian must be conscious of sin, and conscious of aspirations for reconciliation to God, and participation in his image. But Christianity must show itself capable of satisfying these demands, or it can never command the assent of these minds. I do not mean that our Protestantism must make haste to bedeck itself with the adornings of Rome. No attempt of set purpose to imitate mediaeval churches can satisfy this demand. It is not primarily a demand for statuary, painting, music, and architecture in religion, but for a place in religion for the beauty of the earth and the heavens, the expressions of the ideals of beauty in the divine mind, which are the originals of all the creations of human genius; it is a demand for a religion which shall reveal God as the soul of universal beauty, and unfold a life which shall be, not a work nor a penance, but a spontaneous and ever gushing joy in the beauty of all that is. This demand, Romanism, with all its fine arts, fails, even more than Protestantism, to satisfy. It beautifies the temple, but the service of the temple is the veriest penance and slavery, and the God of the temple, is but the task-master of the universe. You may crowd your temples with the creations of art, and infidelity will spurn the offering, until all the beauty expressed in the material of the church and its worship, is seen to be the outward expression of the spirit of beauty, living in the life of Christianity, and revealed spontaneously in all its action and growth.

Hence the existing endeavor for elegance in churches is oftener an attempt to put on a grace, the need of which is felt, but which there is no life to develop, or even the vulgar outgrowth of the pride and ostentation of wealth, than the legitimate growth of the spirit of beauty. Hence so often modern attempts at church architecture are entire failures, unsuited to the uses and spirit of Protestant worship, and violating the essential rule of architecture, that no building can have beauty unless it harmonizes with the uses for which it is designed. When Protestant society, purified from the greed of gain, which now vulgarizes the whole staple of thought and life, shall be, by a pure Christianity, imbued

with the spirit of beauty, then the whole outward material and service of its worship, being the outgrowth of that spirit of beauty, will both express the genius and meet the wants of the religion, and at the same time both satisfy the demands and express the growth, of a true æsthetic culture. And Christianity has in itself the spirit which, legitimately evolved, will meet these demands and quicken this growth. The fact that the first gush of Christian love and joy in the heart of a convert, however uncultivated, clothes all nature with a new loveliness, is a familiar illustration of the essential tendency of Christianity, both to satisfy and to unfold the æsthetic nature.

The essential nature of Christianity throws it, at first, into a seeming antagonism to the culture of the beautiful. The æsthetic mind delights in what is; the Christian mind aspires to what ought to be. The æsthetic mind, not looking beneath the surface for causes or moral relations, nor beyond it for uses and capabilities, simply rejoices in the beauty that it sees; it concerns itself with the world no further than to enjoy what it expresses. The Christian mind, discerning moral evil in and around itself, and grasping the sublime purpose for which all things were made, concerns itself with what the world ought to be, and toils to realize its perfection. Therefore the life of a Christian is a life of aspiration and of work; and aspiration implies the knowledge of evil as well as the vision of good; and work is always unsightly, however beautiful its results. Hence arises an apparent antagonism. But it is only apparent. Work and Beauty, Vulcan and Venus, though they seem irreconcilable, are yet wedded. Out of unsightliness of work rises, evermore, the perfection of beauty.

And here appears the capacity of Christianity to satisfy the æsthetic mind. Though it calls its disciple to work rather than to enjoy, yet its work is always to realize a perfect ideal. Yearning for a perfection that ought to be, it looks through all outward grace to the beauty of holiness, which is the ideal of all beauty; and, like an artist in his life-long toil to bring out his ideal on the canvas, consecrates itself to the

endeavor to realize this ideal in human society. And as the sculptor by rude blows increases, for a time, the unsightliness of the marble, within which lies hidden the ideal of beauty that he seeks ; as he may even employ workmen who have no appreciation of its beauty, so Christianity, in all the unsightliness of its present toil, is working to realize that beauty of universal holiness, of which material beauty is but the shadow ; and though individual Christians, in particular parts of the work, may fail to appreciate the beauty, and are only earnest to do the work, yet is it all, under the divine guidance, tending to realize the divine ideal. Therefore, as we read the Holy Scriptures, amid all the warnings that awaken our fears and send us tearfully to explore the evil of our hearts, amid all the exhibitions of the strictness of the law, and all the commands to toil and cross-bearing, and all the invitations which meet us as lost sinners, amid all these indications of our ruin, ever and anon bursts on our view a glimpse of the beauty of the work in its completeness on earth, when the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them ; when all the stones of the divine structure shall be laid in fair colors, and its foundations with sapphires ; when its windows shall be of agate, its gates of carbuncles, and all its borders of precious stones ; when the glory of Lebanon shall come to it, the fir tree, the pine tree, and the box together, to beautify the place of God's sanctuary, and to make the place of his feet glorious ; and, from far beyond, steadily shines the city of the blessed, in which every conceivable element of beauty helps to complete the glorious vision ; in which the ideal of the whole work of Christianity beams, in divine perfection, and the spirit of beauty finds its complete outward embodiment.

As Christianity presents an ideal of beauty, as the issue of all work and the object of all aspiration, so in its doctrine and spirit, it possesses the essential element of the æsthetic nature. It reveals God, indeed, as a person acting with an intelligent will, unfolding the eternal purpose, in which the

unity of all things is found. But it recognizes him also as a plastic creator, expressing himself in creations of beauty; not merely creating the flowers and all lovely things to secure in them the praise of his creatures, but adorning the lonely wilderness, and elaborately painting even the microscopic animalculæ, because he himself delights in beauty, because the spontaneous evolution of his own character impels him to make his works beautiful, and then divinely to rejoice in them, and declare that they are very good.

That Christianity justifies this view of God is evident, because it teaches that there are, in the divine nature, energies which impel him to act, and of which his action is the spontaneous evolution and the real satisfaction. Such, for example, is the doctrine that Christ's sacrifice satisfies the divine justice, and the doctrine that the pardon of a penitent satisfies the yearnings of the divine compassion. It teaches that in God are feelings,—if this human word may be applied to those divine and external energies—which, by their very existence, necessitate a certain course of the divine procedure. Such, for example, is the doctrine that Christ died that God might *be* just; his justice could not but evolve itself in that divine action. A similar evolution and satisfaction of himself in creations of beauty, is precisely the idea of God, which the æsthetic mind demands. Thus in the profoundest and most distinctive doctrine of orthodoxy, we find the deepest idea of æsthetics, and the very element that is to satisfy its demands.

And precisely accordant with this view of the divine character, is the divine requirement of men in order that they may be made into God's image. He requires, not merely that they propose their own happiness or the happiness of the universe as a distinct and objective end of action, but that they act from an inward and spontaneous delight in holiness and in God; that they so discern his loveliness that they shall spontaneously praise him, and thus participate in the spirit of heaven, whose perfect inhabitants are so enraptured with what they see of the Divine beauty, that they can never satisfy themselves with wondering adoration, and rest

not, day nor night, saying : " Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty ! the whole earth is full of thy glory." And this realizes precisely the life of spontaneous joy in all that is, which the æsthetic mind demands.

It is true that, when the Christian life commences in the soul, it allies itself with the love of self and a regard to the soul's highest interest ; it allies itself with conscience, and strengthens itself by appeal to duty ; and the man goes forth to work because he knows he ought, and his Christian life is a conflict and a toil. But, as the Christian life advances, it is more and more the development of love, the very nature of which is to fasten on its object for its own sake, and with no ulterior consideration ; and love gradually gets precedence of the sense of duty and the regard to eternal interest, and, in its quick and spontaneous impulses, leaves no place for the categorical imperative of conscience ; and the whole life of the soul, in true spiritual freedom, tends to become but the spontaneous action of pure impulses and the perpetual following of sanctified desires ; tends to the state—certainly realized in heaven, if not before—when work will be no longer toil, when action will no longer be conscious of restraint, and the whole existence will be one long gushing joy in all that is, an everlasting anthem, spontaneous as the music of birds, intelligent as the adoration of angels.

Thus Christianity has resources to satisfy the unintelligent demands of those æsthetic natures that impotently strive to realize a spontaneous, childlike, purposeless joy in the beauty of nature, which can be realized only in the perfection of holiness ; those souls that discard the purpose and work of life, in their enjoyment of what it expresses, who, to avoid the conflict of subjecting the will to law, recognize no personal will of God, and scarcely any definite will or purpose of their own, more than as " the river windeth at its own free will ;" who know not that the spontaneousness which they inadequately exhibit, is realized only in Christianity, which most distinctly reveals the personal will of God, and most distinctly demands that human life should be controlled by an intelligent purpose and the human will sub-

jected to the divine law ; and which, at last, realizes that true freedom in which the broadest influence of purpose and intensity of volition are combined with the perfectly spontaneous and never ending joy of divine love.

The four demands of infidelity, which have been enumerated, lie outside of the immediate scope of Christianity ; yet Christianity is adequate to meet them. There are other demands of the soul, which never lead to infidelity for their satisfaction. Such are, the consciousness of guilt and of the need of reconciliation to God ; the consciousness of sin and the aspiration for spiritual purity ; the consciousness of imperfection in all that is human, and the demand for objects of pursuit that are adequate to satisfy, and an object of love that is free from all unworthiness, and capable of concentrating the strongest affections of the soul. These demands Christianity alone meets. And however desirable it may be to present it, in all its comprehensiveness and its fitness to meet every human want, it is its adaptedness to these spiritual necessities, which give it its highest power ; and, in meeting these, it must always find its highest success. All its incidental capacities are found in its central revelation of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. To preach Christianity, in all its comprehensiveness, we are not to preach Christ less ; but to understand that, in him, are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge ; and that, only by studying more thoroughly Christ and redemption through him, can we learn more clearly what is the comprehensiveness of the Christian system, and how to set it forth in its fitness to meet all the wants of man.

Brethren of the Society of Inquiry, to you this gospel is now committed. In the face of infidelity and atheism, in the face of heathenism and superstition, in the face of worldliness and indifference, in defiance of Satan and all his strength, you are now to go forth to proclaim this gospel of life. See that you grasp its central life, and discern its universal scope, and preach it as the power of God unto salvation. Human expectations perish. Hopes swell in the hu-

man heart like waves out of the ocean, only to break in ceaseless succession and roll back, sighing, to the heart from which they came; and the heart, strong as the ocean, never ceases to swell with new hopes, always to break again. But beneath the swelling and breaking of human hopes rises, evermore, the ocean-tide of God's love. This is the Divine power, swelling vast in the gospel that you preach. It is the promise of the Eternal: "The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." In this assurance labor. Broken hopes, thwarted plans, bitter discoveries of human wickedness, toil without visible results will sober and sadden you. Death will overtake you while you feel that you have accomplished nothing, and you will be able only to look to Jesus to pardon an unprofitable servant; yet, in the assurance of victory, labor; and, in the distant future, looking down on the renovated earth, you will hear and join the voice of the great multitude, as the voice of many waters and the voice of mighty thunderings, saying: "Alleluia, for the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth!"

ARTICLE III.

FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE OF THE SCRIPTURES.

By Rev. Edward Robie, Greenland, N. H.

THE number of primitive words in any language is exceedingly small; and each primitive word was, in the first instance, the name of some object or appearance in outward nature. A word is used literally when it is used in its primary sense and original application; a word is used figuratively when, though retaining its primary sense, it is used in an application different from its original one.¹ E. g. when, in

¹ Newman's Rhetoric, p. 103, sixth edition.

a description of some stately edifice, mention is made of the pillars that support the structure, the word *pillars* is used in its ordinary literal sense; but when it is said that virtue and intelligence are the *pillars* of a republic, or when it is said of some distinguished statesmen, that they are the *pillars* of the State, the word is still used in its common signification, as denoting that which, firmly fixed, gives a solid support; but the word is applied to objects different from those to which it was originally applied, and is accordingly figurative in its use. When it is said of old-age that is the *evening* of life, the word *evening* is used in its ordinary sense, but not in its ordinary application; and the word calls up before the mind images of the setting sun and the approaching twilight, which betoken the close of the day; and, in the form of the expression, there is an implied comparison between the life of man and a natural day.

By far the great majority of words in any language are figurative; although many words have been so long and so exclusively applied to spiritual ideas, that their primary and original application has been lost sight of, or forgotten. A slight examination, however, into their history, will show that they are figurative; or if, with regard to some few words, this cannot be done, it is because their early history is lost in obscurity. Very few persons, in speaking of the moral ideas of *right* and of *wrong*, remember that these words are figurative. Yet *right* literally means *straight*; and *wrong* literally means *wrung, twisted, crooked*. *Law* denotes that which is *laid*.¹ All words applied to mental exercises or states are figurative, being originally applied to outward and material things. Thus, to *imagine*, in its literal signification, implies the forming of some visible image; to *impress*, conveys the idea of leaving a stamp or mark, as a seal leaves its stamp on the wax or any other soft substance. To *reflect*

¹ So with the word *Gesetz* in German, which is a participial form from *setzen*. Thus in the very structure of language there is an argument for the being of God. As the Latin word *fatum*, meaning something *spoken*, implies that there must first be some being who *spoke* what is fated or spoken, so the English word *law* implies that there must first be some being who *laid* what is laid.

means to turn back; to *expect* means to look out; to *attend* means to stretch towards¹ any object. Examples of this kind might be extended indefinitely, so as clearly to show, both from facts and the nature of the case, that all words expressive of spiritual ideas, have an external origin, and were applied to outward and material things before they were applied to the things of a spiritual world.

As no book so abounds in spiritual truth as does the Bible, so, for this very reason, does no book so abound in the use of figurative language. The figures of the Bible are drawn, for the most part, either from nature, from common life, from the political and religious institutions of the Hebrews, or from history.¹ The reader of the Bible will, at once, call to mind figures and symbols drawn from these various departments of the outer world. The mention of a few will suggest to the memory many others. The apostle says: "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." The language of this verse is highly figurative. The new creation is described in terms drawn from the account of the creation given in Genesis. The heart of man is represented as being, naturally, in the same dark, chaotic state as was our earth when darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the change produced in the soul, by the new creation in Christ Jesus, is like the change that took place in the earth when the Spirit of God brooded upon the face of the waters, infusing vital virtue and vital warmth, and God said: "Let there be light." The images of light and darkness are frequently employed, in Scripture, to denote good and evil, joy and sorrow, prosperity and adversity, knowledge and ignorance. Christ is called "the *sun* of righteousness." The Psalmist says: "God is a sun and shield." The Spirit of God is spoken of under the image of the air and the wind. The blessings of the gospel are spoken of under the images of fountains of water, rivers, copious showers. Christ says of him-

¹ A similar classification is given by Rev. William Jones of Nayland in his excellent Lectures on the Figurative Language of the Scriptures.

self, that he is the vine, and of his people, that they are the branches.

As exemplifying the use of figures drawn from common life, may be mentioned the twenty-third Psalm, "The Lord is my shepherd," in which the language is derived from the pastoral occupations of the Hebrews. In the same Psalm, the figure is changed to that of a banquet, in which favorite guests were anointed with oil. Very frequent, also, are the allusions made, in the Bible, to agricultural operations. The world is compared to a field; the children of God, to the wheat; the children of the wicked one, to tares; the end of the world is the harvest; the angels are reapers; a preacher of the word is a sower; the word of God is the seed; the heart of men is the soil; the cares, riches, and pleasures of life are thorns; the preparation of the heart, by penitence, is ploughing and breaking up the fallow ground.

For examples of figures drawn from the religion of the Hebrews, we may refer to the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which it clearly appears that the entire system of the ceremonial institutions of the Mosaic Law was symbolical of the future dispensation of the Gospel. The services of the Jewish ritual were typical of that spiritual worship which is performed through Jesus Christ.

For examples of the use, in Scripture, of historical facts as figures of spiritual truth, we may refer to the words of Christ (John 3: 14): "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up." Our Saviour here applied the lifting up of the serpent by Moses, in the wilderness, to the lifting up of himself upon the cross, to draw all men to himself for the cure of their souls. Again, the miraculous supply of manna, in the wilderness, was a symbol of that true Bread which cometh down from heaven and giveth life unto the world. Paul tells us that the rock which Moses smote to give drink to the people, was Christ, i. e. a figure of Christ smitten for our sins, and giving to a thirsty world the waters of life. How far all the historical portions of the Old Testament may also be symbolical of spiritual truth, is a question we will not at present discuss;

but certainly the Christian church has not been mistaken in ever regarding the wanderings of the children of Israel through the wilderness as symbolical of the pilgrimage of the people of God to the heavenly Canaan; and doubtless there are other historical portions of the Old Testament, which, while their literal verity is to be held fast, in the strictest sense, may yet be regarded as containing within them perpetual illustrations of spiritual truth.¹ The Bible, like the book of nature, has an inexhaustible manifoldness as well as depth of meaning. Its histories, as well as its precepts, contain principles of universal application, which, like precious gems, radiate from all sides and in all directions. Thus there is not only a double sense in Scripture, but there are more senses than can be numbered.²

And now what are some of the principles that may aid us in the interpretation of the figurative language of the Scriptures?

1. One obvious remark is, that, in order to understand the figures of speech employed by the sacred writers, we should be well acquainted with the sources from which they are drawn. We should study nature as continually presenting

¹ Paul's use of the history of Sarah and Hagar to illustrate the difference between Jewish bondage and Christian liberty, is an evidence that some portion, at least, of Old Testament narrative is illustrative of the facts of Christian experience not literally expressed by it. — *Trench*, in his work on the *Miracles*, has beautifully shown that the miracles of Christ were not only historical facts for the time then being, but are signs and symbols for all time of higher and more important facts continually taking place in the spiritual world. The changing of the water into wine was a sign and symbol of what Christ is evermore doing in the world, elevating and ennobling the most common conditions and relations of life. The opening the eyes of the blind was a sign and symbol of that spiritual illumination which the Gospel now produces in the hearts of all who receive it. The healing of the sick was a sign and symbol of that recovery from the malady of sin which is effected by the great Physician upon thousands and millions of immortal souls; and the raising of the dead from the grave was a sign and symbol of that resurrection from death in trespasses and sins unto newness of life which Christ now effects in the experience of all believers.

² A frequent difficulty in the interpretation of prophecy may perhaps be removed by the remembrance of this principle. The difficulty has been in supposing that a given prophecy must refer to one event only, whereas, while containing one fundamental principle of the divine administration, it may equally well refer to many different corresponding events in the course of the ages.

us with manifold lessons of spiritual wisdom ; we should observe the common relations of this earthly life as illustrative of still higher spiritual relations ; we should see, in the transitory forms and ceremonies of the Jewish ritual, the signs and symbols of everlasting truth ; and, in the history of God's ancient people, we should see how was shadowed forth the coming and progress of God's heavenly kingdom. The more we form the habit of looking at outward nature and the forms of outward life in a religious point of view, and as symbols of spiritual realities, the better prepared shall we be to apprehend the truth that is conveyed to us in the figurative language of the Scriptures. Nature continually speaks to us the same language with Revelation ; what the one teaches by words, the other teaches by images and signs ; and the words with which Scripture addresses us were originally taken from the living vocabulary of nature, and to this we must resort in order to understand their primary meaning and power.

2. A second principle to be observed in the interpretation of figurative language is, that we must not think it necessary to change it into literal terms. This would be impossible. As all language that is applied to spiritual subjects, from the nature of the case, must be figurative, of course there are no *literal* terms in which to express spiritual truth. If any terms that are applied to spiritual subjects, *seem* to be literal, it is because, from long use, their figure has been worn out. They are like coin of which the stamp is worn off. People will not readily take them. Though they have some intrinsic worth, yet they need to be recoined in order to pass well. So it is with words. If they do not call up some figure in the mind, people will not take them. The preacher who uses them can make no impression.

We have said that no figurative terms applied to spiritual subjects can be changed into literal ones. We may change the figure, but this is only like turning liquid from one vessel into another. One vessel may contain more than another. One figure may express more than another. Every thought makes for itself some embodiment. We often speak

of *conceptions* of spiritual truth. But what is a conception but a taking together the elements of some thought, and forming them into some image in the mind? We speak of *ideas* of truth. But what is an idea but the *form* in which some *thing* presents itself to the thinking mind? Even in religious worship, where, if anywhere, we should divest ourselves of all ideas of form, every man who worships at all, worships some conception of his mind, which is to him the visible embodiment of the divinity. There is in the human mind an earnest craving after some visible form of God. This want of our nature is satisfied in him who is the brightness of the Father's glory, the express image of his person, the one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus; and the worship of God as revealed to us in the man Christ Jesus, is a worship of the Father, in spirit and in truth. And they who worship him, must worship him in the Son, for the Father seeketh such to worship him. Our purest, our truest, our most spiritual idea of God, is, when we think of him in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead *bodily*. All our ideas of heaven, and of the spiritual world necessarily assume some form.

Every object in nature is a symbol of some spiritual truth. When the names of outward objects, or of outward appearances are given to spiritual subjects, we say the language is figurative; but, properly speaking, these outward things are the figures designed to embody and represent spiritual truths. Nature is so laid out by its great author, as to represent the spiritual world. God is a sun, therefore is there a sun placed in the centre of the heavens to represent the brightness and glory of God. Earthly relations are so arranged, as to set forth heavenly relations. Material things are copies of spiritual things, and we learn divine things through copies; but the copies are trustworthy and true, being made by the same divine hand that made the archetypes, and made after the pattern of heavenly things.

The language of the Bible respecting the atonement made by Jesus Christ, is taken from the phraseology of the Old

Testament, respecting the sacrifices of the Hebrews, and therefore, say some, must be understood in a figurative or metaphorical sense. But the figure looks a different way from what they suppose, who make this remark. The law was a shadow of good things to come; the sacrifices of the law were figures of the true sacrifice, which is Jesus Christ, slain from the foundation of the world. He was the original, and they of the law were figures of him. Had it not been for his priesthood and his sacrifice foreordained of God, there would have been no priests, and no sacrifices appointed in the Jewish ritual, neither would the ideas of propitiation and atonement be inwoven as they now are, into the very tissue of the Scriptures. So the natural world around us would have been very different from what it now is, had it not been for the spiritual facts that underlie it, and have given shape to its phenomena. Thus in the physical evils that afflict the world, we may see the representations of man's sinful state, and the indications of the divine displeasure at human sinfulness, while also the goodness of God is poured out over all the earth, and even his very judgments are tempered with mercy, in order, during this dispensation of grace, to lead the children of men to repentance.

3. A third remark is, that important aid towards the understanding of the figurative language of the Scriptures may be derived from the cultivation of the imagination. Imagination is that power by which we form images or pictures to be seen by the eye of the mind, as the objects of the outward world are seen by the bodily eye. It was through the imagination that a large part of the revelations recorded in the Bible were made to those holy men who have transmitted them unto us. Divine revelations were addressed to the minds of the prophets by symbols set before them in visions and dreams, and the events of their daily life. Now it is imagination alone, that can reproduce these symbols to the mind of the reader, so that they may be clearly apprehended, and stand out before his mind as they did before the mind of the prophet. Moreover, imagination looks into the soul and living principle of things, discerns those moral ideas, or spiritual

truths which they are fitted and designed to express. The poet and the clown may both look at the same outward object, e. g. the western sky at the time of some brilliant sunset; but the one sees in it only what strikes his bodily eye, while the other may see in it the emblem of the gateway to the celestial city. If the natural world is laid out so as to represent the spiritual world, there is a reason in the nature of things why certain moral ideas should be expressed by certain figures, and not by others. It requires but little imagination to see that there is a reason, in the nature of things, why the moral idea of *right* should be designated by a word meaning *straight*, rather than by a word meaning *crooked*; and why the moral idea of *wrong* should be designated by a word meaning *crooked*, rather than by a word meaning *straight*; or why knowledge should be represented by light, and ignorance by darkness. And since it is one province of the imagination to discern the true correspondency between the phenomena of outward nature and the facts of the spiritual world, the cultivation of this faculty will furnish essential aid to the understanding of the figurative language of the Scriptures.

4. A fourth principle to be observed in the interpretation of figurative language is, that we remember the inadequacy of figures of speech, or of any sensible symbols, fully to express spiritual truth. The inadequacy of a symbol is to be distinguished from its falsity. A symbol may be perfectly true so far as it goes, and yet be utterly inadequate to express the whole truth. Our ideas of God are utterly inadequate to the reality, and yet may be true ideas for all that. So of spiritual truths generally. However formless spiritual realities may appear to us in the spiritual world, yet, so long as we are in the body, they can be conceived or expressed by us only in forms and figures. So far as spiritual truth is in itself formless, so far is human language incapable of giving it adequate expression; for language was originally applied to forms and appearances in the natural world, and still bears the marks of its origin; yet human language is capable of giving a true expression of spiritual things; for

the natural world is an image and picture of the spiritual world. The soul of man is now known to us, in part, by the expression of his face. Yet internal consciousness assures us that in the soul of every man there are depths of thought and feeling which cannot be told by the lineaments of his face. So internal consciousness assures us that the truths of the spiritual world are of a deeper measure than can be contained within the forms of material things. The limitations of form and figure, under which spiritual truths appear to us, are not also the limitations of our knowledge. But to convey our knowledge to others, or clearly to apprehend it ourselves, it must assume some form, more or less definite. And there are many spiritual truths which will require many different figures in order rightly, in some measure, to express their fulness and greatness. E. g. all our language with regard to God is figurative: "God is a spirit," "God is a rock," "God is a high tower," "God is a dwelling-place," "God is a sun and shield." Yet no one of these figures, nor all possible figures put together, can adequately express God to us. All created things fail adequately to do this, though all created things do, in a measure, tell us of him. And as God cannot adequately be expressed in any finite form, so neither can the truths which relate to his government and kingdom. It may be said of figures, what Dr. Bushnell has said of creeds: "No one creed contains the whole truth, and therefore the more creeds the better;" so no one figure contains the whole truth, and therefore the more figures the better; provided, however, that they be true to nature—that there be a true correspondency between the figure and the spiritual reality expressed by it.

We close with one suggestion to our ministerial brethren. They whose business it is to communicate spiritual truth to others, should make much use of figures as vehicles of truth. This is taught us by the example of the inspired writers, and especially by the example of our great Teacher, who hath taught us to look upon nature with a spiritual eye, and from the fowls of the air and the flowers of the field to learn the lessons of wisdom and piety. In our ideas of spiritual

truth, we cannot divest ourselves of images and forms, if we would. What we have to do is, to see that our figures and images are true and according to nature. Nature is an inexhaustible storehouse of hieroglyphics, pregnant with spiritual meanings. What we have to do is, to bring those meanings into the clear light of consciousness, and that not in dead abstractions, but in the living forms which nature herself offers to us. "The more vivid," says Schlegel, "the more striking, and apparently startling, the more boldly figurative and rare, are the terms or forms of expression employed, the more pertinently and clearly do they often convey our meaning, and the more happily chosen and to the point do they appear. In proof and confirmation of this assertion, I would appeal to the language of Holy Writ. Most, if not all, its descriptions of matters belonging to the invisible world, if we could still recall or still experience the first fresh impression, would at once be confessed to be the boldest that language has ever ventured upon. Long familiarity, however, has made them seem ordinary and tame. And it is necessary to contemplate them long and intensely, if we would revive their original fulness and peculiar significancy."¹ It would be well for us, in our use of words, to call up the images which lie at their base, so as to have a clear and distinct view of them in our own minds, and then endeavor to call up the same images in the minds of those to whom we speak. Much that is not literally true, is yet most true, because it makes the truest impression.

¹ *Philosophy of Language*, Morrison's translation, p. 419.

ARTICLE IV.

THE INFLUENCE AND METHOD OF ENGLISH STUDIES.

By William G. T. Shedd, Professor at Andover.

THAT the philological structure and history of the English language is a branch of investigation very greatly neglected by all to whom this tongue is vernacular, will hardly be questioned. If one examines the public or private libraries of this country, he finds them better supplied with works in almost every other department of knowledge, than with those that relate to the origin and early progress of the literature of the Englishman and Anglo-American. How little is known of the lexicographical labors of Junius, Lye, and Spelman; of the critical researches of Hearne, Ritson, Pinkerton, Tyrwhitt, Wright, and Price; and even of the histories of Warton, and Ellis. The publications of the Camden and Percy societies rarely make their way over the Atlantic. The small but increasing stock of Anglo-Saxon literature, well edited by scholars like Conybeare, Thorpe, Bosworth, Kemble, and Cardale, and still more, the Anglo-Norman literature brought to light by Michel and other French scholars, is a *terra incognita* to many whose explorations in classic and oriental regions have been extensive and accurate. Notwithstanding the genial and thorough criticism of Coleridge, Hazlitt, and Schlegel, it can hardly be affirmed that the literature of the Elizabethan era, has made that profound impression upon the thinking and composition of the present age, which its intrinsic merits entitle it to. That hearty and idiomatic, yet flowing and graceful, style of English, which is one result of the study of this portion of the language and literature, is confined to a comparatively small circle of writers. The common English diction of the day, has been formed more by the age of Queen Anne, than by that of Shakspeare and Bacon. The orator, reviewer, and paragraphist, puts on the "learned sock," not of Jonson the

dramatist, but of Johnson the moralist, and the pompous and measured diction of Gibbon, is preferred to the more natural and flexible, but not less finished and musical, phrase of Hooker.

The critical study of the English language and literature, as a special discipline in the general system of modern education, is consequently a topic that needs to be frequently and earnestly discussed, in order that a proper enthusiasm may exist in reference to it. The readers of this journal will bear testimony, that, from time to time, attention has been directed to this department of inquiry; and it is in the line of these preceding efforts that we would labor, and move forward.

The English language is the language into which we are born, and the English literature is the literature in which we are brought up. From the beginning of our existence, onward, through all the several ages of life, and through all the multiplied experiences of head and heart, we are continually receiving and propagating that fine and volatile influence which emanates from the national language and literature, upon every individual of the nation. A literature, therefore, in which we have an interest by virtue of our very birth and origin, and which penetrates so pervasively our daily life, has claims upon our best powers, in order that we may come to apprehend, with a distinct consciousness, its *peculiar* character and worth, and thereby experience more and more of its *specific* influences and impressions. For the objection that meets us, whenever we recommend the analytic study of a vernacular tongue, viz. that we are recommending a superfluity, inasmuch as the mother tongue is imbibed with the mother's milk, vanishes the moment we remember that the purpose of study, in nearly all instances, is to substitute a clear knowledge for an obscure one. There is meaning and truth in the Platonic dictum, that learning is reminding. One of the principal processes in mental cultivation consists in acquiring a distinct perception of that by which we are spontaneously, and therefore unreflectingly, influenced or actuated. What the common mind sees as in a

glass darkly, the educated mind sees face to face. The most of men are the creatures of the moulding and shaping ideas that are mercifully inlaid in their mental constitution, and of those institutions and permanent circumstances amidst which they live; and, inasmuch as these ideas are ideas of reason, and these institutions and permanent circumstances are arrangements of divine providence, no practical injury results to the individual, even when he surrenders himself to their influence and actuation, without philosophic reflection upon their nature and qualities. The citizen, for example, will suffer no injury, who yields himself up most implicitly and obediently, to the moral or the civil law, without analyzing the contents of this idea, or becoming metaphysically aware of its vast implication. Let him allow the principle and spirit of law to take possession of his whole being, and suffer all his faculties and energies to be absorbed in this august and beneficent power, and he will experience no detriment, intellectually or morally, even though he reflects but little upon the nature of the agencies by which he is moulded. In like manner, the individual may surrender himself to the influence of the literature and civilization of the nation to which he belongs, and, if these be truthful and sound, his comparative unacquaintance with what is constantly pressing upon him, and shaping and forming him, on all sides, will not prevent his being rightly shaped and formed. He is under and within a divine constitution, and whether consciously or unconsciously, must feel its power, and receive its influence. But while this is said, it must not be inferred that *philosophic reflection*, upon that which exerts an influence upon us whether we will or not, is of no worth; that *analytical study* into the nature and qualities of that which actuates us whether we think or not, is superfluous and unnecessary. Powerful as ideas, principles, and institutions are, even in relation to the unthinking man; and at times, for instance in political revolutions, they are as powerful as fire in gunpowder, and accompanied with nearly as little distinct knowledge; they yet receive a vast accession of power, when their operancy is accompanied with the

clear intuitions of reason, and the lucid perceptions of self-consciousness.

These remarks upon the general relation of analytic study and philosophic reflection to that which is innate in our mental constitution, or intrinsic to those permanent circumstances which exert a constant and unperceived influence upon us, independent of our reflection, apply with full force to subjects so close to us, and influences so spontaneous and irresistible, as those of our own mother tongue and our own native literature. For although none can help speaking their vernacular, and feeling more or less of the influence of the literature embodied in it, yet only those few feel its selectest influence and drink in its most essential spirit, who pass beyond the every-day use of the language to the critical and philological study of it. It is indeed true, that, whether the Englishman or the Anglo-American has studied his national language and literature, or not, he has, nevertheless, been so moulded and affected by it, that, if those elements in his culture which have come in from this source, should be withdrawn, it would lose its most vital if not its finest constituent; still he cannot feel, and he has not felt, the freshest, heartiest, healthiest, and most effective influence from this source, unless, by study and reflection, he has made himself unusually conscious of the intense power of the English language, and the vast wealth of the English literature. But in order to this intimate acquaintance, something more is needed than that easy and passive perusal of the current literature of the present period, which, in the case of one's native language and literature, so often passes for study. The full power of the English language cannot be adequately apprehended short of an acquaintance with it in *all* the periods of its history. The life of a language, like the soul of a body, is all in every part; and its highest intensity must therefore be sought for by a laborious and patient study of the language, back, through all its change and growth, to the lowest root.

There is a special reason for this close and minute study of our vernacular, founded on the fact that, speaking it, and

writing it, and thinking in it, as we do continually, we unavoidably acquire a moderate knowledge of it, which we are too willing to regard as philological and thorough. In the case of a foreign tongue, we are compelled to the lexicon and the grammar, because we cannot *understand* it without such study; and hence we inevitably acquire, in a greater or less degree, a critical knowledge of it. But it is not so in the case of our own language. The majority of words we have some acquaintance with, without any study on our part. It is true that this acquaintance is not close and accurate, like that which springs from etymological and careful analysis; but it is sufficient for all the purposes of practical life, and of an easy, passive perusal of books.

The only remedy for this superficial knowledge is to be found in the study of the language in all its periods, and especially in those elder forms which have passed out of use, and which, consequently, sustain something of the relation of a foreign tongue to the modern Englishman. Not that these earlier forms are really alien to us, like the French or the Latin tongues, for they still have an existence in the heart and pith of the English of the present day; but they require, in order to their being understood by the modern reader, a minute philological study, like that expended upon the Greek and Latin, which brings the mind into close and invigorating contact with them. For, to carefully trace a word, through its whole history, up to the root from which its true force and significance are, in the majority of instances, derived, is the only sure way of imbuing the mind with the spirit of a language. By this slow analysis, the power of the word is brought out and felt.

The same remarks hold true respecting the scope and riches of our national literature. He who is conversant with it in only one or two of its periods, can have but a meagre conception of its opulence. The national mind finds a full expression only in the totality of the national literature. Like the individual mind, it passes through great varieties of being; through a great multiplicity of moods; through various stages of development; and therefore its complete

expression and manifestation must be sought for in the *whole* literature to which it has given origin. It often happens that the earlier literature of a people contains elements not to be met with in any of the after periods of its history. The national mind often shows a phase in some one particular period, which centuries of existence would not bring round again. Should the English nation, for example, continue in existence, and the English mind continue to undergo change and development until the end of time, it is not probable that another period would occur in its history, in which the drama would reach such a height of life and power, and such a breadth and depth of passion, as characterize the Elizabethan drama. And can we ever expect the re-appearance of the fresh, hale, and lifesome spirit of "merrie England," as it appears in Chaucer? The beautiful vanishes and returns not again in the same form. Each age has its own excellences; and not until we have passed all the ages in review, can we know and feel the endless variety and opulence of a national mind.

With these general remarks upon the neglect and the importance of the philological study of the English language and literature, we proceed to consider the quality of the influence which flows from this particular branch of discipline, and to indicate the best method of pursuing it.

I. The first effect of a thorough acquaintance with English literature, is the *vivification* of the culture that flows into the modern mind from the classic world, and the prevention, thereby, of an ungenial and artificial classicism. This undoubtedly was the purpose aimed at, by those who constructed the modern system of education. A department of instruction in this language and literature, is established in all those institutions which propose to impart a symmetrical and complete discipline, in order that the youthful student, while in the flexible process of education, may be in communication with the modern mind and the modern world, as well as with the ancient mind and the classic world. Those who planned that system of liberal instruction,

by which the modern scholar is trained up, selected the vernacular tongue of the pupil himself, as one of the concurrent branches of knowledge to be pursued in order to a harmonious mental development, because it furnishes an element needed in modern culture, and derivable from no other source. They "yoked," as has been said of the education of Leibnitz, "all the sciences abreast," that the mind might be subjected to the widest possible intellectual influence, and, by binding the ancient and the modern world together, threw in upon the modern scholar the combined influence of both.

The difference between the ancient and the modern mind, is exhibited in the following extract from Coleridge, with remarkable comprehensiveness and conciseness. "The Greeks," he says, "idolized the finite, and therefore were the masters of all grace, elegance, proportion, fancy, dignity, majesty; of whatever in short, is capable of being definitely conveyed by defined forms or thoughts; the moderns revere the infinite, and affect the indefinite as a vehicle of the infinite; hence their passions, their obscure hopes and fears, their wandering through the unknown, their grander moral feelings, their more august conception of man as man, their future rather than their past, in a word, their sublimity."¹ But this native difference has been still more increased by the influence which Christianity has exerted upon the modern world, and the new species of development that has been introduced thereby. Consequently it is only a particular and peculiar element of culture, and not the entire culture itself, which the modern is to derive from the cultivated pagan. It is the form only, and not the matter, of literature, that is to be furnished by the Greek and Roman. The Christian world cannot go back to the pagan for ideas and thoughts. The humblest modern mind that lives within the pale of revelation, moves in a sphere of thought and feeling, infinitely transcending that of the loftiest heathen sage. It is not, therefore, for information and for living force, that the

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 29.

modern devotes himself, as he has ever since the revival of classical learning, to the study of the beautiful models of Greece and Rome. The function of classical discipline is æsthetic.

On the other hand, the modern mind is full of matter, and overfull of force. It is not naturally master of itself or its materials. Its vitality and energy require direction and a serene flow. The Goth needs to become an artist. Hence the coöperation of the Pagan with the Christian in the process of modern education; a coöperation that will be beneficial, only so long as the former is confined to its proper function of refinement, and justifiable, only in proportion as the latter does not permit its vigor and vitality to be killed out by the seductive grace of the former. *Upon the due proportion and the right mingling of the æsthetic element derived from classical literature, with the philosophical and theological elements derived from the world of modern Christian thought, depend the harmony and perfection of modern education.* For if the form and the grace become predominant to the neglect of the idea and the thought, the vitality and the force, culture becomes formal, artificial, and spiritless. It will not even make the impression of the model itself, to which it has been so servile. It will exhibit the symmetry, and finish, and elegance of the works of the Grecian and Roman mind, in the manner of a mere copyist, and with none of the genuine classic feeling and spirit. The peculiar vigor and energy which characterize modern literature, and which must characterize it, in order that it may produce a permanent impression upon the modern mind, will be wanting in the productions of such an unvivified classicality, and they will be out of place in the midst of all the motion and energy of the modern world.

For proof of this, we need only look at those periods in the history of literature, which were marked by an exclusive devotion to classical studies, to the neglect of modern thought. The eighteenth century was a period in English literary history, characterized by excessive classicism. The elder literature of England was greatly neglected and under-

valued, by the literary men of this period.¹ The English mind during this century having almost no communication with the modern European mind, contented itself with a by no means genial and reproductive, but servile and mechanical, study of Greek and Roman models. Much is said of the influence of French models, and canons of criticism, upon this period in English literary history; but what were the French models themselves, but cold copies of the classic age, with no modern new-born life in them; and what were the canons of criticism but the substantially correct rules of ancient art *mechanically* applied, and that too under totally different circumstances, and amidst entirely foreign relations? For as Schiller truly remarks: "the French, wholly misapprehending the *spirit* of the ancients, introduced upon the stage a unity of place and time, *according to the common empirical sense of the terms*, as if in the drama, there could be any other place than mere ideal space, and any other time, than the mere steady progress and sequence of the action."²

The truth is, the literary men of such periods started from the wrong point of departure. Instead of generating within themselves the stuff and material of literature, and employing classical culture as a formal or instrumental agency, in order to the symmetrical and finished presentment of it, they isolated themselves from the great process and movement of modern thought, violently threw themselves back into the ante-Christian world, and sought the matter, where they should have sought only the form, of literature. The result ought not to surprise us. For a genuine literature, one that

¹ The estimate in which Shakspeare was held by a mind like David Hume, is an example in point. The criticisms of Johnson, meritorious as his services in other respects were in regard to the earlier English literature, display little profound sympathy with the elder English spirit, as one feels on passing from them to the English and German criticism of the present century. The endeavor of Addison, in the *Spectator*, to awaken an interest in Milton and the Old Ballads, though more appreciative and genial than that of any other critic of the eighteenth century, was on the whole a failure, so far as the popular mind of that day is concerned.

² Ueber den Gebrauch des Chors in der Tragödie.

is destined to live in other ages, and to impress other nations, can originate only in the midst of present, actual, realities; only in the stir and throng of daily interests and feelings; only in the most intense and concentrated nationality. The training, the elaboration, the stimulation, may be brought from foreign climes, and from all ages, but the central root must grow up out of native soil.¹

The proper method of counteracting the tendency to Formalism, which seems to be as natural in literature as it is in morals, is, not to give up the study of the great ancient masters and models of Form, but, along with this study, and coincident with it, to pursue with equal thoroughness and diligence, the study of modern literature. And inasmuch as, in most instances, a selection must be made from the several literatures that are comprised within this denomination, there are strong reasons for the selection of that of England.

(1) In the first place, the English literature is the most universal and generic in its character of the literatures of modern Europe. It may be regarded as the one, among them all, in which the distinctive peculiarities of the modern mind have found the most full and forcible expression. For the English race itself is the most comprehensive of any. It is a mixture and cross of all the best of the modern stocks. At the bottom of it lies the Celtic, a portion of that great Scythian people which was the first to move westward from Central Asia, the cradle and birthplace of the human family. Judging from the relics of it, still to be found among the mountains of Wales, the highlands of Scotland, the bleak

¹ All the modern endeavors to revive the Pagan culture have failed, because they were attempts to find the *principle* and *substance* of literature in a stage of human history that has had its day, and which cannot, therefore, furnish anything beyond the artistic and the formal. A return to the culture and poetic Polytheism of the classic world, such as Shelley strove for, and Schiller yearns after in his poem entitled: *Die Götter Griechenlands*, would be as impossible and irrational, as would be the attempt to reconstruct the Fauna, or reanimate the Flora, of the primitive geological periods. The history of the efforts of the New Platonics to revive Paganism in its religious aspects, is equally instructive with these attempts to revive it in its literary phase, and ought to be pondered by that small circle of religionists, of the present day, who seem to be repeating that futile endeavor.

and sterile district of Brittany in France, and in the eloquent and impetuous Irishman, it was a race eminently fitted to constitute the ground-work of a national character. Bold, fearless, and possessing an indomitable love of freedom, as the Commentaries of Cæsar evidence, the Briton still lives in the modern Englishman ; and, by a singular yet natural coincidence, gives his name to England itself, whenever the elements of power and empire are sought to be made prominent. For they are "*Britons* who never will be slaves;" and it is *Britannia* who

* * * * needs no bulwark,
No tower along the steep,
Whose march is o'er the mountain-wave,
Whose home is on the deep.

Into this living and solid root was then grafted one of the very finest shoots of the great Germanic race—the Anglo-Saxon. The second wave of Asiatic emigration, thus rolled over upon the first, and mingled with it. Widely-differing national characteristics, originating in the same centre of the world, but separated by centuries of rude and savage, yet real and thorough, development during the various fortunes of emigration and warfare, of conflict with man and with material nature, were thus commingled in the Saxonized Briton. And, lastly, into the nation and character thus formed, an infusion of the Roman nature was introduced by the invasion and armed occupancy of the land by the Normans.

Constituted in this manner, the English mind became an exceedingly comprehensive one. Containing the qualities and characteristics of all the principal races that have made Europe their home, with the exception of the Slavonic, a race which, perhaps, is to play an important part in the future history of the world, but which, as yet, has had no development, and, until recently, has been a mere cipher in European history—containing, we say, such widely-different and yet substantial characteristics, the English mind is the most adequate representative of the Universal-European or Modern Mind.

(2) But, in the second place, besides this peculiar conformation of the English race and mind, there is still another feature in its history which contributes to render the study of it, and its productions, of more worth than that of any other of the literatures of modern Europe. We allude to the peculiar and powerful influence which the Christian religion has had upon its formation and development. We have already alluded to the fact that one great cause of the difference between Ancient and Modern culture, civilization, and literature is to be traced to the influence of divine revelation. Christianity imparted a depth and spirituality to the thought and feeling of the Modern world, which could not arise under the predominantly sensualizing tendency of Paganism, and those literatures which imbibed its spirit most deeply and purely, other things being equal, are most worthy of attention. For they harmonize best with the tone and spirit of the Modern world; they best prepare the scholar to enter vividly and with a vital consciousness into the career and movement of modern society; they afford more that awakens and strengthens and nurtures the individual mind; they are less liable to be exhausted of their contents and to be outgrown and left behind in the progressive development of human nature. But of all the literatures of modern Europe, the English felt the influence of Christianity in its purest form. The literatures of Southern Europe grew up under the influence of a nominal Christianity, which had in it far more of the sensualism of Paganism than the spirituality of the gospel. The effects of it are to be seen, this day, in the nerveless, emasculated national character, and the feeble, decaying, dying literature. The English mind and heart, on the contrary, have, in the main, been exposed, age after age, to the spiritualizing influences and discipline of the Christian religion. Even those periods in English history when a false Christianity prevailed, only served to make the recoil more violent, and to subject the nation to a still purer and still more spiritual form of truth. The rich, healthy genius and strong sense of England have, for a longer and less interrupted period than has been the case with any other peo-

ple, been slowly, and from the centre, unfolding themselves under the cultivating, elevating, humanizing influences of the Christian religion.

In the English literature, then, by virtue of the comprehensive representative character of the English mind, and the strength, depth, and purity of the influence exerted upon it by the Christian religion, is the modern student to find the most effectual preservative against that literary Formalism which an unbalanced, and in reality ungenial, study of classical literature is sure to produce. The modern scholar ought to be a man of power and of impression. He ought also to be a man of well-proportioned, symmetrical, elegant cultivation. But he is more likely to be the latter, if he is already the former, than he is to be the former, if he is, first, the latter. For, wherever there is matter and power to start with, there *may* be beauty, and grace, and elegance. The same degree of careful effort devoted to the artistic and formal finish of a work *after*, instead of before, the proper diligence and care have been devoted to its material origination within the mind, will elaborate it into a high beauty and an exquisite grace, that are absolutely beyond the power of one who has not thus begun at the beginning; who has not first gendered the work in his own soul.

In the thoughtful opulence and the throbbing life of the English literature, the modern student should, then, seek for mental wealth and power; for that vigorous and masculine principle that will vivify all his other culture from whatever source it come. In so doing, he is going to Ophir for gold, to the gorgeous East for barbaric pearl, to the very heart of nature for the forces of life. For let him bring before his mind, for a moment, the series of productions in the several departments of literature, which the English mind has been originating and throwing off with freedom, and force, and wonderful variety, during the last half millennium; let him remember the wisdom of Bacon, and Hooker, and Burke; the satire of Hall, of Butler, of Swift; the humor of Chaucer, of Goldsmith, of Sterne, of Lamb; the brilliancy and art of Pope; the magnificence and architecture of Milton;

the sweetness, and fluency, and flushed beauty, of Spenser; the meditateness of Wordsworth, and the intensity of Byron; let him think, lastly, of that wonderful being in whom all these qualities existed in their prime and purity, and found their full expression in the immense range and expanse of the Shakspearean drama, in the portraiture of the whole human being in its myriad minds and moods; let the modern student recall all this, and feel its full impression, and believe that, in pursuing the close and thorough study of English literature, he is pursuing the study of the richest, and the most thoughtful, the most vigorous, and the most vivifying, literature of the modern world.

II. The second principal effect of English studies is seen in the *excellence of the style of thought and expression*, that results from their prosecution.

The mode of thinking induced into a mind by a course of education, is a matter of the highest importance. If it cannot be said that it is of as great moment *how* the mind thinks, as *what* it thinks, it can be asserted with positiveness, that the *matter* of its thoughts is very closely connected with the *manner* of them, and, in this respect, the style of thinking becomes worthy of attention and cultivation.

By the *style of thinking*, is meant the particular and peculiar manner in which thought is produced in the mind, when left to its spontaneous, unwatched workings. This peculiar manner undoubtedly has its lowest foundation in the peculiar structure of the individual mind; but it is also modified, and, to a certain extent determined, by the class of minds and kinds of thought, in other words, by the species of literature with which it is familiar. Besides, so far as the style of thinking is founded upon, and determined by, the structure of the human mind itself, it is a correct one, and all deviations therefore, in the wrong direction, must be traced to external influences. For the mind itself is well made, and when its laws and constitution are perfectly obeyed, nothing, either in its mode of action, or in its products, requires emendation or correction.

When, however, a mind is exposed to the influence of other minds, whose way of thought is unnatural, affected,

artificial, extravagant, or whatever the bad quality may be, it is very liable to be drawn into the same false manner. Especially is this true, in case there be in the individual mind a bent of the same general character. In this case, the student, while in the plastic process, and before he has reached "the years that bring the philosophic mind," is extremely liable to attach himself to some school in letters, in which the false mode of thought has embodied itself in all probability in dazzling glare, and with a species of imposing power difficult to be resisted. Falling in, as it does, with his own particular tendency, it is no wonder that his whole intellect is taken captive by it, and he acquires a fixed style of thinking, in which the most glaring faults of his model appear.

But the age, as well as the single individual, always has a style of thinking which is peculiar to itself, and this also exerts a controlling influence upon the individual. For that must be an extremely intense and determined individuality that can keep itself out of the great main current and tendency of the age in which it lives, and, in strong contrast, exhibit a style of thinking purely sui-generic. Such individualities, when genuinely original, become the creators of new schools in literature, and of new eras in art. The great mass of men, however, naturally share in the general intellectual characteristics of the age in which they live, and no one can rid himself of the faults of his age, unless he carefully study and imbibe some of the better characteristics of other periods. If he contents himself with the literature of the present, and suffers himself to be the mere creature and copy of its good and bad qualities alike, he will not attain the best development of his own mind, and will help to perpetuate what is defective in the existing type of thought and culture.

The influence of English studies, and especially of the study of the earlier English, in reference to the point under consideration, is most excellent. For, if we were called upon to mention the distinguishing characteristic of these elder writers, we should mention the sincerity and thoroughness

of their mental processes. They never write for merely momentary effect, but absorb themselves, with great self-forgetfulness, in the subject of their reflections. They had, it is true, one advantage over writers of the present day: they composed before criticism (either as theory or practice) became a constituent part of the national literature, and hence wrote without restraint. But, aside from this, the elder English mind was a singularly thoughtful and even-tempered one. When stirred deeply, it proved itself to be a mind full of powers and energies, as the political history of England shows. But this force was under the control of strong English sense, and of that more profound faculty which is the parent of ideas and the discoverer of laws. This temperance of intellect, this moderation of soul, invariably accompanies depth and richness of thought, and manifests itself in a grave and commanding style of reflection and expression. Turn, for example, to the poetry of Spenser and Milton, to the philosophy of Bacon, to the history of Raleigh, and notice the entire absence of that quality so much strained after by the modern *Belle Lettrist*, the striking and the startling. The charm lies not in individual passages; and hence no compositions suffer more when judged of by "elegant extracts" from them; but in the continuous and continual flow of the main current of thought, which pours onward in gentleness, in quietness, and in broad, deep strength. This same characteristic is seen in every department of literary composition. Even in auto-biography, where the writer would be specially tempted to throw a brilliant hue over his own personal history, the same sedateness and balance of judgment is exhibited. The Memoirs of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, for example, contain the history of one of the most rare and accomplished gentlemen, as well as one of the most learned and thoughtful students, of the age in which he lived. They also contain an account of chivalrous adventures—

"of most disastrous chances,
Of moving accidents, by flood and field;
Of hair-breadth scapes i' the imminent deadly breach."

And yet the narrative is equable and tranquil, the language

mild, melodious, and flowing; and the coloring over the whole, not glaring and showy, but sober, suffused, and rich. Indeed, what Heminge and Condell, the editors of the first edition of Shakspeare, say of this author, applies to the early English writers generally: "As he was a happy imitator of nature, so he was a *most gentle expresser* of it. His mind and hand went together; and what he thought, he uttered with that easiness, that we have scarce received from him a blot in his papers."

These characteristics in the mode of thought and expression, arose from the singular sincerity and gravity of the English character and mind, in these earlier stages of its history. By sincerity we mean the pure outgoing or *issue* of the mind, unmodified by any outward references. As has been already remarked, the Englishman of this period had not the fear of the Critic before his eyes. English literature, therefore, though it suffered undoubtedly for the want of a sound philosophic criticism, and was somewhat lacking in those excellent qualities, conciseness and perspicuity, which the sharp analysis of a later day has superinduced upon it, did, nevertheless, attain to a sweet fluency, and rich copiousness, and sober gravity, and wise thoughtfulness, which have never been surpassed. Again, the author of these periods did not write for all grades and capacities of intellect. He was not a society for the diffusion of useful knowledge among all classes of men, but he was a retiring, studious person, who thought as he listed, and wrote without much regard to an immediate sensation, for a "fit audience though few." Far be it from us to speak disparagingly of the useful knowledge diffused so widely at the present day, or of that body of sound and useful literature which has been called into existence by the wants of the people. In reference to all the solid characteristics and qualities of literature, it is more worthy of the name than much of the so-called polite literature and belles lettres of the times. Like the elder literature of which we have been speaking, it is an honest and sound production. It came into being owing to a felt want, and it meets a felt want of an intelligent, sound-hearted body of men, and

therefore it is to be respected by every one who respects the human mind. Still the somewhat insulated position of the earlier English writers, by freeing them from all side influences and by-aims, gave them an opportunity to free their minds as slowly, as lengthily, as copiously, as thoroughly as they pleased. They were at liberty, in the retirement of their closets, and addressing a limited public of similar cultivation with themselves, to pay no attention to time, place, or circumstances, in the development of a subject. That short method, rapid movement, and striking statement in which we of the present excel them, and which is a necessary quality in oratory, is not to be found in them. We must look to modern English literature for the best specimens of oratorical composition.

The whole influence of such a thoughtful and sincere literature upon the mind, is educating in the highest degree. The reader is not violently excited by a rapid series of single striking thoughts and images, which, in the phrase of De Quincey, "can hardly have time to glance, like the lamps of a mail coach, before his hurried and bewildered understanding," but he is gradually penetrated and permeated by warm currents of rich and genial reflection. He acquires, insensibly, the same temperate and composed style of thinking; learns to *commune*, long and patiently, with the subjects that come before his mind; and, like these his teachers and models, finds all themes wonderfully fertile. For, along with this simplicity, there is a remarkable copiousness in the literature of which we are speaking. Instead of being made poor by this freedom and prodigality, these minds, like a living fountain, only became more ebullient the more they were drawn from. Call to mind, for example, the wonderful fertility of the English mind in the Elizabethan age! What an immense amount of rich and weighty thought, that was rich and weighty enough to come down to our day, and which will have a permanent interest for the human mind in all time, was originated during the fifty years between 1575 and 1625! During this short fifty years, English literature was enriched by the productions of Spenser, Sidney, Raleigh,

Bacon, Hooker, Shakspeare, Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher, Chapman, Marlowe, Webster, Middleton, and Ford. The catalogue reminds one of the dazzling treasure vault of Marlowe's rich Jew of Malta:

Infinite riches in a little room,
Bags of fiery opals, sapphires, amethysts,
Jacinths, hard topaz, grass-green emeralds,
Beauteous rubies, sparkling diamonds
And seld-seen costly stones of so great price,
As one of them, indifferently rated,
And of a caract of this quality,
May serve in peril of calamity
To ransom great kings from captivity.

This fertility of the English mind was, at once, the cause and effect of the prevailing style of thinking at that period. The striking, startling, brilliant mode, which has reached its acme in the modern Novel, not drawing upon the meditateness and *reserve* of the intellectual character, is utterly incompatible with such a *union of quantity with high quality*, as appears in this Elizabethan literature. On the contrary, that calm and composed method which characterized these men, and which is worth toiling after, is most conformed to the nature of the human mind, to that "*large discourse of reason which looks before and after*," and consequently may be presumed to be, more than any other one, the mode in and through which the contents of the mind may be discharged in richest abundance and with least self-exhaustion.

In this connection it is worthy of notice that the principle here advanced holds good in other departments besides that of letters. The highest and most productive genius in Fine Art, is also the calmest and gravest. Raphael died at the early age of thirty-seven, yet he filled all Europe with masterpieces before he died. And into each one of these works, if we are correctly informed, he threw, with all the prodigality of nature herself, a world of life, motion, and expression. Many of his pieces are groups, and groups within groups; and yet each individual in them is itself a study. His creative talent finds no parallel but in Shakspeare himself; and there is certainly no distant similarity between

that universality and wealth of artistic power which projected itself in the paintings of Raphael and that which embodied itself in the vastness of the Shakspearian drama. But Raphael's genius was mild and serene. His temperament bordered upon the feminine; and his activity as an artist was deliberate, equable, and sustained. Indeed, the history of literature generally, shows that ages of great productive power have not been marked by violent and spasmodic action. The intellects of that wonderful age, the age of Pericles, were grave and tranquil in their nature and actings. So equable and calm was their intellectual manner, that the Greek Prose of this period, especially that of Plato, is rhythmic and sweetly musical, and their thought is so utterly destitute of everything startling or glaring, that the modern student, brought up, as he has been, amid the animation, and brilliancy, and sensation, of the present age, must school himself, and acquire a classic taste, a taste for *Platonic* beauty, before he can feel its hidden charm.

But while this feature in the elder English mind and literature is brought out, it is necessary to guard against the notion that this calmness was accompanied with dulness, that the body of thought thus originated is destitute of vitality and energy. The life and the power run very deep, and they are felt with tremendous force, by that mind, and only that mind, which by a genial and somewhat reproductive study, has adopted the same style of thinking. For when the student has once sunk down into the element and the depth, where these minds think, and can repeat their processes, he knows of a vitality and an energy not to be found nearer the surface. The literature of which we are speaking, is in no sense languid or lifeless. The minds that produced it were deeply earnest, inspired with a serious purpose, and at no rare intervals glowing with enthusiasm. Nay, they seem to have found their most congenial sphere in the drama; the department of all most aloof from coldness, tameness, and lifelessness. The subject-matter in which they seem to have taken the liveliest pleasure, was human passion; and that this most vivid part of human na-

ture found a powerful painter in them, the Elizabethan drama is a proof. For if we look through universal literature, we cannot find anything more passionate than this drama. Saying nothing of its immense range and expanse, it being nothing less than the whole human consciousness, an infinite canvas which would seem to require an infinite rather than a finite power to fill up; saying nothing of its vast extent, nowhere do we find such an intensity of life, breath, and motion; and this too at every point, and in every part and particle. Take the play of Hamlet, for example. We do not find the violent, volcanic, energy of a modern melo-drama, or of a modern French novel; but he must be stone-dead in the depths of his being, who does not find beating throughout this *organism* the deep life of nature and reality, and beating with a stronger pulse the more he knows of it. Take again, a play like the "White Devil," of Webster, and see with what terrible strength the fundamental passions of human nature are shown working. Notice the rousing effect of the play upon the mind. This production of this same reserved and thoughtful period is intensely passionate. It has a most profound affinity with the human imagination, and raises storms of feeling and passion in the mind of the reader.

The truth is, the literature of this period is alive *all through*, and hence the depth and calmness of its life. The more that is known of it, the more will it be felt to be a powerfully educating instrument. No literature imparts a more distinctive and highly determined character to the culture of one who studies it; and this not for one stage of the intellectual life, but for all stages. It is characteristic of a less reserved and more striking mode of thinking, that it seizes with violence upon the mind at a particular period, and takes possession of it altogether during this period. It exerts a greater influence than it has a right to, because no one style is absolute and perfect enough to justify this monopolizing of all the powers and capacities of the human soul, to the exclusion of all other forms of literature, or modes of thought. Even in the case of the higher and more

perfect species of literature of which we are speaking, the influence exerted, is not to the exclusion or at the expense of that of other excellent species, such as the classic, for example, but in coincidence and harmony with it. It is therefore an unfavorable sign in relation to the character of a mode of thought, or a school in letters, if the mind, during one particular period in its history, and especially if it is an unripe one, become so absorbed in it as to be dead to all other forms. A reaction must come eventually, and the favorite author will become as intensely repulsive, as he was once intensely attractive.

But the influence of the literature under consideration, is eminently catholic and liberalizing. The mental tendency produced by the study of it, does not in the least unfit the student for a genial appreciation of other forms. Nay, we affirm that it is one of the very best preservatives against narrowness in criticism, and bigotry in literary feeling. The calm, self-possessed, thoughtful spirit, which reigns in English literature, taken as a whole, tends to extirpate all exclusive sympathies, and to render the intellectual affinities more comprehensive and far-reaching. Whenever we meet a mind, one of the deep bases of whose culture has been laid in a thorough apprehension and genial admiration of *English thought* in its best forms, we meet one of enlarged and catholic views of literature generally. Such an one is far better qualified to sit in judgment upon a false and exaggerated mode of thinking, than he who is fully involved in it can be. The admiration which he feels towards a dazzling school or author, is far more correct, because it is far more moderate and intelligent, than that of a servile disciple. He is not blind to its faults, and therefore best knows the actual worth of its excellences.

And more than all, and better than all, the style of thinking produced by the study of the literature in question, is essentially permanent in its character. By this, is not meant, that it is a stiff and rigidly fixed style, incompatible with mental freedom; a style that is a mechanical, rather than a vital process, and keeps the thinker constantly

running in his old ruts. The style is permanent, in the sense of being broad enough, and calm enough, to make room for all the modifications that may be introduced into it by the growing culture of the student, *without changing or deranging the ground-work*. The mind has not been committed, so to speak, to intensity of any sort, to any violent manner, but is impartial, grave, and judicial, in its tone and temper. Hence it is not compelled, in order to change at all in its style of thought or expression, to change altogether, and take on some entirely new form of intensity or mental violence, thus going through a round of particular and transient manners, or rather *mannerisms*, but never acquiring any one permanent and standard style. For it is noticeable, that a constant hankering after the most intense and striking form is destructive of all true form. An intellectual restlessness is produced in this way, that keeps the mind in a ceaseless chase after the novel and the startling, in neither of which can it ever find permanent satisfaction and rest.

The truth of these remarks may be seen by a reference to the style of the modern journalism. The journal must be striking and brilliant, or it is nothing. That repose and reserve of manner, which appears in the treatise, in the methodical, organized product that makes a positive addition to the sum of human knowledge, is death to the journal. Hence the journalist must be ever on the alert for forms of expression, and turns of periods, and peculiarities of manner, that will make a sensation in distinction from an impression. He is compelled to lead an intense, excited, unnatural intellectual existence, and to find ever new, and ever changing forms for it. But how little of standard style, of finished, noble form, is there in the current journal literature! There is not mental repose long enough to allow the mind to settle into one permanent manner. The production of fixed form, the crystallization, is prevented by the perpetual jar and agitation.

Such then, we conceive, is the influence of English studies upon the style of thinking. They induce a calm, grave, sin-

cere, profound, exhaustive, and commanding manner of mind. And inasmuch as it is the great end of education to enable the mind to think its very best thought, and to express it in its very best manner, the great worth of this literature for educational purposes becomes apparent. It is a powerful organ and instrument of culture. It is to be recommended to the modern student, as an extremely influential means of bringing out into full action his best capacity. If there be any literature that can stir, and stimulate, and educe, while at the same time it nurtures and enriches, it is the English. And it is, whatever may be our theory on the matter, the literature to which we betake ourselves when we wish to feed our mind with sweet and wholesome food; when we wish to have its best powers roused; when we wish to think for our own satisfaction, or to give out thought for others. If we are scholarly now, we keep Milton, and Shakspeare, and Chaucer, and Bacon, and Hooker, by us; and if we shall continue to be scholars, these minds will continue to mould and educate our minds. For this literature is home-bred, and, apart from its intrinsic excellence, speaks in our own tongue, and addresses our own nationality, and our own individuality. To feel its influence, we need only to keep a healthy English spirit, and a sound English heart within us; we have but to open our mouths and draw in the fresh bracing element and atmosphere we were born for.

III. In our discussion thus far, we have devoted almost exclusive attention to the elder English writers; and it might, perhaps, be inferred that we would discard the productions of the later authors, and do them injustice. This would be a mistaken inference; for, although we believe that, if a line were drawn between the literature preceding, and that succeeding, Milton, the weightier and more precious portion would lie on the further side of it, we would not say one word that could possibly lead to the neglect of any portion of a literature that we desire to have studied as a sum-total. From his contemporaneous position, and immediate relation to it, however, the modern will not be likely to un-

dervalue modern English authorship ; while, on the other hand, there is much need of effort and urgency to prevent him from remaining as ignorant of Chaucer, and Gower, and even of Spenser, as if, instead of being the "wells of English undefiled," they belonged to a foreign literature. The purpose, therefore, of the remainder of this Article will be, to give some practical directions respecting the best method of pursuing English Studies philologically and critically.

(1) One principal reason why the language and literature of England, which really forms the connecting link between the student and the great modern world into which he is soon to enter and become a constituent part, has exerted so little comparative influence in the system of public instruction, and in connection with the classical, mathematical, and philosophical discipline, lies in the fact that it has not been made the subject of etymological study and philological analysis. No language, no literature, as we remarked in the outset, can exert a thoroughly educating power, unless the mind works its way into it by the study of its individual words and radicals ; unless its force and life are felt through the slow process of decomposing and recombining its rudimental elements. The first practical recommendation therefore is this : Select an old English author, from a period so remote that his language and style shall be so strange and unknown, as to require close glossarial and grammatical study in order to a bare understanding of him. The common error is, to select a writer, Milton or Shakspeare, for example, so near to our own age as to require but little study of this sort in order to reach his general meaning. But in reality, such authors as these should be *studied*, only after a preparatory discipline of the sort we are recommending. The wonders of their English style can be appreciated only by one who has analyzed the language in its roots, and has acquired a knowledge of its history ; only by one who has traced words up to their origin, and down again, through all their changes and uses ; only by one who has studied the various styles of thinking to be found in the literature as a

whole, and knows, in some good degree, all the various types and manners the national mind has taken on. For these great masters are highly national in their literary character, and their productions contain the concentrated essence of the general English mind and heart, and the general English culture. In order to their profound apprehension, a very extensive knowledge of English literature is required; and the truly philosophic study of them cannot be commenced even, without much previous preparation. The student must, then, select Chaucer to start with. He must go back of the prolific and somewhat familiar sixteenth century, across the almost totally sterile and barren fifteenth century, and plant himself in the very heart of the fourteenth. In this way he will have put a gulf between his present knowledge of English and that knowledge which he proposes to acquire, over which he cannot pass without some more earnest and thorough study than is implied in an easy and passive perusal of a form of English like that of Shakspeare or Spenser. He will be made aware that the Englishman of 1350 used a form of English that is, to a great extent, unintelligible to the Englishman of 1850; and yet a form which thorough philological study will show is not so wholly different from that employed by himself, as he might imagine in his present ignorance of it. Increasing acquaintance with it will evince that, after all, it is genuine, hearty, idiomatic English, and has a most close and vital affinity with the best portion of his own vocabulary, and with the raciest, heartiest trains of thought in his own mind.

An additional reason for selecting Chaucer is found in the fact that, in his works, the English language first appears in a tolerably fixed form. Previous to Chaucer it had been passing through those intermediate stages which marked the transition from the pure Saxon to the English proper. Hence the literature of the nation may be said to have sprung into existence with him. For Layamon's translation of Wace, the metrical Chronicles of Robert of Gloucester and Robert Mannyng, and the Vision of Piers Plowman,—the principal productions that mark the progress of the language

and literature of England during the two centuries between 1150 and 1350—all bear evident marks of immaturity and instability. While the range of thought is trivial and mean,¹ the form of the language, and the character of the style, indicate that the national mind, during this period, was uncultivated and unformed. It was feeling the effects of the Norman conquest. For, although the Norman was more cultivated than the Saxon whom he conquered, still the Saxon *serf* could derive to himself but little of the culture of his Norman lord. The relation existing between the two parties precluded any civilizing and cultivating influence of one upon the other. Only in proportion as the Saxon recovered his rights and political freedom, did he profit by the culture which his conquerors possessed. During the two centuries of which we are speaking, the English nation was slowly recovering its freedom, and the English mind was slowly emerging from the ignorance and barbarism of a servile condition. The literary productions of the period, although they must receive, sooner or later, the careful study of every one who wishes to obtain a complete knowledge of the English language and literature, are crude in their matter, inelegant and even barbarous in their form. There is the same objection, therefore, to commencing with them that there is to commencing with the Saxon, in order to a complete knowledge of English. They are too naked and bald for the mere beginner. They are not thoughtful and attractive enough to waken the interest of the student, in the first period of his English studies. They need to be examined in the light thrown back upon them from a succeeding age, and under the interest excited by their seen relation to forms of English that have already been studied and mastered. For it is plain that the natural method for the Englishman to pursue, in the study of his mother tongue, is retrogressive. He should work his way back, from the present form of the language, step by step, until he reaches its heart and root. Instead, therefore, of leaping from the last and newest form to

¹ This remark is only partially true of the *Vision of Piers Plowman*, which is a vigorous and lively picture of life and manners.

the first and oldest ; from the present English to the Saxon of *Beowulf* or *Caedmon* ; he should study, one by one, the intermediate forms, until, by a natural and imperceptible progress, he arrives at the beginning. All that is needed is, that he study the subject by distinctly-marked periods ; that he investigate authors, who are sufficiently far apart to enable him to see and realize that the language has undergone a great change.

As one of the first steps, then, in English study, let Chaucer be taken up as an author to be studied critically and for years to come. This is a better method than merely to peruse a history of the language and literature, like those of Warton and Ellis, and there stop. It is true, that such histories afford a selection of extracts from the principal writers of each period, from which some general notions and views may be formed ; but they are the last works to be put into the hands of a beginner. He who has already mastered the few leading authors of the different periods, may make use of them as an aid in epitomizing and generalizing his knowledge. For, by this independent and accurate study of individual authors, he has obtained a clue that will lead him through the maze and perplexity of a historical series, and leave him in possession of distinct and well-methodized information. But without this clue and previous preparation, the vast amount of material contained in such a history as that of Warton, will only confuse and overwhelm the mind, leaving it full of obscurity and vagueness. In selecting a particular author, and devoting the whole attention to him for the time being, the student has only a single end in view. He is busied with one individual mind, and in endeavoring to penetrate into its nature and spirit, his own mind moves in one straight line, and all his acquisitions are simple and homogeneous in their character. And if the author whom he selects be worthy of such an undivided attention ; especially if he be one in whom the general culture and spirit of his age found expression ; the knowledge acquired is not only thorough, but extensive. For such minds are very broad as well as deep, and there need be no fear of becoming nar-

rowed by such exclusive study of one writer. That close and undivided attention which the Greeks, in all ages of their history, devoted to their Homer, contributed, as much as any one thing, to the liberal and expanded feeling so characteristic of Greek literature. The Greek, unlike the Englishman, did not allow the dialect or the poetry of the father of his national literature to become strange or obsolete. His works were, alike, familiar to the educated Greek of the Attic and Alexandrine periods. In the words of Heeren: "The dialect of Homer remained the principal one for epic poetry, and had an important influence on Grecian literature. Amidst all the changes and improvements in the language, it prevented the ancient from becoming antiquated, and secured it a place among the later modes of expression."¹ And had the Englishman been as careful to prevent the language and works of the English Homer from becoming obsolete and unknown, the English language and literature would have been different from what it now is, by a very important modification. If that stream of sweet, fresh, and hearty thought had been kept running, for four centuries past, into the great main volume of English thought, there would be more of nature and less of art in it. If that simple, expressive, nervous, and (notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary by critics who had not *imbued* themselves with Chaucer) that melodious diction had come along down as a familiar form of the language, the English of the present day would be a higher type of the language than it is.

Another reason for selecting Chaucer, and making him the subject of exclusive and close study for a long time, is found in the fact, that in this way alone can he be understood and appreciated. To read a few extracts from his works in a compendium, in connection with a few extracts from all the other leading writers of England, is not the way to a worthy and fruitful knowledge of him. Indeed the first effect of Chaucer upon the modern, is to repel; and it is only the first effect that is experienced upon the perusal of extracts. The immediate impression of an old writer upon an uncul-

¹ Ancient Greece. Chapter Sixth. Bancroft's Translation.

tivated mind, generally, is that of disappointment. The unschooled reader finds nothing but strangeness of diction, excessive simplicity of sentiment bordering upon triviality, pathos that is bathos, and a verse from which no ingenuity can extract either melody or harmony. All this is true in its full extent of Chaucer. Even such clear heads and sensible minds as Dean Swift and Alexander Pope, saw no poetry or charm in him; if their burlesques and travesties of him afford, as they unquestionably do, any index of their real opinion. But it is the effect of the critical and prolonged study of Chaucer, to so *imbue* the mind with his matter and manner, that his truthfulness, and charm, and power, as a poet, are felt vividly and fully. Perhaps the point upon which the sceptic would hold out longest in relation to him, would be his verse; it being an unquestioned assertion, in some very respectable schools of criticism, that it is destitute of both melody and harmony. But we do not hesitate to affirm, that when the student has by long continued intercourse become *familiar* with him; when his antique strangeness has worn off, and the ear has become accustomed to certain variations from the modern custom in pronunciation; when, in short, he has so cultivated himself, that Chaucer is to him what he was to the ear and the poetic feeling, of his own age, we affirm that more melodious and harmonious verse is not to be found in the literature. It can be read longer, and not weary the ear, than the verse of Scott or Moore can be; because the melody is ever subordinate to the harmony; because the sentiment is natural, and the measure undulates with the sentiment. But such a genial and truthful appreciation of Chaucer is not the work of a day. The scholar must gradually grow into it, and grow up to it. Time alone imparts the sense and vernacular feeling of his excellence.

When this author has been completely mastered, the student is prepared for those still earlier and ruder forms of English, of which we have spoken. Once at home in the English of Chaucer, the passage to that of the metrical chronicles is easy and natural; and when these have been studied, the few

remains of Saxon that are left, furnish the matter for the final study in this direction.¹

(2) The second practical recommendation respecting the best manner of pursuing the study of the English language and literature is this : select from leading periods in the history of the literature, those productions in which the power of the great minds found its fullest expression, and regard them as models to be studied. As examples, may be cited such productions as Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, the first book of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Milton's *Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing*, Locke's *Conduct of the Understanding*, Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*.

Productions like these are eminently English. They are eminently characterized by the solid sense, the strong understanding, and the thoughtful spirit of England. These qualities, it is true, are characteristic of all genuine products of the English mind, but they are found in their greatest energy, only in the productions of leading minds. With these, therefore, the student should imbue himself. He may peruse the second-rate writers without being greatly affected by these characteristics, but he cannot meditate upon such treatises as the above mentioned, without becoming more thoroughly English in the process. The importance of a national spirit in culture cannot be overestimated, and to this point we would direct attention for a moment. The individual mind is not individual merely ; it is also national in its structure. It partakes of the peculiarities of the par-

¹ An English Chrestomathy is a great desideratum. Commencing with selections from Gower's *Confessio Amantis* (1415), followed by most of the *Canterbury Tales* (1390), then with extracts from Langland's *Piers Plowman* (1360), from Lawrence Minot (1340), from the hybrid form of the language in Robert de Brunne's *Chronicle* (1339), and Robert of Gloucester's (1280), from Layamon's translation of *Wace* (1165), and ending with specimens of the Saxon in all its periods ; such a reading book, provided with a full glossary, and a brief Anglo-Saxon Grammar, would do great service towards imparting an etymological and critical knowledge of English. For the study of Saxon alone, the life of Alfred, by Pauli, in Bohn's *Antiquarian Library*, which is supplemented by a very correct edition of the text of Alfred's *Orosius*, together with a glossary and a concise Anglo-Saxon Grammar, furnishes a very convenient apparatus.

ticular race of mankind to which it belongs. As the State is in the individual, as really as the individual is in the State, so the nation is in the individual, as really as the individual is in the nation. By virtue of a political nature and element in his constitution, the individual contains the groundwork and inward reality of the commonwealth of which he is outwardly a member; and by virtue of a national and idiomatic element in his mind, the individual contains the groundwork and inward reality of the nation of which he is outwardly a member. In neither case could any conceivable heightening of the *merely and strictly individual*, possibly produce the *national*. No degree, however intense, of private and individual feeling could possibly produce patriotism. Private interest and private feeling spring out of the individual in the man, and public interest and public feeling spring out of the State in the man. Both natures co-exist in one subject, in harmony when human nature is in a normal condition, and in antagonism when it is not; but each has its distinct characteristics, and forms the basis of a distinct activity.

These remarks hold true in relation to literature, as well as politics. In respect, therefore, to culture and to authorship, the national is, or should be, in the individual. While the individual opens his mind and heart to all that is true and genial in the productions of foreign minds, he should retain his own nationality in its most independent and determined form. The Englishman should think like an Englishman, and compose like an Englishman.

Now the thoughtful and ever repeated perusal of such products of the great English minds as have been specified above, contributes to strengthen and develop that which is national and idiomatic in the individual intellect. And in the present influx of foreign literature, of foreign modes of thought and expression, the conservative influence of these great English masters and models should be felt more than ever. It is only by a more profound acquaintance with these, that the good elements in other literatures and other national minds can be assimilated, and the bad rejected. An,

ardent attention to French literature, for example, would induce an excessive materialism, and an ardent attention to German literature a hyper-spiritualism, in the English mind and literature, if each were not counteracted by the sober sense and calm reason of our own thinkers.

The influence of German literature upon the student, in this connection, merits a moment's consideration. At this late day, no respectable scholar will deny that this literature ranks among the very first, as a source of knowledge and an instrument of culture. Probably none exerts a more profound influence upon the stuff and substance of literature, upon thought itself, than this. Eminently speculative and thoughtful, it seizes with a strong grasp upon the laws of thought, and habits of thought, and style of thought, and exerts a wonderfully modifying, moulding, and internally revolutionizing power. But it cannot safely be made the principal instrument of education. It must be kept in check and subordination by others. Its strong spiritualizing tendency must be counteracted by opposite tendencies; and this in order that this very spiritualizing tendency itself may do its best work. For this bias, if left to run on indefinitely, results, as the history of some of the most interesting schools of philosophy and literature shows, in the sheerest and merest materialism. Any tendency if excessive, annihilates itself by turning into its own contrary. And the Englishman, especially, is liable to this result. If his large round-about sense and sober reason, are once over-mastered by the tendency and influence in question, he becomes the most ultra of spiritualists. The wines and luxury of the south of Europe entering into the strong and coarse nature of the northern tribes, generated an intoxication and a debauch, at which the Southron himself stood aghast. When Caliban feels the fumes, the drunkenness is absolute.

In furnishing a proper counteraction to this tendency, and to all other foreign tendencies, and thus preserving the true nationality of the scholar, the works in question are invaluable and indispensable. They are by no means destitute of

speculation, but they are remarkable for their sobriety and sense. Even when they verge strongly in the direction of materialism, they are valuable aids; especially in the reference now under consideration. Take, for example, the treatise of Locke on the Conduct of the Understanding, the best tract yet written upon education. It is less a model product of the English mind, than some others in the list, because it sprang from a root that had too strong a tang of earth; because it grew out of an extravagantly sensuous system of philosophy, and a culture corresponding thereto. But it furnishes a most excellent and efficacious corrective to a wan and bloodless hyper-spirituality. If the Englishman or Anglo-American has weakened himself by too much dreaming over such interesting, but, after all, essentially feeble products, as those of the German Novalis, or the French Chateaubriand and Lamartine, or the English Tennyson, let him transfuse into his veins the blood of John Locke. If he has become thin and pale in the process, let him feed upon the pulp and brawn of as masculine a mind as ever lived.

The preservation of nationality, in all respects and relations, is of the highest importance in this age of the world, when the ease, and frequency, and intimacy, of intercommunication, are erasing some lines that ought to be scored still more deeply rather than obliterated. The extinction of nationality, like the extinction of individuality, would be the death of all the great interests of the human race. The confusion of tongues, and the origination of many languages, though primarily a curse, yet like the curse of labor, brings many blessings in its train. The formation of nations and of languages has unquestionably contributed to a more profound and exhaustive development of the *fallen* human soul, than could have been attained without it. And the further progress of the race in art, in science, in literature, in philosophy, and in religion, is dependent upon the preservation, and the quickening collision, of this variety in unity. The moment a mind loses its nationality, it loses its charm and power for other minds; even for that other mind in which it has servilely sunk its own nationality.

By this thoughtful and prolonged perusal of the products of the master-minds of the literature, the student will preserve and strengthen what is national and idiomatic in his mental structure, while at the same time he will more genially appreciate, and heartily relish, what is national and idiomatic in other literatures. And, what is not less important, he will be storing his mind with the best sense and reason of the nation to which he belongs; he will be planting the seeds and germs of all noble and ennobling truths, thereby preparing himself to be an original and influential thinker and author in his own day and generation. For the words of Chaucer are as true now as ever:

Out of the olde fieldes, as men saithe,
Cometh all this newe corn fro yere to yere;
And out of olde bookes, in goed faithe,
Cometh all this newe science, that men lere.¹

ARTICLE V.

THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES AGAINST SLAVERY.

By George B. Cheever, D. D., New York.

[Continued from p. 48.]

Statute for the Protection of Oppressed Fugitives.

THE Mosaic legislation, the more it is examined, is seen to be a system of supernatural, divine wisdom. Amidst a congeries of particulars, sometimes seemingly disconnected, great underlying and controlling principles break out. The principle revealed in the statute against man-stealing, is the same developed in the next statute which we are to consider, in the order of the logical and historical argument from the

¹ Assembly of Foules. Stanza IV.

Old Testament Scriptures against slavery. The principle is that of the sacredness of the human personality, which cannot be made an article of traffic, cannot be bought and sold, without a degree of criminality in the action like the criminality of murder. As the sacredness of human life is guarded by the penalty of death for the crime of maliciously *killing* a man, so the sacredness of human liberty, the property of a man's personality, as residing solely in himself, is guarded by the same penalty against the crime of *stealing* a man. The theft is that of himself *from* himself, and from God his Maker. As murder is the destruction of the life, so man-stealing and selling is the destruction of the personality, the degradation of the man into a thing, a chattel, an article of property, transferred, bartered for a price, as if there were no immortal soul nor personal will in existence.

The statute in Deut. 23: 15, 16, is properly to be examined next after that in Exod. 21: 16 and Deut. 24: 7. The whole form of the statute is as follows: "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him." Of the *interpretation* of this statute, there cannot be the least doubt; as to its *application* only can there remain, in any mind, some little question.

The first thing to be considered is the language: "Thou shalt not deliver up the servant to his master, which is escaped unto thee from his master." *The servant to his master*, עֶבֶד אֲדֹנָיו. It is not, *the slave to his owner*, or the *heathen slave to his owner*, which would have been the proper form of expression, if either *slaves* at any rate were under consideration, or *heathen slaves* alone. The word for servant is the ordinary עֶבֶד, and the word for his master is אֲדֹנָיו, which is to be compared and contrasted with the word for owner (בַּיִת), the latter word being used when a beast or an article of property instead of a human being is spoken of. The contrast may be fairly and fully seen, and the usage demonstrated, by comparing Ex. 21: 4, 5, 6, 8, with Ex. 21: 28, 29

32, 34, and 36, and likewise Ex. 22: 11, 12, 14, 15. Here, in the first case, where the subject is a human being (the servant), the *master* (אֲדֹנָי) is spoken of, but never the *owner*. The relations and responsibilities are brought to view between master and servant, but never between owner and slave. But in the other cases, where the subject is property, as an ox, ass, sheep, or article of raiment or furniture, the *owner* (בַּיִת) is spoken of, not the master. The distinction is one of purpose and care, and not accidental; and in no case is any such relation between human beings brought to view as of the one being owner of the other, with sanction of such relation. The history of such relationship is the history of crime, and the selling of human beings is always a criminal transaction. The whole transaction of the selling of Joseph is described as the crime of stealing; and no person in Judea could ever have sold any human being, no matter by what means in his power, without the conviction of doing what was forbidden of God. Man-selling was no more permitted than man-stealing. Accordingly, there are no instances of its being practised.

Now if there had been in Judea, from Abraham downwards, the system of what we call slavery, the system of chattelism, the purchase, ownership, and sale, of human beings as articles of property, there must have been some traces of such purchase, ownership, and sale, in the history of the people. Their domestic life is so fully set before us, that, if this system were a fixture of it, the evidence could not fail to have leaked out; nay, the proof would have been glaring. If this fixture, with all its concomitant transactions and habits, had existed, had been maintained, as a national institute, *against* the divine law, we should as certainly have found it in the history and the books of the prophets, as idolatry itself; we do find it instantly recorded, in the only cases in which it was attempted; and the case in which the crime was completed, occasioned the instant vengeance of God, in the destruction of the Jewish State. But if it had existed by *appointment* of the divine law, under the sanction and favor of God, then much more should we have found some traces of

it, not only in the law itself, but in the manners and customs of the people, and in their historical and commercial records.

But in the whole history, from that of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, down through the whole line of their descendants, not one instance is to be found of the sale of a man, a servant or a slave. The only approximations to such a thing are treated and denounced as criminal; as for example in Amos 2: 6, thus saith the Lord, "For three transgressions of Israel and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof, because they sold the righteous for silver, and the poor for a pair of shoes." When they obtained servants, or purchased them, as the phrase was, they purchased their time and labor from themselves; but if they attempted to sell them, it could not be done without stealing them; it was making articles of property out of them; it was asserting and violently assuming ownership in them; it was man-stealing. But if slavery had been a legal institution appointed of God, a righteous policy and habit of the domestic life, we should have found, somewhere, some traces of the transactions by which always it is attended and maintained. We should have found mention not only of obtaining servants by contracts made *with* them, but of buying *them*, as slaves, from others, and of ownership in them, and of the sale of them; and if they were considered in law as chattels, as articles of property, we should have found legal provisions for reclaiming and securing them when lost, fugitive, or stolen; just as we do in the cases of oxen, asses, sheep, or property of any kind, lost, strayed, or stolen. It would not be possible, for example, to write the history of laws and customs in the United States for a single century, without such traces of slavery and of slave-laws coming out.

When, therefore, we search for such traces in the Mosaic legislation, what do we stumble upon? The first thing in regard to fugitives is this law before us, a law made *for their protection against their masters*, and not in behalf of the masters, or to recover their lost property. The judgment gathered from this law in regard to slavery is in condemna-

tion of the whole system, and remains in full, to whatever class of inhabitants the passage be applied. The question is, whether its operation was intended to comprehend Hebrew servants, or heathen servants only; whether it was a law for Judea at home, or for the nations abroad, or equally for both.

1. There is no restriction or limitation expressed; it would have to be supposed, and a construction forced upon the passage, which the terms do not indicate, and will hardly permit. It would be unfortunate to have to treat any passage in this manner, to make out a case, unless the context required it, or the history and some more comprehensive laws enforced it. Compare, for illustration, the command in Isaiah 58: 6, 9, where it is enjoined: "to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke." And again: "If thou take away from the midst of thee the yoke." We might assert concerning these passages that they referred only to the heathen, whereas it is notorious that they applied to abuses and oppressions committed, not among the heathen, but in Judea itself, by the Hebrews themselves, and not against strangers only, but against their own countrymen, as in Amos 2: 6, and 8: 6, and Jer. 22: 13-17, and Hab. 1: 14-16, and other places. But when it is said, *that ye break every yoke*, it is not meant that the lawful and appointed contracts with Hebrew servants or others were to be broken up, for those were not yokes, nor regarded as such; and it only needed the application of common sense to know perfectly the application of the passage to unjust and illegal oppressions. But again, if a stranger or a heathen was thus oppressed and subjected to the yoke, it applied to him, as well as to the Hebrew; and the distinction was well known between oppressive and involuntary servitude, which was forbidden of God, and the voluntary service for paid wages or purchase-money, as appointed by the law. The command *to take away the yoke from the midst of thee*, applies to every form of bondage imposed upon any persons whatsoever in the land, contrary to the

divine law, and without agreement on the part of the servant. The fugitive from such oppression was to be relieved and protected, and not delivered back to bondage. The Hebrew is emphatic, אֶם-תִּסְרֹף מִתּוֹכָהּ מִיָּדְךָ, if thou remove *from the midst of thee* the yoke; the yoke in thine own country, not in a heathen country. And so, in the statute before us, the oppression, the escape, and the protection are neither, nor all, exclusive of Hebrews.

2. But second, it is contended by some, that this is merely a law to prevent heathen slaves that were escaping into the land of Judea, from being sent back to their heathen masters. It certainly comprehends this class of persons, and this would be an inevitable result of its operation, at any rate, whether Hebrew servants were excluded, or not. But no intimation can be found, either in the text, the context, or the whole history, of its application being restricted to the heathen. The word in this statute used for *servant* is עֶבֶד. It is not a statute concerning the *hired servant*, the שֹׂכֵר, nor the six years' hired servant, who could not be compelled to remain at service any longer than that period, but was free as soon as his engagement was over. It certainly could not apply to him, for he received his pay from his master beforehand, and the law would have been an incentive to dishonesty and villany, if he could have received his six years' wages, on entering into covenant of service, and the next week could have decamped from his master with the money in his pocket, secure against being retaken. Such a person was not the עֶבֶד contemplated in this law, nor could there have been any danger of its being so perverted. At the same time, the proofs are numerous that in the land of Judea, among the Hebrews themselves, there were, and would be, persons unjustly held as servants beyond their time of service, as contracted for, persons oppressed in such bondage, and for whose protection such a statute as the fugitive law before us, might be more necessary than for persons fleeing from idolatrous masters in heathen lands.

3. In the third place, then, we must remember, that there were servants in Judea, both of the Hebrews and the hea-

then, whose term of service was not limited to six years, but extended, with somewhat more undefined dominion of the master, to the Jubilee. There were servants of all work, indentured servants, bound, by their own contract, for the whole number of years intervening between the time of the contract and the Jubilee. These were mostly of heathen families, though also of Hebrew, and were much more in the power of their masters for ill treatment and oppression, if they were cruelly disposed. Now it is most likely that the statute in question was interposed for the protection of just this class of servants from the cruelty of their masters; servants, the nature and the term of whose service was, to such a degree, undefined and unlimited. There certainly was such a kind of service, and such a class of servants, to which and to whom the expressions עֶבֶד, and *service of an עֶבֶד* peculiarly applied. See, for example, Lev. 25: 39, 40: the Hebrew servant, contracting till the Jubilee, shall not be compelled to serve with the service of an עֶבֶד (the servant of all work), but as a hired servant and a sojourner. But the *term* of service was unlimited, except by the Jubilee; and so, in some respects, was the power of the master.

The statute before us seems to have been passed for the protection of such servants from the possible cruelty of their masters. Although it was not deemed best entirely to abolish that kind and tenure of servitude, but to lay it mainly upon the idolatrous nations who were to be conquered by the Jews; yet God imposed such protective safeguards in respect to it, as would keep it from being a cruel and unjust treatment, even of them; such safeguards, that the masters should find kindness towards their servants not only commanded by the letter and spirit of the law, but the only safe and profitable policy. Therefore it was enacted that, if any servant chose to flee from a tyrannical and cruel master, and could succeed in getting away, the master should not be able by law to recover him, should not be able to force him back; or, at all events, that none should be obliged to return him to his master; on the contrary, that those to whom he might flee from the oppression of a cruel master, should be bound

to protect him, should not be permitted to deliver him up, but should give him shelter, and suffer him to dwell in safety, wherever he chose, without oppressing him.

This beneficent statute was, in this view, a key-stone for the arch of freedom which the Jewish legislation was appointed to rear in the midst of universal despotism and slavery; it formed a security for the keeping of all the other many provisions in favor of those held to labor or domestic service; it opened a gate of refuge for the oppressed, and operated as a powerful restraint against the cruelty of the tyrannical master. There might be cruelty and tyranny in the land of Judea, but there was a legal escape from it; the servant, the עֶבֶד, if men attempted to treat him as a slave, could quit and choose his master, was not compelled to abide in bondage, was not hunted as a fugitive, nay, by law was protected from being so hunted, and everywhere, on his escape, found friends in every dwelling, and a friend and protector in the law.

It is impossible that such a provision as this should be made only in regard to the heathen slaves of the Canaanites, or of the nations around Judea, since the Jews were forbidden to enter into any treaties with the Canaanites, and were commanded to bring under tribute of service as many of them as were spared. Their whole legislation, in regard to all the heathen, was by no means that of amity with masters or kings, but of opposition and of jealousy against them. They were forbidden to enter into covenant with them. Nor was there any more need of a statute for not restoring heathen slaves that had fled into the country of the Hebrews, than there would be of a law in Great Britain for not restoring the slaves of Egypt, or of the South-Sea Islanders, or of the cannibals or savages in New Zealand, that had got away from their masters. But there might be need of such a law among the Hebrews, to mitigate the evils of servitude, to preserve the עֶבֶד, the indentured servant of all work, from cruelty and oppression, to prevent his service from passing into slavery, and to render it for the master's interest to treat him well and kindly, as knowing that, if he did not, the in-

jured servant could escape from him, and seek another master, with impunity. So, if he would not lose him altogether, he was compelled to treat him kindly.

There was no such law as this, no such humane statute, among the heathen ; and hence the heathen masters were ferocious despots, and were accustomed to restore fugitive slaves, even for the support of the system of slavery, that there might be neither relief nor release from their own authority, nor restraint nor check upon their own cruelty. Accordingly we see the terror of the Egyptian slave whom David encountered after the foray upon Ziklag, lest he should be sent back to his master (1 Sam. 30: 15). The slave called himself a *young man* of Egypt (נַעַר מִצְרַיִם), the *servant* (עֶבֶד) to an Amalekite (1 Sam. 30: 11), and his master had left him to die, because he fell sick. He made David swear that he would not send him back into that slavery. There was no such system of slavery among the Hebrews, and, with this humane law, there could be none. The operation of this law, in connection with other statutes, was certain, at length, to destroy all remains of slavery among the people, and to make all within the limits of the Hebrew nation wholly free. To bring about this desirable end, God so surrounded the system of servitude with wholesome checks, and entangled and crippled it with such meshes of benevolent legislation, such careful protection of the servants, such guardianship of their rights, such admission of them to all the privileges of the covenant, such instruction of them, and such adoption of them at length as Hebrews, even when they were foreigners at first, that, in that land, among that people, there could be no such thing as that system of injustice, cruelty, and robbery, which we call slavery. It did not, and it could not, exist.

Force of the demonstration from this Statute against the possibility of Property in Man.

This law, like the grand statute against man-stealing, strikes at the principle of property in man. It shows that

God would not permit human beings to be regarded as property, as slaves in our day are considered property. Even if they had been *called* slaves, it is clear that their masters were not considered to be their *owners*, for they could take themselves off at pleasure, if oppressed, and nevertheless no wrong was charged upon them for thus escaping from bondage. They did not belong to the master in such manner that wherever found he had a claim upon them, and they must be given back. When they fled away, they were not considered as having stolen themselves; and the man who found them neither acquired any claim over them himself, nor was under any obligation to the master to return them or to inform against them. The master, in such a case, was not the owner.

This statute must be compared, under this view, with the laws concerning the restoration of articles of property, whether found or stolen, and it will at once be seen what a difference is made between the ownership of a man over his servants, and over his cattle, his lands, his houses, and all riches. Ex. 23: 4: "If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again." So in Deuteronomy: "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, and hide thyself from them; thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy brother. And if thy brother be not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy brother seek after it, and thou shalt restore it to him again. In like manner shalt thou do with his ass; and so shalt thou do with his raiment; and with all lost things of thy brother's, which he has lost and thou hast found, shalt thou do likewise; thou mayest not hide thyself" (Deut. 22: 1—3).

Now as to the force of this demonstration that men cannot be property, that men-servants and maid-servants were not and could not be the property of their masters, it makes no difference whether this statute be restricted to the heathen or not. It was incumbent on the Jew, if he saw the ox or the ass, even of his enemy, even of a heathen, or a stranger,

going astray, to inform him of it, or bring the animal back; it *belonged* to the man who had lost it, from whose power it had escaped. But if the servant of the same man, worth to him fourfold, escaped from him, and the Jew knew it, there was not only no obligation to let the master know, or to help return the fugitive, but a direct command from God *not* to do this, but on the contrary to aid and protect the fugitive. It is impossible to deny or condemn more forcibly the assumption of property in man. Yet that is the assumption on which slavery is grounded, and if God condemns the one, he does the other.

We may add that, if the servant in any class, either the עֶבֶד or the שִׁכְרִי, *had* been regarded as property, and if the law against the recapture or restoration of fugitive servants was intended only with reference to foreigners, and did not apply to the Hebrews, then must the exception necessarily have been made clear in such a statute as Deut. 22: 1-3. "All lost things" of his brother's, a Hebrew was bound to restore; and if slaves were property, and the Hebrews had held slaves, then inevitably must lost or escaped slaves have been enumerated as among the things to be restored. Compare Ex. 22: 9, "For all manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges, and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbor." If men had not been forbidden thus to challenge the fugitive עֶבֶד, the escaping *servant*, as their property, a like provision must inevitably have been made for trying *this* claim also before the judges. But in the whole history of the Hebrews, there are no instances on record of the reclamation of fugitive slaves in their country, under their laws. There are cases mentioned of servants escaping; and the statute itself was the supposition that they *would* escape, and formed a protection and a safeguard for them; but there is never a case named, nor any intimation of any such event, of a master hunting for slaves, going in search of, or reclaiming, his runaway property, in the country of

the Hebrews. There are instances of men going from Dan to Beersheba to hunt up and reclaim an ox or an ass, but never a hint of any such thing as a man hunting, or reclaiming, or recapturing, a fugitive servant.

And yet, from incidental testimony, the more striking because it falls out naturally in the course of the history of David, we said that it was no uncommon thing for servants to escape, and to be going at large, unmolested. Nabal's complaint to the messengers of David proves this; "there be many servants (עֲבָדִים) nowadays, that break away every man from his master (1 Sam. 25: 10);" and the manner of the complaint argues the anger of Nabal because such a thing could be, and the servants get off with impunity. But no instance can be found of any man undertaking, with marshals, or otherwise, to recapture them. There is no hint of any *posse comitatus* at the disposal of the master for this purpose. Had there been such a thing as a Fugitive Slave Law *against* the slave, instead of one for his protection, Nabal's language would rather have been that of threatening, than complaint. "You rogues, if you do not take yourselves off, I will have you arrested as fugitive slaves, such as you doubtless are, you vagrant rascals. I will have you lodged in the county jail, and, if your master does not appear, you shall be sold to pay the jail fees." But Nabal's language is that of "a son of Belial," who is furious because there is no help for such insubordination against tyranny.

The case of Shimei must be considered in illustration, because, at first thought, it might seem to be an exception, and might appear as an instance of reclamation. 1 Kings 2: 39, 40. Two of the servants (עֲבָדָיו) of Shimei ran away to Achish, king of Gath, son of Maachah, and from thence information came to Shimei; and in his blind haste to recapture these runaways, forgetting or despising his oath to Solomon, he saddled his ass and went to Gath, and found his servants, and brought them back to Jerusalem. It is no wonder, from the description given of Shimei's cursed manners and disposition, that his servants, even purchased, as they may have been, from the heathen, could

not endure his service, but preferred to run away even into a heathen country; and it is not a little singular that the first and only instance of a slave-hunter figuring in sacred history is that of this condemned liar, hypocrite, and blasphemer. But he captures his servants in the country of the Philistines, and not in a land under Hebrew law. Doubtless, they were foreigners and heathen, not Hebrews, or they would not have fled away to Achish king of Gath; they would have been secure against Shimei's claim in their own country, but there was no law for the protection of slaves in the land of the Philistines; and, although they imagined themselves more secure from pursuit there, especially as they must have known that their master himself was a prisoner of State within certain limits in Jerusalem, yet the rage of Shimei defeated their calculations, and they were brought back. It may have been by some friendship of Achish with Shimei, and a spite against king Solomon, that this was accomplished, which made king Solomon the more ready to inflict upon Shimei, without any farther reprieve, the sentence he had brought upon himself.

The history in 2 Chron. 28: 8-15, has an important bearing in illustration of this and other statutes, especially those for the protection of the Hebrews from becoming slaves. The kingdoms of Judah and Israel were at war, and the latter had taken captive of the former two hundred thousand, whom they proposed to keep for bond-men and bond-women, the ordinary fate of those taken captive in war. But the fierce wrath of God was instantly threatened, if they carried this intended crime into execution; and some able and patriotic leaders of the tribe of Ephraim resisted the proposition with such effectual energy, that the men of the army left the captives to their disposal; whereupon they generously clothed and fed them and carried them back free to their own country. The intention had been, contrary to the divine law, to bring them into bondage in a manner expressly forbidden. It is to be feared that in some instances the legal prohibitions against such slavery had already been set at defiance both by rulers and people in the two king-

doms ; but never yet had the attempt been made in so bold and public a manner, and on so huge a scale, to over-ride the laws.

There are very decisive intimations, however, that look as if this iniquity of a forced and continued bondage, by which the Jewish masters retained their servants contrary to law, had become, at a later period, one of the great outstanding crimes of the nation. After the divulsion of the kingdom into two, those persons unjustly held in bondage would be likely to take refuge from cruel taskmasters in one kingdom by fleeing into the other ; and the law in Deuteronomy was unquestionable and explicit : “ Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, where it liketh him best. Thou shalt not oppress him.” Contrary to this great statute of Jehovah, there may have been compacts or compromises, between the two kingdoms, for the delivering up of such fugitives ; or if not between the kingdoms, at least between confederacies of masters. But, whatever fugitive slave laws might be passed, or compacts entered into, they were all as so many condemned statutes, judged and condemned beforehand by the law of God, and to be held null and void by those who would keep his commandments. Nevertheless, with the example once set, first in one kingdom, then in the other, of such unrighteous statutes, it might become comparatively easy, through powerful local interests, by the combination of large holders, or of those who could profitably become slave-masters by trading with the heathen, not only to evade the divine law, but at length to get statutes passed, though manifestly and directly contrary to it, for the protection of slave-property, or to assist in retaining or recovering such property. There might be enactments for the interest of the masters, setting at nought all the provisions of the divine law for the limitation of servitude, the preventing of slavery, and the protection and emancipation of indentured servants.

That some such form of oppression began to be prevalent soon after the separation of the kingdoms of Judah and Is-

rael, the tenor of the Prophets and the Psalms, from Joel to Malachi, leads us to suppose. It is probable that this legislation for the masters, this care for their interests and their favor, this oppression of those whom they held in bondage, and this disregard of the divine law in their behalf, are referred to by the prophet Amos, especially in the fourth chapter of his prophecy, where God rebukes the princes, the rulers, and the wealthy and great men, for oppressing the poor and crushing the needy, but saying to their *masters*: Bring business and wealth, and let us trade and drink together (Amos 4: 1. Compare also Amos 2: 6.): "They sold the righteous for silver, and the poor for a pair of shoes." Scott's note on the first of these passages presents the case in a manner not improbable: "They crushed and trampled on their unresisting brethren, and sold them for slaves. Having made the iniquitous bargain, perhaps on low terms, they required from the purchaser, in this *slave-trade*, to be treated with wine." It may have been partly in reference to such sins as these, that the rebuke of God by the prophet Micah was directed, that "the statutes of Omri were kept, and all the counsels of the house of Ahab" (Micah 6: 16). For, immediately after that indictment, it is asserted that 'men are hunting every man his brother with a net, and the prince asketh, and the judge asketh, for a reward, and the great man uttereth his mischievous desire, and so they wrap it up, the best of them being as a brier, and the most upright sharper than a thorn-hedge' (Micah 7: 2, 3, 4).

It was in reference to such iniquity, this great and glaring guilt of oppression especially, that many passages in the Prophets and the Psalms were written. "Wo unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and that write grievousness which they have prescribed, to turn aside the needy from judgment, and to take away the right from the poor of my people" (Isa. 10: 1). "He looked for judgment, but behold oppression" (Isa. 5: 7). "Hear the word of the Lord, ye rulers of Sodom; give ear unto the law of our God, ye people of Gomorrah. Your hands are full of blood. When ye make many prayers, I will not hear. Put away the evil of

your doings. Seek judgment ; relieve the oppressed " (Isa. 1: 10, 17). " Wo unto them which justify the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him. Therefore, as the fire devoureth the stubble, and the flame consumeth the chaff, so their root shall be as rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as dust, because they have cast away the law of the Lord of Hosts, and despised the word of the Holy One of Israel " (Isa. 5: 23, 24. Comp. Jer. 6: 6 and 7: 5, 6 and 22: 17).

It is in the light of such historic references, showing to what a degree the Jews had corrupted justice, and set up oppression, in a system of precedent and law, in contempt of the divine law, that we come to the consideration of the great illustrative record in Jer. xxxiv. The progress of the iniquity and the ruin therein recorded had been gradual, from father to son, from generation to generation (Jer. 34: 14) ; but at length it arose to the crisis of an open, combined, and positive rebellion against God, in entirely trampling under foot the great ordinance against Hebrew slavery, contained in Ex. 21: 2, and confirmed and guarded by other statutes. The crime of injustice and rebellion was the more marked and daring, because it had been preceded by a fitful penitence and acknowledgment of the oppression, and acceptance of the law as righteous, and a return to its observance, with a new covenant to that effect. So the whole people, princes and people, loosed their grasp upon the servants they had been unjustly retaining in bondage, and for a season, at the word of the Lord, let them go. But on reflection, they felt that it was too great a sacrifice of power, and a relinquishment of property, to which they would not submit. " So they turned, and caused the servants and the handmaids, whom they had let go free, to return, and brought them into subjection for servants and for handmaids " (Jer. 34: 11). Then came the word of the Lord, and its execution followed, as the lightning doth the thunder : " Because ye have not hearkened unto me, in proclaiming liberty, every one to his brother, and every man to his neighbor, behold I proclaim a liberty for you, saith the Lord, to the sword, to

the pestilence, and to the famine, and I will make you to be removed into all the kingdoms of the earth" (Jer. 34: 17).

It throws a solemn light of additional warning upon this transaction, to compare with this chapter of Jeremiah, the contemporary prophecy of Ezekiel, in the twenty-second chapter of that prophet. As men gather silver, brass, iron, lead, and tin, into the midst of the furnace, to blow the fire upon it, to melt it, so God informed Ezekiel that he was now gathering the whole house of Israel, that had become dross, priests, princes, prophets, and people, in the midst of Jerusalem, to pour out his fury upon them, and melt them as refuse metals in the midst of the fire. The indictment of their wickedness in this chapter, issued just three years before the prediction of Jeremiah, in the thirty-fourth of his prophecy, closes with these words : "*The people of the land have used oppression, and exercised robbery, and have vexed the poor and needy ; yea, they have oppressed the stranger wrongfully.* And I sought for a man among them that should make up the hedge, and stand in the gap before me for the land, that I should not destroy it, but I found none. Therefore have I poured out mine indignation upon them ; I have consumed them with the fire of my wrath ; their own way have I recompensed upon their heads, saith the Lord God."

Almost at the same moment, and in view of the same predicted event, though residing at so wide a distance from each other, these two prophets were charged with God's denunciation against the same sin of oppression, as the one climacteric occasion and cause of the destruction of the nation. God refers the people back to the first covenant of freedom (in Ex. xxii), abolishing and forbidding slavery forever ; and the violation of that covenant, in the attempt to establish the forbidden sin, is distinctly and with sublime and awful emphasis, marked by Jehovah in his one, final, conclusive reason for giving over the nation into the hand of their enemies, and sweeping the whole community into bondage. It would not be possible to transmit, in historic form, a more tremendous reprobation of the sin of slavery,

and of slavery as a sin. From Ezek. xxii. and Jer. xxxiv., this lesson stands out as the one grand lesson of God's vengeance in the captivity.

We have now to consider the institution and law of the Jubilee, as the completion of the system of social benevolence and freedom embodied in the Mosaic statutes.

Meantime we have before us, even if we stopped short of that, a body of laws embracing, as thus far traced, beyond all comparison, the most benign, protective, and generous system of domestic servitude, the kindest to the servants, and the fairest for the masters, ever framed in any country or in any age. The rights of the servants are defined and guaranteed as strictly and with as much care, as those of the employers or masters. Human beings could not be degraded into slaves or chattels, or bound for involuntary service, or seized and worked for profit, and no wages paid. The defences against these outrages, the denouncement and prohibition of them, are among the clearest legal and historical judgments of God against slavery. The system of slavery in our own country, even in the light only of these provisions, holds its power by laws most manifestly conflicting with the divine law, and stands indisputably under the divine reprobation.

Four forms of statute-law combined, in this divinely-ordered social arrangement, to render slavery forever impossible among a people regardful of justice and obedient to God. First. The law of religious equality and dignity, gathering all classes as brethren and children of one family before God. Instruction, recreation, and rest, were secured in the institution of the Sabbath, and its cognate sacred seasons, following the same law; and freedom, not slavery, was inevitable.

Second. By the same system, the original act of oppression and violence, which has been the grand and almost only source of all the slavery in our own country, was branded and placed in the catalogue of crime, on a level with that of murder, to be punished by death. It requires no particular acuteness of vision to perceive that what was an injustice to the parents, worthy of death, cannot be transformed, in the

next generation, or the next after, to a righteous institution, sacred by the grace of God. By covenant, the curse of the Almighty is upon it.

Third. The right of possession to himself, is recognized as resting, by the nature of humanity and the authority of God's law, in each individual ; and the sacredness of the human personality is demonstrated by the same law to be such, that a human being cannot, but by the highest violence and crime, be degraded into an article of property and merchandise. From the Mosaic statutes, it is indisputable that such is the judgment of God ; and the successive history, which takes its course and coloring from them, or from their violation, confirms the demonstration. From the statutes and the history together, it is as clear that slavery is a moral abomination in the sight of God, as it is from the history in Genesis that the iniquity of Sodom and Gomorrah was a sin. The destruction of Judah and Jerusalem for the iniquity of oppression, *in this particular form, of a forced involuntary bondage*, was a more stupendous and enlightening judgment by far, all things considered, than the overwhelming of the cities of the plain with fire. How can it be possible for any unprejudiced reader of the word of God to avoid acknowledging our own condemnation in this light ?

Fourth. The protection, by statute, of the servant escaping from his master, instead of any provision for the master's regaining possession of the servant, was another interposition in behalf of the weaker party, in the same design of rendering slavery impossible, and is another plain indication of the judgment of God as to the iniquity of American slavery, and of the laws for the support of it. The Hebrew system was so absolute and effective a safeguard against oppression, and rendered any form of slavery so impracticable, and in its legitimate working would have so inevitably subdued the slavery of all surrounding nations to its own freedom, that it stands out as a superhuman production, the gift of God. The wisdom and benevolence of the Almighty appear in it to such a degree, in comparison and contrast with the habits and morals of the world, that the claim of the Pentateuch to a divine

inspiration might, in no small measure, be permitted to rest upon it.

*The Law of Jubilee.—Universality of its Application
Demonstrated.*

We come now to the consideration of the Law of the Jubilee, in Lev. 25: 10, 35–55. This great statute of personal freedom was as follows: “Ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a Jubilee unto you, and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family.” LIBERTY THROUGHOUT THE LAND UNTO ALL THE INHABITANTS THEREOF. The expression is chosen on purpose for its comprehensiveness. It is not said to all the inhabitants of the land, *being Hebrews*, or such as are Hebrews, which restriction would have been made, had it been intended; as is manifest from the case in Jeremiah xxxiv, where the restriction is carefully and repeatedly announced. But the phrase *all the inhabitants of the land*, seems to have an intensity of meaning, comprehending, purposely, all, whether Hebrews or not; it being well known that many of the inhabitants of the land were *not* Hebrews. This phrase, the inhabitants of the land, had been frequently used to describe its old heathen possessors, the Canaanites, and others, as Ex. 23: 31; 34: 12, and Num. 32: 17; 33: 52. It is used, Josh. 2: 9; 7: 9; 9: 24, in the same way. It is never used restrictively for Hebrews alone; not an instance can be found of such usage in the Mosaic books. It is used in Jer. 1: 14, *an evil on all the inhabitants of the land*, and in Joel 1: 2, and 2: 1, *let all the inhabitants of the land tremble*. In this statute in Leviticus, it is the whole number of inhabitants of the land, *held in servitude*, that are included. Ye people of Israel shall do this, shall proclaim liberty to all the inhabitants of the land.

And proclaim liberty throughout the land to all the inhabitants thereof. The Hebrew is as follows: יְקַרְאֵתֶם דְּרוֹר בְּאֶרֶץ, לְכָל-יֹשְׁבֵיהָ, *and preach freedom in the land to all the dwellers*

thereof. The expression is emphatic; the proclamation to be made throughout the length and breadth of the land, not to those only who inhabited it as Hebrews by descent, but to all that dwelt in it. Had it been intended to restrict the application of this statute, the class excluded from its application would have been named; another form of expression would have been used. Had it been intended to make a law broad, universal, unexceptional in its application, no other phraseology could be used than that which is used. If it had been a form of *class-legislation*, it must necessarily have been so worded as to admit of no mistake. But the expression employed is found, without exception, in all cases, with an unlimited, universal meaning. It is *never* used where a particular class alone are intended. The proof of its usage, and the demonstration from its usage may be seen by examination of the following passages.

Is. 18: 3, *All ye inhabitants of the world, and dwellers on the earth.* כָּל-יֹשְׁבֵי הָאָרֶץ וְשֹׁכְנֵי הָאָרֶץ. Here are two words used as synonymous. The first is the word employed in the law under consideration, from the verb יָשַׁב, with the meaning to *continue*, to *dwell*, to *inhabit*; and this is the word ordinarily employed to designate the whole people inhabiting a country. The second is from the verb שָׁכַן, to *encamp*, to *rest*, to *dwell*, employed much less frequently, as in Job 26: 5, the waters and the inhabitants thereof, מַיִם וְשֹׁכְנֵיהֶם. Also, Prov. 1: 33; 8: 12; 10: 30. Ps. 37: 29; 102: 28. In Is. 32: 16; 33: 24, and in Joel 3: 20, and some other places, as in Ps. 69: 35, both these verbs are used interchangeably. But the verb שָׁכַן is used exclusively in a number of passages which speak of God as dwelling among his people, or in his temple. And hence the use of the word Shechinah, שְׁכִינָה, the tabernacle of God's presence. In Is. 33: 24, we have the noun שֹׁכֵן for *inhabitant*, and the verb יָשַׁב for the *people that dwell*. But the noun שֹׁכֵן is very seldom used, while the participle from יָשַׁב is employed in more than seventy passages to signify the inhabitants of the land, or of the world without any restriction. For example:

Lev. 18: 25, the land vomiteth out *her inhabitants*, וְשֹׁכְנֵיהָ.

Judges 2: 2, make no league with *the inhabitants of the land*, לִישְׁבֵי הָאָרֶץ.

Ps. 33: 8, all the inhabitants of the world, כָּל־יֹשְׁבֵי הָעוֹלָם.

Ps. 33: 14, all the inhabitants of the earth, כָּל־יֹשְׁבֵי הָאָרֶץ.

Is. 24: 1, 5, 6, 17, inhabitants of the earth. Also, 26: 9, inhabitants of the world, יֹשְׁבֵי הָעוֹלָם.

Jer. 25: 29, 30, *inhabitants of the earth*, and Lam. 4: 12, *of the world*.

Joel 2: 1, let all the inhabitants of the land tremble, כָּל־יֹשְׁבֵי הָאָרֶץ.

And so in multiplied instances. There is no case to be found in which this expression signifies only a portion of the inhabitants, or a particular class. Of the two words to which we have referred, the form שָׁכֵן would most probably have been employed, if only a portion of the inhabitants, and not all classes, had been intended. There would be just as good reason to restrict the denunciation in Joel 2: 1, or 1: 2, *give ear all the inhabitants of the land*, to a particular and limited class, as to restrict the expression in which the law of Jubilee is framed.

Indeed, according to the universal reason of language, and especially according to the necessity of precise and accurate phraseology in the framing of laws, had the blessings and privileges of the Jubilee been intended only for native-born Hebrews, or guaranteed only to such, the expression universally employed on other occasions when that particular portion of the inhabitants alone are concerned, would have been employed on this. There being such a well-known phrase, capable of no misunderstanding, the law would have been conveyed by it. The phrase must have been the common one, of which one of the earliest examples is in Ex. 12: 19, עֵדוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאֶרֶץ, *the congregation of Israel born in the land*. In Ex. 12: 48, the same distinctive expression, to particularize the native Hebrew, is used along with אֶרֶץ, thus, אֶרֶץ הָאָרֶץ, *the born in the land*, the native of the land, of Hebrew birth or origin.

Whenever there was danger of misinterpretation, misapplication, or confusion, as to the class intended by a law, this

phrase was employed, and the distinction, whatever it was, which the law intended, was made plain; or, if there was danger of making a distinction where none ought to be made, *that* was equally plain. For example (Lev. 16: 29), the fast and Sabbath of the day of atonement being appointed, its observance is made obligatory on the stranger as well as the native Hebrew, by the following words : *הָאֲזֻרָה וְהַגֵּר הַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בְּתוֹכְכֶם*, *both the native born and the stranger that sojourneth among you*. So in Lev. 18: 26 : "Ye shall not commit any of these abominations, *neither any of your own nation, nor any stranger*, *הָאֲזֻרָה וְהַגֵּר* . Again (Lev. 19: 34) : *As one born among you, shall the stranger be that dwelleth with you, הָאֲזֻרָה מִכֶּם יִהְיֶה לָכֶם הַגֵּר* ; and it is added : *Thou shalt love him as thyself*, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. Again (Lev. 24: 16) : He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, *as well the stranger as he that is born in the land*, *בְּגֵר אֲזֻרָה* . And, Lev. 24: 22, Ye shall have one manner of law, *as well for the stranger as for one of your own country*, *בְּגֵר אֲזֻרָה* .

So in regard to the passover (Num. 9: 14) : Ye shall have one ordinance, *both for the stranger, and for him that was born in the land*, *וְלִגֵּר וְלְאֲזֻרָה הָאֶרֶץ* . The same in regard to atonement for sins of ignorance, and punishment for sins of presumption (Num. 15: 29, 30), two instances of the same expression, employed where there was any danger of a misapplication or insufficient application of the law. In the first instance, the expression, *him that is born among the children of Israel*, *הָאֲזֻרָה מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל*, is set over against *the stranger that sojourneth among them*. In the second instance, the comparison is more concise : *whether the born in the land, or the stranger*, *מִן־הָאֲזֻרָה וּמִן־הַגֵּר* . Josh. 8: 33 affords a striking example where, to prevent the expression *all Israel* from being restricted so as to exclude the stranger, it is added : *as well the stranger as he that was born among them*, *בְּגֵר אֲזֻרָה* . The expression *all Israel* not being necessarily so universal as the expression *all the inhabitants of the land*, its enlarged meaning is defined; and just so, if the expression *all the inhabitants of the land* had been used in any case where *not* all the

inhabitants of the land, but only all the native Israelites were meant, the *restrictive* meaning must have been defined; otherwise, it would inevitably include both the native and the stranger, both the *אֲזִקְרָה* and the *גֵּר*.

This word *אֲזִקְרָה*, used to designate the native Hebrew in distinction from the stranger or any foreigner, is a very striking one, from the verb *זָקַח*, *to rise, to grow or sprout forth*, as a tree growing out of its own soil. It is used in Psalm 37: 35, to signify a tree in full verdure and freshness; in the common version, *a green bay-tree*, *אֲזִקְרָה יָרֵחַן*. It is thus a very idiomatic and beautiful word for particularizing the Israelite of home descent, the child of Abraham. There cannot be a doubt that this expression must have been used in framing the law of Jubilee, had it been intended to restrict its privileges as belonging *not* to the stranger, but to the home-born.

Moreover, it is obvious that, if this comprehensive and admirable law meant that only Hebrew servants were to be set free, but that others might be retained in servitude at the pleasure of the masters, or in other words might be made slaves, the law would have acted as a direct premium upon slavery, offering a very strong inducement to have none but such servants as could be kept as long as any one chose, such as were absolutely and forever in the power of the master. So far from being a benevolent law, it would thus become a very cruel and oppressive law, the source of infinite mischief and misery. If the choice had been offered to the Hebrews, by law, between servants whom they could compel to remain with them as slaves, and servants whom they would have to dismiss, at whatever inconvenience, every sixth year, and also at the Jubilee, it would have been neither in Jewish, nor in human, nature, to have refused the bribe that would thus have been held out, in the law itself, for the establishment of slavery. Even in regard to Hebrew apprentices, it was so much more profitable to contract with them for the legal six years' service, than to hire by the day, or month, or year, that we are informed (Deut. 15: 18), that the *שִׁכְרִי*, the servant of six years' apprenticeship, was worth double the price of the *שִׁכְרִי*, *the hired servant*. This difference at length

came to be felt so strongly, and operated with such intensity upon the growing greed of power and gain, that the Jewish masters attempted a radical revolution in the law. And what they would have done, had the law allowed, is proved by what they did attempt to do *against* the law, when they forced even Hebrew servants to remain with them as slaves ; and because of this glaring iniquity and oppression, in defiance of the statute ordaining freedom forever, they were given over of God to the sword, the famine, and the pestilence. The intention and attempt to establish slavery in the land, constituted the crime for which, and the occasion on which, God's wrath became inexorable. There is no possibility of a mistake here. God's indictment was absolute, and we have already examined and compared the passages.

The motive for this crime was profit and power ; and now it is clearly demonstrable that, if the people of Judea had had a race of human beings at their disposal, whom, by their own law, they could possess and use as slaves, chattels, property ; and if the law had marked off such a race for that purpose, and established such an element of superiority and of despotism in the native Hebrew nation, over such a race, consecrated for their profit to such slavery,—it is demonstrable that the Hebrews would not have degraded any of their own to such a state. It would have been quite a needless wickedness to set up slavery as a crime, if they had it already legalized as a necessary virtue. Their attempt to make slaves of the Hebrews, is a demonstration that they were not permitted, by law, to make slaves of the heathen.

The analogy of other statutes is in favor of this interpretation, nay, requires it. This statute is a statute of liberty going seven-fold beyond any other ; intended to be as extraordinary in its jubilee of privileges, as a half century is extraordinary above a period of seven years. But already, by the force of other statutes, a septennial jubilee was assured to the Hebrews ; the law would never permit a Hebrew to be held as an apprenticed servant more than six years ; in the seventh he should go free. Every seventh year was already a year of release to most of the inhabitants of the land, so

that the fiftieth year, if that jubilee was restricted to the Hebrews, would have been little more to them than the ordinary recurrence of the septennial jubilee. What need or reason for signalizing it, if it brought no greater joy, no greater gift of freedom, than every seventh year of release must necessarily bring? But it was a jubilee of seven-fold greater comprehensiveness and blessing than all the rest; and whereas the others were *not* designated nor bestowed for all the inhabitants of the land, this *was*; and in this circumstance lay its emphasis and largeness of importance and of joy. This constituted its especial fitness as a prefiguration of the comprehensiveness and unconditional fulness of our deliverance and redemption by the gift of God's grace in Christ Jesus. It was a jubilee, not for those favored classes only, who already had seven such jubilees secured to them by law during every fifty years, but for those also, who, otherwise, had no such gift bestowed upon them, and could look forward to no such termination of their servitude. It was a jubilee of personal deliverance to all the inhabitants of the land, Hebrews or strangers, whatever might have been the tenure of their service. The servants, apprenticed or hired, were all free to seek new masters, or to make new engagements, or none at all, according to their pleasure. The Hebrew land-owners were to return to the possessions of their fathers, "every man unto his possession, every man unto his family" (Lev. 25: 10). But no man could carry his apprenticed servants, his עֲבָדִים, with him, or his hired servants, except on a new voluntary contract; for all the inhabitants of the land were free.

The clause preceding this statute is an enactment concerning every seventh year, to be observed as a Sabbath of rest for the land, but not necessarily of release for the servants; consequently, provision is made in the promise of sustenance through that year, "for thee, and for thy servant, וְלַעֲבָדְךָ, and for thy maid, וְלַאֲמָתְךָ, and for thy hired servant, וְלַשֹּׁכֵרְךָ," all of each class, being supposed still with the family. But when the enactment of the fiftieth year as a year of rest is announced, it being announced as a year of

liberty for all the inhabitants of the land, nothing is again said of the servants of the family; neither in regulations as to buying and selling, with reference to the proximity of the Jubilee, is there any exception made in regard to servants, as though they were not included in the freedom of the Jubilee. But in regard to some things there *are* such exceptions stated, as in Lev. 15: 30, of a house in a walled city, and verse 34, of the field of the Levites; showing that, if any exception had been intended in regard to servants, it must have been named.

We come, next, to consider the phrase וְקָרָאתֶם דְּרוֹר, *proclaim liberty*, announce deliverance. The strongest corresponding passage is Isa. 61: 1, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord. In this passage, it is called שְׁנֵי־רִצּוֹן, *the year of acceptance*, or of benefits, or, as it might be rendered, *of discharge*. In Ezek. 46: 17, it is called by the word with which the law is framed in Leviticus, שְׁנֵי דְּרוֹר, *the year of liberty*. And the passage in Ezekiel is emphatic in more respects than one. (1) It is a recognition of the year of Jubilee at a late period in the history of the Hebrews; it is also a notice of a prince giving an inheritance to one of his servants, לְאֶחָד מֵעֲבָדָיו, who *might* be, not a Hebrew; but in the year of liberty, the servants were free, and the inheritance returned to the original owner, or to one of his sons. (2) It is an incidental argument against the existence of slavery, when we find the servants made co-heirs with the sons. It cannot be slaves who would be so treated. (3) Ezekiel's designation of the year of liberty corresponds with that of Isaiah, at a period more than a hundred years earlier. The allusion, in both prophets, to the Jubilee, is unquestionable; and, in both, the grand designation of the year is that of a period of universal freedom. In Isaiah it is *deliverance to captives and prisoners*, לְשִׁבּוּיִם דְּרוֹר וְלְאֶסְחָרִים. *Those that are bound*, includes those under any servile apprenticeship; but if any one should contend that it means slaves, then it is very clear that the Jubilee was a year of deliverance to such, and therefore certainly

applied to the heathen, inasmuch as among the Hebrews there were no slaves, and by law could be none. But if it was a year of freedom for heathen slaves, admitting they could be called such, then it was the complete extinction of slavery; it was such a periodical emancipation as abolished slavery utterly and entirely, and rendered its establishment in the land impossible.

Here we see the inconsistency of lexicographers and commentators between their own conclusions, when they assume that the Jubilee was a year of deliverance to *slaves*, and at the same time restrict its emancipating operation to the Hebrews. For example, under the word *יָדוּר*, we read in Gesenius the definition of *the year of liberty*, *שָׁנַת הַיָּדוּר* as "*the year of deliverance to SLAVES, namely, the year of jubilee*. This is either assuming the Hebrews to be slaves, contrary to the well-known law which made this impossible, or, of necessity, it assumes and asserts the application of the law of Jubilee to other classes, namely, of strangers and of the heathen; and interprets that law (as, beyond all question, its phraseology demands) as applying to all the inhabitants of the land. The Septuagint version of the proclamation is, ἀφεσις ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πᾶσι τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν αὐτήν, *deliverance to all the inhabitants*; and the Sept. version of Ezek. 46: 17 is, ἔτος τῆς ἀφέσεως, *the year of discharge or deliverance*; and the Hebrew for *the year of jubilee*, *שָׁנַת הַיָּדוּר*, is translated, in the same version, by ἔτος τῆς ἀφέσεως and ἐνιαυτὸς ἀφέσεως, *the year of freeing, of discharging, of letting go*.

It is of little consequence whether the Hebrew appellation was adopted from the *instrument*, the species of trumpet, used in making the proclamation of the jubilee, or from the meaning of the root-word, from which the name of that instrument itself was derived. The Jubel-horn may have been a ram's horn, or a metallic trumpet. But the name *יָדוּר*, to designate, repeatedly, *a jubilee*, and *הַיָּדוּר*, *the jubilee*, and *בַּיָּדוּר*, *in jubilee*, and *שָׁנַת הַיָּדוּר*, *the year of jubilee*, besides the expression *שָׁנַת הַיָּדוּר הַזֶּה*, *the year of this jubilee*, would lead us more naturally to the verb *יָדַר*, *to go, to flow, to run*, as the origin of the appellation, by its peculiar meaning of *deliver-*

ance, freedom, remission, a flowing forth as a river. This is the more probable, because the appellation יוֹבֵל, *jubilee*, is not first given in connection with the blowing of the trumpet, but with the proclamation of liberty. When the forty-nine years are passed, "then shalt thou cause the trumpet of rejoicing to sound—in the day of atonement ye shall make the trumpet to sound" (Lev. 25: 9). The Hebrew, here, is not the trumpet יוֹבֵל, of *jubilee*, as might be supposed from our version, but שׁוֹפַר הַרְוּצָה, *the trumpet of rejoicing or of shouting for joy*. After this trumpet-sounding, comes the proclamation of liberty; and then, first, we have the name *jubilee*. The Hebrew, in its connection, is full of meaning: וְקָרְאתֶם הָרֹר בְּאַרְצְךָ לְכָל-יֹשְׁבֵיהָ יוֹבֵל הוּא הַחֵדָּה לָכֶם, *and proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: a jubilee it shall be unto you*.

The leading idea in the law is that of freedom from servitude, and the *proclaiming clause* is the proclamation of liberty; and *from that proclamation*, and not from the *enacting clauses* immediately following, in regard to restitution of property and the return to patrimonial possessions, is the name of the jubilee taken. The trumpet of rejoicing shall sound, and ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and shall proclaim liberty to all the inhabitants of the land, AND THIS SHALL BE YOUR JUBILEE. And in the year of this jubilee, ye shall return, every man, unto his possession. And so on, with the detailed enactments of the law. It is manifest that this great year is called the jubilee, *from its ruling transaction of liberty*: that joyful announcement, in the proclamation, gives it its reigning character; it would have been worth little or nothing without that. It was the breaking of every yoke, and the letting of every man go free.

[To be concluded.]

ARTICLE VI.

AN ESSAY TOWARDS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE DIVINE
EXISTENCE.

By Rev. Daniel P. Noyes, one of the Secretaries of the American Home
Missionary Society.

It must be possible to "demonstrate" the existence of God. The following Essay is an attempt to do this. Should it altogether fail of illustrating the divine glory, this failure will yet be, for its author, at least, a monition to humility.

Of all miracles, the greatest is the universe itself; and the greatest of wonders is, that anything exists. If we can believe this, we ought to find no difficulty in the acceptance of any proposition, on the mere ground of intrinsic miraculousness. For, that any particular thing, very great, strange, or wonderful, should be, or that any remarkable relation should subsist between any realities, is not so wonderful or incomprehensible as that anything at all should have being.

The earth appears in broad expanse, or towering in lofty heights, and we seem to feel its solid substance beneath our feet; above us is the apparition of the heaven, with its many lights, its ceaseless motions, and its stable laws; while within us is springing up, ever, the wonderful consciousness of intelligence, of identity, and personality. We ask ourselves: Is all this real? If so, what could make it? And then, what could have made that maker? And then—where, when, how, what, is the *Beginning*? *How* can aught begin? *How can* aught be? And yet, we see and know that all this is; and we are perfectly sure of our own personal reality. That there should have been an eternal nothingness, would seem very easy to believe, did we not so surely recognize positive existence, that it becomes an impossible belief. And now, perceiving and recognizing, as we do, this existence, it is yet a wonder passing all wonder, the mystery before which all others fade, that anything hath being. The beginning is a dark abyss.

It is not the business of philosophy to deal with madmen, or with those who choose to imitate madness. Her occupation is, to picture, by means of language, the true image of that which is, and its method. If any please to affirm, there is nothing; then, denying as they do, both the reality of their own proposition and of themselves, they cannot accuse us of a want of respect, while we merely take them at their word and deny their existence.

There is, undoubtedly, an intellectual interest in attaining the most logical, most complete, most rational, form of stating our knowledge; but not even for philosophical purposes, is it worth while to allow the possible reasonableness of a doubt of the reality of being. Nor this, merely because it is useless to permit such tampering with the truth and with the soul, but the habit of "supposing" things to be false which we must know to be true, of theoretically giving up the original foundation principles of right thought and feeling, whether out of an ambition for fairness, or in concession to the mental obliquity or moral perversity of another, is perilous and pernicious. No man can safely play these games with his own mind, or countenance them in another. Such levity is a wrong to the majesty of the truth, and to the sacredness of the soul.

We shall not undertake to prove, then, that the world exists, or that the soul is not a dream of nothingness. Every man knows the reality of the universe, and his own distinct personal identity. We accordingly affirm this; and *begin* by saying:

I. SOMETHING IS.

This is not a semblance of a sun, which shines above. Those are not falsehoods that strew the nightly heavens. That is not a phantasm-life which swarms the earth. That is not a form of nothingness which perceives and knows in thine own consciousness. Behold, this all is *real*. It is.

Did it just now spring from nothing? Did it ever spring from nothing? What power was there in nothing, to throw forth this vast reality; or even the least visible or conceiv-

able thing? In nothing, there is nothing. From nothing, nothing can come.

The mind seems sometimes to take wing, as it were, and with unnamable swiftness to fly back into the immensity of the time that is ended; but when it pauses, it is to find itself in the presence of *being*. If again it rise upon its swift wings, and again plunges into the inconceivable past, still, wherever its measureless flight is stayed, it is, it must be, in the presence of being, yet; and no point can be reached, where the reason can rest, and looking around and within, say, there is nothing! Thus the great truth is ever present with us, and it overcomes us, and from it we can never flee, that:

II. SOMETHING ALWAYS WAS; BEING IS ETERNAL.

It is impossible, with open and steady eye to contemplate this eternity of being, without awe. The vastness grows, and there is no end. The sublimity has no limit, save our own power to grasp and to feel it. The very *certainty*, in which this dread and glorious vision stands robed; that necessity, so absolute, of an eternal something, from which the mind finds no escape, is of itself sublime. Turn whithersoever we will, it rises before us still. Begin at what part of the universe we may, we discover this awful presence lingering behind it, and holding it all in his bosom. We look; and the longer we look, the more sure the vision becomes, not as truth merely, but as reality, as power, a veritable presence, reality most real—more real, possibly—we are sometimes tempted to say—than any of these things which we can touch. For may it not be, that these are but semblances shaped from out of this same “eternal something” which *is*? For:

III. It is very plain, that, IN ALL THAT IS, HAS BEEN, OR WILL BE, THERE CAN BE NOTHING SAVE THE ETERNAL, WITH WHAT HAS SPRUNG, SPRINGS, OR WILL SPRING, FROM THE ETERNAL.

We are not ready yet, from our present investigation, to affirm, whether this varied universe is all one pure substance only, which puts on and off these many fleeting forms, while

itself is in its essence the original and only being; or whether, again, in addition to the original element and out of it, constituted by its inner force, other essences and secondary beings have sprung into separate and partially independent existence. Here, we neither affirm nor deny; but, certainly, either in itself alone, or in itself and with its own products, achieved and achievable, this element constitutes the whole universe, present, past, future, possible. Either it is, or is and produces, the great *whole*. Thus, whatever theories we may adopt, this one *fact* remains sure: THERE IS AN ORIGINAL AND ETERNAL POWER¹; and all things not embraced within it, are of it.

We propose, now, *carefully to examine this our conception, and to see what it logically and rationally involves*. Possibly we may discover that what the mind believes to be eternal and real, it must also believe to be spiritual. Perhaps it will become evident to us, that the "original power" can be none other than a personal God. We will advance slowly and with care; endeavoring to make every successive step to stand forth in light, looking at each successive proposition in its place and connection, until each, with the whole, becomes luminous. It is already clear:

IV. THAT THIS ORIGINAL POWER IS NOT DEPENDENT ON ANY OTHER POWER.

It was not created by any other, for it is original; nor sustained, for there was none to sustain it; nor limited, nor

¹The word "power" is used in two senses. In one, it refers to the capacity or potentiality residing in a substance, and is the name of an energy, or of energy, which may be put forth by *that* in which it inheres. Thus, various things are said to "have" various powers. But, in its second meaning, this word refers to that unity of both substance and accident which constitutes being or reality, and is the name of something, or of anything, which asserts positive being. All such things *are* "powers." Thus of the soul, it is properly said, when the body is yielding up the ghost:

"A power is passing from the earth."

Again, each distinct material element is, it is, a "power," a reality, i. e. a genuine substance and presence within the universe. "Power"—it is an appropriate name for all, and for any "being."

modified, nor qualified, nor in any way affected by anything else, for it was alone. It can not depend, for there is nothing outside of it on which it might depend. It is independent, then.

It is *self-existent*. Nothing makes or helps it exist, or in any way whatsoever, or in the slightest degree influences its existence. All that it needs, it is. All that can be had, it has. Self-existent, and self-sufficient, it is in the highest, widest, fullest sense, *absolute*.

V. THIS ETERNAL, ORIGINAL, INDEPENDENT, SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE POWER IS NOT LIMITED.

We have already seen that, in itself and its possible outgoings, it is all that is real, all that is certain, and all that is possible. That is to say, its various kinds and species embrace all possible powers or existences; and there can be no form of power, which is not essentially involved and contained in this. There can be no being, whose integral original forces are not, from eternity, active or sleeping within the great original Force.

For example: We will take it for granted that *light* is a one pure elementary substance, or else one kind of action in some one substance. It is thus, or else it represents a certain definite pure power (substance). Certain effects it produces; others, it is not capable of producing. It can shine; it can cause opaque forms to be visible to the eye; but it can not carry a mill, like water; can not feed lungs, like air; can not think, like the soul. Now this identical energy, whatever it be, resident in light, or rather constituting light, is, manifestly, either a part of the eternal Power, or a product of it. Its integral, original force, traced back, is found at last—there. The same is true in every existing element, substance, and action. The same is as true, also, of the things that will be, or the things that can be, as of the things that are or have been.

They are all parts, or else products, of the Eternal, whose possible activity, therefore, goes forth, from its centre, in all directions; the rays fill up the universal sphere, the sphere of possibility, and it makes that all solid with itself.

Whatsoever things, or forms or relations of things, may be reasonably supposed to be, are within its scope. Whatsoever things can be rationally talked about, the supposition of whose existence is not a contradiction, jargon, all such are contained within the sphere of the original Power; its *range* is the range of the possible; and so we may say, with truth,

(a) That in *kinds* and *directions* it is infinite.

But more than this must be true; for, clearly,

(b) In *each* kind and direction it is absolute. Whatsoever it is, it is unchecked. By supposition, there is nothing in being, that might put constraint upon it; and so it has the fullest liberty to act out itself, being wholly without limit, not only in its action as a whole, but in every distinct part, or kind of its action.

It is to be observed, however, that when we speak of "parts," *we speak* of limitations. In saying, therefore, that in these "parts" it is unlimited, we must not be understood as affirming that there are limitations which have, severally, no limits; or, that there are particular, definite kinds of this power, which *are* all other kinds; or, that in these, the Original Power is in such a sense infinite, that it could give them an intensity that should surpass the original limitations of their nature and idea. To say this, would be mere jargon. Accordingly, if an objector should ask: "Is the Original 'infinite in *each kind*,' in such a sense that it could have constituted light, e. g. so brilliant that a single pencil of it, no larger than a straw, would have clothed a world like ours with noon-day effulgence, and have awakened, in mere flesh and bones, in woody fibre, and in crystals, a faculty of vision?" it might be replied: We have no reason to believe that results like these belong to *any degree* of that action and power which we have named "light." A little reflection will make this very plain. For the sake of illustration, we will suppose that the "Theory of Vibration" is the true one, though the particular theory chosen would make no difference with our argument. According to this hypothesis, the effects of light are produced by the vibration of a certain ethereal medium, and the medium thus vibrating

we call "light." It is apparent, now, as soon as stated, that, if the intensity of these vibrations be supposed to increase indefinitely, by and by the effects are changed, not in degree merely, but in *nature*; we have a different "kind" of phenomena, and what *was* light, has become, we know not what, perhaps magnetism, heat, electricity, a something else; or, possibly, *nothing* perceivable by any human sense.

When, therefore, we affirm that the Original is *unlimited* in this or in any particular "kind," we mean: That all the intensity of this particular energy, or substance, which is, *in its nature and idea*, possible or conceivable (and none higher is namable), all this is within the range of the sole real Original Power.

So, when we say that the "Original is, in *all* kinds and directions, absolute," we mean, obviously: That whatsoever kinds of power (substance) are, in the nature of things, possible, or, in other words, whatsoever kinds are rationally conceivable, the *fulness and completeness* of *all* those powers (substances) resides in the *One* which is original and self-existent; and can be *exercised*, to any degree of intensity, up to the line dividing them, respectively, from other forms and kinds of substance — the crossing of which line would not be a heightening of degree, but a change of nature.

The truth of this statement is easily shown. For, in the first place, it is manifest that all the intensity of any substance (power) that has *yet* existed, is directly traceable to the sole Original; and if any higher degree can, in the nature of things, possibly exist, it is because there is energy in that which is the *ground and origin* of the "nature of things," equal to the constituting that higher degree. But if no higher degree be, in the nature of things, possible, then it is because the substance (itself a part or limited product of the Original) is, in its own *idea and nature*, exactly *so* defined that it cannot even be *supposed* capable of increase without a contradiction. To ask that a certain specific product of the Original, which *is* that specific thing by virtue of being

limited to x degrees of a certain kind of energy, or form, should manifest $x+y$ degrees, is saying—nothing.

The proposition (b) holds good, then, of *all kinds* and *directions* of power; and, in every one, the Original is unlimited, is *absolute*.¹

But (c) the original power is infinite in *extent*, or *space*; that is to say, it is “omnipresent.”

There is the same reason for its presence in any one place as in any other; and no reason for supposing it excluded from any. For even if it have a centre, in any sense, there is no possible supposable obstacle to its *extension* more than to any kind of its action. It must be everywhere absolute, since at no point is there anything to oppose it. Moreover, in the *beginning*, no place can be selected as its possible centre, since every other place has as good a claim as that. Its “centre must be everywhere, and its circumference nowhere.” But let us meditate somewhat further.

It is *objected*, we will suppose, that, perhaps, this power has a *law within itself*, according to which the intensity of its energy and action diminishes from some particular centre. It may diminish, too, in a *finite* series, and so come to an end; or, fading away infinitely, may at last approach *infinitely near* to nothingness, and be inefficient.

Answer. If this *be* so, you cannot *think* it is so; for you can have no reason for so thinking; and thought without reason in it is no thought. You can have no reason, for all space is the same utter desert *until* the original power has made one part to differ from another; and you have no right to *assume* that there is a difference when there is no possible cause or reason for a difference. The proposition—There is an eternal, absolute, infinite Being—is just as good for any other place, as for that in which you stand to affirm it. Why not? Does it grow weaker by travelling? In climbing the heights, does it faint? Or in sounding the depths, is it lost? What has any supposed position to do

¹ The power which is absolute, both in kind and in degree, is properly called “Almighty.”

with *absolute truth*? And how can the emptiness of nothingness cause a difference, or create a change? Whatever be the reality then, it would manifestly be an irrationality to believe the original self-existent power limited in space; and as such, it is an impossibility to a *rational* being.

But some one persists in saying: "I *object* to the breadth of these conclusions. I grant, that there is something; for I can feel it, touch it, see it; but what I *see* is finite. I can not *see* any infinite and omnipresent power. I behold a power, it is true, in this region of the heavens to which our system belongs; but I am not convinced that there is anything more than this. There must be an original indeed, but this may yet be a *limited* power, though inconceivably vast. Besides, there is an *analogy* that implies, if it does not prove, that the power has a centre, and that it *diminishes* from a centre.

To this it may be replied: 1. That the limited scope of our being renders it as impossible to see, as to be, an infinite power.

2. That all possible *analogies* must be taken from among related and derivative forces; while, in the case before us, we are speaking of the original. These forces mutually limit each other; but, by supposition, there is nothing which might limit the self-existent power. But,

3. This diminishing of which the objector speaks, would be a part of the *history* of the original power. We are now inquiring, not into its history, but its original nature. His theory confines its *original* being to a single point; and declares that, *in the beginning*, it had no extension whatever, but simply position; that it was finite, and divisible, and *sent forth* a diminished effluence, so soon as it began to spread.

But it is hardly worth while to waste words on this. The first statement (p. 395) was really sufficient. The only rational conception of the original absolute power, is that which makes it *all everywhere*.

As we rest here, in contemplation and survey, what do we behold? There are no worlds; there is no ether; not

even a thinnest, feeblest, electric fluid. No separate things rise to the mind's view, no limitations, qualities, forms; there is only the one aboriginal power out of which all things in their modes and degrees will come. If, now, we ask ourselves, *why* is this power in being? and try to search out a cause that shall account for it, we find none. Of its own force it exists; and carries the reason of itself within its own bosom. We can only say, *it is*; and, eternally, *IT IS*! As we meditate, a voice comes to our spirit, declaring: "I am *for that* I am!" and the voice ceases. The mystery is unuttered, because unutterable. Only the presence is revealed; and, as in imagination, we explore the immensity, and sound its depths, we meet everywhere this eternal reality. Whithersoever we turn, one word, one presence greets us. Power! everywhere, *power*! above, beneath, all round about unto infinite extent, POWER! As yet we know no more.

VII. THE ETERNAL, ORIGINAL, SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE, OMNIPRESENT POWER IS IMMUTABLE.

No addition can come to it from any external source; for it is itself the only source. No diminution can be made; for there is nothing to make it. Again, there can be no increase; for already it completely fills the sphere of the possible; and no decrease; for it is self-existent. There can be *no change* of any kind; for all change must be by addition or diminution. All changes that shall ever appear will be either forms of it, or created by it; none can be intruded within it. There may be endless evolution of existences, but underneath them all, originating and sustaining them, abides this one substance, this eternal power, unchanged. As, with our spirits, we profoundly listen, in the midst of that awful silence of the eternities into which we seem to have penetrated, a voice rises distinct upon the ear and it says: "I am *that which* I am!" and the voice ceases; and we understand that, from everlasting to everlasting, the power endureth *the same*.

VIII. THE ETERNAL, ORIGINAL, ABSOLUTE, OMNIPRESENT, IMMUTABLE POWER IS ALWAYS ACTIVE.

This power is either subject to the strict [law of cause
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and effect, or it is not. That is to say, it is either material or voluntary, either physical or spiritual.

We will suppose it to be the *former*. "It sleeps," you say. Then can it never waken; for there is nothing to stir it. It has no action now, and, being tied to the strict law of "cause," it can never rise to action of any kind; for nothing exists to act upon and "cause" it to rise. It is nothing now, and nothing can ever be made of it. A present unreality, it is also an eternal impossibility; and cannot even be supposed ever to exist. But if *this* have no existence, then there is no real being, and never can be any. If we begin by supposing the "power" to be a physical one; if, next, we suppose, that, in some remotest age, it rested in total and absolute inaction; then, since no change is going on within itself, and since no external agency exists which could start a change there, it must abide forever in this state of utter stillness, and, from everlasting to everlasting, nothing is, nothing can be. But something *is*. Then, the original power, if a *natural* one, is eternally active.

Again: Let us suppose it to be a *voluntary and spiritual* Power. As such, it acts only when consciously having an object in view, and an intelligent purpose. It is affirmed, now, that this great Mind and Spirit was, in the older eternity, buried in absolute inaction: this pure Will and Reason *sleeps*; neither knows, feels, nor determines. It is, in itself alone, the All. Now *what* can be supposed to wake it? What motive can grow up from the utter stillness within? What object or aim can come upon it, from the nothingness without? How can any change be supposed to begin? How can any be rationally imaged by our minds? Only as an *impossibility*. Besides, what *conception* can be formed of a pure spirit that is absolutely inactive? There is no such thought.

But again: we are compelled, in reason, to think that this Power, if spiritual, must have been always active, not alone within itself, *but also outwardly*. For, if ever inactive, it was in view of some motive, of some reason. But, so long as the eternal stillness remains unbroken, there is no change; and so if,

originally, no motive existed, then none can ever exist. If, in "the beginning," there was no reason for outward action, then no progress of time can bring a reason, for it brings no change of any kind; none within the depths of the Eternal Being; for he is immutable and not subject to "cause;" and none without; for, by supposition, he, the sole cause, causes none. If ever there has been a reason or motive, or ever can be, then there always was. But we see that there has been, for creation has taken place. Then *some* action, of *some* kind, outward as well as inward, has always been in exercise; and, viewing this power as spiritual, we must say: *God is eternal in his action; and some "off-spring" of God is eternally begotten of him.* Some word has been eternally spoken. This is a strict necessity of our thought.

There are those who, grounding themselves upon the affirmation that the universe had a beginning, understand that, from everlasting, Jehovah dwelt in utter stillness of his own silent mind. Their proposition might be worded: God is eternal in his dream; since, for the only real eternity, he has dwelt among the pure images of his thought. Let us accept this view, for a moment. "*After* an eternal dream, Deity rouses himself to action, and creates the world." *Why* did he create it? For a *reason*, we all answer, a wise and all-sufficient reason. But this reason existed from all eternity; since, from all eternity, there has been no change. And, if there were a good and sufficient "reason" for the divine action, then the divine Being *acted*. God is never irrational. There always was such a reason, and therefore there always was — action.

But if, now, any one should ask of us, what this "eternal outward action" of God has been, we bow humbly before the Great Incomprehensible, and own our ignorance. Does any one inquire whether suns and stars have always been in being? It passes our knowledge to declare. Do any affirm that it could have been only the inter-communion of a "trinity in the unity?" We hear in modest silence. But, that the energy of the original and omnipresent Being has always been put *forth* somehow, and somewhere, the

very law of our minds compels us to believe. We cannot rationally, and therefore cannot *really*, "think" (out) the contrary. The notion itself is found, when we follow it out and endeavor to mature it, to be an intellectual impossibility.

IX. BUT, THROUGHOUT ALL ITS BROAD, ETERNAL ACTIVITY, THE POWER OF WHICH WE SPEAK, — ORIGINAL, ABSOLUTE, OMNIPRESENT, IMMUTABLE, EVER-ACTIVE, — IS YET ONE.

We have but to open our eyes upon the manifold glory of the universe, to see that varied forms exist, both of being and of operation; and yet we have clearly been right in speaking of "*the (one) original Power.*" For,

(1.) If a *spiritual* Power, it is of course one; since unity is an essential attribute of spirit; unless indeed any one should so far forget himself as to intimate the possibility of a *polytheism*!¹

(2.) If the Original be a physical Power, it must yet be *one*.

a. It is not divided in *time*; for, by supposition, it is eternal.

¹ *Polytheism*, as a philosophy, or rationale of the universe, is wholly unworthy of attention. Not even in its simplest form, as a system of Dualism, does it merit any consideration, except as one of the follies in which the human soul has abased itself. Suffice it to say, that the very aim and end of philosophy, which it always presupposes, and in the absence of which its identity is lost, is, to mount up to the ONE WHICH IS ETERNAL. The intellect is not satisfied with anything short of that; nor can the heart find repose in any other home. The diversity and multiplicity must be seen in a Unity. A possible and a reasonable cause, or author, must be found for it all. To diminish the number, to reduce them to *two*, will not answer. It may be a simplification of the problem; it is not its solution. The mind cannot rest there. We have only the groping of unsatisfied Science, or a dream of the imagination, until we strike upon THE ONE! Until the whole is comprehended and referred up to an Original which is a Unity, and is viewed, thus, in a certain oneness, the intellect is not, and cannot *begin* to be, satisfied. When it has done that, then it is satisfied, indeed, but not perfectly. For there remains the work, afterward, of going down from this "Original," and of understanding each separate thing by itself and in its relations. To the achievement of the former, the human mind is equal. The latter is its immortal labor; and, for all finite minds, must be an endless and ever-widening task.

b. It is not divided in *space*; for it is omnipresent (p.395) and there are no intervals, that might serve as divisions between parts, and no external agencies, to cause separations.¹

c. There is no division in *kind*; that is to say, no separation of inherent qualities; for it everywhere contains all kinds, and embraces all qualities. It is *all* everywhere. The fact that an apparent separation of qualities has taken place, so that "gravitation" is found here, in stones, and appetite there, in animals, and yonder, nothing at all; so that, in one place all the attributes of matter embodied, and in another, the attributes of mind, and in a third, no sensible attributes of anything, does not prove, surely, any *inherent* loss at any point of space. The other kinds of power may be latent, when not evident to sense; and the potentiality may remain where the actuality is, to *human experience*, wanting. The gold in your right hand may be but an apparition to sense of that one substance, which has also taken the form of silver, in your left hand, of carbon, in your diamond ring, and of oxygen in the air you breathe; and, since *originally* all these qualities were potentially omnipresent, we have no right — having no reason — to say that they are inherently absent anywhere now.

There is, manifestly, no possible reason for believing that, *in the beginning*, there was any difference between the kinds of power present in different parts of space. That which is self-existent, is *one and the same*, since there cannot be *two* self-existent, i. e. absolutely independent, powers. But the power that is *anywhere* present "in the beginning," is self-existent; and so everywhere the same. Again, being self-existent, absolute, it is immutable, and so always the same; never anywhere changed in its kind, but eternally embracing

¹ If, in process of development, it have now resolved itself into parts, even this is in accordance with its own law, and by virtue of it; and is but a preservation of its immutability and identity (or oneness) of nature. Although it is apparently divided into parts, there are only divisions in certain respects or particulars, and these phenomenal; while, in other respects, and *fundamentally*, it is still *itself*, and the unity must be supposed to continue.

all possible kinds. Besides, by our very *supposition*, it is *one*, for we are "philosophizing" here, and trying to account for the universe. Any one then who, in such connection, denies this unity, forgets himself, loses the thread of his own thought, drops into confusion, and talks incoherently. It is sufficiently apparent, therefore, that *we* at least, can not rationally refuse to say that the original Power is *one*.¹

Here, however, an *objection* comes in. A doubter rises and declares: *There is no Eternal Being, but the universe is an endless "flux,"* a flux aimless and without method, other than that of necessity, having no reason for it or in it, so that there can be no rationale of it, and no philosophy.

The "universe is a flowing!" But *what flows?* Underneath this appearance, there is something appearing; an apparent, evident something, is there not? "Flux" is not substance, but the act or state of a substance and which indicates and *proves* its real and positive being. "The universe is a changing," you say. A changing then of something. Of what thing? What, but of that eternal original, which through all these changes *remains*, and upholds each successive appearance. The forms come and go; they have their beginnings and their endings; they pass away and cease to be; but the original substance *abides*. It begins not; it ends not; in all changes, is unchanged; but endures, in eternal action immutable, and immutably creating and sustaining mutation.

"Ah! but the universe in an *Infinite Series*," says another.

This is but the same objection in other words. Is the "series," we ask, made of *nothing*? Then it is "nothing." But if, of something, then, of *what*?

It is acknowledged that the *present* universe is real; but then, this, it is affirmed, is the product of that which existed before it, which again sprung from another older still; and so on, forever and forever.

¹ This unity is, in truth, higher and more absolute than has yet been *distinguishingly* affirmed. This we shall have occasion more particularly to unfold hereafter; but, for the present, are content with justifying our use of terms in speaking of "the Power."

Now, manifestly, these several universes are either forms of one substance which abides eternally, and takes these shapes in succession, or else each new form is not merely new in shape and condition, but new in its very substance. Then, on the last-mentioned hypothesis, supposing that we are able to distinguish the generations one from another, we have the following philosophy of the universe. "There was a universe in being, a thousand (or any other number of) years ago. That universe ceased. In ceasing, however, it created, out of *new* substance, another universe, also endowed with creative power. This second universe, in its turn, dies, and in dying, it creates a third, and so on. The substance is new every time. These births and deaths have always been taking place, and will always continue."

Now, manifestly, this very statement *itself* asserts the reality of *an eternal power*, an omnipresent energy, inherent in all these successive forms, and by virtue of which it is possible for them to come thus in an unbroken series, each one creating its successor. And this power is a most substantial being, exalted above all conditions of time and place, a *reality* that no death or change can approach, but which itself originates all endings as well as all beginnings. Thus, this theory of an infinite series is itself an affirmation—in-felicitous, indeed, to awkwardness—of the reality of that which it tries to deny.

Or again: There is a "series," it is said. This series, then, has a *law* which makes it a "series;" by virtue of which it is an order, and not a mere chaos of heterogeneity. But this "law," is the mode or condition of some substance; the method in which the substance acts, or is. Since, too, the series is from everlasting, its law is from everlasting. And since the law is eternal, the substance of which it is the mode is eternal, and there is an "ETERNAL POWER" in the universe.

When last we halted in our ascent, and, lifting our eyes from the uncouth and somewhat rugged path of our argument, essayed to look about us, we found ourselves in the midst of an infinite darkness and stillness. There was no

sound, no motion, no thing, no sensible action. Only one word breathed itself to the soul, not articulated without, but rising like an enchantment within the spirit, and whithersoever we turned in our thought, it smote upon us with its unseen stroke. Power! everywhere, *Power!* eternally, *POWER!* Power original, absolute, omnipresent, immutable. But we have now mounted higher up; and the utter darkness has broken away, and forms and sounds, and motions are seen. *Action* is begun; nay, it has always been begun, and is seen to be from everlasting. How, then, do we now image the universe to our minds; and as we pause to view and contemplate, what do we see? We see the *manifestation* of the power. In what? We know not in what particulars; for we are not able, beginning with the great original, to trace down its operations in all successions, gradations, and development; and we are especially ignorant concerning those which stand early and earliest in the series. The original methods of the Eternal one, remain to us an unfathomable mystery; and, were we to seek to picture within our minds, that beginning in which this visible universe, or any region of it, first stood forth a reality, we could, at best, only image it in symbols; our science is incompetent to furnish us with the facts. We only know, that, in its glorious progression and everlasting changing, as in its mysterious beginning, *a presence*, immutable and eternal, abides, the element of all substance, the spring of all action. In all visible glories, in all that wonder and majesty, which eye cannot see nor ear hear, and which the intellect but feebly grasps, and the heart is too faint to feel; in all, we see but the manifestation of the eternal activity of *THE POWER*. It is an omnipresent sea, lifting its waves, ever, amid the darkness, and these visible things are but the shining foam with which they break into view and disappear. Wide all around, unto an illimitable extent every way, their lamenting voices rise; the moaning of the infinite element of this shoreless ocean, as it mourns, in eternal blindness and senselessness, from everlasting to everlasting; moved by necessity, and, in dreary monotone without ceasing, raising its unconscious elemental cry; moaning as it works on endlessly.

We have now attained the materialist's conception of God.

This great, eternal, absolute, unreasoning Power, is his "God." He believes in a "power," not in a "spirit;" in a *force*, not in a benevolent and intelligent *Will*. Nature stands, with him, in place of Deity; Nature, working with interminable succession of cause and effect, worked by an invincible Necessity, the embodiment of force and fate; Nature, driving her million orbs and her ceaseless combination and dissolution of elements; driving and grinding on with her boundless ~~inquiry~~, without rest from age to age, and from everlasting to everlasting; *Nature*, immense, dumb, pitiless, senseless NATURE is his God.

He looks into the skies at night. Who is it, that "stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in?" He replies: It is the law of gravitation, and other unknown laws. He gazes upon the stormy sea, "when the deep utters his voice, and lifts up his hands on high." Who is it that "ruleth the raging of the sea, when the waves thereof arise?" "It is the principles of hydrostatics and of aerial pressure." Or, he turns his gaze inward, and looks upon the wonder of the soul. What is this, which thinks, which loves so tenderly, and *rules* in this mystery of the will? "Oh, this! It is a very curious effect of atomical combination: this is the most ethereal of all the forms of matter!" And so on, through the whole realm of things visible or known, he finds only the operations of nature, only the hand of necessity.

It is the same, also, in the experience of life. When sickness comes, it comes not under the supervision of any wise and kind Providence, but merely according to certain natural and necessary laws, and is but the working of the original energies of matter. When death enters his home, and the beautiful and the gentle one, whom he dearly loved, lies pale and cold, he hears no Father's voice speaking to him, feels no Father's hand laid on him, in admonition or reproof; and of the consolation which the Spirit, the Comforter, gives, he knows nothing. It is the deed of Fate. He gazes, in bitterness, on this work of the pitiless powers. In utter

dreariness of hopelessness, his spirit sits desolate and angry in her anguish, and he curses the senseless energies of irrational Nature, that have destroyed such beauty and delight, and laid waste his hopes, and extinguished his darling life. Brute Nature ! to crush beneath its dreadful heel so fair, so fragrant, and so tender a flower ! Fool Nature ! to make, and straight unmake ! to destroy goodness, and happiness, and the fountain of joy, and let vileness and misery, ugliness and shame, live on !

So when death, at last, draws nigh his own soul to extinguish it in eternal night, he yields himself up, with cold and hardy stoicism, to be dissolved back into the elemental power of which he was made at the first : earth to earth, ashes to ashes, *soul* to ashes ; all, dust to dust. Nature has done with him. She made him ; she unmakes him. Old Necessity, working by its law, put him together, at the first ; and now grinds him to powder again. The *inquiry* rolls on forever, senseless, pitiless, aimless, without rest, without change, and hears no cry, and heeds no prayer, and knows no thrill, and knows no compunction, and knows — nothing ; brute and inexorable, rolling on from everlasting to everlasting. This great, eternal, dumb *Force*, *this* is the materialist's God !

In the process of our reasoning, we have now got back to a one element from which all things spring ; to this unity all things are referred ; by it all are explained, and here the materialist makes a final stop, and says : This is God ; and there is no other. He thinks that he thus accounts for all things, and that here he has reached the *Unity* after which philosophy strives, and in which the mind and heart of man find a refuge from the questions that haunt his solitude, and embitter his toil.

This supposition — that he has reached a satisfying “unity” — will not bear scrutiny, as will be shown hereafter ; but, for the present, we are content to take him upon his own ground ; and remark,

X. THIS SOLE, ORIGINAL, ABSOLUTE, IMMUTABLE, EVER-ACTIVE POWER, IS SPIRITUAL AND PERSONAL.

We have already seen that the “original Power” con-

tains, essentially, *all* finite powers that ever *can* exist. The whole force of gravitation that is in action now, or ever will act; all the several kinds of chemical attraction or influence; every specific energy of material substance, of organization, and of life; together with all intelligences, persons, spirits, are all involved and contained within the one eternal element. But,

How are they contained there? To this we answer: There are only *four* possible ways. Upon the supposition that this element is a purely *natural* power, then whatsoever particular forces of substance or of quality have existed, exist, or will exist, must have been wrapped up within the eternal element, either,

a. As each a real and specific entity held, from everlasting, in unity with other entities; or else,

b. They had being merely, under the form of a natural tendency and necessary law of production, sure to operate effectively so soon as the indispensable conditions shall have been wrought out.

Again: upon the supposition that the element be a *spiritual* one, then each particular atom must have had being from eternity, either,

c. As a positive specific reality, eternally generated by the infinite volition, or,

d. As a certain energy of the eternal Will, sure to be put forth at an appointed time; that is to say, as an idea and fixed purpose (decree).

There can be no other modes than these four; and one of these even (a) is excluded, by the conditions of our present problem, as we shall immediately see, in the following

EXPLANATION. A. The "Original" may be a *natural* power. If so, then either the thing itself must have existed always, or the power that *must* constitute the thing, so soon as the necessary condition or concurrence comes; and this condition, too, is itself necessitated. But, if we take the first of these suppositions, and say that all elements have *always* had their specific character; then we have not advanced one step in our "philosophy," which strives towards unity, and

we are still entangled amid the multiplicity and diversity from which we have been struggling to escape. If, by this one "element" of which we have been speaking, we mean merely an inconceivably thin fog or mist into which all the material universe has been (in our minds) rarefied, and where its several elements all commingle, we have still just as many things and the very things to account for, as at the first.

We find oxygen and nitrogen blending in our atmosphere; we find carbon, and gold, and silver, with many other elements, scattered throughout the earth. The question is: whence came these? And how came they to be at all? Are we so wise, as to imagine that we have answered the questions, when we say: there was, originally, an infinite cloud, or sea, composed of atoms of these several kinds; and, by and by (as birds of a feather flock in company), like sought out like or mingled in amicable contrariety, and so chaos became cosmos! Who does not see that the very question in which we began still remains? *Whence* did these same atoms of oxygen, of hydrogen, of carbon, of gold, and of silver come?

This supposition, then, in any investigation of the present kind, cannot be adopted. Let us turn to the other alternative, "b." What is that? According to this hypothesis, each atom, or element, has not existed from eternity, *by itself*, but there is an eternal somewhat which had a power of varied production, and was possessed of energies never all wholly inactive, and these which we now behold, were, from everlasting, sure to act at some time, and to be acting at this time. This element is neither fluid, nor aerial, nor fiery, nor electrical, but a mysterious and indescribable something, which, by an inherent law of necessity, will turn itself into everything that will be. If the original power be a *natural* one, this is the only mode in which things finite and temporal can be supposed to have been originally involved within the infinite and eternal one. But,

B. The original power may be *spiritual*. What then? Why then, each particular atom must have existed from eternity, as has been remarked, either as a specific reality

eternally generated by the power of the original will put forth continuously from everlasting; or, as a part of that power, held in reserve, but definitely appropriated to this particular thing, and determined for its particular time (idea-decree). It *may* be, e. g., that these atoms of oxygen that I am breathing have always been in being, as an eternal *product* of an eternal volition. Who is able to arrest them, single out each one, and read its date? Again, it *may* be that all these elements, and every atom of each of them, were absolutely *created*, when as yet there were none of them, at a certain particular point in the immense past, at a certain definite number of ages, years, days, hours, and seconds, from the present instant of time. *Then*, they first began. *Before*, they were not. How then were they from everlasting contained in the eternal? Thus: the power which is in them now, constituting their essence, he *possessed*, and was able to put it into these forms; the conception also of what they now are, he always had, and the archetypes of all things rested in the unfathomable depths of his mind. The *certainty* of their existence lay in the fixedness of his purpose to create each one, in the place assigned and at the time appointed, from everlasting.

In either of these *two* ways, may the manifold forms and kinds of being which the present universe shows, have been involved in the original, if that original were *spiritual*; in either of these, but in *no other way* than these two (c. and d). No other way has ever been suggested, that we know of, in which *material* things could have been eternally involved in a spiritual Original; but, in every Pantheistic theory, a different origin and evolution is necessarily implied for finite *intelligences*. Every such theory presupposes the reality of a certain element, not yet personal, but from which persons will and *must* come—a refined potency, omnipresent, eternal, indescribable, whose qualities cannot be definitely enumerated, but from which, not only all matter but all souls are born—it is, or contains, an element that is truly and properly *spiritual*; and that element can be imaged, in its omnipresence, no

otherwise than as an infinite spiritual *mass* (as ethereal as you please), the original stuff out of which all finite personalities are composed. If the reasonableness of such a theory be conceded, or its possibility, then there certainly would be *another* hypothesis for us to consider, in addition to the four already announced. But we meet this new comer upon the threshold, by the denial of his *existence*. That is, we affirm:

There *can* be no such thing as a "spiritual mass," out of which individual personalities may be carved, or from which they may be condensed, or of whose elements they may be combined or constructed. The mind cannot *conceive* of a chaos of spiritual substance from which a world of intelligences should be developed, and *there is no such thought*. The phrase "spiritual substance" *has no meaning* whatsoever if intended to shut out personality; for *the* meaning of *spiritual* substance is, *that* substance which is personal, in being intelligent, sensible, and volitive—in that it is *will*, knowing, feeling, choosing, doing. The substance which is marked by these traits, men call "spiritual;" they mark it by that word; and they mean, and can mean, none other.

In saying this, however, we do not imply, that there may not be traits or properties of spiritual being not yet named in human language, or recognized in human thought. We do not deny that there may be powers in some spirits altogether surpassing those in any "persons" who have yet come within our knowledge, or that the Eternal and Original one may thus be, in a mysterious and incomprehensible sense, *super-personal*. One definition limits only on one side. We say what "spirit," at the *least*, must be; not what it may be, beyond. We draw the line beneath which it cannot sink, and the limits which, at lowest, it completely fills; but we do not assume to define the shadow of that great mystery, into which the word, in its grandest and divinest meaning, recedes and expands, overshadowing the mind with an unknown majesty, baffling the utmost stretch of pursuing thought, overpassing the profoundest and the broadest search of the soul's anxious and awe-struck vision. We

simply affirm that the Original Power (if spiritual) and all spiritual substance is *personal*.

A STATEMENT. All existence, all *re-ality*, is either under the law of necessity, or it is not. The only existence which is not completely under the law of necessity is *volitive* existence. There is no volitive existence outside of *persons*. All matter is under the law of necessity. The *characteristic* of spirit is freedom or will. Matter and spirit, then, are separated, in all rational thought and theory, by a perfectly definite and immutable line. *Matter* exists, or seems to exist, in atoms ; and these "atoms" may be agglomerated into "masses," or organized into "bodies." *Spirit*, on the other hand, exists in "persons." These persons may be combined into "societies" and "communities," and *these* are the only "masses" or "organizations" of spiritual substance. In other words, the *person* is to spirit, what the *atom* is, or seems to be, to matter—the *simple and primal form, in the absence of which "spirit" is non-existent*. Out of atoms, the material universe is (or is supposed to be) built. Out of individuals, the world of spirits is combined. The former are organized according to laws of necessity, such as gravitation, chemical affinity, etc. The latter are organized according to the law of *divine love*, a certain free or voluntary energy (in contradistinction from pathological or emotive), which is the sole bond of reasonable beings, and the central principle of the great world of intelligences, as indeed of each separate soul, and through whose might (and inner harmonies) the moral universe is beautiful and strong.

The foregoing distinctions hardly admit of discussion at all. For, that matter is under the law of necessity, *all* men agree ; and that persons are free, *all* are conscious. Every spiritual being is a person. Every person is spiritually endowed. The two terms are identical in essential idea.

The phrase "spiritual substance," then, has no meaning, if intended to shut out personality. The only intelligible idea which it can convey, as the name of anything either real or conceivable, is—the substance which exists as "person" and not as "thing."

Since, then, there can be no such thought, there is certainly no such reality as a spiritual "mass," a vapor, a fog, an ether, out of which individual souls could be supposed to be condensed, or constructed; and so there remains only the two methods mentioned above (c. and d.), according to which, upon the supposition of a spiritual Original, derivative existences could have been eternally involved therein.

More briefly, again, we may state the matter thus: The objector affirms a spiritual "mass" as the original of all particular spiritual existences. This "mass" is either under the law of necessity, or it is volitive. If under the law of necessity, then it is material, not spiritual. If volitive, then it is a *person*.¹

Having settled, therefore, with regard to the *modes* in which derivative existence *may* have been eternally involved in the Original, and having shown that there is only one possible hypothesis, upon the supposition that the Original is a merely natural force, while there are two others admissible upon the supposition that it is spiritual, we must proceed to determine the *fact*, and to inquire *whether it really be spiritual or material*.

ARGUMENT.

I. It is obvious that the universe contains finite *natural* powers, forces, i. e. which are strictly subject to the law of necessity.

It is possible (for aught our argument has, at present, to

¹ The words "will," "volitive," and the like, are used throughout this Essay in their highest and most absolute sense; in that in which they are applicable to none but free moral agents. This, indeed, is their only strict and proper meaning. The volitions, so called, of animals, can only be viewed as the resultants of natural forces working in an organism; whereas those "choices" of free moral agents, in which they rise superior to such "causes"—the forces of mere nature—and assert their personality, breaking away from all lower dominion, and treading the *world* beneath their feet, are acts in view of *eternal and absolute good*. Every being, who is truly "free," is so by virtue of his ability to recognize this good, and to choose it, the solicitations of nature to the contrary notwithstanding. No being can be deemed free who is incapable of discerning between right and wrong; and none surely ought in strictness to be spoken of as "volitive," or possessed of "will," unless strictly "free."

say to the contrary) that these may have been wrapped up, in the Original Power, in either of the three modes (b. c. d.) mentioned above (p. 407). They may have been parts of the ~~sure~~ tendency, and of the necessary working out of a merely natural force; or parts of the eternal action; or parts of the eternal purpose, and long-withholden action, of an infinite spiritual Power.

Here is a diamond. It is built up (we will grant) of atoms. Take one of those simple, primal particles. *This* is not com-posed at all. It does not con-sist. It is. Here we have a material unit. The question is, Whence came it? How comes it to be? To reply that it has always existed, is no answer, surely, but simply an affirmation of the impossibility of an answer. It is no answer, for it meets not the demand of the intellect; but instead, refuses to listen to that demand, and calls the intellect fool, for making it. It is no answer, for it is an absurdity; affirming the eternity and consequent independence and self-sufficiency of things that are partial and limited. It is no answer for *us*, certainly; for we are seeking to account for the universe, and are endeavoring to comprehend the multiplicity of its whole, in our philosophy. But this reply mocks at philosophy.

But whence came this atom? "Out of the eternal Element," says the materialist, a form or vortex of the original Power, a form not eternal, but that has now come, in the course of the necessary workings of eternal energies. It is the same with all the atoms that, together, make up the universe. (The inadequacy of this theory will be shown hereafter; but we pass on.)

But whence came it? we ask again; and the spiritualist replies: 'From God; and this in one of two ways: either it has been eternally generated by his volition, or, at some point of time in the past, it was once created, and has being still, an embodiment of a part of his infinite force. Thus it is with all the atoms of the material universe.'

We will not stop here, to criticise either of these replies, but remark:

II. The universe contains finite *spiritual* powers.

There are atoms, and there are also persons, masses and communities, bodies of particles, and bodies of individuals. There are things, and there are *souls*. The one is characterized by such attributes as impenetrability, inertia, gravitation, affinity, polarity. The other is distinguished by intelligence, love, will.

There is a greater and more specific difference between the two classes of attributes, than between any two attributes of the same class; a wider, and more definite, and more complete distinction between "things" and "persons," than between any two things or any two persons whatsoever.

It would certainly be illogical, therefore, to confound forces so particularly and so widely distinguished. We may not let it be assumed that gravitation and volition are, or can be, the *same*. Whether either may be the result, or product, of the other, it is not yet time to inquire; but, in themselves, they are *distinct*. We must affirm, then, in positive terms:

a. That these finite spiritual powers, *are not material*. Still further: that which is material not only *is not* personal, but

b. *It cannot become personal*. A pound weight can raise a pound, so much and no more, but it cannot feel or know. A two-pound weight has twice the force of the other, in its *kind*, but it does not begin to approximate any nearer to perception or understanding. Take any other material energy, it can act in its own way and produce effects of its own kind, but that is all. They cannot *become* another kind.

Here is a force; it matters not what it is, but a force under the strict law of necessity. How is that force, *of itself and by its own energy*, to pass from under that law, and to make itself intelligent and free? How is it to abdicate that which is the essential mode (law) of its being, and crown itself with a different and a higher mode? Here are forty forces, of forty kinds, combined and organized; each one, by itself, and the whole in their united action held in the strict rule of "causation." How are they to cease from that condition, and to rid themselves of this their *nature*, and be of another nature? Here is a universe of one infinite

material element, the whole bound by necessity, and exercising, of course, only natural forces. Now, how is this *matter*, held, as it is, eternally under the "law of necessity," how is it to become "free?" If it be not spiritual now, what can ever make it so? Nothing! for there is nothing outside of it, to act upon it, or influence it in any way. But how, then, can it make itself spiritual? It cannot: for no conceivable multiplication, or division, or interaction of material forces can *constitute* a spiritual force. They cannot even advance one step toward that point. Matter cannot begin to transmute itself into mind. Gravitation is no element in will. Chemical affinity is not the remotest incipency of that love which resides in moral beings and is intelligent and voluntary. No act of matter ever approximates the specific character of a personal act. But if so, then no matter ever approximates personality. The line of distinction ever remains sharply drawn, and the lower can never cross it and become the higher; material force cannot produce spiritual powers. Hence

c. The original power, of which we have been speaking, cannot have been *purely* physical and natural, but *must have been at least partly spiritual and personal*. That is, a *part*, at least, of its unity is a *person*.

The reality of this part can no more be denied than that of the other. The existence of spiritual beings is, in fact, not only as evident and as indubitable as the existence of material things, but the denial of it necessitates the denial of everything. Since, if we contradict and reject our own consciousness, we reject all that it brings. If we cannot believe in ourselves, we surely cannot in an external world revealed to ourselves. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to deny all things, we are compelled to grant that the original power was, from eternity, at least in part personal—a person. [See sequel.] Just here, an *objection* may be thrust forward; viz. If you deny the possibility of a spiritual "mass," out of which individuals may spring, and if you affirm only *one* eternal person, then there can never be more than one.

It suffices for our present purpose, to reply to this objection, that it is more than the objector is competent to affirm; for it is more than he can prove. He does not *know*, that the eternal will cannot embody in matter inferior, derivative, personalities, nor can he so much as bring a fair presumption in favor of his denial. In the fulness of our ignorance concerning these high matters, and of the beginning of things, we cannot presume to set bounds to the original spirit. We may not comprehend, indeed, the *way* in which he acts in creation, but this does not justify us in saying, he cannot create. For neither can we definitely image to our minds the way in which he does anything; since all this is outside of our experience. From the necessity and the very nature of the case, we know beforehand that we cannot do this. "*Such* knowledge is too wonderful for us. It is high; we cannot attain unto it." But here we know that there are finite personalities. We have proved that these finite personalities could not have originated in any material forces; and therefore that there must have been an original *spiritual* force; or, in other words, a *person*. To say, now, that we are unable to describe the genesis of derivative souls, from this original spirit, is of no account. We are quite as incompetent to detail the exodus of suns and planets from an original *hyle*. But,

d. The original power, if partly spiritual, is *dominantly so*.

The original power is a unity. We seem to have shown that, *in certain respects*, it is also a duality. The question arises, therefore, in that combining of the two, whereby the duality is yet an eternal and absolute unity, which is the superior, and which the inferior? which succumbs? which rules? The answer must be: It is the material which succumbs to the spiritual. For,

(1) It is a part of the essential nature of spiritual powers, to *use* those which are material. If we appeal to our own observation and experience, we everywhere meet with this fact. In all human beings, it is manifestly the proper office of the soul to rule the body; and in proportion to the actual

spiritual force which exists in any man, in that proportion is the physical part of his being kept in subjection and made to be subservient to the purposes of the soul. *More* than this, it is of the spirit's *essential nature*, to rule material forces. For it is its nature to know them, to understand their laws, and, finally, in volition, to take advantage of those laws (or modes and conditions of being and of action) for the accomplishment of *purposes*. It is impossible to conceive of spirit in active contact with matter, without thinking of it as both recognizing and exercising its own superior dignity and right to rule. Its actual dominion, at any time, must correspond with its actual power, then.

(2) It is just as much the nature of matter, too, *to be used* by spirit. Material forces are such, that they are, of necessity, susceptible of being controlled by the energies of personal existences. Consciousness declares the spirit's superiority, and perpetual experience proves the susceptibility of matter to the controlling action of the soul.

(3) We cannot conceive of the *two as coexisting in unity, except in this relation*. It is manifestly impossible that this unity should exist, except by the subordination of the one to the other. But it is equally impossible to conceive of spirit yielding itself up in *absolute* submission to material force. For so, it would come under the law of matter, which is necessity; and it would *be* matter, not spirit.

It is the essential nature of spirit to know, and to plan, and to seek to accomplish ends. Its nature is action for an end self-determined. This nature it cannot lay by, without ceasing to be itself. There is no subjection for it but in annihilation. But if spirit cannot be subordinated to matter, and if matter is not subordinated to spirit, then must there be perpetual war between these two kinds of forces. Our "philosophy" has not attained the unity which it seeks, unless it acknowledge a subordination here, and in denying it, affirms *two* absolute, original powers, each independent and self-existent, yet dependent each upon the other, and waging an irreconcilable conflict from everlasting and forever! But,

e. This subordination must have been *entire* and *absolute*.

For, if in any respect the unity were marred, then were there still two powers, and we have our unity yet to seek. That is to say, after having gone back to a power, which by supposition and the necessity itself of our argument, is original, we find in the investigation of it, that this, the only possible original, is itself derivative. For, any existence which is coördinate with another, cannot be viewed as self-existent and absolute, but only as dependent and secondary. Hence we see, that it is strictly a necessity of the case that the material forces should have been, from the first, *absolutely* at the disposal of the spiritual; or, in other words, the eternal person must have been absolutely supreme. The one original, absolute, infinite, immutable, ever active power is *supremely* a personal power. More than that,

f. *The person is the power.*

In the beginning there are, as has been shown, no material *things*, but only a something, able and certain to originate, alike, atoms, masses, organizations, and persons; and this "something" is the sole original being.

We have hitherto spoken as though there were, or might be, two *parts* in this original unity; the first a material force, and the second and ruling part, a spiritual power, or person, and have just shown that, as there cannot be two absolutes, the material must be viewed as *absolutely* subjected to the personal, which is to be viewed as *absolutely* supreme.

But if so, then the *ground* of all material force is identical with the spiritual power itself; for there is but one "ground," since but one "absolute." But if the person be the one *ground* of all things, physical as well as spiritual, then is he the "one original," the "first power."

Furthermore, since, in the beginning there were no material *things*, therefore, by the "material power" of which we spoke, we can mean nothing but a power having the faculty of producing matter, i. e. of creating a substance, and substances, which shall be under the strict law of cause, or necessity. Our argument enjoins no more upon us, then, than that we find this faculty somewhere; and this once really found, all the conditions of that part of our problem

are satisfied, and the *material* universe is adequately accounted for. The phrase "material power," as we have hitherto used it, applies perfectly well to *a faculty of natural or physical force, resident in the eternal person, and having its first impulse and its continuity, in the voluntary energy of his will*. Indeed, when it has once been conceded, that the *person* is absolutely supreme, there is no other consistent sense, in which the phrase can be used. For, it can only be understood as the name of something *utterly* and *absolutely* at the *disposal* of the person, as completely so as any of his own energies, that is, as in reality itself but an energy or faculty of his being.

The only "material power," therefore, which can have any original existence, is that eternal energy of the original spirit, whereby he is able, of his own free will, to constitute things whose law is necessity; and fundamentally, in the absolute beginning, the *one only reality is a PERSON*.¹

¹ This "Person," proved thus to be identical with the "original Power," is possessed of all those attributes hitherto shown to belong to that Power. The great original Spirit is independent, self-existent, absolute, of infinite power and presence, immutable, eternally active. He reigns from everlasting in sole supremacy, and all else that exists is either of him or by him. The energy of his will is an absolute energy, not simply tending towards its objects, but attaining them; not merely determining, but establishing them; moving ever with perfect creative force, and constituting whatsoever it wills. We must also confess the scope of his knowledge to be boundless as his power; and he beholds all that can be, could have been, has been, is, or shall be. But, moreover, mere will and intellect do not round out into completeness the sphere of spiritual being. There is another energy, as our minds necessarily conceive, resident *within* these, and without which they are not; and this is *love*. The love is as absolute as the power or the wisdom. But of this hereafter. Suffice it to say, now, that in finding the Eternal Person, we have come into the view of our soul's Lord and King. Ranging the vague immensity and eternity in search of the centre and the throne, we have come upon it, at last, and find it; not empty, the seat of vacant laws, nor yet the desolate penetralium of vast and brute force, but the home of the Infinite Glory—not unfamiliar—and the sanctuary of the presence of Him, whom we are privileged to name *OUR FATHER*! who is of like substance with ourselves, but not identical, of whose infinite and perfect image the sinless human soul is a similitude.

Thus great truths, glorious realities begin to loom up from beneath the edge of our horizon, and we feel impelled to hasten forward that we may do them reverence; but this is not yet permissible. A *falsehood* stands in our array, and we have not called it false! We can leave no traitor behind us; we must turn back.

In the process of our reasoning we reached a point whence we seemed to behold a *one eternal Element*, the original of all existence, and which, regarded as a purely natural power, is the materialist's God. We tacitly permitted him to call this a "unity," and an "original;" but proceeded, immediately, to prove that he was mistaken in calling it a merely natural, instead of a spiritual, power. We accepted his own ground, and then showed that the *ground* was other than he supposed it to be. We have now to acknowledge an error, and to affirm that there was *no ground at all*, that is,

I. *We deny that the one original Element of the materialist is, in any proper philosophical sense, ONE, and that it can possibly be thought of, or at least thought out, as ORIGINAL.*

Let us see. We have, to begin with, the universe of earth and heaven. We find it made up of an immense variety of objects, solid, fluid, aerial; and containing powers most subtile and wonderful; agencies of light, heat, magnetism; principles of vitality and sensation; with the personal energies of mind, heart, and will. The philosopher enters, in the first place, upon a scrutiny of ponderable elements. He finds that a very great variety of them may be reduced to very few simples. The imponderable agents puzzle him somewhat; but he concludes, without serious difficulty, that sufficient skill would be able to resolve them, either into activities of other elements, or, perhaps, into the very primitive substance itself, from which all other things are made. As for mind and soul, he seems to himself easily to trace it back, through receding forms of animal existence, to its rudimentary state in the zoophytes, whose vague sensibility bears, he fancies, the closest resemblance to the chemical affinity which rules among the elemental atoms. It is, therefore, sufficiently plain to him, that human science has already proved the universe to be compounded of a comparatively small number of primal substances. But, small as this number is, it is yet too large; for the reason will not rest satisfied when told that the universe has — creators; and if his chemistry should succeed in reducing all these to *two*,

and should declare oxygen and hydrogen¹ to be, at once, the substance, and the life, and the soul of the world ; still, the mind obstinately refuses to be content, and demands, with as much pertinacity and eagerness as ever : “ But what is the ground and the spring of these *two* ? whence came they ? and what is their history ? Indeed, the difficulty is quite as real, and may be as great, with two as with two hundred. What is, now, our philosopher’s resource ? Why now, seeing that investigation has failed, he meditates ; and since the intractable elements baffle the resources of his chemistry, he throws them into the alembic of his imagination. Watching closely he sees, or seems to see, an immensely thin vapor issuing thence, an ether impalpable to every nicest sense, and unrecognizable by Chemistry’s subtlest detective police, seen only by the mind. It rises, and, in a twinkling, has spread itself throughout all space. It filleth immensity and inhabiteth eternity, the one primal substance, the great first being, the sole original, eternal, omnipresent, omnificient. Has it any qualities ? Not any in particular, but all in general. Is it any definite substance ? No, but the mother of substances, and the father. It is Proteus, and becomes anything and everything, not at will, however, but according to necessity — a great sea, brooded over by no spirit, eternally it is breaking into form, and, changing forms, giving forth all things, and, perhaps, receiving again into its infinite bosom all, as they in succession complete the cycle of their fate. In *this* he finds the reason and the rule, the beginning and the destiny of the universe.

Is there such a thing as carbon ? As known to sense, it is compounded of particles ; but, as seen by the understanding, each particle is merely but one definite and continuous limitation of the original infinite Energy. A portion of this Energy, in process of its eternal action — effect succeeding cause without end — stands, at the present moment, in this form. It is capable of being anything else. Just *now*, it is this.

¹ See the speculations of Transcendental Chemistry.

Again : In a different place, do we discover a different thing, and name it — nitrogen ? Then we have merely to say : In this place the ancient Necessity has worked differently, so that the primal essence has come to wear a different form, and — nitrogen is accounted for.

Next, we stumble upon our own soul ; and this, too, we discover lying latent in the aboriginal abyss of entity. Thus we go the round of the world, and behold each several thing rise into being, and depart ; whereupon, we fold our robe about us, and sit down in peace — the *world* is at our feet. We fear lest we are transgressing our own canon in listening, so patiently, to this philosophy of materialism. But let us contemplate it. The materialist finds the beginning of all things in a certain indescribable *hyle* or first matter (rather, *mother* of matter). This, like an immense impalpable sea, is omnipresent ; and, being possessed with a multitude of energies, is ever simmering, as it were, and its vibration and its foam is this visible action, appearance, sensation, knowledge, will, which constitute the sensible and intelligible universe ; while *it* is, itself, the one only real, ultimate *substance*.

The materialist, like all other rational beings, is under the pressure of that relentless question which ever stirs up the mind with its inappeasable cry : *Whence* all this ? and *how* ? what is the beginning ? what the *unity* of the whole ? He too lies, in company with all his compeers, under this most stringent intellectual necessity of rising from the great chaos of diversity about him, to the vision of a *one original cause and reason*. All his philosophy is inadequate, as philosophy it is inept, if it fail of attaining *this*. He claims that he has attained it ; what has he done ? Exactly this : He has taken all existing with all possible things, shaken them well together, and then, by the solvent of his imagination, has melted them down into one vast “puddle,” in which every specific quality is neutralized by its contraries or correlatives, and all definiteness lost in universal indistinction. Thus, having *absolved* each thing of all separate and particular character, through intimacy of intermixture with everything

else, he has attained THE ABSOLUTE. This is the great Original, the one First Power. He finds *here* that unity, cause, essence, and law of all, which reason always demands, and for which all philosophy seeks. Here is, literally, the "solution" of the great problem.

But let us look at this solution a little more closely. It is no *unity*. An ocean is not a unity, not even though it be of one pure, unmixed element. Here, e. g., is a drop taken from it; and here, is another drop taken from another place, of course; we will say one mile distant from the first. Now look at those drops. Are they *one*? No, manifestly not one, but two. Are they identical? And is this one that, and is that one this, and is each one both? No, manifestly; but each one is itself alone, and not the other. Are they of the same substance, absolutely the *same*? Not the same, surely, but only similar, exactly similar. And this is true of all the drops, and all the particles, even of the minutest atoms in all that infinite sea. Undoubtedly. Each particle is itself, and not its neighbor; and no one part whatsoever is identical with any other part whatsoever. And so, this great sea, instead of being an absolute unity, is as complete a diversity as any philosopher need demand for his problem. The ocean is not *one*, but merely of *one sort*. It is a multitude, though the multitude are all alike.

When you can take us to the centre of your abysm, and show us there a something which creates each point in this ocean, a *unity* which establishes and sustains each particle in being and in action, then will you have brought us face to face with a true unity, and have found for us the object of our search. But,

II. This one original of the materialist is not even an ocean of *one pure element*; it is *many elements*, or, at the very least, it must be *two*.

We will grant, for the argument's sake, that all the substances known to chemists might be analyzed, were the manipulators skilful enough, and reduced to *two* simple elements; also, that from these two a material universe might by possibility have constructed itself. But it is *not*

conceivably possible that *one* pure natural element *should have worked itself out into the diversity of the physical world*. Such mere sameness could not have wrought differences.

If we suppose that, in the beginning, there are two distinct elements, then we may conceive the two, in combining, to form a third; the third, again, with each of the other two, forms a fourth and a fifth; and these, together with their after combinations and their mutual modifications, form a still greater variety of elements, by varied degrees of union and influence, again producing varied degrees and kinds, in endless permutation. Thus, according to a law which might, perhaps, be supposed inherent in the original two, a material universe might be imagined to build itself up.

But, now, instead of this *twain*, let there be but *one* pure universal element, and no universe is conceivably possible. From this *one* nothing whatsoever can be supposed to spring in any one part or place, which does not also spring in every other part or place; that is, there can never be any diversity; and a "universe" is impossible.

The conditions of our problem are, the same thing everywhere, and this everywhere in the same state. Now, what is there anywhere to make a difference? Is it said, there is a *law* within it, necessitating action and change? But that law is in it all, necessitating in every point the same change; and this infinite sea never loses its dreary monotony. It cannot become worlds. It cannot be the original of even a material universe. Hence, that great ocean into which the materialist melted down the existing multiplicity and variety, so far from being an absolute unity, cannot even be of one *sort*, but, at the very least, by the necessity of his own argument, contains *two* distinct elements; elements eternally distinct, and that cannot be supposed to merge and lose themselves in each other; and so, his "*one* original," in order to be an "*original*," must be two or more. But,

III. Let us concede to him, temporarily, the privilege of supposing, *that he has reached a true unity, a one pure power, which, lying, as it were, underneath the great abyss, has constituted each point and particle of material existence*. This is

not a sea, but it makes the sea. And it is a *purely natural* power. WHAT IS IT?

a. Whatever it be, one thing is clear, *it is not matter*. By the very supposition, it is not only deprived of all essential material qualities, such as extension, and the like, but it is definitely set *over against* matter, as an entity logically anterior to it, and the active originating cause of it. The matter that we know of is its effect, not itself. Extension is not an attribute of itself, but only of its product. This power is not matter, though all matter, and mind, is but this power.

In putting his statement into this shape, therefore, the objector ceases to be a materialist (*materia*) and becomes, shall we say? a *matrist* (*mater*), ascribing the origin of the universe, not to matter, but to a certain nondescript *mother* of matter, the invention of his own imagination. Having melted the universe down in his furnace, and finding the flux still unmanageable, he has now, by a violent effort, sublimated and concentrated it all into a single mathematical point of pure natural power. From the infinite energy of this *punctum*, the universe has sprung, mind and matter both. This power, it is claimed, acting under the strict law of necessity, goes forth eternally in action, and each individual thing is thus caused to stand forth in its own place and time.¹

¹ Even if such an hypothesis could suffice for those existences, which, like this supposed original, are under the law of necessity, it encounters in voluntary beings an insurmountable obstacle. Were it conceded that such a power might be equal to the production of a material universe, yet, when we come to the realm of spiritual energies, its strength is palsied, and it cannot cross the line. This god is, at best, but a god of the valleys; and when we call upon him to ascend the hills, and to enter with us the solemn presence of those mysterious energies who act of their own free will—upon those heights where nature's kings hold their court, then his spell ceases. He falls powerless, crippled and dumb, the instant he touches the other side of the boundary line.—Although this point has been already discussed, yet it is so essential that it will bear review.

The universe, it is affirmed, is the *product of a Power acting by a natural law, a strict necessity*. Then, we reply, are *all* the products of this Power under the same law, and bound, with equal strictness, by the same necessity (pp. 415, 416). The stream cannot rise higher than its fountain-head. The *genus* cannot overpass the limits of its kind. By the supposition, there is, in the beginning, but one Power. That Power is of a certain kind, viz. *not* voluntary and personal,

But we have not yet answered the question : *What is it?* This question may be answered in part, very easily. It is a merely physical power. It acts unconsciously, and towards whatsoever ends it may be working, it has, itself, no end. It is a blind force acting from necessity.

Moreover, it has an absolute unity ; and, in fact, the only true substance, being alone eternal, and immutably perpetuating change. From it, all attraction and repulsion has proceeded, affinities that draw atoms together, and the gravitation that rules worlds, the energies that operate in light, and in heat, in nerves, brains, souls ; nay, the very forces themselves which *constitute* the hardness of things hard, and that repellancy which is the impenetrability of matter, the organic principle which is the central essence of vegetable and animal life, and even the intelligent and affectional free agency, in which the personal will has being. These all are but effluences, expansions, as it were, of this one power ; are eternally resident therein, and taken with all the other forces that are real, or can be, they essentially constitute it. The power is itself to be conceived, however, as, in the absolute beginning, but a *point* ; any, the least, diffusion is as fatal to this hypothesis as omnipresence itself ; as having mere position, without size, and as *eternally active*. Now, what is this power ?

First : What is its *original position* ? Granted, that it is now extended, and exists wherever anything is, but, in the *beginning*, where is it ? *Ans.* In a point. But where is that point ? Has the philosopher any reason for saying that

but strictly bound to the method of "cause and effect." The whole universe is in it — all *there* — each part sure to be "caused" in its time, each in turn, a necessary factor in causing its successor, and there is no thing, and no act, that is not strictly an "effect," and that does not "cause." This same law is everywhere ; and there is nothing anywhere, nor can there be, which is not subject thereto, and which does not, in all its operation, act thereby. There is, and there can be, no free agent in the universe. The objector is imprisoned within walls of adamant to this conclusion. He is shut up within *his own premises* ; an honorable and courteous constraint perhaps, when gracefully yielded to, but in this case a secure one.

The "Original," then, proposed by the *matrist* is incapable of fulfilling its function. It cannot *originate* the universe.

it is here, rather than there? None. Or, anywhere, rather than anywhere else? None. But it *must* be *somewhere*; and where it is, there it is by necessity; for, by supposition, this is not a voluntary power. Wherever it is, some necessity compels it to be there; and there is a cause of its presence at that point, and of its absence from every other. Now, *where* is it?

But here is another difficulty. The "original power" has been proved *omnipresent*; that is, to be either *in act*, or else (in case it be a voluntary power) potentially present everywhere. But the power of which we are now speaking, is purely physical. If, at every moment and eternally, it *can* act at all points of space, then must it *be acting* eternally at all points. For, if, at any instant, it is *not* acting at any one point, then it was impossible for it to be acting *there*, at that time. But, if the objector says that it *is* acting at all points eternally, then he asserts the eternal existence of an infinite *ocean* of power, as the cause of the universe; and so falls back into that "great sea" where his argument was drowned once, and there it is drowned again, and is twice dead.

But the question still pursues us: What is this Power? Let us return and consider. We are told, here, of a force which is somewhere, and that necessary, and yet without any cause, or any reason for being there rather than elsewhere; which is in one particular point *only*, and this by a necessity that is absolute, while there is no possible cause supposable that could exclude it from any or from every other point; and while, furthermore, it is omnipresent. It is *there*, within space, yet not occupying space, although a real *physical* force. Since it occupies no space, the point where it is might be supposed to be surrounded, and in fact to be occupied, by some other physical power, which should yet meet with no opposition from this force already there, because this is so wonderful a force that it has no extent. It is *there*, and has never moved, nor will it move thence, for there is nothing to move it (and it acts from necessity alone), but *there* it remains, permanently creating and constituting the whole universe, through all mutations; it is *just* there, and could

not have been and can never be elsewhere, and yet no agency limits it, or, being anterior to it, dictated its position. It is an absolute unity, a one *pure* element of the most perfect simplicity; and yet has, by an inner necessity, unfolded this pure simplicity of its self into all things; and all the diversities that are or can be, are eternally contained within this single and simple force. It has ever acted by necessity; and, at every successive step, was compelled to do as it did; and yet, it has ever been the sole original and absolutely supreme Power, wholly unconfined, unconstrained, passive in nothing, the first spring of all possible activity; in fact, active from eternity without reaction, every energy being but a radiance from itself. And notwithstanding it is a unity by being a *punctum*, it is also a diversity in being an *immensum*; for, in its eternal action, it is eternally omnipresent. What is this *original physical Force*? We cannot say.

It is proper now, however, that we inquire into the origin of all this confusion, and endeavor to understand whence this amazing chaos of contradictions has sprung. It comes, we think, from the effort to conceive of a material spirit, of a physical will, of a necessity-God; to find the *beginning*; in other words, *in that which is merely natural, and under the law of cause and effect*.

The materialist clings to the notion that nature is all. He believes that natural science can compass all; that necessity rules the universe; and that the world's great problem is to be solved like any in mechanics or chemics, its peculiar difficulty arising merely from the seemingly vast number and complexity of its factors. He proposes, then, to account for all things and all events, without conceding a spiritual personal Creator.

Of necessity, however, he must ascribe to his supposed Original, all the *natural* attributes of a personal God. In the very beginning of his statement, he must set forth to our view a something, a real power, which is eternal, immutable, omnipresent, omnipotent, ever-active. More than this: he finds himself obliged to deny to this "First Cause" *almost all* the peculiar attributes which characterize matter; for,

matter being, in some sense at least, its product, cannot be identical with it. But his own argument will not suffer him to rest even here. Compelled to affirm the *unity* of his "Original Power," he is at last driven to divest it of *all* material attributes whatsoever, except that one which could not be surrendered without giving up materialism altogether, and ascribing to his "Original" the distinctive trait of spirituality, viz. freedom. He still holds fast to "necessity." To such extremes does he find himself constrained to go, towards acknowledging a personal Cause, that he even denies to his First Power the relation of space, so far as that can be denied (and farther than it can be intelligibly denied) to what is physical. He strips it of all *extent*; and, though compelled to give it position, is unable to assign it any particular position; and is, in fact, logically necessitated to lift it altogether out of the relation of space; which, however, he is, by a logical necessity equally stringent, forbidden to do, because his main proposition is, that the power is a *physical* one.

Thus he has denied to his original Being all the attributes of matter save one, necessity; and endeavors to ascribe to it all spiritual attributes save those involved in one, viz. moral freedom, or personality; and after all finds himself, not surprisingly, in a net of contradictions. Surely this is not strange; for is it not plain that he is endeavoring to form a conception of a being which shall be, at once, independent and enslaved, absolute and yet under constraint of absolute law; of a "force," which yet occupies no space; of a one pure natural element, which is yet the *involution* whence an infinite diversity shall evolve itself; of a *beginning*, in short, which being in *all* things necessitated, needs itself to be begun, and, in its helpless unity, must forever wait in vain for something to change it, and enable it to become something more? In a word, he is predicating attributes specifically spiritual, of that which he assumes to be merely material. He is striving, in brief, to conceive of a *material spirit*, of a *physical will*, of a *necessity-God*.

The truth is, that *no unity can be supposed to be omnipresent*

save a spiritual one ; that there is no "absolute beginning" conceivable, except in will; that there is, even, no pure "unity" whatsoever, save that which we behold in a "person ;" nor any possible "Original" for the world, save a personal God, who is not the world, nor the "cause" of the world, but the author, the sustainer, and the ruler of it. These statements, however, each demand some further elucidation.

First : NO POWER WHICH IS A UNITY CAN BE OMNIPRESENT, UNLESS IT IS A SPIRITUAL POWER.

The very object of our argument is to find the *one* from which (or whom) the universe came, and whence it forever depends. Our "original," therefore, *must* be a unity.

Again, it has been proved that the "First Power" is *omnipresent*, in the sense that it must be conceived of as present, in the beginning, as much at one place as another, and as at least capable of acting at every place. Now if a *natural* power is, at any given moment, *not* acting in any particular place, then how can it, or could it, at that moment, act there ? Wherever it operates it operates by an absolute necessity. Wherever it does *not* operate, there it is *inoperative*, also by necessity, and *cannot* act. The only conception, then, of an *omnipresent physical force*, is of one which is really acting everywhere ; a conception i. e. of an infinite sea, or abyss, of natural power. This, as has been shown, is not a unity. No physical unity, then, can be omnipresent ; and the "First Cause," which philosophy is searching after, cannot be a physical cause, and so cannot be, strictly, *cause* at all. But,

Secondly : THERE IS NO "ABSOLUTE BEGINNING" CONCEIVABLE, EXCEPT IN WILL.

The "beginning" cannot be begun ; neither can there be anything anterior to it, which, by acting upon it, shall stir it up to make a beginning. The "beginning" must be purely and strictly *self-active*. Matter is not so ; neither this matter about us, nor any other possible substance, which, like it, is under the law of necessity. For, by this law, there is no action without a cause ; and the action of the cause precedes the action which is its effect, and then that *causal* activity it-

self, if a necessary one, must have been caused again; and so we find ourselves, once more, stumbling up the ladder of an "infinite series." There is no such conception as that of a self-agent necessitated. The two terms are contradictory and cancel each other. Such language is jargon, and no statement of thought.

It has been proved that the "Original Power" is active from eternity. But if the original be a natural power, then this action must have been *caused* by something else, which proves itself, therefore, the true Original; but on the supposition that it also is physical, this one immediately surrenders his crown to another, and then that other to another still: and the last that we can see is, the insignia of royalty flying, with infinite speed, along an infinite line of powers; each one of them became a king and no king the same instant, and disrowned forever: The "infinite series" again.

There is no "beginning" conceivable, then, in anything which is under necessity, or anywhere but in *will*, which, by its very idea and definition, is self-active. The will, being essentially intelligent, makes and chooses its own object, and originates its own action. So strictly is this true, that the instant you bring in any other "cause," you destroy personality. So plainly is this true, that there is no man so feeble as not to be conscious of doing some things, and of having a corresponding responsibility; or so stupid as to believe himself answerable for what is not done by himself.

Since, therefore, the Power which originates all power, all substance, all phenomena and events, must be self-active, and since no powers are self-active but such as are of that kind which we call "voluntary" or "personal," the absolute beginning can be found nowhere else but in a *personal Author*.¹

¹ We have a clear conception of voluntary action, and a positive consciousness of originating it; and though this action, in us, finite and created beings, is put forth under close limitations, and upon a basis of occasions furnished to us, we readily understand that, with an *eternal* Spirit — the Original — no such constraints can exist, and no such basis be needed; but that his absolute intelligence must furnish objects at which his absolute will aims. Thus, though differing from us immensely, as infinite must from finite, and the original from things derivative, he does not so differ but that we find ourselves in his similitude, and call his action "voluntary," and call him a "Will," a "Person."

But we are now ready to go a step further yet. We have already affirmed and proved that there can be no omnipresent *unity* save a personal one; also that there is no *beginning* save a *personal* one. We now affirm,

Thirdly : THAT THERE IS NO TRUE, STRICT UNITY, EVEN, THAT IS NOT PERSONAL. For,

a. Every natural force whatsoever may be supposed to be divided; must be viewed as divisible; and so, *has no absolutely necessary unity.*

The smallest particle of matter has its sides or circumference, which can be cut by a plane that, of the one, would make two. The thinnest and minutest lamina, that at any moment you can think of, may, the next moment, be logically and rationally imagined the base of a pyramid whose apex should be, by any desired ratio, smaller than the base. So much for physical force embodied in solidity. But its form makes no difference.

Think of it as fluent, and moving in that simplest of directions, a straight line. First, this is not a "mathematical" line, for it must have some thickness, since it has material substance. This line of power, then, can even be conceived of as split longitudinally, by a wedge from that pyramid, if you please; and, certainly, can be cut across.

But reduce your conception to the last degree of evanescence, which shall yet leave any real natural power. Conceive of its utmost concentration, viz. into the nearest approximation in reality possible, to a "mathematical" point. This point is not a hard atom, but something else. We will not exact too great precision, a force, *something*. Still, it cannot be absolutely without extent; for then, as a physical force, it must be without being. Yet, if it be viewed as having extent, it must also be viewed as divisible. It has a north part, and a south part, an eastern half, and a western. But if divisible, then it has no essential, no *necessary* unity, since its unity is such as may, logically and rationally, be conceived as lost. It is impossible, then, to *conceive* of any merely physical power, as being essentially and necessarily one. Its unity, at any time, exists by chance,

merely; that is, by a temporary, and to us, uncertain and vague necessity, not by a necessity eternal and absolute.¹

But, let us even suppose, as the objector affirms, that the universe is at bottom a mere physical force, and that this all is a *unit*. Then are all souls blended and lost in this necessary indestructible physical unity, and blended, not merely with one another, but with all matter also. And, since this unity is so absolute, we must go one step further, and affirm *this*: The whole physical force of the universe, (for it is *eternally* one and indivisible) is in each part in souls, as well as in atoms, and in each act, alike of matter and of mind. For, being *essentially* indivisible, it must be in each thing, in it all the time, and in all its motions, *all* these, again, not potentially, but *actually*. That is, all particular forces are *actually* and *physically infinite*, in mind as well as in matter; all powers are irresistibles, all resistances immovables; all momentum and all inertia, all intelligence and all stupidity, are alike infinite. No wonder, that, from the boundless crash and conflict of the tremendous forces of this "unity," wherein infinite meets infinite in reckless concussion, results of remarkable brilliancy should ensue. When such flint meets such steel, it must be that celestial fires are elicited. The existence of suns, and comets, and philosophers is a problem no longer.

On the whole, is it not sufficiently clear, that, whether we select any conceivable part of the physical universe, or view it entire, it is impossible to imagine any merely natural power to have in itself, and to be, an essentially indestructible unity? We think it is clear. But,

b. Every "person" must be conceived of as essentially, necessarily, indestructibly, absolutely *one*.

That which says "I" cannot be divided, or be supposed

¹ If the possibility of an eternal, physical unity could be proved, this unity could not be conceived of as originating the universe, because, by supposition having no other material than itself to make it of, and being itself an absolute, indestructible unity, it can neither make nor become a diversity. A spiritual Power, however, in its very idea, is one that "works undivided, operates unspent." The substance of the soul is not diminished by living, nor the force of the will divided by willing.

to be divided. (1) It cannot be divided in *time*. No man can think of himself, of his own personality, as having existed in successive parts. But, if he remembers the past, it was he himself, whom he remembers as living then. It is he himself who lives now; and himself whom he thinks of, when he anticipates the future.

(2) Nor in *space*. No man can think of himself as being partly in one place, and partly in another; but wherever he is, *he* is there.

(3) Nor into different *kinds* of things. The self is not dissected into sensation, knowledge, will; but it is the self itself which feels, knows, and chooses.

All the powers of the spirit, are powers which *it* possesses; and, however much they may diminish or change, the unity of the central, self-affirming, self-active agent is neither destroyed nor marred. It is not possible to conceive of this unity as not involved in the essential idea of "person," and of "spirit." While the being lasts, this unity is necessary and indestructible, has no degrees, does not vary in different individuals, but *is absolute in all*.

We have already endeavored to show that there is no "beginning" conceivable (for anything) save in a will. But even if we had been wrong there, we cannot be wrong in affirming,

Fourthly: THAT FOR THE UNIVERSE, AT LEAST, THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE ORIGINAL, SAVE A PERSONAL AUTHOR.

Here is an immense system claimed, by the objector, to be altogether material, i. e. subject to the strict, perpetual operation of "cause and effect," a combined movement of *natural* forces. There is no God, he claims, superior to the *whole* of all these parts. God, if such a term be proper, and the universe, are identical. Or, perhaps he refuses the term altogether, and says: there is no God, no spirit; matter is all, mind is but one of its operations. With such views, he proceeds to inquire for the origin of the universe, the great first cause. In other words, having here an infinite chain, he is looking for a hook whereon he may hang it. Unless he find this, the whole falls, instantly, out of his sight. He *must* have a *first* cause, an original.

But is it not plain, that the original of the universe, is not *in* the universe; and that the *cause* must not be looked for among its *effects*? that the chain cannot be hung on any one of its own links, or on them all together. If there is good sense or right reason, in this perpetual search of philosophy after the "one original," then must that "one" be found outside of what we call the universe, outside, and above; anterior, in order of nature, certainly, and superior in essential dignity, in real power, and in comprehensiveness of being. Surely, the original of the universe is not wholly contained within it.

But it is equally clear, that you do not get out of this "sphere of cause and effect," until you have entered that of free-agency; you do not emerge from the natural, until you come to the spiritual. You have not escaped from matter, unless you have reached mind. In short, you have not got outside of the world, unless you find yourself in the presence of a *personal* cause, i. e. not "cause," but *author*. You are still entangled in the interminable succession of cause and effect, *until you see God*.

SYLOGISMS. The "origin" of the world is out of the world. The world (the objector himself claims) is all a sphere of cause and effect. The "origin" of the world is out of the sphere of cause and effect. But free-agents are the only existences that are out of the sphere of cause and effect. The "origin" of the world, then, is a free agent.

Or again: The "beginning" cannot have been "caused." All action is caused, save that of "persons." The act of the beginning, then, was the act of a person.

OBJECTION. A single objection here demands a brief notice. It is said: "In proving the existence of God, you have but plunged into deeper embarrassments than ever; have escaped from one mystery, only to fall into a greater mystery. If the world needs to be accounted for, much more, God; and, if the universe without this incomprehensible being, furnishes a difficult problem, much greater does the difficulty become, when this new infinitude is added to the old."

ANSWER. I. We started in the endeavor to account for the "*world*." We have done so. If it is now proposed that we account for *God*, it is manifest, that a *new question* is propounded to us, wholly distinct from the one with which we started, and which we have been discussing.

We started to find the "first ONE." It is simply unreason to speak of another "first" anterior to that, or to require a unity more complete than the "one." We sought to find the key which should unlock the mystery of creation. It is absurd to ask us to unlock the key. We aimed to find the principle which should give us a *rational view* of all things. The principle that does this, stands within its own light, and needs not to be made to appear reasonable by the light of any other principle. That which explains all things, is, by the very supposition, as by the necessity of the case, *the final statement*. That being, the recognition of whose existence makes the perception of all other existence a rational conception, is the primal mystery. The primal mystery, explaining *all* others, is explained by none. But the objector may put his statement into another shape and *deny* that a *reasonable principle* has been given, that the affirmation which we have reached has any light of its own to stand in.

To this, in REPLY, II. We affirm that it *is* reasonable, and that it *does* stand in the light of its own perfect reasonableness, commending itself, not to the intellect alone, but to every department of the soul, and eliciting a thrill of acknowledgment from every fibre of man's being.

This assertion is not of a nature that admits *à priori* demonstration; but it can be illustrated and proved in an endless fulness and perfection of detail. Such illustration, however, must for the present, be omitted.

We are willing to rest, here, our demonstration of the truth laid down on p. 406, "X," *that the sole, original, absolute power is SPIRITUAL AND PERSONAL*; and delay the conclusion of this Essay, merely to observe, that the result now reached, the great *facts* of the visible, and of the "intelligible" universe harmonize. Everywhere behold material forces subjected to ordinances of wisdom; working in com-

bination for intelligible and rational ends. Whether we contemplate the structure of our own bodies, or of the world; meditate upon atoms, or upon suns; upon those invisible seeds, finer than minutest particles of impalpable powder, which no secret depth and no distance can escape, or on that stellar dust which clouds the blueness of the heavens by night, that inconceivable system of solar and planetary orbs to which our own is imagined to belong, and of which the earth, with her sister spheres, constitutes but an infinitesimal and utterly insignificant part, whether we sink or soar, we behold everywhere the same subjection of material force to reasonable aims. This glorious vision crowns our metaphysic dream with new fulness of assurance; and we rejoice to find the same eternal one revealed in the universe without, as in the mind. Outward facts, as well as inner processes, hold us fast in the conclusion, that the highest and truest conception of the original power of the universe, is that of a *spiritual power involving and using all material forces*. And so, we pronounce firmly, confidently, but with eager inquiry, and intense longing, the GREAT NAME—GOD!

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. NORTON'S TRANSLATION OF THE GOSPELS.¹

PROBABLY no theological work of equal bulk has ever been published in America, which combines so many outward attractions as are presented in this work of Prof. Norton. The paper is firm and pure, the type clear and elegant, there is a liberal width of margin, and every page is significant of affluence.

The editorial labor performed on the work is distinguished by its obvious

¹ A Translation of the Gospels, with Notes. By Andrews Norton. In two volumes. 8vo. pp. 443 and 565. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

fidelity. We have seldom noticed more evidence of scrupulous and conscientious care, than is evinced by the Editors in their preparation of the second volume. The first volume contains Prof. Norton's Translation of the Gospels, and the second his Notes upon the Translation. These Notes were not left, by their author, in a finished state. The Editors have endeavored to supply the deficiency, by a cautious use of manuscript notes of Prof. Norton's oral exposition of the Gospels, given in the years 1826—1830, while he was Professor of Sacred Literature in the Divinity School of Harvard University; also by extracts from the author's published works, such as the Statement of Reasons for not believing the Doctrines of Trinitarians; also by an occasional reference to a Course of Lectures left by the Professor in manuscript. Such a compilation must, of course, have a fragmentary appearance. Many of the criticisms lack the pertinence and the pith which would have been given them, had they been prepared expressly for the purpose to which they are now applied. The Editors deserve high commendation for the degree of unity and completeness which they have given to the volume, compiled under these various disadvantages.

The Translation of the Gospels is written in that pure, chaste style which is always expected from Mr. Norton. In many instances, it gives the meaning of the original more accurately than we find it in King James's Version. In our opinion, however, it is often less correct than our received translation; and still more frequently its deviations from the style of that venerable text seem to be needless, and are, consequently, unpleasant. We are often pained as we miss some beautiful word or phrase, sacred in its associations and fascinating by its artlessness, and find, as a substitute for it, something which, at the best, is no better than what it has displaced, and which appears, in the comparison, rigid or forced. There are turns of expression for which our language is indebted to our English Bible, and which are now indispensable to the perfection of the language itself. We can never feel at home in reading any Translation which exchanges these simple idioms for novel and stiff phrases. We doubt whether a lover of the good old English literature can read a page of Prof. Norton's Translation, without admiring the Professor's exact terminology, and at the same time feeling an occasional wish that he had not sacrificed it to the equally exact, but far more charming, terminology of our familiar Version. As innovation is not always improvement, so, in many instances, a needless innovation is, on the whole, a serious damage. An inferior Version, however, may not be altogether useless; as it directs especial attention to the superior, and illustrates its neglected excellences.

A reader unused to the comments of the German philologists, will be rather startled at the unauthorized liberties which Prof. Norton takes with the evangelical record, and at the coolness with which he devises methods for its emendation. We will succinctly state his mode of explaining the account of the Saviour's temptation in the wilderness. Prof. Norton supposes that certain men who "had been excited by our Saviour's miracles, and by the declarations of John the Baptist to look upon him as their Messiah,"

"were ready to profess themselves his followers, with the hope of sharing in the good things which his followers might expect." In order to convince these men of "the opposition between his office and character, and the office and character of the Messiah expected of the Jews," our Saviour represented himself as tempted, by Satan, to do the very things which the Jews had expected that their Messiah would do, or at least might do, according to their conceptions concerning him. It was a popular notion of the Jews, that temptations to sin proceeded from Satan; and our Lord, in using language founded on this idea, meant to give them the strongest impression which they were capable of receiving, of the moral evil, the opposition to God's purposes, which would characterize such actions as were in accordance with their conceptions of the expected Messiah." Our Lord's words respecting his temptation by Satan, were spoken to the excited and erring Jews, "before those who afterwards became his apostles had joined him," "and we have no reason to think that any one of them was present at the delivery of this discourse. The words of Jesus were imperfectly repeated by those who heard them, without a distinct comprehension of their design. The striking representation which he had given, was adapted to fix itself in their minds, and was repeated without being understood.

"Had the occasion of his words been preserved, the narrative of it, in the style of the evangelists, might have been somewhat in this manner:

'And some came to him, saying, Master, we believe that thou art he who was to come. We will follow thee whithersoever thou goest.

'And they said, When wilt thou manifest thyself in thy kingdom, and be exalted, thou and thy followers?

'And he spoke a parable unto them, saying, The Son of Man was in the wilderness, praying to God and fasting; and Satan came to him to tempt him, and said, Lo! thou art hungry; since thou art the Son of God [that is, the Messiah], command these stones to become loaves of bread.'

"The announcement of our Saviour that he was speaking a parable, escaped the attention or memory of his hearers, and the evangelists recorded the narrative as a veritable history, because it was so reported, directly or indirectly, to them by those who heard but misunderstood the Saviour's recital." Vol. II. pp. 31—54.

But if we allow such conjectural emendations of even an uninspired history, what confidence can we place in it? And if we allow them in an inspired narrative, of what worth is the inspiration? What is the character of that teacher who makes his illustrations so much stronger than his statements of the truth to be illustrated, that the shadow only is retained in the mind, and the substance is permanently lost? If we may thus explain away one simple narrative, why may we not explain away the whole record?

We are well aware of the answer which will be given to these queries by the advocates of Prof. Norton's interpretation. It will be said that the disciples of our Lord did misunderstand him often and grossly: see Vol. II. Appendix, Note E. pp. 519—565. But were these errors permanent?

When the Holy Ghost brought all things to the remembrance of the disciples, did these errors remain ?

It will be again replied, that the errors were not essential. Prof. Norton affirms : " As regards the apostles, we believe that their minds were enlightened by the Spirit of God, and by direct miraculous communications from him, in regard to the essential truths of Christianity. But we have no warrant to believe, nor is there any probable argument to show, that this Divine illumination was further extended." Vol. II. p. 549. But are not all truths intimately connected ; and if, on subjects like the existence and agency of fallen spirits, and the coming of Christ to judge the world (see Vol. II. pp. 195, 196), the writers of the New Testament lapsed into incorrigible errors (Vol. II. pp. 559—561), must not these mistakes affect their views of other still more important themes ? And if the narrators of our Lord's conversations cannot be trusted, how can we trust the authors of the Epistles ? If from imagined internal evidence merely, we have a right to ex-punge Matt. 12: 40 (see Vol. II. pp. 123, 124) from the actual conversation of our Lord, what confidence can we place in any doctrinal statements of Paul or John, when they happen to oppose our antecedent convictions, or our sense of propriety ? Besides, what are the essential truths of religion ? Are the doctrines of entire depravity, regeneration by the Divine Spirit, the atonement, the divinity of Christ, essential ? Are the instructions which the apostles gave on these subjects, as clearly, as definitely in favor of Prof. Norton's views, as he would have desired ? Are they perfect instructions ? Were they supernaturally revealed ?

These volumes of Prof. Norton, learned as they are, and exhibiting such a classical finish of style, afford a new proof, that any interpreter who does not believe in the plenary inspiration of the Bible, will err in his comments upon it. He will not regard its assertions as sufficiently important to justify that laborious study which is sometimes requisite to unfold their mutual consistency. He will adopt plausible interpretations, which are inconsistent with the claims of a volume written by holy men as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Prof. Norton was a sedate, sober, and acute philologist ; but, under his criticisms, the spirit and living energy of many passages in the Gospels, seem to evaporate. His Translation and Notes may be read with profit, if they be read with care ; he suggests many rich and beautiful thoughts ; but, in our opinion, he fails to exhibit the profounder meaning of the evangelists, and to unfold the deeper wealth of our Lord's instructions. When we reflect on his valuable services in defending the genuineness of the Gospels, and the reality of the miracles recorded in them, we regret so much the more that he failed to develop that great system of doctrines which gives to the Bible its peculiar value, its essential glory.

II. NORTON'S INTERNAL EVIDENCES OF THE GENUINENESS OF THE GOSPELS.¹

In this elegantly printed volume, Prof. Norton refutes the main theory of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, in few words, but with obvious success. The comparison instituted between the methods adopted by Strauss, for throwing discredit on the evangelical narrative, and equally justifiable methods which might be adopted for casting suspicion on the narrative of Julius Cæsar's death, is very apposite and forcible; see pp. 71-84. Prof. Norton's criticisms on the style of the whole Straussian school are eminently just. No man loved a transparent and accurate phrase more than he, and no man was more disgusted with mere verbiage, and unmeaning mysticism.

The moral effect of the Straussian discussions with regard to the claims of the Redeemer, is deeply injurious. "If one were to submit to hear the character and conduct of his most intimate friend canvassed and questioned at great length, in the manner in which Strauss discusses the history of our Lord, he might find it difficult to feel for him the same confidence and respect as before." This judicious remark of Prof. Norton, p. 102, is worthy of being often pondered, and it applies to many other discussions than those relating to the history of our Saviour on earth. Any style of reasoning, which brings any religious truth into grave question, is attended with moral perils.

In this volume, Prof. Norton derives much lucid proof of the truth of the Gospels from their internal structure. No jurist, accustomed to weigh the minutest probabilities for and against a record, can read the arguments detailed in this volume, without a confirmed faith in the evangelical narrative. Mr. Norton repeats a remark which he has elsewhere made with much force, that, "if we prove the genuineness of the Gospels, we prove the truth of Christianity; but, on the other hand, to disprove the genuineness of the Gospels, were that possible, [and of course he believes it impossible,] would not be to advance a step toward disproving its truth," p. 98. If the Gospels were not written by the men to whom they are ascribed, they may yet be true in their essential teachings. There is satisfactory evidence that "Luke's narrative" is authentic, even if it should be proved, as it cannot be, that Luke never wrote it. "In order to disprove the truth, or, in other words, the miraculous origin, of our religion, it is necessary to show that all those facts in the history of the world which imply its miraculous origin as their cause, never existed, or that none other sufficient solution may be given of their existence," p. 99.

It would be wrong to accuse Prof. Norton of denying the supernatural

¹ Internal Evidence of the Genuineness of the Gospels. Part I. Remarks on Christianity and the Gospels, with particular reference to Strauss's *Life of Jesus*. Part II. Portions of an unfinished work. By Andrews Norton. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1855. 8vo. pp. 309.

character of the Gospels. He says: "Whatever they may discover of human incapacity or imperfection, appears in intimate union with conceptions which I do not say that the minds of their uninstructed writers could not have attained, but which no human mind could have attained without being supernaturally enlightened by God,—conceptions of religion and duty, of all that is most sublime in character, views of God and man, of life and immortality, far transcending all which mere human philosophy has revealed." p. 144. See also pp. 145, 156. Still, Prof. Norton's views of the strict inspiration of the Gospels are far beneath the true standard, and he holds the Gospels in higher estimation than the Epistles. The celebrated passage, 2 Tim. 3: 16, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God," etc., he interprets thus: "The spirit of God is breathed into every book," that is, of the Old Testament; "and the only purpose of the apostle was to assert generally, what no Christian will deny, that a religious spirit pervades the books of the Old Testament." pp. 16, 17. Such inadequate views of the Inspiration of the Bible lessen the value of all arguments for its Genuineness; for, if the Bible admit as many errors on religious themes as Prof. Norton ascribes to it, who shall tell what these errors are, and how shall we determine whether its miracles were wrought in confirmation of what we believe to be true, or in confirmation of what we believe to be false? The value of miraculous attestations in favor of the Bible is so far diminished, as we admit that doctrines fairly taught in that Book are unworthy of belief.

Mr. Norton's theory of the atonement affects, and is affected by, his interpretation of some momentous words in the Gospels. He translates Matt. 27: 46 and Mark 15: 34, "My God! my God! why hast thou left [not forsaken] me?" These are the first words of the twenty-second Psalm. The quotation of these words would bring the whole Psalm to the remembrance of the Jews around the cross. These Jews applied the words to David, whom they believed to be the illustrious type of the Messiah. If then David was left to suffer, the sufferings of Christ do not prove him to be an object of God's displeasure. If the type of the Messiah was "*left*," and still remained a favorite of Heaven, so Jesus may be "*left*," and still remain a favorite of Heaven, the true Messianic archetype; pp. 289—292. But can we believe that these words have a meaning so cool, argumentative, diplomatic? Is not such an explanation of them at variance with the spirit of the scene described, and with the religious feelings which the scene yet awakens, and will always awaken, in our hearts? Such inept and frigid interpretations materially diminish the value of Prof. Norton's philological works.

III. SHELDON ON SIN AND REDEMPTION.¹

THE author of this volume was once President of Waterville College, Maine. For several years he has been known as a clear and forcible writer, a vigorous and independent thinker. Some of his views are peculiar to himself; and those which are coincident with the standard of others, have evidently been wrought out by his own mind. It is to be regretted that he has not been more familiar with the Edwardean School of divines, and that a more careful study of their treatises has not saved him from certain errors which are made prominent in this volume. We do not deny that his discourses evince much talent, keen discrimination, strong thought; but they indicate that he has overlooked various important principles, and has therefore stumbled into various grave errors. We have no time to specify all of them, but will merely allude to a few.

In a note appended to the first sermon, and designed to furnish a proof of the being of God, Dr. Sheldon denies that matter has "any proper substantial being," that it is "the subject of sensible qualities." He affirms, matter is "that which is without not only any self, but also any actual subject. It is a mere objective appearance in space, a collection of particles with similar properties." pp. 32, 33; see, likewise, 326—329. We know it to be an historical fact, that this idealism, as applied to matter, has resulted in a like idealism as applied to mind. Dr. Sheldon reasons thus: "Now as matter is thus a mere appearance, without any subject of its own, it seems a warranted inference that it has, in itself, no independent ground of existence; and therefore must have had a Creator"; p. 34. Many divines have reasoned in a similar method, and have supposed that by denying the substantial existence of matter, they might exalt the Mind which made it. But other philosophers have inferred that, as physical things have no substantial being, so mind has none; and, as the earth is a mere appearance, so the spirit is a mere seeming; and thus the very process of reasoning which was designed to prove the existence of God, has been applied to the disproof of that existence. Dr. Sheldon's note involves a denial of one of the fundamental laws of human belief; so it appears to us; and this rejection of a first principle must logically result, as it has heretofore resulted, in conclusions hostile to religion. Doubtless the aim of Dr. Sheldon, in his denial of a familiar axiom, is a good one; so was Bishop Berkeley's.

Some of our author's anthropological theories are, in our opinion, inaccurate. He speaks of "the power of free will" as "the faculty of determining our actions, and so forming our character. This constitutes the executive power in man, or that by which he gives being and direction to his

¹ Sin and Redemption: a Series of Sermons, to which is added an Oration on Moral Freedom. By D. N. Sheldon, D. D., Pastor of the Elm Street Baptist Church in Bath, Maine. New York: Sheldon, Lampont and Blakeman. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. Chicago: S. C. Griggs and Co. 1856. pp. 332. 12mo.

actions," p. 45. Is not this a less definite account of the will than is given by President Edwards, when he says that will is the power of choosing? Is not Dr. Sheldon's language consistent with the theory, that will is merely the power of executive volition? He subsequently distinguishes from the will, "the power of exercising certain affections," as "love to God," "love and piety towards other persons," p. 47. But does not all holy love to God, all holy love to man, all piety involve a preference, a choice, an act of will? It is one of the best peculiarities of Edwards, that he ascribes preference, as distinct from natural affection, to the will.

"Sure I am," says Dr. Sheldon, "that there is not a hint in the Bible, Old Testament or New, that Adam had a single natural power or endowment which his descendants do not have. Nor is there a single intimation that he was in any respect, a finer and nobler specimen of his race than any other person who has lived since," p. 50. The writer of these sentences does not mean to assert, however, that "human nature now, before the beginning of moral action," is "as undamaged as the human nature of Adam before he sinned." On this subject, our author says, that "no one will be over-confident," p. 144. "If any choose to maintain the existence, in the posterity of Adam, of an originally disordered constitution, while yet they allow that in this constitution there is nothing of the nature of sin; this is a point concerning which we neither affirm nor deny anything. We refrain from any positive assertion, because our inquiries have thus far furnished no positive evidence," p. 124, see also pp. 125, 120—123. Our author supposes, then, that "the powers given to Adam are essentially the powers conferred on all other men," p. 51, and does not deny, nor deem himself authorized to deny, that the posterity of Adam possess "a nature disturbed in the relation of its parts to one another and not having the harmony and proportion" belonging "to the original nature of our first parents," p. 120. If, therefore, Dr. Sheldon does "not presume to decide, whether the descendants of Adam begin life with such an altered deteriorated nature or not," how can he presume to decide whether they have in any sense lost the divine image or not? He affirms positively that "the sin of Adam did not destroy his human nature and faculties, which were the image of God within him," p. 51; and that "the human nature in which [Adam] was created, *remained*, though no longer undamaged, since he, by his defection, had damaged it, had impaired its harmony," p. 52. If Adam's posterity have a nature disordered, damaged, as Adam's own nature became, is this injured nature *as much* in the image of God as was the nature of Adam before he sinned? Is there not a contradiction between the assertion on the one hand, "of the *equal* creation of all men in the divine likeness," so that men now living "need, they *deserve* by their very nature, all the respect and consideration, which any possessor of this nature has *ever* needed and preserved," p. 53, and the assertion, on the other hand, that, perhaps, for aught we know, the nature of all Adam's posterity has been damaged before their own voluntary act? We cannot agree with Dr. Sheldon in maintaining that the image of God consists *merely* in the possession of faculties and

sensibilities among themselves; and that, while in the former respect the divine likeness has been retained, in the latter respect it has been lost. Often also the phrase "image of God," is used in a third sense, and denotes the holy preference which Adam once freely put forth, and which none but the regenerate put forth now. It seems to us that Dr. Sheldon presses the phrase into a narrower compass than prevailing usage justifies, and makes affirmations which are true *secundum quid*, as if they were true *simpliciter*.

If it *may be* the fact, that the posterity of Adam have a damaged nature, p. 121, then it *may be* the fact that they receive this nature in consequence of his apostasy. If it *may be* right for God to introduce Adam's descendants into the world with "the harmony" of their institution disturbed, then it *may be* right for him to do so on account of their ancestor's rebellion. As Dr. Sheldon will not deny the *protasis*, we see not how he can deny the *apodosis* in these sentences. He does contend, however, that the origin of men's sin can not be traced back to Adam, p. 112, and he interprets Rom. 5: 19, as not teaching that our sins were occasioned by Adam's fall in any way, but merely as teaching "the universal fact that sin follows transgression," "that Adam and Eve sinned, and spiritual death, condemnation followed in consequence of their sin. So their descendants have sinned, and spiritual death has followed their sin. So it will be hereafter," p. 104. Dr. Sheldon is thus obliged to give a forced interpretation of the Bible, and of history. And what are his reasons for denying that our sins may be traced back to Adam's fall? His main reason is, that such a theory makes "the disobedience of Adam *necessitate* the sinfulness of all his posterity," p. 107. He rejects the theory, because the relation of Adam to his offspring "is not that of one who by his own act determines, in a *necessary way*, the acts and the moral state of all the rest," p. 109. "Adam has exerted no *irresistibly* determining influence;" we see "no BLIND mechanism or *natural necessity*," in our sin, p. 110; see also pp. 111, 116, 125. Sins do not "pass by natural descent from generation to generation," p. 118, are not *propagated*, p. 119. It is rather singular, that a divine so acute as Dr. Sheldon, should not recognize the distinction between the doctrine that our sinfulness is *occasioned* by the fall of Adam in such a way as leaves our wills entirely free, and the doctrine that our sins are *caused* by his fall, in such a way as to force, necessitate, irresistibly compel us to do wrong. From the absurd notion that our sin is made *fatally inevitable* by Adam's apostasy, Dr. Sheldon has allowed the pendulum to swing over to the other extreme, that our sin cannot be traced back in any sense to the *occasioning* influence of Adam's disobedience.

We regret, as well as wonder, that this perspicacious author has not adopted the true theory on this subject, for he sometimes admits "the existence of influences external to the will and back of its act, which have some tendency to lead to acts of sin," p. 116. He says: "Every generation that has lived on earth, since the first, has been influenced by those which preceded it, and has, again, sent forward an influence to those coming after. In this way, the influence of Adam and Eve, if it has not (as, per-

haps, it has(not) been wholly lost and spent, has been so variously mingled with, and modified by, the influences proceeding from the long series of intermediate generations, that we may justly be said to be free from it in its original and pure form." p. 117. If then it be conceded, that our sin may be traced to influences back of the will, while yet the will is free in yielding to those influences, how can it be maintained that, "to attempt to trace it [sin] to anything farther back [than our personal volition] is to annihilate it?" p. 116. It is in vain to say that we are influenced by merely the *example* of Adam. Dr. Sheldon admits that influences "which have some tendency to lead to acts of sin," are "found in the relation of the appetitive or propensional part of the nature to the moral part, and in the external circumstances and situation of men." p. 116. "The true origin of actual sin, in every human being, is found in the relation of the appetitive and the propensional part of our nature to the rational and the moral part." p. 123. Why is it, then, that in all mere men this disordered relation, which is distinct from external example, is found at the beginning of their personal life, and leads them to sin? Why do we not find some exception? This question is answered by the unforced interpretation of the words: "By one man's disobedience many were constituted sinners," etc. "In opposition to this," says Dr. Sheldon, "we maintain that sin can just as easily and as conceivably begin its existence in every one of the descendants of Adam, as it would begin its existence in Adam himself. [All men *could* sin; but *would* all men sin, if their nature were perfect?] We have before shown how Adam and Eve, constituted as they were, could be tempted and sin; and what we said there, is equally a proof that their descendants may all be tempted to sin." p. 115. (See the same idea stated more fully on p. 121.) Dr. Sheldon here overlooks the fact that the uniformity of phenomena needs to be accounted for, as well as the individual phenomena themselves. As the *concurrence* of witnesses in favor of a cause is an argument for it, distinct from the separate testimonies of the individual witnesses; so the uniformity of sin, in all men, in the earliest period of their moral existence, is a distinct argument for a nature inclining them to sin, and will remain such, even if each individual act of sin can, by ingenious hypotheses, be otherwise accounted for. The Bible gives us the idea that Adam's nature did not, at first, incline him to sin; was thus, at first, different from our own; and by his "offence" we are "dead." The fifth of Romans obliges us to differ from Dr. Sheldon, in his theory that *perhaps* "we all start with a well-adjusted nature," and "commit sin just as Adam and Eve with their perfect nature" did. p. 121.

It is one great evil of false doctrine that it repels men to opposite errors. In his discussion of the atonement, Dr. Sheldon rejects the theories that Christ became morally guilty of the sins of men or of any part of them, pp. 148—151; that he underwent the moral "punishment which is due to the sins of men;" so that he literally bore all that the law threatened against them (pp. 151—159); "that the sufferings of Christ were equal, in amount, to what men would have suffered for their sins, if no salvation had

been provided for them." pp. 154—156. Revolting from these doctrines, our author does not stop at the true, but passes on to a false and an extreme, theory. He rejects the idea that the sufferings and death of Christ "were necessary to make the exercise of divine mercy to men consistent with the maintenance of divine justice." pp. 156—159. But this theory is essential for the explanation of the fact that Christ (rather than Paul or John) was made "*sin for us*," that God set Christ forth "to be a *propitiation*, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins *that are past*, through the forbearance of God; *that he might be just and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.*" We know not how to explain these and similar passages, and why they are applied to Christ rather than to all the servants of God, if we adopt the theory of Dr. Sheldon. This theory is: "Christ, in the accomplishment of his work in behalf of men, was brought at every step into direct connection with the sin of men, and he was made sin, or treated as a sinner, by all who opposed his teachings, threw obstacles in his way, and sought and compassed his death. God, who sent him into the world to declare himself and teach the saving truth, and who knew all the opposition which he must thus encounter, did himself set forth his Son in this way, a spectacle of One unjustly suffering from men, while seeking to recover them to righteousness. It was the divine will that he should thus come, suffer, die on the cross, rise again and pass into heaven, in order to reveal God fully to us, be to us a pattern of all goodness, and, by the power of divine love working in him and through him, draw us to forsake our sins and obey him. Had he desisted from teaching men the truth, on account of the opposition raised against him, he would have suffered less from the sin of men, but at the same time have done less to save them. If he had made his abode on earth shorter, or less conspicuous; if he had kept himself from the great festivals and gathering-places of the Jews, and avoided intercourse, now with the common people, and now with the chief men and rulers; he would have escaped much hatred and persecution; but he would also have done less to reveal himself and his religion. He would not have connected himself, in so many ways, with his time; he would not have so worked himself and his acts and teachings into that *varied history*, through which he now addresses us. The heavenly compassion, which was in him, would not have come forth so fully and winningly to view. We needed all his life, miracles, and conversations, and all his manifold connection with the sin which was ever assailing him, in order that we might be gained by his sympathy and love, and be brought to heed his call to repentance." pp. 159, 160.

In what sense are we made the righteousness of God, in Christ? Not, says Dr. Sheldon, by a transference of Christ's own righteousness to ourselves. pp. 167—172. How then? "The exhibition of Christ furnishes us with the best possible idea of true goodness, pp. 172—174; it is suited to awaken a return of love from us to him, pp. 175—178; it is the specially appointed medium through which God imparts his saving power to men," pp. 178—181. But throughout the entire discussion of this theme, Dr. Shel-

don fails to exhibit the old Hebraistic sense of the word *righteous*, as denoting acceptance with God. The sinner is made righteous, when he is treated as if he were righteous. Christ is made the representative of sinners for us, and we are made the representatives of righteous men by him. Dr. Sheldon too often neglects the Hebrew idioms in his interpretation of the Bible.

He reduces what we ordinarily call the atonement, to a merely persuasive influence over men, and discards from it any influence on the government of God. He considers repentance not only a condition, but also a ground of pardon. But when we reject the governmental agency of the atonement, we impair its moral, persuasive agency upon men. This moral power over the human heart, is but a branch of the tree, and its vitality is diminished in proportion as the stock is injured.

We had intended, but our space forbids us, to comment on Dr. Sheldon's unauthorized use of the word *atonement*; see pp. vii, 163, 164; his inadequate definition of "spiritual death," see pp. 80, 81; his objectionable phraseology on the extent of human depravity, p. 114. He says: "We believe," "not that they [unregenerate men] never perform any right actions, but that they frequently, and often quite habitually, perform wrong ones." If the word *right* here means holy, morally right, Dr. Sheldon denies the true doctrine of total depravity. Perhaps, however, he uses the term *right*, as denoting "natural virtue," "pathological goodness," "civil right."

If the vigorous and independent mind of Dr. Sheldon would not spring from the rejection of one error into the adoption of another; if he would stop on the Edwardean ground, midway between two injurious extremes, he would accomplish a great work for the cause of truth. His fresh thoughts, when accurate, are attractive; but they are so often incorrect, that they mislead the reader, who is interested in their originality. If his volume be met by fair argument, instead of dishonest and bigoted invective; if it be calmly and philosophically examined, instead of being furiously denounced, it will do good; for its errors may be easily refuted, and the discussion which they elicit will confirm men in the true faith.

IV. KNIGHT'S COMMENTARY ON THE ROMANS.¹

In our last Number, pp. 210, 211, we noticed a work by Mr. Knight, on the Doctrine of Scriptural Predestination. We regard his Commentary on the Romans, as far superior to that volume. Although written under many disadvantages, it may be read with much profit. It suggests not a few striking ideas. A fair and independent mind characterizes its various discussions. Our author has avoided the fault specified by Lord Bacon, who says of commentators and commentaries: "It is ever usual to blanch obscure places

¹ A Critical Commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul the Apostle to the Romans. By Robert Knight, Perpetual Curate of Warton. London: Samuel Bagster and Sons; Simpkin, Marshall and Co. Oxford: J. H. Parker. Cambridge: Macmillan and Co. Atherstone: W. C. Holland. 1855. pp. 640. 8vo.

and discourse upon the plain." Mr. Knight is not always so clear nor so accurate as we could wish ; but he meets the difficulties of his theme with a brave heart, and hesitates not to express his opinion upon them in his own style. He does not write as a partisan. Even when erroneous, he seems honest and fair. A few quotations from the work will illustrate its character. Mr. Knight thus paraphrases the contested passage, Rom. 5: 12—19 :

"(12) Wherefore, since the benefits procured for men by Christ are so great, they are fully commensurate with the evils which they were intended to remedy. For as by one man (Adam) sin entered into the world, and death through sin ; and so death passed upon all men, to the extent of incurring which all, without exception, have sinned (13), it is evident, that even to the coming of the law sin was in the world ; but actual sin is not reckoned where there is no law ; for, where there is no law, there can be no transgression. (14) Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, during which period no law was given. Therefore death must, it is clear, have been the consequence of that sin which all men inherit ; for death reigned even over those that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, and who, dying in infancy, were perfectly free from all actual sin ; or who, reconciled to God through faith in the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, had received forgiveness of all actual sin. Neither of these classes, and most certainly not the former, had sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of Him that was to come ; for neither of them sinned against a distinctly-revealed law ; and the former persons were free from all actual sin, so that, in their case, death was clearly the result of sin original. (15) But not as the offence of Adam, so is the free gift by Christ. For if, through the offence of one, the multitudes who have peopled the earth from the time of Adam's fall until now, have died through Adam ; much more hath the grace of God, and the gift of a resurrection through grace, abounded unto the many through Christ. By Adam they were involved in a temporal dissolution ; by Christ they are raised to an enduring existence. (16) And not, as if it had been bestowed through one that had sinned, so is the gift ; for even if men had not inherited a corrupt nature from Adam, nor been involved in the consequences of his personal sin, still, according to the covenant in which he was placed, and to which, in that case, they would have succeeded, a single offence would have involved them in judgment unto condemnation ; but, according to the covenant in which Christ places them, the free gift is a forgiveness of many offences unto justification. (17) For if (notwithstanding Christ's intervention) by one man's offence death reigned, by the corruption of nature entailed by one ; much more they, which consent to receive the abundance of the grace and of the gift of the righteousness that flows from Christ, shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ ; and in their future reign in life and glory through Christ, they shall receive an abundant compensation for their short deprivation of life through Adam. (18) Therefore, as by one offence, judgment came upon all men, in the manner already stated above (ver. 12) unto condemnation to death, even so, by one righteous act, the free gift came upon all

men unto adjudication of life. (19) For, as by one man's (Adam's) offence the multitudes who have peopled this world have been placed in the position of sinners, by being handed over to death, so, by the obedience of one, even Christ, shall the same multitudes be placed in the position of righteous persons, so far as to be raised from death." pp. 613, 614.

In the 12th verse, *ἡ ἀμαρτία* is explained as denoting "original sin, a sinful constitution, consisting in a derangement of the original equipoise of the soul, and due subordination of our various faculties and powers. The word *θάνατος* is explained as meaning temporal death merely :

"Many commentators contend that the death here spoken of is the whole penalty of sin. That it is not so, is almost susceptible of demonstration. In the next verse but one, the same death is said to have reigned over all, from Adam to Moses. Now I would ask, Did eternal death reign over all, from Adam to Moses? And if not, how can it be contended that *θάνατος* means eternal death? Temporal death did thus reign, and universal dominion during that period can be accorded only to temporal death. It seems contrary to all our views of God's character, that infants should be eternally damned for Adam's sin, without the intervention of any act of their own wills ; but if it was clearly and indisputably revealed, it would be our duty to submit our views to an express declaration. The present passage, however, gives no support to such a doctrine. In the examination of the following verses, I shall be enabled to bring forward several extracts from St. Chrysostom, which will prove that he regarded temporal death as the death here meant. The following are from Bishop Taylor ; Ambrose, as quoted by him ; and from Bishop Terrot : — ' But against those that say the flames of hell are the portion of Adam's heirs, and that infants dying in original sin are eternally tormented, as Judas, or Dives, or Julian, I call to witness all the economy of the Divine goodness, justice, and truth. *The soul that sinneth, it shall die ; as I live, saith the Lord, the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father ; that is, he shall not be guilty of his crime, nor liable to his punishment.*'—BP. TAYLOR. Upon the account of these reasons, I suppose it safe to affirm, that God does not damn any to hell merely for the sin of our first father, which I sum up in the words of St. Ambrose, or whoever is the author of the commentaries upon the epistle of St. Paul attributed to him : " *Mors autem dissolutio corporis est, cum anima a corpore separatur. Est et alia mors, quæ secunda dicitur, in gehenna, quam non peccato Adæ patimur, sed ejus occasione propriis peccatis acquiritur.*" but by occasion of it we fall into it by our sins."—IDEM. "You set up his sovereignty to confront his other attributes, viz. his justice and mercy, and think you do much honor him in assigning him a power to command perjury, blasphemy, and a prerogative to cast poor innocent babes into hell-torments, a piece of doctrine which the great patriarch never dreamt of, when he expostulated with his Maker and said, *Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?*"—BP. LOMOCK'S PREF. TO TRIAL OF TIBERIUS. "It appears from this verse (16), and still more plainly from verse 17, that eternal misery formed no part of the penalty upon Adam's posterity ; since,

in that case, there would have been a parallelism between Christ and Adam, which is here expressly denied."—TERROT. "Just as by Adam's transgression, sin entered into the world and mortality followed."—IDEM. These views correspond, closely, with St. Chrysostom's. "La mort du corps, qui est la peine generale et naturelle du péché : car il ne s'agit pas de celle de l'âme."—DE SACY.

"Independently of the reasons already assigned, there are others for confining St. Paul's words here to temporal death. He is speaking not so much of what men incurred, as of what they actually, and visibly, and indisputably underwent. To declare that all men, even infants, perished eternally for Adam's sin, would have been as injurious to the force of his argument as it was far from the apostle's thoughts. He would then have substituted, as the ground of his argument, a position of which no actual proof could have been given—and which would have been in the highest degree at variance with men's views of God's goodness and justice, and with his own declaration, that the benefits of Christ were greater than the evils from Adam—for a palpable and indisputable fact, viz. that all men had actually died or undergone a temporal death.

"St. Augustine, although he maintained that infants incurred more than temporal death, qualified the consequences by mitigating their punishment. If we receive a *limbo infantum*, or separate place, respecting which Scripture gives us no information, then every person may make it what he pleases, and disarm it of all tormenting associations, so that nothing seems to be either gained or lost by such a resource except the invention of a theory.

"Ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον, *Unto which all have sinned.* That is, to which extent, "quatenus" (*Eras. Limborch, et alii*). "Auquel tous ont péché."—*Rouven F. B.* "Porro locum hunc Erasmus ita vertit; quatenus omnes peccaverunt, quod et interpres Chrysostomi secutus est. Quæ versio ita demum tolerari potest, si id non de actualibus peccatis per quæ homines primum hominem imitari dicantur, sed de originali peccato singulorum intelligatur."—*Est.* All have, without exception, sinned to the extent of incurring temporal death. All the children of Adam have sinned and come short, as inheriting a degeneracy which must, in all, be visited with death—a leprosy which taints every earthly tabernacle, and requires that it shall be dissolved and taken down preparatory to its final reconstruction and eternal stability. "Mors ergo, seu moriendi necessitas, quæ ob peccatum Adami initium cepit, in omnes homines pertransiit, quatenus omnes peccarunt."—*LIMBORCH.* Compare 8: 10, *But if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin.*

"I do not think that another instance could be found, in St. Paul's epistles, of such a separation of the relative from its antecedent as is effected by making ἀνθρώπου the antecedent to ᾧ; nor that anything could warrant the rejection of the proximate noun θάνατος as an antecedent, in favor of a noun so far separated from the relative as ἀνθρώπου is, except the impossibility of making any pertinent sense in any other way. But no necessity of this kind occurs: for the sense, that all men have sinned, without exception, to such

an extent as to incur temporal death, is quite as intelligible as that all men have sinned in Adam — quite as consistent with the meaning of the preposition *ἐπί* — quite as pertinent to the argument, and as much in harmony with the context. In Gal. 5: 13 we find *ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε*, "ye have been called unto liberty;" in Eph. 2: 10, *ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς*, "unto good works;" in 1 Thess. 4: 7, *ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ* means, "to uncleanness;" and 2 Tim. 2: 14, *ἐπὶ καταστροφῇ*, "unto the subverting." Erasmus, speaking here of the use of the prepositions *ἐν* and *ἐπί*, says: "Quoniam autem varius est usus Græcarum præpositionum, non ausim affirmare nusquam inveniri *ἐπί* junctum dandi casui, ubi quid declaratur esse in alio, velut arbor est in semine. Certe mihi non contingit hactenus aliquid invenire simile. Nam ad Hebræos vii. quum Paulus dicit, Levi fuisse in lumbis Abraham, non ait *ἐπ' ὀσφύϊ*, sed *ἐν ὀσφύϊ*. Contra prima Corinth. xv. Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita in Christo omnes vivificabuntur, non est, *ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀδὰμ*, *ἐπὶ τῷ Χριστῷ*, sed *ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ*, *ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*." It seems clear, that the preposition which would have been employed to signify "sinning" in Adam, is *ἐν*, and not *ἐπί*, according to Pauline usage.

"Stuart adduces from the classics, *νοσθεῖν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ*, "to be sick unto death" (*Ælian*); and *δῆσαι ἐπὶ θανάτῳ*, "to bind unto death" (*Herodotus*). His objection to a similar interpretation in the present instance, seems to be without foundation. Neither would it make the apostle "repeat what he had just said," nor does it necessarily imply that men "might have sinned to a certain extent without incurring such a penalty." On the contrary, it as truly assigns the cause of men's death as his own rendering (*because that*), since it declares that it is the result of their guilt; and it is also the natural expression to signify, not the greater, but the less guilt; and suggests most naturally, in connection with its being attributed to all without exception, the existence of a greater guilt and condemnation, which some of the *all* who have incurred the less, have escaped, namely, eternal death. That sin, of which all, even the least sinful, have been guilty, must, it is clear, be attended with the least possible guilt; and, if anything is implied, it is not that less guilt might have been incurred, but that the least guilt possible for any of the human race to incur led to death. *Τί δὲ ἐστὶν ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον; ἐκείνου πεσόντος, καὶ οἱ μὴ φαγόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου γεγόνασιν ἐξ ἐκείνου πάντες θνητοί.*¹ — *St. Chrys.* The statement of Theodoret: "Because each man, for his own and not the sin of Adam, comes under the decree of death," is correct if understood as it was in all probability intended, of original sin." pp. 246—250.

The Bible never intimates the existence of two kinds of sin, one of which deserves eternal punishment, and the other only temporal death. Our own moral feelings recognize no such distinction. All sin merits an everlasting penalty. We lessen our dread of transgression when we imply that it is, or can be so slight an evil as to be adequately punished by the mere dis-

¹ But what means, Unto which all have sinned? This: he having once fallen, even they that had not eaten of the tree became by him all mortal.

solution of the body. "The derangement of the original equipoise of the soul" is represented by many authors as not only a sin, but as the source of all other sin, and ultimately of all woe, and therefore as more malignant and ill-deserving than any other iniquity. This is consistent, and in our opinion, Mr. Knight is incongruous with himself in affirming that this want of equipoise is real iniquity, and affirming, at the same time, that it would be unjust and cruel to punish it with the evil which the law threatens against all *ἀνομία*. Sin is sin, and it harms the conscience to represent it as meriting only a slight penalty.

On verse 13, Mr. Knight teaches: "It is not simply said, that sin is not imputed by God, but that it is not reckoned *under certain circumstances*; or, in other words, that sin requires the presence of several things, and among these a law, and a possible knowledge of that law, to constitute *guilt*. That, under certain circumstances, God does not reckon sin to individuals, is clearly proved by the preceding chapter, and the whole epistle; and it would be as unjust to reckon sin to a man who had no law, or possibility of knowing that it was sin, as it would be to reckon it to one in whose case Christ had atoned for it." p. 253.

On the phrase *ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*, in verse 14, Mr. Knight says: "The points of contrast which the apostle here adduces, are their respective influences upon the human race. In Adam, all die. By his sin and their participation in it, as in his loins, and inheriting a degeneracy by which they come short of the object of man's creation, all men without exception return to the dust; and this sentence has no reference whatever to their personal character or conduct, to their freedom from all actual transgression, as in the case of infants, or to their relation to God, as in that of faithful believers. Young and old, friends and foes of God, are all involved in this sentence, without any discrimination. But, in Christ, *all shall be made alive*. By his obedience unto death, he has reversed man's attainder, purchased the resurrection of the whole human family, and completely and universally obviated Adam's sin as to the sentence of dissolution. This resurrection and restoration to primitive existence, in the union of soul and body, has likewise no reference whatever to personal character or conduct; it is shared as indiscriminately as the death entailed by Adam. *As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive*. But this is not the full extent of the antithetical correspondence between Adam and Christ in their influences upon the human race. Its full extent may thus be stated: 'Whatever penalties the human family has incurred from Adam, without the intervention of any exercise of their own individual wills, and to which they have not individually been consenting parties, are as fully and freely removed without the intervention of their own wills.' Temporal death comes upon all men, altogether irrespectively of their own wills or distinctive characters, through Adam, and the inheritance of a corrupt nature entailed upon them by him. Life is, therefore, restored to all men, as universally and irrespectively of their own distinctive characters or wills, by Christ. By Adam's fall, man forfeited the position in which Adam stood in the covenant of obedience;

because Adam was placed in it with an uncorrupt nature, and his descendants would have occupied it with a corrupt nature. By Christ, a more than proportionally favorable result is introduced ; and one which vastly counterbalances the loss of the Adamic covenant, even when associated with an uncorrupt nature ; since, by the Adamic covenant, one sin would have incurred the penalty, but, by the Christian, provision is made for the forgiveness of many sins." pp. 257, 258.

Mr. Knight labors earnestly to show that the oft quoted passage, Rom. 9: 9—24, furnishes no support to the Calvinistic creed. He seems to consider that creed as necessarily teaching, that God elects some to eternal life *arbitrarily, without any reason*, and reprobates the non-elect according to his own pleasure, for which there is no rational ground. He speaks of the Calvinistic interpretations as "founded upon the false theory, that there can be no medium between a discriminating principle involving merit, or rather, involving merit adequate to the reward, and the absence of any discriminating principle whatever. Surely a principle, neither involving merit adequate to the blessing associated with it, nor *any merit whatever*, may yet draw a distinction between classes, and individuals as belonging to classes, and be perfectly consistent, not only with man's total and complete demerit, but with God's justice and mercy at the same time." p. 440. We are well aware that one class of Calvinists speak of God's will in election and reprobation as *arbitrary* ; but another class explain this word as denoting, not the absence of a reason, but the absence of all reason, *known to us*. God never acts without a rational ground, although his creatures are unable (all finite minds must be unable) to detect the full reason, sometimes any reason, for his providences ; and should unite in the prayer : "Even so, Father, for so it *seemed good* in thy sight."

V. THEORY OF THE MORAL SYSTEM.¹

"SAID a sturdy carpenter, at the close of a preaching service in the ship-yard : 'If God is so good, why not redeem the angels?'

"And what man, illiterate or educated, *if he thinks*, is without such and more troublesome inquiries. Why did the angels come to need redemption ? Why did the first pair, happy and holy in Eden, sin ? If God be infinitely wise, could he not have devised some plan to save his subjects from rebellion ? If infinitely powerful, could he not have executed the plan ? And if infinitely good, would he not have both devised and executed it ? Why then a race of subjects in rebellion ? Why is human experience invariably that of sin and suffering ? Especially, how is it possible for these and kindred facts, to be comprehended in a harmonious and benevolent system ? Who has not thought thus, until thought was anguish ? The author of the Conflict of Ages is not alone in his painful experience ; and undoubtedly, many minds pressed with his difficulties and others, would hail

¹Theory of the Moral System : including a Possible Reason why Sin exists. Hartford : Published by F. A. Brown. 1855.

with a satisfaction equal to his own, anything which they deemed even a possible solution," pref. pp. vii, viii.

The design of this treatise is to furnish a solution of the question, why sin is suffered to exist. The treatise proceeds on the hypothesis, that the moral system may be now in its infancy; that the motives which the universe furnishes at the commencement of the present system, may be insufficient to restrain the free will from rebellion; that, as the system continues, the character of God will be more and more fully unfolded in his providences, and will therefore constantly furnish an increase of motives to holiness. "It is not at all improbable that the great end at which the entire arrangements of the universe are at present aimed, may be *that development of the Divine Character which shall be sufficient, hereafter, to determine the action of all newly created beings, under the trial of Probation, toward obedience and submission,*" p. 98.

1. The first moral beings "had no conception, either from experience or observation, of the nature of *suffering*, especially of that fearful form denominated *punishment*, and which, wherever justly inflicted, is mingled ever with the terrible ingredient of *remorse*."

"2. They had no such warning before them to deter them from transgression, as the universe now has, in the *example* of beings sinning and receiving deserved punishment."

"3. They had no palpable evidence *like this* of the veracity of God, and that he would be true to his threatenings, however dreadful."

"4. They had, therefore, no *such* reason to fear him, and to look upon him not merely as a benevolent Creator, but as a great and terrible Jehovah, which the universe now has, and which led the Psalmist to exclaim, 'O Lord, who shall not fear thee?'

"5. And furthermore, they had witnessed no manifestation of *mercy* on the part of God. His compassion for the sinful had never been made known to them, for there had been no occasion for its exhibition, especially his amazing condescension in stooping to raise fallen, guilty creatures from their degradation. That overpowering disclosure of all that is tender, melting, and winning, which has since been made in the death and sufferings of God's only Son for man's redemption, and which furnishes a motive for love and obedience to God, infinitely surpassing all others, had never been made to them. All this vast amount of motive has been created by God's dealings with his moral universe *since* the creation and fall of the first sinful beings; and the conclusion therefore is, that, at the time of their creation, there may not have been sufficient motives in existence actually to deter them from daring the tremendous experiment of disobedience," pp. 143—145.

Still the author of this treatise supposes that the first moral beings must have sufficient knowledge and sufficient motive to render them inexcusable for their sin. He is a firm believer in the freedom of their will. He rejects the theory, that their sin was a necessary means of the greatest good. His concluding chapters on the plan of redemption in its relation to the

universe in all time, to moral beings hereafter to be created, and on the employment of the redeemed in the future state, are highly interesting. With all the theories defended in the volume, we cannot coincide. Some of them are not only correct, but eminently useful. The entire volume is ingenious and able. The style of it is lucid, the spirit reverential and devout. Some of the phraseology, however, as for example on pp. 124, 125, appears to us infelicitous. As a whole, the volume will repay the student for a thoughtful perusal.

VL THEOLOGIA GERMANICA.¹

THIS work was probably written about 1350. Its author "was of the Teutonic Order, a priest and a warden of the Teutonic Order in Frankfurt." Martin Luther discovered the work, and published an edition of it in 1516. During his life-time, seventeen editions of it were published. More than sixty editions of it have already appeared in Germany, and it has been widely circulated in France and the Netherlands by means of Latin, French, and Flemish translations. Luther says of it: "Next to the Bible and St. Augustine, no book hath ever come into my hands whence I have learnt, or would wish to learn, more of what God, and Christ, and man, and all things, are." Chevalier Bunsen adds: "With Luther, I rank this short treatise next to the Bible; but, unlike him, should place it before, rather than after, St. Augustine." The main principles of the work are thus stated by Bunsen: — "Sin is selfishness; godliness is unselfishness; a godly life is the steadfast working out of inward freeness from self; to become thus godlike, is the bringing back of man's first nature." On the nature of sin, the instructions of this volume are very explicit: "For all manner of sin and wickedness can never make us evil, so long as it is outside of us; that is, so long as we do not commit it, or do not give consent to it." "Disobedience and sin are the same thing; for there is no sin but disobedience, and what is done of disobedience is all sin." "But what, then, is there which is contrary to God and hateful to him? Nothing, but sin. But what is sin? Mark this: sin is nothing else than that the creature willethe otherwise than God willethe, and contrary to him. Each of us may see this in himself; for he who willethe otherwise than I, or whose will is contrary to mine, is my foe; but he who willethe the same as I, is my friend, and I love him. It is even so with God; and that is sin, and is contrary to God, and hateful and grievous to him. And he who willethe, speaketh or is silent, doeth or leaveth undone,

¹Theologia Germanica: which setteth forth many fair Lineaments of divine truth, and saith very lofty and lovely things touching a perfect life. Edited by Dr. Pfeiffer, from the only complete manuscript yet known. Translated from the German, by Susanna Winkworth. With a preface by the Rev. Charles Kingsley, rector of Eversley; and a letter to the translator, by the Chevalier Bunsen, D.D., D.C.L., etc.; and an introduction by Professor Calvin E. Stowe, D.D. Andover: Printed and Published by W. F. Draper, at his Printing House, Main Street. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. MDCCCLVI.

otherwise than as I will, is contrary to me, and an offence unto me. So it is also with God : when a man willesh otherwise than God, or contrary to God, whatever he doeth or leaveth undone, in short, all that proceedeth from him, is contrary to God, and is sin. And whatsoever Will willesh otherwise than God, is against God's will. As Christ said: 'he who is not with me, is against me.' Hereby may each man see plainly whether or not he be without sin, and whether or not he be committing sin, and how sin ought to be atoned for, and wherewith it may be healed. And this contradiction to God's will is what we call, and is, disobedience. And therefore Adam, the I, the Self, Self-will, Sin, or the Old Man, the turning aside or departing from God, do all mean one and the same thing." "And what sin is, we have said already, namely, to desire or will anything otherwise than the One Perfect Good and the one Eternal Will, and apart from and contrary to them, or to wish to have a will of one's own. And what is done of sin, such as lies, fraud, injustice, treachery, and all iniquity, in short, all that we call sin, cometh hence, that man hath another will than God and the True Good; for, were there no will but the One Will, no sin could ever be committed. Therefore we may well say that all self-will is sin, and there is no sin but what springeth therefrom. And this is the only thing which a truly godlike man complaineth of; but to him, this is such a sore pain and grief, that he would die a hundred deaths in agony and shame, rather than endure it; and this his grief must last until death; and where it is not, there be sure that the man is not truly godlike, or a partaker of the Divine nature. Now, seeing that in this light and love, all good is loved in One and as One, and the One in all things, and in all things as One and as All, therefore all those things must be loved that rightly are of good report; such as virtue, order, seemliness, justice, truth, and the like; and all that belongeth to God in the true Good and is His own, is loved and praised; and all that is without this Good, and contrary to it, is a sorrow and a pain, and is hated as sin, for it is of a truth sin. And he who liveth in the true light and true love, hath the best, noblest, and worthiest life that ever was or will be, and therefore it cannot but be loved and praised above any other life. This life was and is in Christ to perfection, else he were not the Christ." "For whenever we speak of the Adam, and disobedience, and of the old man, of self-seeking, self-will, and self-serving, of the I, the Me, and the Mine, nature, falsehood, the devil, sin; it is all one and the same thing. These are all contrary to God, and remain without God." "It hath been said, that there is of nothing so much, in hell, as of self-will; the which is true, for there is nothing else there than self-will, and if there were no self-will, there would be no devil and no hell. When it is said that Lucifer fell from heaven, and turned away from God, and the like, it meaneth nothing else than that he would have his own will, and would not be at one with the Eternal Will. So was it, likewise, with Adam in Paradise. And when we say Self-will, we mean, to will otherwise than as the One and Eternal Will of God willesh." See pp. 25, 54, 117, 118, 154, 155, 159, 172—180.

Equally plain are the teachings of this volume on the disinterestedness of true virtue. "Behold! in such a [holy] creature, there is no longer anything willed or loved but that which is good, because it is good, and for no other reason than that it is good; not because it is this or that, or pleaseth or displeaseth such a one, is pleasant or painful, bitter or sweet, or what not. All this is not asked about nor looked at. And such a creature doth nothing for its own sake, or in its own name, for it hath quitted all Self, and Me, and Mine, and We, and Ours, and the like, and these are departed. It no longer saith, 'I love myself, or this or that, or what not.' And if you were to ask Love, 'what lovest thou?' she would answer, 'I love Goodness.' 'Wherefore?' 'Because it is good, and for the sake of Goodness.' So it is good and just and right to deem that if there were ought better than God, that must be loved better than God. And thus God loveth not Himself as Himself, but as Goodness. And if there were, and He knew, ought better than God, He would love that and not Himself. Thus the Self and the Me are wholly sundered from God, and belong to Him only in so far as they are necessary for Him to be a Person.

"Behold! all that we have said must indeed come to pass in a godlike man, or one who is truly 'made a partaker of the divine nature;' for else he would not be truly such." pp. 105—107.

"Further, mark ye; that when the True Love and True Light are in a man, the Perfect Good is known and loved for itself and as itself; and yet not so that it loveth itself of itself and as itself, but the one True and Perfect Good can and will love nothing else, in so far as it is in itself, save the one, true Goodness. Now if this is itself, it must love itself, yet not as itself nor as of itself, but of this wise: that the One true Good loveth the One Perfect Goodness, and the One Perfect Goodness is loved of the One, true and Perfect Good. And in this sense that saying is true, that 'God loveth not Himself as Himself.' For if there were ought better than God, God would love that, and not Himself." pp. 151, 152. See also pp. 161, 162.

The *Theologia Germanica* is often complained of as mystical. On some topics it is remarkably plain and simple. We know not where we could find a more definite explanation than is here given of the union between good men and their Maker. This union results from love to God. "And this love so maketh a man one with God, that he can never more be separated from him." "Now, what is this union? It is, that we should be, of a truth, purely, simply, and wholly at one with the One Eternal Will of God, or altogether without will, so that the created will should flow out into the Eternal Will, and be swallowed up and lost therein, so that the Eternal Will alone should do and leave undone in us." "Now, when this union truly cometh to pass and becometh established, the inward man standeth henceforward immovable in this union; and God suffereth the outward man to be moved hither and thither, from this to that, of such things as are necessary and right. So that the outward man saith in sincerity: 'I have no will to be or not to be, to live or die, to know or not to know, to do or to leave undone, and the like; but I am ready for all that is to be, or ought to be, and obedient thereunto, whether I have to do or to suffer.' And thus the out-

ward man hath no wherefore or purpose, but only to do his part to further the Eternal Will. For it is perceived of a truth, that the inward man shall stand immovable, and that it is needful for the outward man to be moved. And if the inward man have any wherefore in the actions of the outward man, he saith only that such things must be and ought to be, as are ordained by the Eternal Will. And where God himself dwelleth in the man, it is thus; as we plainly see in Christ. Moreover, where there is this union, which is the offspring of a Divine light and dwelleth in its beams, there is no spiritual pride, or irreverent spirit, but boundless humility, and a lowly, broken heart; also an honest, blameless walk, justice, peace, content, and all that is of virtue, must needs be there. Where they are not, there is no right union, as we have said. For, just as neither this thing nor that can bring about or further this union, so there is nothing which hath power to frustrate or hinder it, save the man himself with his self-will, that doeth him this great wrong. Of this be well assured." pp. 91, 92.

The doctrine of human impotence is explained and asserted, very profoundly, on pp. 116, 178, 179, et al.

The entire volume is full of deep, rich thought. It is eminently practical. It is fitted to nurture a meditative spirit. It is a scholar's "daily food;" for many a single sentence of it will cherish a devout and humble temper during the day on which the sentence is studied. Clergymen, and all instructed laymen, owe a debt of gratitude to MR. DRAPER, for having published this volume, especially in such an appropriate and elegant style. It will delight and profit every intelligent reader.

ARTICLE VIII.

THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

THE work which has attracted by far the most attention among the recent theological publications of Germany, is that by Chevalier Bunsen, on the "Signs of the Times;" the appearance of which was announced in the last Number of the Bib. Sacra, and which has since been through three editions. The book owes its significance partly to the distinguished position of the author, and partly to the fact that it discusses with the utmost freedom, and from a somewhat novel point of view, questions which have, of late, assumed a good deal of importance; or, to speak more precisely, it is an earnest and vigorous attack upon the so-called New Lutheran party, or the party of ecclesiastical and political reaction.

On returning to his native land, after a residence of fourteen years in England, Bunsen was impressed with the revolution both in religious and political opinion which, during his absence, had taken place; and, after pon-

dering the phenomenon for a while, in the seclusion of his charming villa on the Neckar, he gives the results of his meditations to the public, in the form of Letters to a friend. He regards as the two most striking "Signs of the Times," the development of the principle of the associated effort of individual churches, especially as shown in the missionary operations of Independent and Baptist churches; and, in contrast with this, the increased prelatical spirit, manifested among the English Puseyites and the German Lutherans. These are taken to be the evidences of increased desire, on the part of the people, for individual freedom of belief, and an increased zeal for its suppression on the part of the priesthood.

In proof of this spirit of prelatical aggression, Bunsen passes, in rapid review, some of the recent instances of religious persecution: the case of the Madiari and of Ceccheti in Italy, and of Boreczynski at Prague. The general conclusion drawn is, that Protestantism has never fully developed itself, save in connection with civil liberty; and that this latter has ever been advanced by the Calvinistic churches, but never by the Lutheran. It should be remarked that here Bunsen has reached the same conclusion, though in a wholly different spirit, with Prof. Leo, of Halle, who upbraids Calvin with being the author of all the political commotions since his time. Civil freedom, says Bunsen, has never shown itself vital, save as resting on self-government in the lower spheres of common life; and this is only possible with spiritual liberty. The great ceremonies in commemoration of St. Boniface, which occurred while he was writing, give occasion for some strictures upon the character of the so-called Apostle of the Germans. Bunsen maintains that Boniface was not the apostle of Christianity, but of the Church; that he reaped the fruit of better men's labors, and succeeded in saddling upon the German race a system which effectually stunted their development, till the Reformation, by reviving the influence of the individual congregations, restored the vital element which Boniface had suppressed. The failure of the Romantic School, in its protest against the disorganizing tendencies of Modern Philosophy, arose simply from the fact that it endeavored to place itself on the basis of the Middle Ages. The Church-question in Baden, the resistance to the Civil-marriage, and other local questions, also receive notice. In contrast with this spirit of Ecclesiasticism, Bunsen brings out, in bold relief, the characteristics of the early English Independents. A hearty tribute is paid to their founder, Brown; and, in speaking of their vigorous career on the other side of the Atlantic, he declares that "the moral earnestness of the Puritans is the mightiest root of the gigantic power of the United States." He then proceeds to criticise the views propounded, last winter, in Berlin, by Prof. Stahl, in his famous lecture on Religious Toleration. Viewing this lecture as representing the sentiments of the New Lutheran party, he earnestly protests against them as breathing the genuine essence of Popery, and as standing, moreover, in flat contradiction to the principles of the Primitive Church. This leads him to enter, at length, into the vexed question of the Union, into which our limits do not permit us to follow him.

From this examination of the spirit of the age, Bunsen reaches the final conclusion, that full religious freedom is the only watch-word under which the Evangelical Church of Germany can expect to triumph, and that a vigorous spiritual life can be reached only by making more prominent the Congregational element, i. e. the independence of the separate churches. In this he makes the apostolic character of the church to reside. It must not, however, be inferred from this, that Bunsen favors unrestricted Independency. He is merely vindicating the worth of a congregational in contrast with a consistorial church polity. From occasional remarks it would seem that he regards a mixed government, like that of the American Episcopal church, as the one adapted, on the whole, to secure the greatest number of advantages.

Any publication of a man of such universal culture and such widely extended reputation as the Chevalier Bunsen, would command immediate attention ; but the present work is peculiarly calculated to awaken the interest of the American public. Aside from its wide historic generalization, its generous theological opinions, and its vigorous and earnest style, it contains a great deal that bears, with no little emphasis, upon ecclesiastical questions which are much agitated in the United States. There are occasional expressions which would not, perhaps, carry with them universal assent ; but the general scope and spirit of the book will meet with a hearty approval ; and whatever may be the personal opinions of the reader, no one can view without interest the spectacle of a man of distinguished rank, who, amid the reaction that has affected so many of his class, has still preserved an unwavering faith in the regenerating power of truth, and in the guiding providence of God.

The severe strictures of Bunsen have called forth from Professor Stahl a spirited and able pamphlet, which, as expressing the views of the leading representative of the most active religious party at present existing in Germany, is deserving of a passing notice.

The drift of Stahl's objection to Bunsen's theory of the church is, that he wholly overlooks the idea of a historic institution ; indeed, he says that Bunsen has no idea of institution, either in church or state, but reduces all to mere American self-government. Hence Bunsen's rejection of creeds, the Nicene and Athanasian included, and his assertion that there is no other rule of faith in the congregation than that contained in the Bible, and no interpretation of this truth but through the Spirit imparted to believers. He therefore accuses Bunsen of attempting to revive the French Atomistic Philosophy of the last century, the shallowness of which was long ago perceived by the more profound, if not more religious, thinkers of Germany.

Stahl finds, besides, much that is objectionable in Bunsen's theory of Universal History ; and especially, in the views which he has propounded respecting the nature of language as bearing upon the possibility of Revelation, in his recent work, " Christianity and Mankind." The Japhetic Dictionary, which will not be forgotten by the readers of that work, is represented as but another form of the more vulgar Rationalism, which claims that its ideas are those of the Bible, only cleared of Oriental Idioms. Bunsen's belief

in God is, in fact, but a belief in the moral order of the universe. This new Gospel promises nothing but Rousseau-Freedom and Young-Hegelian Faith. It is but an attempt to make religious truth acceptable to the natural man. To Americans who still hold fast the distinction between Belief and Unbelief, he offers the German Philosophy, which confounds this distinction ; while into Germany, where the idea of the Church is still cherished, he imports the American sectarianism, which destroys the Church. And this is claimed to be a restoration of Apostolic Christianity. Like St. Simon, who, in aiming to reconcile the Spirit and the Flesh, left nothing but the Flesh remaining ; so Bunsen, in endeavoring to reconcile Religion and Public Opinion, leaves, as a result, only the latter, under the designation of "The Japhetic Reason."

On the question of Religious Toleration, which will excite more interest on account of the persecutions to which the Baptists in Germany have been subjected, Stahl holds that while the private belief of an individual should not be interfered with, yet no ecclesiastical organization opposed to the national church should be tolerated by the Government ; and, above all, that any attempt at making proselytes should be strictly prohibited.

Stahl then examines, at considerable length, the claims of the Puritans to be the first teachers of religious toleration. It must be confessed that here he displays a more exact acquaintance with the facts of history than his opponent. He shows, clearly, the error of Bunsen's assertion, that the principles of the French Philosophers in regard to toleration had been advocated by the English Independents. The aim of the Puritans was not religious freedom, but Religion ; their appeal was not to the Right of Personality, but to the truth of the Gospel ; they preached not the freedom of every conscience, but only of the conscience enlightened by God. Hence they extended their toleration only to Evangelical sects, not to Catholics, nor to Baptists and Quakers. Stahl quotes the Cambridge Platform, and adduces the case of Roger Williams to prove that the toleration of the Puritans was not exactly that advocated by Voltaire and Bayle. Not till Jefferson had taught Philosophical Toleration, or rather Religious Indifference, was it introduced into Congregational New England. The toleration of the eighteenth century, as appears from all its advocates, from Locke to Lessing, had no other motive than Indifference or Unbelief. Conscience is not enslaved because sects are forbidden to send out colporteurs. Hence Stahl demands the aid of the police ; not for persecution, but for defence. Had Rome gone no further than this, the Reformation would have been a normal movement ; and Italy, Spain, Austria, and Bavaria would not have been driven into the counter-Reformation. In fine, the only safeguard against any error, is in holding that all truth is preserved in the recognized Confessions of the Church, and is thus transmitted from generation to generation. This is all that can save us from a statement of religious doctrine that would have been accepted by Kant or Voltaire.

Such are the views of Religious Toleration advanced by the leading professor of Ecclesiastical Law in Prussia. Yet they are but the consistent conclusions of an advocate of a national church. If the government is to

assume the entire management of the spiritual affairs of the people, it may justly claim the right of protecting itself.

Though Bunsen has the right on his side, Stahl exhibits more skill in the defence of his positions, and therefore possesses the great advantage of being able to present a more lucid and clearly defined statement of his views. But his objections are not always true, nor always even consistent with each other. Thus the charge that Stahl labors most pertinaciously to fasten upon Bunsen is, that he writes purely in the spirit of the French philosophy of the last century, that his book advocates a one-sided and shallow Subjectivism, that his program is nothing but the *Contrat Social* transferred to a religious province. This charge is simply absurd; for if there is anything that shows itself in all Bunsen's writings, it is his profound conviction of the organic nature of History. Indeed, to a superficial reader he seems far more open to the charge of Pantheism than of Atomism. The philosopher, whom he most resembles in his style of thinking, is the very Schelling, whose objective theory of Church and State Stahl labors to array against him. And in another place Stahl intimates the charge of Pantheism. Our space does not permit us to show its groundlessness. It is a charge oftenest made by those who would be most puzzled to define what they mean. Long ago it was flung at the illustrious Schleiermacher, by men who could not understand the "*Reden*," and who had never read a line of Spinoza, and more recently an ingenious attempt has been made to fasten it upon Rothe and Julius Müller.

The past winter is also memorable in literary history, for the detection of one of the most extraordinary forgeries of modern times. It is well known that the ancient history of Egypt has been preserved, so far as preserved at all, in two ways; by the monuments and by the Greek historians, especially those who made use of Egyptian sources, as Manetho. From a reference of Stephanus, of Byzantium, the name of another work had been preserved, a *Chronicle of the Kings*, by a writer of the fourth century, named Uranios; but the work itself was unfortunately lost. A few months since, a Greek named Simonides, arrived at Leipsic, bringing with him a number of manuscripts collected among the convents on Mount Athos, and among them a Greek manuscript of the twelfth century, which he alleged was a palimpsest, stating that the original work was the lost *Chronicle of Uranios*. The manuscript was submitted for inspection to the eminent philological critic William Dindorf, and by him was pronounced to be genuine. Fully aware of its importance, he wrote to Oxford, that it might be secured for the Bodleian, inclosing also some passages which he had deciphered. Subsequently the affair was brought to the notice of the Royal Academy of Berlin; the manuscript was brought up for examination by Dindorf, with the design of disposing of it to the Royal Library. A committee of the Academy pronounced it genuine. The liveliest interest was of course excited in the literary world. Lepsius announced in his lecture at the University, that a new era in the study of Egyptian history would now begin; the ugly gaps which have thus far frustrated all attempts at a fixed chronology were now to be filled up.

The manuscript was then placed in the hands of Lepsius that he might study out its contents. So far as the literary sources extended, it was found to be in entire accordance with them, but whenever it touched upon points that can be determined only by critical research, and especially by a knowledge of the monumental sources, it became involved in suspicion. In fact not a single independent statement of the new text agreed with the monuments, and in one place the pretended passage arose manifestly from a misunderstanding of Africanus. Furthermore, the Egyptian mode of dividing the year into four months, was not only placed before Menes, in the oldest historical dynasties, but was brought down to the latest times, and the names of the kings as translated into Greek, revealed a total ignorance of the Egyptian language. But a still more convincing proof that the work was a modern fabrication was found in the 22nd Manethonian dynasty. Of the nine kings of this dynasty, three only are preserved in the literary sources, but the remainder are known with entire certainty from the numerous monumental remains. The three were given of course correctly, but the remaining six proved to be pure inventions, without the slightest resemblance to those in the monuments or to any others ever heard of in Egyptian history.

A second more thorough examination of the manuscript was now made, and with the assistance of chemical reagents, and the microscope, various suspicious features were detected, which would not have been sufficient however to condemn the work had not the internal evidence also been against it. Simonides was at once arrested at Leipsic, as he was in the act of taking his departure for London, and an examination of his effects furnished all that was necessary to complete the evidence of his fraud. Among other things was found his original copy of the pretended work of Uranios, before it had been put upon the parchment, the ink prepared from rusty nails, the reed pen which he had used, and above all the literary material which was necessary for his really learned undertaking.

No one, who has not himself examined the manuscript, can form any idea of the extraordinary skill and patience which the work required. The manuscript is a genuine Greek one of the twelfth century, written in the ordinary cursive script, on seventy-one quarto leaves, every page being divided into two columns. Beneath this perfectly legible writing, in lines not exactly corresponding, can be traced the indistinct Uncial script of the pretended Uranios. It has the appearance in every respect of a far more ancient writing which had been purposely erased. Much of it is wholly illegible, and can only be deciphered after the application of reagents, which bring out the letters with perfect distinctness. It could be the work only of a man possessing a most thorough acquaintance with ancient manuscripts, as may be inferred from the fact of its imposing upon such critics as Dindorf and Augustus Boeckh. Since the fraud has been made public, Tischendorf has published a characteristic letter, claiming that when the manuscript was first brought to Leipsic, he pronounced it to be a forgery; but the real glory undoubtedly belongs to Lepsius.

ENGLAND.

THE Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, translated from the original Hebrew, with a Commentary, by E. Henderson, D. D. This work is written on the same principles as the learned author's Commentaries on Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the Minor Prophets. The same diligence, learning, sobriety, and judiciousness, characterize it. We disagree with his principles of prophetic interpretations; and believe that his exposition of Chapters XL, and XLVIII, is incorrect.

A Commentary on the Greek text of the Epistle to the Colossians, by John Eadie, D. D., LL. D. This is similar to the author's Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians. The book, however, is shorter, as might be expected; many things being explained in the former volume, which need only to be referred to again. The same qualities essentially distinguish both works, which are excellent specimens of Commentary. Everything is investigated in the true spirit of a sound exegesis; and the tone is healthy throughout. Extensive learning, minuteness and accuracy, comprehensiveness of conception, love of the truth, liberality of sentiment towards such as differ, acquaintance with all helps, characterize the Commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians; which appears to us superior to its predecessor. It will not be expected that we should concur in all the opinions of the esteemed and able author. In some instances, we fancy he is trammelled by Scotch orthodoxy and Scotch creeds. He has also too much preaching for an exegetical work of the kind. But where so much is good and wholesome, we ought not to complain of a few blemishes, or needlessly sit down to find out incorrect interpretations. The volume, as a whole, may be heartily commended to the attention of all Biblical students.

The Beauty of Holiness, illustrated by two thousand reflective passages, selected for meditation from the Sacred writings. A very good selection from the Scriptures and the Apocrypha.

Emblems of Eden, by James Hamilton, D. D. This is a little volume of fancy pictures, in the characteristic style of the writer.

The Doctrines and Difficulties of the Christian Faith, being the Hulsean Lecture for the year 1855. By the Rev. H. Goodwin, M. A. An excellent volume.

The Influence of Christianity upon International Law, being the Hulsean Prize Essay for 1854. By C. M. Kennedy, B. A.

The Heroes, or Greek Fairy Tales for my Children. By Rev. C. Kingsley. This is a beautiful and fascinating book.

Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Mecca. By R. F. Burton, Vol. 3d.

The Principles of Psychology, by Herbert Spencer. This work is characterised by great intellectual ability and acuteness. But the tendency of it is unfavorable to a belief in the personal existence of God.

The Difficulties of Belief, in Connection with the Creation and the Fall.

By Rev. T. R. Birks, M. A. The tone of this little work is healthy, and the theology sound. We cannot say, however, that our knowledge of the difficult points treated is enlarged; or that any new light is thrown on them. Indeed, Mr. Birks is not the man to do this; though he writes sensibly and well, except on prophecy.

Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, edited from the author's MSS. with notes. By W. H. Thompson, M. A. 2 vols. 8vo. These volumes form an important contribution to the science of mind, and cannot be neglected by the student of philosophy. Prof. Thompson of Cambridge has well performed the office of editor.

A second series of Prof. W. Archer Butler's Sermons. Edited from the author's MSS. by Rev. J. A. Jeremie, D. D.

The Nature of the Atonement, and its Relation to Remission of Sins and Eternal Life, by John McLeod Campbell. Though we cannot regard this treatise as a satisfactory or full exposition of the atonement, and should demur to not a few statements in it, various points are put in a new and better light than is usual in books treating of the doctrine here discussed. It is marked by more acuteness than breadth.

The Book of Genesis, according to the version of the LXX. Translated into English, with notices of its omissions and insertions, etc. etc. By the Hon. Henry E. J. Howard, D. D. To beginners in the criticism of the Old Testament, this volume may be recommended as a useful help. To others, it would be of no benefit; and there is sufficient evidence that the author has not gone far or deep into the study of the old Greek version.

Sinai and Palestine; in connection with their history, with maps. By Rev. A. P. Stanley, M. A. This is an interesting, instructive, and well written book.

The 12th volume of Grote's History of Greece has appeared, completing the work. The volume contains a portrait of the writer, maps, and an index. The learned author may be congratulated on the termination of a work of which Englishmen may well be proud.

The last three volumes of Milman's History of Latin Christianity, have also appeared, with an index to the six volumes. This is one of the few ecclesiastical histories, written by Englishmen, which will live. The learned author combines all the best qualifications essential to a first rate historian.

Faith and Practice: an Exposition of the Principles and Duties of Natural and Revealed Religion. By Rev. John Penrose, M. A. A volume characterized by mediocrity.

Memorials and Correspondence of Charles James Fox; 4th and concluding volume. By Lord John Russell.

The Book of Solomon, called Ecclesiastes or the Preacher; metrically paraphrased, and accompanied with an Analysis of the Argument; being a Re-translation of the original Hebrew, according to the interpretation of the Rabbinic Commentary of Mendelssohn and the criticisms of Preston and other Annotators. By Rev. A. A. Morgan, M. A. A very dear and worthless book. It is obvious that the author does not understand Ecclesiastes.

A Lady's Second Journey round the World, from London to the Cape of Good Hope, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Celebes, etc. By Ida Pfeiffer; 2 vols. Light, amusing, gossiping, and interesting.

A new edition of Bingham's Antiquities has appeared in 10 volumes 8vo, edited by his descendant, Rev. R. Bingham, M. A. The Editor has not added much that is of value to the book; nor does he seem to be well acquainted with the subjects treated of in it.

Bacon's *Novum Organum*; edited, with English Notes and Appendices, by Rev. G. W. Kitchin, M. A. A new translation of the same work, by the same. Both volumes may be safely commended to the philosophical student, as furnishing important aid to the understanding of Bacon's great work.

A History of Rome, from the Earliest Times to the Establishment of the Empire. By H. G. Liddell, D. D., Dean of Christ Church; 2 vols. 8vo. This is the best history of Rome, within the same compass.

Five Years in Damascus; with Travels to Palmyra, Lebanon, and other Scripture Sites. By the Rev. I. L. Porter; 2 vols. The readers of the *Bibliotheca* are already acquainted, to some extent, with the travels of this Syrian missionary.

The Tragedies of *Æschylus* re-edited, with an English Commentary by F. A. Paley, M. A. A most useful edition of the Greek tragedian.

The Entomologist's Annual, for 1856.

The Natural History of the Tineina, Vol. I. By H. T. Stainton, assisted by Prof. Zeller and I. W. Douglas.

An Essay on Intuitive Morals; being an Attempt to popularize Ethical Science. Part I.: Theory of Morals. An excellent attempt to propound a system of morals which shall commend itself to the popular mind.

An English Translation of King Alfred's Anglo-Saxon Version of the History of the World by Orosius, etc. By I. Bosworth, D. D., F. R. S.; King Alfred's Description of Europe, Asia, and Africa; with the Voyages of Othere and Wulfstan, and the History of the World to 1413 B. C.

The Rivulet: a Contribution to Sacred Song. By Thomas T. Lynch. A little volume, containing beautiful pieces, breathing the true spirit of religion.

Agamemnon the King. Translated from *Æschylus* into English Verse. By W. Blew, M. A.

Congregationalism for Christ. By Newman Hall. We dislike the title of this little tract; and it is pervaded by a tone of self-complacency as well as assumption, which cannot be approved.

Letters from the United States, Cuba, and Canada. By the Hon. Amelia M. Murray; 2 vols. Superficial and useless volumes these.

Macaulay's History of England, Vols. III. and IV. has had, in England, an unprecedented sale. It has been the book of the season. The gifted writer is too well known to be here described. Almost all who pretend to any literary taste have read the volumes. The prejudices of the author appear very strongly; and we much doubt if posterity will ratify the

exceedingly favorable judgment pronounced by Macaulay's contemporaries.

Statistics and Treatment of Typhus and Typhoid Fever. By Magnus Huss, M. D. Translated from the original Swedish, by Ernst Aberg, M. D.

A Manual of the Domestic Practice of Medicine. By W. B. Kesteven.

The Life, Opinions, and Writings of John Milton. With an Introduction to *Paradise Lost.* By Thomas Keightley.

The New-Testament Quotations; collated with the Scriptures of the Old Testament in the original Hebrew, and the Version of the LXX. and with the other writings, Apocryphal, Talmudic, and Classical. By Henry Gough. This is a work of greater promise than performance. It adds nothing to what has been done before; and the author's knowledge of Hebrew is such as to prevent him from making any good criticisms.

Rhemes and Doway: an Attempt to show what has been done by Roman Catholics for the Diffusion of the Holy Scriptures in English. By Rev. Henry Cotton, D. C. L. Archdeacon of Cashel. An excellent and useful work, by a learned and able man.

The Adventures of the Caliph Haroun Alraschid. Recounted by the author of *Mary Powell.* This work, like the rest of the same author, is marked by considerable ability of execution. The value of it, however, for all practical purposes is very small.

The first two divisions of the *English Cyclopædia*, based on the *Penny Encyclopædia*, are now completed, containing Geography and Natural History, in four volumes each. The third division, containing a *Cyclopædia of Biography*, has commenced. The general editor is Charles Knight; and the execution is excellent.

Mr. Dickens has commenced a new Serial, entitled *Little Dorritt.* The Number issued on the 1st of February was the Third. We believe that the circulation is as large as that of its predecessors by the same popular writer.

Poems of Ten Years. By Mrs. Ogilvy.

Memoirs of the Right Hon. R. L. Sheil. By Torrens McCullagh, Esq.; 2 vols.

Mr. Sheil's *Legal and Political Sketches*; 2 vols.

The Wanderer in Arabia. By G. T. Lowth, Esq.; 2 vols.

A new edition of *Addison's Works*, with Notes by Bishop Hurd, has just been published, in 6 vols. by Bohn.

The Principles of the Pastoral Functions in the Church. By Micaiah Hill. This volume is from the Methodist position, and contains nothing worth reading.

Scripture Studies; or *Expository Readings in the Old Testament.* By the Rev. G. S. Drew, M. A.

Christ and other Masters: an Historical Inquiry into some of the chief Parallelisms and Contrasts between Christianity and the Religious Systems of the Ancient World; with special reference to Prevailing Difficulties and Objections. By Charles Hardwicks, M. A. Part I. This is the com-

mencement of a most important work, on a part of theology which has scarcely been touched in this country. Mr. Hardwick is quite competent to the task of elucidating what he has undertaken.

A new edition of Dr. Richardson's large Dictionary of the English Language has appeared, in two quarto volumes, like the first.

Selections from the Writings of Archbishop Whately. With his lordship's permission.

A new edition has appeared, of Bishop Middleton's book on the Greek Article, with Rose's Notes and Observations. This work should have been revised and re-edited, with additional notes, by some one acquainted with Winer's Grammar of the New Testament. S. D.

We have been happy to receive the second volume of "The Words of the Lord Jesus. By Dr. Rudolf Stier, Doctor of Theology, chief pastor and superintendent of Scheuditz. Translated from the second revised and enlarged German edition, by the Rev. William B. Pope, London, and Rev. John Fulton Gurrall. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark." The same publishers have also given us an interesting volume, entitled: "The Suffering Saviour: or Meditations on the Last Days of Christ upon Earth. By the Rev. Fred. W. Krummacher, D. D., Chaplain to His Majesty the King of Prussia. Translated by Samuel Jackson." It is an admirable volume.

UNITED STATES.

THE preceding reference to the Chevalier Bunsen, will interest the reader in a new work, soon to be published in this country, entitled Hippolytus and his Times, or Church Order in the first two centuries. By Joseph P. Thompson, Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle Church, New York. This work will contain (1) Hints on Church Order in the New Testament, being an analysis of all passages bearing upon the subject, and a classification of the same under generic principles. (2) The testimony of Church History to the popular element in Church government during the first two centuries. (3) A sketch of Hippolytus and his Times. (4) A translation of those parts of his lately discovered treatise which have a bearing upon Church Order. (5) General observations and reflections.

Our readers are doubtless acquainted with the volume entitled "Primitive Piety Revived; or the Aggressive Power of the Christian Church: a Premium Essay. By Rev. Henry C. Fish, Pastor of a Baptist Church in Newark, N. J." This work was published under the auspices of the Congregational Board of Publication. The premium was awarded by Drs. Humphrey, Ide, and Hawes. It is a stirring, eloquent volume. It will prepare its numerous readers for the perusal of two volumes which are soon to be published under the editorial care of the same author, entitled "History and Repository of Pulpit Eloquence." The first volume is devoted to the sermons of deceased divines, and contains "Discourses by Cyprian, Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine, etc., of the 'Fathers'; Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, Latimer, Knox, etc., of the 'Reformers'; the Master-

pieces of Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Massillon, Chillingworth, Barrow, Taylor, Hall, Watson, McLaurin, Chalmers, Edwards, Bedell, Maxcy, Mason, Olin, etc. : and the most Remarkable Sermons of Schleiermacher, Herder, Kirwan, John Elias, Evans, Irving, Griffin, Livingston, Dehon, Staughton, Summerfield, and some sixty other eminent English, French, German, Scottish, American, Welsh, and Irish preachers ; many of which have now, for the first time, been translated into the English language. The whole arranged chronologically in their respective Departments, and accompanied with Historical Notices of the different Pulpits, and Biographical Sketches of the several Preachers represented."

The second volume will be devoted to the sermons of divines now living, and will contain "Discourses by A. and F. Monod, Grandpierre, Malan, Gausen, D'Aubigne, Tholuck, the Krummachers, Harless, Melvill, Noel, Hamilton, Newton, Guthrie, McFarland, Duff, Arthur, and many other Foreign Preachers ; besides some thirty in the United States, representing the several Evangelical Denominations."

These volumes will fill a vacuum which pastors have long felt, and will exert an elevating influence on the style of the Pulpit. Among the sermons of Deceased American Divines, we notice the celebrated Discourse of Dr. Maxcy on the Being of God, and the truly elegant Sermon of Prof. B. B. Edwards on the one hundred and nineteenth Psalm.

We have received, too late for insertion, in our present Number, a lengthened notice of a new work, which will attract much attention among the American and British clergy. It is a Memoir of the Rev. John M. Mason, D. D., from the press of Robert Carter, New York. The author of the memoir is Rev. Jacob Van Vechter, D. D., a son-in-law of Dr. Mason. In a future Number of the Bib. Sac., we hope to present a full analysis of this volume. The career of Dr. Mason was so conspicuous, his influence has been so extensive and so permanent, that a full biography of him will be instructive, as it cannot fail to be entertaining.

Mr. W. F. Draper, of Andover, has recently stereotyped and published a volume entitled, "Lectures upon the Philosophy of History : by W. G. T. Shedd, Brown Professor in Andover Theological Seminary." It is a neatly printed duodecimo volume of 128 pages. The Introductory Note states : "The substance of this book was originally written, in the winter of 1853-4, as an introduction to courses of prelections in the department of Ecclesiastical History. This will account for its prevailing reference to this department, as well as for the tone of direct address which occasionally characterizes it. At the same time, it is hoped that the work will be found to have a general reference to all species of historical inquiry, and may contribute to deepen and widen the growing interest in the most comprehensive of the sciences." The volume consists of four lectures, of which the following are the titles : "The Abstract Idea of History. The Nature, and Definition, of Secular History. The Nature, and Definition, of Church History. The Verifying Test in Church History." It is written in a lucid style, and will interest the students of theology and of history.

ARTICLE IX.

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR LEWIS.

Union College, Schenectady, February 25, 1856.

EDITORS OF THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA:—In a late article in your columns, by Prof. Dana, of Yale College, I am charged with teaching, as a “*prominent point*,” “that man’s *physical nature* (to use the Professor’s own expression), was brought forth through the parturitive powers of the earth.” I am charged with being “pretty well agreed” with the *Vestiges of Creation*; with teaching “*naturalism*,” in a “*huge self-existent nature*,” in the sense of a nature independent of God; with ignorance of the Scriptures on some of the most obvious points; with teaching, in general, an “*infidel philosophy*,” (p. 91;) and this is accompanied by an expression of pain, on the part of the reviewer, that such infidel philosophy should have emanated from such a source.

These charges are odious ones, and are of a nature to bring upon me the theological hatred. On general considerations of justice, I might claim the right of reply; but my relation to the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, as an instructed reader and subscriber, as a friend who has done what he could to promote its interests, and as a repeated contributor to its pages, makes it, at least, proper that I should ask permission to deny those charges, and in the briefest possible space, show their falsity.

To the first charge I reply, that the book reviewed, teaches the direct contrary doctrine. A hypothetical argument is employed, the connection of which with the main discussion it would take too much space here to show. In that argument the position is taken that *if the Scriptures had clearly taught it*, there is nothing monstrous or incredible in the idea that the human body might have been a growth, through natural laws and processes originated by God and quickened by him to higher developments. The hypothetical view being carried on for a few pages, it is then distinctly stated, page 251, as follows:

“Such might be our reasoning if we had no more in the Scriptural account of the human origin than is presented in the words and expressions on which we have been commenting. The declarations, ‘He made,’ ‘He created,’ ‘He formed *from the earth*,’ might be interpreted in consistency with a long as well as a short, a mediate as well as an immediate process, an instantaneous production as well as a slow natural growth through the operation of natural law. The chart has no dates, the picture no shading, from which we can make the estimate of intervening distances. But there is another part of the account which it is not easy to reconcile with such an

idea. We refer again to the creation of woman. The whole language here seems to necessitate the idea not only of a supernatural spirituality, but of a sudden and preter natural formation of the natural organism. If we are shut up to this view, then was man widely distinguished from the brute creations in the origin of his lower as well as of his higher being." See also p. 247, latter part, where there is a similar reference.

The language is that of interpretation, not dogmatic, nor scientific, but just the kind ever held, and that ever ought to be held, by careful commentators. It is cautious, but not deceptive. It is cautious, and this is its chief merit. It shows the author's opinion; the best opinion he could form on a most difficult and mysterious passage of Scripture; an opinion, clearly expressed, that the origin of the human physical organism was indeed peculiar and different from that of the lower animal races; that the human body was, in some way, "a sudden and preternatural formation;" but that, along with this, there was something in the words "from the dust of the earth," that "had a deep significance." There was room to doubt whether this did not mean something more than the outward, mechanical, plastic forming of the Promethean fable. But what it signified beyond this, the author did not venture to affirm; and therefore concluded with the impressive moral lesson to be derived from our connection with the earth. This brought in the sentences directly following the previous quotation:

"Still, however formed, there is a deep significance in the phrase 'from the dust of the earth.' High as may be our celestial parentage, we have an earthly mother. The most touching appellations, in all languages, are expressive of the idea. Man 'is of the earth, earthy.' He is *Adam*, he is *homo*, *humus*, *humilis*. If he has a spiritual life that connects him with the higher worlds, he has also an animal and even a vegetable life, that connects him with all below."

The radical injustice of the criticism in the Bibliotheca is, that it so wholly discards the style of interpretation, and treats the author as simply expressing scientific or philosophical opinions. If my interpretations are incorrect, if my difficulties in respect to what appears to be very mysterious language are no difficulties, let it be shown from the record. I deny that I teach the doctrine, as imputed to me, at all, either scientifically or otherwise. But the real question is, Do I teach it as an interpretation from the Bible? Now to settle this, I might refer to page 248, line 6 from the bottom, where, in reference to this very supposition, it is said as follows: "We do not say the Bible teaches this; *we do not think that any one would be warranted in putting any such interpretation upon it.*" Could I use language more explicit, to show that I regard interpretation as against this mere hypothetical view of an *à priori* credibility or incredibility?

There can be no cavil about the language of our first quotation, as this exegetical conclusion is made the final one, to be no farther called in question; and then the argument proceeds to another and still higher distinction, arising from special covenant. The design of the hypothetical argument thus stated was, to meet an objection that might arise from what was

said about the growth of the plants, etc. ; and also, as every careful, candid reader must see, to get a surer foundation for the special individual formation of man than could be obtained in the general expressions : " he formed from the earth," etc., or the word *Adam* merely ; " from which alone," it is said in the book (p. 248), we could not have determined with certainty that the account was not generic. The generic growth was at war with the idea of one single pair, the female miraculously brought out of the male ; and hence, in both places (p. 248 and p. 251) the stress is placed on this view. The general expressions of formation, as also the word *Adam*, it is well known, have been interpreted (and by authority which Prof. Dana eulogizes) of the creation of man generally, or of races, or of many individuals under one general classification, instead of *one* single pair made to be *one* centre of life for all humanity. It is certainly strange, that the very effort to avoid the view of Agassiz, and to make out a single *primus homo*, should be the subject of such a charge. Whatever be the mode or time of the human formation, there is no truth in the Christian theology which the author regards as more vital than that there was *one* historical Adam, even as there is but one historical Christ. *I cannot help feeling that Prof. Dana's statement is very unjust both to the book and its author. His lamentation over the "infidel philosophy not to be expected from such a source," I shall not attempt to characterize.*

The answer to charge second is of a similar kind. In the book, Gen. 1: 11, 12, is interpreted as being capable of no other meaning than that of a natural process or growth from the earth of the first plants, then being maintained in this, as in all the other great periods, the going forth both of the supernatural word and quickening spirit to commence such process. The language seemed to compel the same, or a similar view in respect to the lower animals. Great difficulty is admitted as attending such a view, especially in the latter aspect ; much diffidence is expressed ; yet still the author had taken upon himself the office of interpreter, and he had nothing to do but to follow the record. If any Biblical scholar will make out any other fair interpretation of this deeply mysterious language, I shall be greatly interested in his argument. Then comes the question, was this first growth in either case, a growth of individuals and afterwards of individuals from individuals, or was it one of species from species growing from the lower up to the higher forms of vegetable and animal life ? This question is answered by saying, that as far as interpretation is concerned, it made no difference. This was satisfied by the most general view of growth through a divinely commenced natural process, whatever, or however long or short, the intervening steps might be. The only thing for which the author was concerned was its bearing on that question of times or durations which is never lost sight of in the book. Either view satisfied the argument ; because either took it out of the 'twenty-four hour' hypothesis, the one requiring seasons and years at least, if the first growths were in any way models of growths now, the other demanding the great *æons* of the Bible, or the epochs of the geologist. It is simply treated as a question of

rational, *à priori* credibility, which is a very different thing from a question of science. What might we rationally believe if Scripture clearly taught it? In answer to this, generation of species from species is treated as involving, in itself, no more *à priori* mystery than the well known, though utterly inexplicable fact of the generation of individual from individual. A strong desire to economize space may make me do myself injustice here; but I would ask of you, and the reader, to read carefully page 214. The substance of it fairly stated is, that IF God had clearly taught us the procession of species from species, as of individuals from individuals, we might believe it; and then it proceeds to say, p. 215 :—

“But there is no place here for any such speculations; since, as far as our philological argument is concerned, either view satisfies it. It is enough for us to learn, without doing any violence to the language of the account, that the production of the vegetable and animal races are set forth as having been originally a *φύσις* or *growth*, a growth out of the earth, and by and through the earth, in other words a *nature*, with its laws, successions,” etc.

Growth from the earth is taken in the most general way for a nature, a natural process, divinely and supernaturally commenced. The view of the book leans wholly on Scripture. It is brought in not for its own sake, as a question of philosophy, much less of science, but on account of its bearing upon the one ruling question, the length of the day. We might also say that in the part the reviewer has perverted, it is wholly hypothetical. But the great difference between it, in any sense, and the doctrine of the vestiges is that it acknowledges divine interpositions, necessary and oft repeated, even to the quickening in every individual human generation, — a step to which perhaps our man of science would not go with me.

On page 104 of his review, Prof. D. has the following contemptuous language: “It is remarkable that in a work on the Six Days of Creation, the author’s system should have led him so far from the record, as to place under the fifth day, both his remarks on the creation of vegetation (the work of the third day), and all he has to say on the quadrupeds or mammalia (the work of the sixth).” And then he confesses his wonder at this in a work entitled: “The Six Days of Creation, by an author who expresses great devotion to the Scriptures? A work exegetical, profound, claiming to sift the Hebrew, and offered as a contribution to our Biblical literature.”

We make no exclamations here, not even at the exclamations of the critic, or his attempt to represent the author as ignorant of things which must be familiar to every Sabbath school teacher. But it shows how utterly he has overlooked, or blindly discarded, the whole design of the book. This was not to talk about Mammalia or to exhibit the author’s own wisdom in telling why the divine wisdom did so and so. There has been enough of that rash work in some scientific books and treatises on natural theology. It was not to talk about mammalia, but to ascertain if possible, whether there were good grounds for maintaining that the word *day*, mentioned in a certain very strange and mysterious manner in an ancient record, was intended for a period longer than twenty-four hours. This was ever in the au-

thor's thoughts. Whatever had no bearing upon that was unheeded; whatever had a bearing upon it was put in the strongest light, in whatever order it might be most conveniently brought in. The question of growth was naturally connected with the duration of the days. If there was a real growth or natural process, it was quite a fair argument, to say the least, that the period of growth could not have been one of our present short solar days. This *language* of Scripture which looks so much like representing a growth, or natural production, is employed in the accounts of both days, the third and the fifth, but is more strong, and presents more strongly the leading view, in that of the fifth. To that period therefore, is the main argument deferred. Economy of reasoning is preferred to any useless affectation of chronological order. This whole matter about which Prof. D. expresses so much wonder in the author's ignorance of science, is clearly explained in two places, at the close of the chapter entitled the third day, and the beginning of the one on the fifth. The author had another object than to expatiate on the wisdom of God in making mammalia when he did, and besides, had he thought much of it as coming within the plan of his works, he had no means of knowing whether or no, this piece of geological wisdom would last for the next five years.

The general charge of naturalism is too important to be discussed in the brief space that must here be occupied. We hope to meet him on it elsewhere. Only one general remark is necessary: the terms "forces in nature," "powers in nature," etc., whenever he cites them from the book, he generally presents in such a way as to leave the impression that *necessary powers, etc., are meant*, or powers belonging to nature absolutely. On the other hand, the language of the book, taken entire, is ever clear that such powers of nature are ever *given to it by God* when he makes a nature, or when he renews one, and that they are always so made as to do just what he meant they should do. The critic also confounds what is said about particular natures with what belongs to the universal.

There are other charges, but of less importance, and they are therefore passed by. These may serve as specimens. There is, however, one *question* which Prof. D. directly puts to the author, and which he therefore claims the right of answering. "We would ask Prof. Lewis what Hebrew word he would substitute for the one used, that would convey the precise idea of creation out of nothing?" We answer, very briefly, There is no such Hebrew word or root; there is none such in the old Shemitic languages; and the reason is, there is no such idea (working, at least) in the old Shemitic mind. The root *bara* is sometimes taken to denote the making of a "new thing in the earth," but it is ever as a new *thing*, not new *matter*. And yet it does not follow but that, if the question had been distinctly put to an ancient Hebrew or Arab, Do you believe the world, or even matter (making him understand the distinction) to be as old as God? he would not have said No, as distinctly as Prof. D. himself. But it was not a speculation of that Hebrew mind, nor a form of that Hebrew mode of conceiving, nor, consequently, a phrase of that Hebrew mode of language which God took as the

medium of his oldest revelation. Creation out of nothing is neither affirmed nor denied in the Old Testament, although the Divine *building* of this present world of ours, and of the *heavens* immediately round it, and the manifestation of the heavenly bodies as they *appear* in such heavens, are most sublimely set forth. Such speculations about the eternity of matter, for and against, were on each side of them, beyond the Indus and beyond the Halys. They entered into the early Greek and Hindoo philosophy; but the Shemitic mind, that lay between, was too simply practical in its worship to think much about them, and too pure in its theism to feel any alarm about them. The same mode of thinking comes down to the writers of the New Testament. The Greek furnished philosophical and metaphysical language in great plenty; but the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (11: 3) sets forth the creation of the worlds by the Eternal Word; and yet, in giving us this ineffable process, employs one of the most purely artistic, constructive, architectural verbs in the Greek language, *καταρτίζω*, to *put together*, to *arrange in order*, to *refit*, to *repair*, to *restore*, etc., all of which imply supposed existing entities. This is the method of the divine writers. When we have more of the same spirit, we shall be better prepared to interpret the language in which they convey truths transcending all human philosophy, and leaving infinitely below them all human science.

Yours, very respectfully,

TAYLER LEWIS.

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